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Globalization and regional integration processes have generated an advanced com -
munications system, an exchange of information and ideas from one country to
another, and the relative ease of moving from one continent to another; all of this
has facilitated greater movement of persons and migrants between societies and
nations in a region. In the same way, electronic communications have made it pos-
sible to disseminate knowledge about migration routes and job opportunities in
different labor markets as well as more attractive living conditions in receiving
countries. In 2010, the International Organization for Migrations calculated that
there were 214 million migrants in the world and that by 2050, that number would
nearly double: almost 400 million migrants would be spread across the main receiv-
ing nations.
One of the effects of globalization is that it has accented disparities in living
standards between sending and receiving nations. As a result, the migration pheno m -
enon has increased in magnitude. Analysts estimate that the work force in the
developing countries will grow from 2.4 billion people in 2005 to 3.6 billion in 2040
and that, between 2005 and 2014, almost 1.2 billion people will have moved from
their country of origin to a migrant-receiving nation attracted by more promising job
opportunities, a better quality of life, and family reunification, which will create a
bigger gap between labor supply and demand at a global level. The European Union,
the United States, Canada, and Australia will continue to be the main poles of
attraction for millions of migrants. However, emerging countries like China, India,
and Brazil will also attract many others. China is the Asian country that sends and
receives the greatest flow of international migrants. In 2005, 64 million migrants
lived in the European Union, and in North America, 45 million. The European coun -
tries that receive the largest number of migrants today are Italy, Ireland, and Spain.
North America (Canada, the United States, and Mexico), with its 470 million
people, is basically a commercial and investment region that has been constituted
based on the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which came into effect
in 1994. This has resulted in a substantive increase in trade and investment, to
Mexico’s benefit. According to the World Bank, our country is not as developed
as its counterparts: the United States is the world’s foremost economy; Canada,
the ninth; and Mexico, the fourteenth. U.S. GDP is 20 times larger than Mexico’s,
and enormous differences persist in development levels, and one of the consequences
of this is migration. The NAFTA negotiations did not include regional mobility of labor
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or the idea of establishing it in the long term. The thinking was that due to the very
important increase in the flow of goods and capital from its regional partners toward
Mexico, the flow of Mexican migrants to the north would diminish. This not only
did not happen, but the flow increased: the push-pull factors of migration have not
diminished. Quite to the contrary, they have sharpened. The interconnections have
taken even deeper root than in the past and have woven a sophisticated bilateral
labor market that works despite how expensive it has become to cross the border
surrep titiously because of the significant increase in the area’s “reborderization pro -
cess.” The on-going tradition of hiring Mexicans, whether with a temporary visa or
clandestinely, is a mechanism for constantly integrating the regional labor market
that is not very well-accepted by the receiving country, but provides invaluable though
unrecognized exported human capital. In this complex regional process, agents in ter -
vene to get jobs and visas, traffickers who charge for transporting irregular migrants,
and intermediaries who make a profit from transferring remittances, all of whom
charge large sums of money for carrying out these services (Levine and Verea 2010).
The economic recession that began in 2008 slowed down the flow of Mexicans
toward the United States; detentions along the border between the two countries
dropped significantly due to the highly restrictive policies imposed, which have
also triggered a record number of deportations of Mexicans located inside U.S. te r -
ritory. Thus, in the first decade of the twenty-first century, Canada and the United
States —but mainly the latter— have set even more restrictive and rigid unilateral
migratory policies than in previous years, focused exclusively on security, above all
after the 2001 terrorist attacks.
Today, the project of North America as a region continues to be questionable,
since, unfortunately, bilateralism has intensified between Canada and the United
States, given that the Canadians want to preserve their traditional “special bilat-
eral relationship”; and ties with Mexico continue to grow, without necessarily being
regional. Nevertheless, we are aware that the ancestral bilateral relationship between
Mexico and the United States will continue to be complex, and perhaps even more
conflictive, given the multiple intervening factors, such as the large migratory flows
of Mexicans with and without visas who find work in different sectors of the U.S.
economy, fluctuating with recessions or economic upturns. For the last few years,
contraband in drugs and weapons has created critical border violence on the frontier
between the two countries, “re-narcotizing” the bilateral agenda and “de-migratiz-
ing” it simultaneously. This also has to do with the scant possibilities of coming to
a migratory agreement between the two and the passage of the much-promised
and until-now stalled comprehensive immigration reform that would favor legal-
izing the status of our fellow Mexicans, who make up around 60 percent of the
11.5 million undocumented migrants residing in the United States, the world’s
largest number of non-authorized migrants.
The European Union, for its part, with more than 500 million inhabitants, is
the world’s most advanced regional project. It has established the appropriate me ch -
anisms to allow the free mobility of persons among all the member countries, a
possibility that has not been put on the table in North America. Its 26 member
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countries have aging societies with very low fertility levels and have shown a no -
table capacity to absorb foreign labor. In contrast, in the United States, this trend
has been balanced by a much higher fertility rate among immigrants. The demand
for foreign labor drops or climbs temporarily according to economic upturns or
momentary crises, stages of unemployment due to recurring economic crises. It
is difficult to understand European Union migratory policy, since it includes sov-
ereign nations with their own migratory policies and bilateral agreements with dif-
ferent countries, while simultaneously, transnational non-state actors like the EU
institutions intervene as do other member countries with their own public policies.
This balance of power between states and supranational institutions is extremely
complex; the proliferation of actors in the regulation of migratory flows has an im -
pact on national policies and relations between neighboring and distant member
states as well as non-member states. Generally speaking, the European Union has
concentrated its efforts on moving toward a comprehensive migration policy, above
all to control its external borders, despite the fact that each country has handled
its policies individually according to its economic needs. Today, the population born
outside the EU has increased significantly, reaching U.S. levels. Now, in addition
to foreigners from their own former colonies, its societies are host to important
numbers of non-Europeans, non-white, non-Christian migrants —the Muslim pop-
ulation alone is calculated at 15 million (Verea 2010a).
The similarity between the two regions’ migratory policies lies in the fact that
they admit an important number of immigrants relative to the size of their popu-
lations as permanent residents or temporary workers, and, in general, they apply rigid
laws through police controls at borders or ports of entry in order to apprehend and
deport foreigners not authorized to reside in the destination country. Despite the
growing interaction of their economies and the formation of intra-regional social
networks, at the same time an important demand for foreign labor has emerged in
their labor markets, above all in times of economic expansion.
The severe economic recession of the end of the decade has brought with it
a substantive hike in unemployment rates in practically all migrant-receiving
nations. In response, they have included a series of much more restrictive mea -
sures in their migratory policies than in the immediate past. The main objective has
been to put the brakes on migratory flows by securitizing their borders even more,
limiting per mits or work visas, admitting fewer migrants, and, in general, establish-
ing more requi rements for entry in order to protect their labor markets to benefit
their nationals.
An economic crisis affects immigrants much more than the citizens of any
country. It is immigrants who are most susceptible to firings and who tend to dis-
play higher unemployment rates than their national counterparts, since they are
concentrated in sectors that are more sensitive to economic crisis like construction
and services. One of the unfortunate consequences has been that migrants have
faced more discrimination that they have had no alternative but to accept, given
that they fear returning to their places of origin where they believe things will be
worse than what they face currently.
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The growing number of foreign residents and undocumented migrants in cer-
tain societies has made those societies more aware of who they are and how they
are constituted, since they perceive migrants negatively and pressure policy-makers
to adopt highly restrictive measures to control the flow. Language, physical appear-
ance, and certain customs that are inherent characteristics and values of certain
ethnic groups, embedded in a specific place, have become more visible because of
their continual growth and have changed the perception receiving societies have
of migrants; this has translated into more restrictive migratory policies.
These are some of the reasons an anti-immigrant environment has emerged
worldwide, much more so than in the past. It has led to the proliferation of stricter
and more restrictive migratory policies on a federal and local level in several coun-
tries. And this is the main aim of this work. We analyze how and why many growing
xenophobic movements have come into being in both regions, movements that are
extremely aggressive and intolerant of non-authorized migrants, generating an environ -
 ment that has led to the imposition of highly restrictive migratory policies. We under-
line how nationalism has also escalated greatly in both the European countries and
the United States given that their identity is constantly blurring and shifting and their
citizens feel threatened by the invasion of other cultures. Many ultraconservative
political groups are even promoting nationalist, xenophobic ideas in the parties’
agendas. Just as the Roma peoples are seen by Italians and French as possible cri m -
inals, U.S. anti-immigrant groups also consider Mexicans undesirable and po ten tial
criminals.
This book has several limitations: one is that the articles will be discussed in
a seminar once the book has been published, so we will not be able to enrich each
of the essays included here with the observations and critiques of our colleagues.
Another is that it does not include the analysis of all the European nations, but it
at least attempts to present a general overview, exemplifying some outstanding cases
in the region. Nevertheless, we try to present a very general perception of this pheno m -
enon, which has an impact on the two regions, North America and the European
Union, to allow the reader to approach this global problem.
The book is divided into three main sections: the first includes two essays that
bring us closer to an understanding of the theoretical and conceptual approxima-
tions about the significance of restrictive migratory policies, xenophobia, discrim-
ination, and therefore, the violation of human rights. The second section includes
the great majority of the essays (13 out of 21). These articles describe, on the one
hand, the stiffening up of migratory policies increasingly demanded by ultracon-
servative movements, and, on the other hand, the anti-immigrant feelings, actions,
and policies applied on a federal and state level, as well as the central points in the
national debates and how they are perceived in the United States, Mexico, and
Canada. Lastly, the third part brings together work on the toughening of anti-im -
migrant border controls and nationalist feelings, and the crisis of the integration
models in the European Union.
We begin the first part of the book with a general overview of anti-immigrant
feelings, actions, and policies in North America and the European Union. The first
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article, written by myself, puts forward the main theoretical and conceptual ap -
proaches needed for understanding the most recent xenophobic manifestations in
the first decade of the twenty-first century. The article begins by explaining how
migratory policy is formulated in the receiving countries, and its intrinsic rela-
tionship with public opinion and debate on the topic and the proposal of restric-
tive initiatives. It describes the restrictionists’ positions, as currents of thought that
influence the formulation of migratory policies regarding admitting migrants to a
given society. It analyzes the restrictionist current’s racism and its most common
expression, discrimination; it looks at the current’s nativism and ethnocentrism and
its insistence on assimilation policies; and finally, the article examines xenophobia
as a current that expresses itself through anti-immigrant attitu des, fostering segrega-
tion, and impeding the integration that would benefit society in general and immi-
grants in particular. It concludes by exemplifying the increase of xenophobia, na -
tionalism, and anti-immigrant attitudes in the United States overall and in some states
in particular in the last decade.
Both in North American and in Europe, criminalization of migration and discri m -
ination and hatred spark social conflicts of differing magnitudes, from de mons tra -
tions to ethnic disturbances, the occupation of public places, and fundamen talisms.
These are the object of analysis in Ariadna Estévez’s article. She argues that all
these actions are violations of human rights, and as a result, are an inter-subjective
lack of recognition that causes conflict. Using Coutin and Honneth’s theories, she
examines how the criminalization of migration and the marginalization derived from
discrimination make up a space of social and legal non-protection, which she illus -
trates with examples specifically about human rights violations in the criminalization
of migration and discrimination, the causal factors for the social conflict involv-
ing migrants.
The second part of this book is dedicated to the analysis of anti-immigrant
feelings in North America. We begin with a broad examination of the United States,
where these sentiments have proliferated very aggressively. Thus, we have a third
chapter written by Liette Gilbert and Kathy Kolnick that explains how local anti-
immigrant activities have emerged as a reaction to the federal government’s inabil-
ity to control “illegal” immigration and securitize its borders. Local ordinances are
the extension of national security policy that increasingly criminalizes immigrants.
At a municipal and community level, these measures attempt to control undocu-
mented migrants’ daily practices instead of “fixing” migratory processes and poli-
cies, over which they have no jurisdiction. To do this, Gilbert and Kolnick look at
how local governments use the concept of “public nuisance” to criminalize undoc-
umented immigrants through local ordinances. They think that politicians have
legitimized their actions by pointing out that it is necessary to empower the local
police. This concept has been used to describe an activity that, without basis, affects
or interferes with the rights of society. Thus, those who support strengthening
immigration laws utilize the concept of “public nuisance” to control and repel mi -
grants locally from their jurisdictions, despite the fact that immigration comes under
federal jurisdiction, thus making this another strategy to criminalize civic offenses
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of migrants, such as their “illegal” entry. Using an interdisciplinary approach, the
authors argue that the use of “public nuisance” to refer to undocumented immi-
grants is problematic because it promotes a discriminatory “public interest” that
criminalizes “others” not for any breach of local ordinances but rather solely for their
presence in the urban setting. Finally they assess the ideological and legal limita-
tions of local police authority to enforce immigration law.
In the fourth article, Frederic I. Solop and Nancy A. Wonders review survey
data on immigration to understand public attitudes about immigrants and immi-
gration policies revealed in U.S. national polls. They put forward the idea that
U.S. public opinion is more complex than the media would lead us to believe; to
explain that, they explore reactions to a variety of immigration issues, proposals, and
border strategies. Using polling data that show that public opinion is not homo-
geneous, particularly taking into account the Latino population living in border towns,
whose opinion differs significantly from mainstream thinking. They demonstrate
this by comparing attitudes nationwide, and those expressed in Arizona and Ca l -
ifornia. Given the demographic changes that have been projected nationally, Solop
and Wonders’s analysis demonstrates the important role Latinos will play in shap-
ing U.S. public opinion in the near future.
Robert Donnelly analyzes the multiplicity of immigration legislative statutes
in several U.S. states, which have jumped in only five years from 570 in 2006 to
1374 in 2010. He considers that this trend will increase in the short term with
popular bills similar to Arizona’s SB1070, given the perception that federal immi-
gration policy has failed, that the border with Mexico continues to be porous, and
that there is an inability to control the increasing flows of “illegals.” Counterposed
to this, pro-immigrant proposals have been very modest, particularly those that
include provisions for an eventual road to citizenship. Donnelly points out that other
factors have influenced the timing of the introduction of other bills, such as the very
tumultuous emergence of the ultra-conservative Tea Party movement, criminal of -
fenses committed by unauthorized migrants that the media constantly shines a light
on, and the recent demographic trends among Hispanics, among others. Given these
factors, he examines some bills presented in 2010, puts forward possible short-term
trends, and analyzes the role nativism plays in developing anti-immigrant legislation.
In the sixth article, Michal Kohout analyzes the situation in the “Inland Empire,”
a traditionally conservative area in Southern California and the destination for
many migrants. The continual flow of migrants to this region has sparked violent
reactions in the perceptions of this “white” population against a possible threat
from undocumented immigrants. Conservative activists have urged several cities to
restrict immigration through creating ordinances to ensure the use of the E-Verify
system, for example, and supporting measures similar to Arizona’s SB1070 in order
to drive undocumented immigrants out. The author analyzes, first of all, transcrip -
tions of city council meetings where anti-immigrant measures were passed, to be
added to national immigration policy, to show these intentions to regulate mi gration.
In the second part of the article, he examines secondary data on national, state, and
local policies to put these “Inland Empire” anti-immigrant initiatives in context.
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Anna Ochoa O’Leary and Azucena Sánchez use some of the results from a
bi-national study of the reproductive health care system to show how anti-immi-
grant policies arise and what their impact is in “mixed-immigration-status house-
holds.” This category refers to households whose members have different immi-
gration statuses. This kind of de facto social organization not only complicates the
enforcement of state policies, whose design singles out or excludes the undocu-
mented, but also induces the deepening of already existing ethnically and racially
based social divisions and disparities in health care, mainly in Arizona. The authors
review Arizona’s legislative history, which provides an anti-immigrant context for
implementing measures that negate the existence of precisely these kinds of
households.
Elaine Levine, in the eighth chapter, carries out a profound analysis of anti-im -
migrant sentiments in the state of Georgia. She starts from an examination of the fact
that over the last two decades, Georgia’s immigrant population has grown marked-
ly from 173 000 in 1990 to approximately 929 000 in 2008. About two-thirds of
these immigrants live in the Atlanta metropolitan area; a little over half come from
Latin America; and one-third of all of them are Mexican. It is estimated that more
than half the immigrants in the state are undocumented. During the economic boom
of the 1990s and the beginning of the twenty-first century, this was not consid-
ered very problematic; it is well known that in the mid-1990s, unauthorized Mex ican
immigrants were actively recruited to work in the construction of Atlanta’s Olympic
installations, in Dalton’s carpet factories, and Gainsville’s chicken processing plants.
However, a decade later, the economic and political climate had changed consid-
erably. Starting in 2006, Georgia began passing restrictive, punitive laws about un -
documented migrants. Four counties with high percentages of Latino immigrants
have signed 287(g) agreements with Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE);
the result has been the deportation of thousands. The causes and effects of these
anti-immigrant policies in Georgia are precisely the topic of Levine’s analysis.
Claire Joysmith analyzes how anti-immigrant feelings have contributed to
feeding the U.S. racist anti-(im)migrant imaginary that has gained strength above
all since September 11, 2001. She puts forward several perspectives from the Chi -
cana and Latino-U.S. communities as subjects —which she calls a “narrative of
compassion”— and objects of that racist anti-immigrant imaginary. Joysmith bases
herself on several testimonial voices-writings. “Godzilla con sombrero de charro”
(Godzilla Wearing a Charro Hat) comes from a testimony-essay written by the
renowned “chicalango” —a hybrid of “Chicano” and “Chilango,” someone from
Mexico City— performance artist Guillermo Gómez-Peña. It catalogues a critical,
thinking, and feeling vision of the greater xenophobia that was an aftermath of Sep -
tember 11. This is one of the testimonies that evoked the U.S. racist anti(im)mi -
grant imaginary, as well as the narrative of compassion by U.S. Latino communities.
In the tenth article, Julie Dufort studies the phenomenon of civilian groups
that patrol the border with Mexico, one of which is the highly publicized Minu te men
Project. She analyzes in great detail the actions of the presidents of this move-
ment in the contemporary debate about immigration policies and border security.
Dufort questions the reason that this movement has become a symbol represent-
ing all those who support the enforcement of strict immigration legislation in the
U.S. The author considers that they have had significant influence, the object of
analysis of this study; she examines some key cases of members of this movement,
like its president, Jim Gilchrist, and Chris Simcox, the president of the Minu te -
men Civil Defense Corps, perceived as “security entrepreneurs,” committed to
beginning a change in policy with their own security agenda, within the contem-
porary movement of civilian border patrols, as well as the influence they have had
on the immigration debate in the first decade of the twenty-first century.
Anna Kaganiec-Kamien´ska is the author of the last of the essays in the book
that analyze anti-immigrant sentiments, actions, and policies in the United States.
She studies the “English-only” movement, whose aim is to establish English as the
United States’ official language, and which is one of the most important manifes-
tations of anti-immigrant sentiments in general, particularly anti-Hispanic feelings.
Despite the fact that no federal regulation has been approved, a majority of states
have adopted measures of this kind. The author explains how this movement has con -
tributed to fostering anti-immigrant sentiments on a national level in the last decade,
and sketches for the reader the broad context for analyzing attempts in different
periods to restrict the use of foreign languages.
The twelfth article is the only one centered on the case of Mexico. Manuel
Ángel Castillo and Germán G. Guerra analyze how the history of Mexico shows
diverse attitudes and behavior vis-à-vis immigration. More recently, Mexico has been
challenged by the growing number of foreigners traveling through on their way to
the United States. The authors first focus on official positions contained in the legis -
lation and regulations adopted by immigration officials at different times in contem -
porary history. Then, they look at the positions held by different sectors of Mex ican
society, a little-studied, little-known area. Because of this, they state that one of the
problems they had to deal with was the lack of sources needed to systematize and
conclude with some kind of generalization. This essay aspires to make a first approx-
imation of the characteristics and importance of the phenomenon. To do that, they
use the First National Survey on Discrimination, carried out in Mex ico in 2005, which
allows them to look at certain perceptions Mex icans have of immigrants. They ana-
lyze the debate about the relevance of some of the ideas prevailing in the imaginary
about Mexican policy’s treatment of immigrants in Mexico, as well as the moral
legitimacy of the Mexican state for demanding res pect for the law and the protec-
tion of its immigrants abroad in light of the treatment immigrants receive within its
own borders. Finally, they point to the need for a migratory policy based on a human
rights perspective that would eradicate xenophobia in institutional day-to-day treat-
ment of immigrants who arrive in Mexico or cross through it toward the United States.
The following three articles analyze the situation in Canada. Yolande Pottie-
Sherman and Rima Wilkes deal with how, despite the fact that Canadians distin-
guish themselves worldwide for having positive attitudes toward immigrants, they
have been changing. In a historic review, they show how, until 1962, Canada had
an explicitly “white,” racist immigration policy, characterized by the selection of
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im migrants according to a racial, ethnic hierarchy. As a result, historically, that
policy included a ban on the entry of Chinese, as well as a refusal to accept refugees
from the Holocaust and Canada’s internment of the Japanese during World War II.
After establishing these precedents, they analyze Canadians’ attitudes toward im -
migration and immigrants. The authors particularly emphasize three his torical stages:
the period of pre-WWII policies not rescinded until 1962, the post-war period until
1988, and lastly, the contemporary stage until today. They posit that Canadians’
positive perspective on immigration is the result of an official policy maintained
because of the benefits migration has brought to the economy and the country’s
national identity. The authors especially stress the official policy on multiculturalism
adopted in 1971, which has resulted in Canadian society’s looking at immigration, and
therefore immigrants, positively. Despite this, they point to recent fears and moral
panics than have emerged and the questioning of the support the government must
continue to give to humanitarian immigration and multicultural policies.
Jeffrey G. Reitz, for his part, analyzes the way in which, despite the fact that the
majority of the Canadian public supports high immigration levels, some perceive
this as a problem. He observes recent trends in attitudes about immigration and
examines the social roots of high acceptance levels based on an analysis of a No -
vember 2010 Environics Institute for Survey Research poll. This survey came up
with two findings: on the one hand, that immigration is an economic opportunity for
the country without displacing Canadian nationals, and a matter of pride in mul-
ticulturalism, which shows the national identity and includes a progressive agenda
on issues of LGBT rights and arms controls, among other matters. The policy also
includes the desire for immigrants to fully integrate into their society and adhere
to the prevailing values, although there is concern about whether they will really adopt
them. This situation has been expressed by the Conservative Party, which has re -
cently begun to emphasize the issue.
Graciela Martínez-Zalce deals with Canadian television production for the
public English-language Canadian Broadcasting Corporation. In her preface, she
analyzes the series Border Wars, a U.S. production for National Geographic, be -
cause of the potential difference in audience ratings vis-à-vis Canadian productions,
both in terms of the number of people in the audience and their geographical spread.
She also contends that, despite the channel’s pseudo-scientific tone and its pre-
tensions of supposedly disseminating world cultures, this series’ tone is scandalous,
leading to the creation of negative stereotypes about the Mexican migrants it depicts.
On the other hand, the author goes into a detailed analysis of two documentaries
produced by the independent production company White Pines Pictures, as well
as the fictional TV miniseries Human Cargo. Both deal with the complex situation
of illegal immigrants in Canada from a perspective that attempts to be objective.
Although both productions veer away from convention by not stereotyping like Holly -
wood border cinema did for decades, occasionally, cracks appear in the narrative
through which seeps a tendency to racially profile, which then translates into a
certain anti-immigrant sentiment. The analysis studies these productions’ invol-
untarily ambiguous results.
The book’s third section includes several essays about anti-immigrant actions
and sentiments in the European Union as a whole, and certain countries specifi-
cally. Xavier Escandell, in the sixteenth article, describes how the European Union
continues to face economic and political challenges because of the recent world
economic crisis. His starting point is that in a context of economic slowdown and
raging unemployment rates, the public’s attitude toward immigrants and immigra -
tion policy changes. To pinpoint this change, he uses Eurobarometer 2009 data,
exploring the relationship between individual and contextual predictors of confi-
dence toward the welfare state and anti-immigrant sentiments. He examines the role
played by institutions in shaping public perceptions of social-democratic policy-mak-
ing and Europe’s overall economic limitations and financial well-being. The author
analyzes these results in the broader context of the literature about the future of Euro -
pean social policy and the emergence of anti-immigrant sentiments.
In Chapter 17, Anthony M. Messina argues that, starting with the public
policies established after the 2001 terrorist attacks, as well as the subsequent attacks
in Western Europe, the liberal state’s historic, traditional commitment to open immi -
gration policies and generous policies for incorporating immigrants into the dif-
ferent societies came into conflict with the responsibility of safeguarding its citizens’
physical safety. Messina explores the available data about public opinion in Great
Britain, France, Spain, and other western countries, to pose some questions. First,
has the European Union become more liberal on immigration issues since Sep -
tember 11? And second, does the public feel less secure economically, socially, and
physically? Despite the fact that the survey shows that immigration issues have be -
come more politically visible since 2001, the author concludes that in the major-
ity of Western European countries, they continue to not be priority concerns, as has
been the case historically.
Christophe Bertossi, for his part, in the eighteenth article, analyzes recent rea c -
tions against liberal citizenship policies in France, Great Britain, and the Nether -
lands. Since the previous decade, these reactions have resulted in new anti-immi-
grant policies in countries traditionally recognized for their integration policies.
Ber tossi argues that understanding the policy and ideological traditions as “na tio n -
al integration models” prevents understanding how citizenship and immigration
policies are politicalized and culturalized in Western Europe today. He stresses the
shift over the last decade from a socio-economic framework to socio-cultural iden tity-
based frames, used to define immigrants’ integration and subsequent anti-immi grant
and anti-Muslim parameters. Bertossi states that Europe never had “multicultural
models,” nor were these ever institutionalized under any kind of co herent norm. He
analyzes in detail the consequences of this new culturalization of immigrants’ cit-
izenship and their integration in France, Great Britain, and the Netherlands.
In article 19, Monika Banas´ starts off from the premise that since the Schengen
Treaty came into effect, migration and its collateral problems have become one of
the main topics in the region’s socio-political discourse. The rhetoric varies from
country to country, from moderate to extremely conservative and nativist. Some
highly developed European Union member countries, like Great Britain, France,
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Germany, and the Scandinavian nations, all immigrant receivers, are formulating
their own policies in accordance with their economic interests and public and social
life. Public perceptions about these policies are not always friendly, and Banas´
warns that there is social resentment of immigrants that has been used by right-
wing conservative parties, who fight for increasingly stringent migratory policies
to slow the indiscriminant entry of immigrants, arguments that have received pop-
ular support. Banas´ presents the case of three Nordic countries: Denmark, Sweden,
and Finland. She analyzes politicians’ speeches in these three countries, the need
to reform their immigration policies, and how the media has covered them between
2005 and 2010.
The next-to-the-last article, by Guillermo Alonso and Michal Weres, des -
cribes chronologically the main landmarks in the processes in Spain, Poland, and
the United States regarding the different migratory routes and flows. In recent years,
Spain created barriers on some of its several land and sea borders, thus shifting
migratory flows. In the case of Poland, the Iron Curtain became the European
Union’s eastern border; and the United States established several changes in its
border policy. This essay compares the process of constructing surveillance on the
three countries’ respective borders and the radical changes that took place over the
last two decades, and delineates the ideological and momentary differences and
similarities among the three, as well as each nation’s specific “local” solutions.
Pablo Nicolás Biderbost Moyano, in the book’s last article, analyzes the Spanish
case. He examines the political parties’ stances, specifically that of the Popular
Party and the Socialist Workers Party. These parties’ representatives have expres sed,
in different ways according to the circumstances, their support for the idea of in -
tegrating immigrants into the society that has accepted them. Nevertheless, other
minority parties like National Democracy and Platform for Catalonia openly raise
anti-immigration slogans. In the second place, and in the light of grievance theories,
the author examines how measures like the immigration rate, immigrants’ scholastic
levels, and unemployment rates have influenced these parties’ electoral results in
places where, compared with other districts, they have gotten elected to the legisla-
ture. Finally, he describes these organizations’ influence in developing legislation
and public policies when they have obtained parliamentary representation.
We are convinced that this book offers the reader the main guidelines and
orientations for understanding what is happening today in two regions that receive
an important number of immigrants: North America and the European Union.
We believe that its analysis of anti-immigrant sentiments, policies, and actions in
these regions is not exhaustive, but it does offer a broad overview and invite us to
continue in an interdisciplinary way with the analysis of this important issue that
affects millions of migrants from different regions of the world.
INTRODUCTION 21

La globalización y los procesos de integración regionales han generado un sistema
avanzado de comunicaciones, un intercambio de información e ideas de un país
a otro, una relativa facilidad para transportarse de un continente a otro, que ha per-
mitido un mayor movimiento de personas y migrantes entre las sociedades y nacio -
nes de una región. De la misma manera, las comunicaciones electrónicas han
posibilitado la diseminación de los conocimientos sobre rutas de migración y opor -
tunidades de trabajo en otros mercados laborales, así como condiciones de vida más
atractivas en los países receptores de migrantes. En 2010, la Organización In terna cio -
nal para las Migraciones calculó que había doscientos catorce millones de mi gran tes
y hacia el 2050 casi se duplicará este flujo, pues alcanzará aproxima damente cua-
trocientos millones, dispersos en las principales naciones receptoras. 
Uno de los efectos de la globalización es que se han acentuado las dispari -
dades en los niveles de vida de las naciones expulsoras y receptoras; y, como con -
secuencia, se ha incrementado la magnitud del fenómeno migratorio. Se calcula
que el crecimiento de la fuerza laboral en los países en vías de desarrollo aumen -
tará de 2 400 millones en 2005 a 3 600 millones en 2040, es decir, entre 2005 y
2014 cerca de 1 200 millones de personas se habrán movido de su país de ori-
gen hacia una nación importadora de migrantes que sea más prometedora en
cuanto a oportunidades de empleo, calidad de vida, reunificación familiar, lo que
causará un mayor desfase entre la oferta y la demanda a nivel global. La Unión
Europea, así como Es tados Unidos, Canadá y Australia continuarán siendo los
principales polos de atracción de millones de migrantes; sin embargo, los países
emergentes como China, India y Brasil también atraerán a muchos otros. China es
el país asiático que ex pul sa y recibe el mayor flujo de migrantes internacionales. La
población migran te de la Unión Europea era de 64 millones en 2005, y en Amé rica
del Norte de 45 mi llo nes. Los países europeos que más reciben migrantes actual-
mente son Italia, Irlanda y España. 
América del Norte, con aproximadamente 470 millones de personas residien -
do en Canadá, Estados Unidos y México, constituye una región básicamente co -
mercial y de inversión, que se ha ido conformando a partir de un Tratado de Libre
Comercio de América del Norte (TLCAN) firmado en 1994. Éste ha traído como
resultado un incremento sustantivo de intercambio comercial y de inversión para
beneficio de México. Nuestro país no tiene el mismo nivel de desarrollo que sus
contrapartes: Estados Unidos es la primera economía del mundo, Canadá la no -
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vena y México la número catorce, acorde con su producto interno bruto (PIB), según
fuentes del Banco Mundial. El PIB de Estados Unidos es veinte veces más gran-
de que el de México y persisten las enormes diferencias en niveles de desarrollo;
una de sus consecuencias es la migración. En la negociación del TLCAN no se in -
cluyó una movilidad laboral regional ni se contempla establecerla a largo plazo. Se
pen saba que a raíz del crecimiento tan importante del flujo de bienes y capital de
sus contrapartes en la región hacia México, el flujo migratorio de mexicanos al
norte disminuiría. Ello no sólo no ocurrió, sino que aumentó: los factores de mi -
gra ción push-pull no se han reducido, por el contrario, se han agudizado. Las inter -
co ne xio nes se han arraigado aun más profundamente que en el pasado y han tejido un
sofisticado mercado laboral bilateral que funciona a pesar de lo costoso que se ha
convertido cruzar la frontera subrepticiamente, debido al aumento significativo de
la refronterización de la zona. La constante tradición de contratar a trabaja do res
mexicanos, ya sea con visa temporal o clandestinamente, constituye un mecanismo de
integración laboral regional constante, poco aceptado por el país receptor, inva lua -
 ble capital humano que es exportado pero no reconocido. En este complejo proceso
regional intervienen agentes que consiguen trabajos y visas, traficantes que cobran por
transportar migrantes irregulares, intermediarios que lucran por trans ferir remesas,
quienes cobran altas sumas por efectuar estos servicios (Levine y Verea, 2010).
La recesión económica a partir de 2008 ocasionó una desaceleración del flujo
de mexicanos hacia Estados Unidos; las aprehensiones en la frontera entre ambos
países disminuyeron significativamente debido a las políticas altamente restrictivas
impuestas, que también han conllevado a deportaciones récord de mexicanos loca -
lizados en el interior del país. Así, durante la primera década del siglo XXI, Canadá,
y principalmente Estados Unidos, han establecido políticas migratorias unila te rales
aún más restrictivas y rígidas que en años anteriores, centradas exclusiva mente con
un enfoque de seguridad, sobre todo a partir de los ataques terroristas del 2001.
Hoy sigue siendo cuestionable el proyecto de América del Norte como región
ya que, por desgracia, la bilateralidad se ha ido intensificando entre Canadá y Es -
tados Unidos, dado que los canadienses desean conservar su tradicional “relación
bilateral especial”; y, con México, se mantienen lazos crecientes sin ser necesaria -
mente regionales. No obstante, estamos conscientes de que la ancestral relación
bilateral entre México y Estados Unidos seguirá siendo compleja y quizás aun más
conflictiva, en vista de los múltiples factores que intervienen en ella, como los cuan -
tiosos flujos migratorios de mexicanos con y sin visa que encuentran empleo en
diferentes sectores de su economía, dependiendo de recesiones o auges econó -
micos. Durante los últimos años, el contrabando de drogas y armas ha generado
una violencia fronteriza crítica entre México y Estados Unidos, “narcotizando” la
agenda bilateral y “desmigratizándola” simultáneamente, en virtud de las pocas
posibilidades de celebrar un acuerdo migratorio entre ambos países y de que se aprue -
be la tan prometida y hasta ahora congelada reforma migratoria integral que bene-
ficiaría la legalización de nuestros connacionales: alrededor del 60 por ciento de los
11.5 millones de indocumentados que se encuentran residiendo en Estados Unidos,
el mayor número de migrantes no autorizados en el mundo. 
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Por su parte, la Unión Europea, con más de quinientos millones de habitantes,
es el proyecto regional más avanzado del mundo, ya que se han establecido los me -
canismos adecuados para permitir la libre movilidad de personas entre los países
miembros, posibilidad que no se ha planteado en América del Norte. Los veinti sie -
te países miembros se caracterizan por tener sociedades envejecidas y con muy bajas
tasas de fertilidad, quienes han demostrado tener una notable capacidad de absor-
ción de mano de obra extranjera; en cambio, en Estados Unidos esta tenden cia se
ha equilibrado por medio de la tasa de fertilidad más alta de los inmigrantes. Esta
demanda se repliega o aumenta temporalmente, acorde con los auges econó micos
o crisis coyunturales, etapas de desempleo por crisis económicas re cu rren tes. Es
difícil entender la política migratoria de la Unión Europea, pues in cluye, por un lado,
a naciones soberanas que tienen sus propias políticas migratorias y arreglos bilate-
rales con diferentes países; y, por otro lado, intervienen actores transna cio nales no
estatales como son las instituciones de la Unión Europea y las voluntades de otros
países miembros, que se traducen en políticas públicas. Este balance de poder entre
Estados e instituciones supranacionales es sumamente com plejo, ya que la prolife-
ración de actores para la regulación de los flujos migratorios impacta en las polí-
ticas nacionales y las relaciones entre los Estados miembros vecinos, dis tantes y los no
miembros. En términos generales, la Unión Euro pea ha concentrado sus es fuer zos para
dirigirse hacia una política integral de mi gra ción, sobre todo para con tro lar sus fron-
teras externas, a pesar de que cada país ha manejado sus políticas indi vi dual mente,
acorde con sus necesidades económicas. Hoy la población nacida en el exterior se ha
incrementado significativamente, hasta alcanzar los niveles que tiene Estados Unidos.
Ahora, sus sociedades hospedan, además de los extranjeros de sus ex colonias, a no
europeos, no blancos, no cristia nos en proporciones importantes (tan sólo la po bla -
ción musulmana se calcula en alrededor de quince millones) (Verea, 2010a).
La similitud entre ambas regiones, en cuanto a la estructura de sus políticas
mi gratorias, radica en que admiten una cantidad importante de inmigrantes en
términos relativos a su población como residentes permanentes o trabajadores tem -
porales y, en general, aplican leyes rígidas mediante controles policiacos en las fron -
teras o puertos de entrada, con el fin de aprehender y deportar a los extranjeros que
no están autorizados a residir en el país de destino. A pesar de la creciente inte rac ción
de sus economías y la formación de redes sociales intrarregionales, se ha genera-
do a su vez una importante demanda de mano de obra por extranjeros en sus mer-
cados laborales, sobre todo en épocas de expansión económica.
La severa recesión económica del fin de la década ha traído como resultado
un alza sustantiva en las tasas de desempleo prácticamente en todas las naciones re -
ceptoras de migrantes. Como respuesta a esta situación han establecido una serie
de medidas mucho más restrictivas en sus políticas migratorias que en el pasado in -
mediato. El principal objetivo ha sido frenar los flujos migratorios securitizando
aún más sus fronteras, limitando los permisos o visas de trabajo, admitiendo a un
número menor de inmigrantes y, en general, estableciendo un número mayor de
requisitos para su ingreso con el fin de proteger sus mercados laborales para bene -
ficio de sus nacionales. 
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Una crisis económica afecta mucho más a los inmigrantes que a los naciona -
les de cualquier país. Son ellos los más susceptibles de que sean despedidos de sus
trabajos y tienden a tener más altas tasas de desempleo que sus contrapartes los
nacionales, al estar concentrados en sectores más sensibles a una crisis económica,
como lo son la construcción y los servicios. Una de las desafortunadas consecuen -
cias ha sido que los migrantes se han enfrentado con una mayor discriminación
que no han tenido más remedio que aceptar, dado que temen regresar a su lugar de
origen en donde creen encontrar una situación peor a la que se enfrentan. 
El creciente número de residentes extranjeros y migrantes indocumentados
en determinadas sociedades las ha hecho conscientes de quiénes y cómo están con -
formadas como sociedad, pues perciben al migrante negativamente y presionan a
los formuladores de políticas a que adopten medidas altamente restrictivas para
con trolar este flujo. El lenguaje, la apariencia física y ciertas costumbres que cons -
tituyen las características y valores inherentes a ciertas etnias, enclavadas en un
lugar específico, se han hecho más visibles debido a su continuo crecimiento, y han
modificado la percepción en las sociedades receptoras de migrantes, la cual se ha tra -
ducido en políticas migratorias más restrictivas.
Éstas son algunas de las razones por las cuales ha surgido un ambiente antiin -
mi grante a nivel mundial, mucho más vehemente que en el pasado, y ha con du -
cido a la proliferación de más estrictas y restrictivas políticas migratorias a nivel
fe deral y local en varios países, objetivo principal de esta obra. Analizamos cómo
y por qué se han generado en ambas regiones múltiples y crecientes movimientos
xenó fobos sumamente agresivos e intolerantes en contra de los migrantes no autori -
zados, un ambiente que ha derivado en la imposición políticas migratorias alta -
mente restrictivas. Destacamos cómo el incremento del nacionalismo ha emergido
con gran fuerza en los países europeos y en Estados Unidos, en virtud de que se
desdibuja y cambia constantemente su identidad y se sienten amenazados por la
invasión de otras culturas. Inclusive, muchos grupos políticos ultraconservadores
están promoviendo ideas nacionalistas y xenófobas en sus agendas partidistas. Así
como los gitanos son señalados por italianos y franceses como personas suscep tibles
de ser criminales, también los grupos antiinmigrantes estadunidenses consideran
a los mexicanos como indeseables y posibles criminales. 
Esta obra presenta varias limitantes: una de ellas es que los productos serán
discutidos en un seminario una vez publicado el libro, por lo cual no podremos enri -
quecer cada uno de los ensayos aquí presentados con las observaciones y críti cas
hechas por nuestros colegas. Otra es que no incluye el análisis a cada una de las na -
ciones europeas, pero al menos intenta presentar un panorama general, ejem pli fi -
cando algunos casos que destacan en el entorno regional. No obstante lo anterior,
intentamos plasmar una percepción muy general de este fenómeno que impacta
a las dos regiones analizadas: América del Norte y la Unión Europea, y que permi -
tirá al lector aproximarse a este problema global.
El libro está dividido en tres grandes apartados: el primero contiene dos ensa -
yos que nos acercan al entendimiento de aproximaciones teóricas y conceptuales
sobre el significado de las políticas migratorias restrictivas, la xenofobia, la discri -
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mi nación y por ende la violación a los derechos humanos. El segundo aglutina la
gran mayoría de los ensayos —trece de los veintiuno— en donde se describen, por
un lado, la rigidización de las políticas migratorias que cada vez demandan más los
movimientos ultraconservadores y por el otro, los sentimientos, acciones y po lí ti -
cas antiinmigrantes aplicadas a nivel federal y estatal, así como los temas de punta
en los debates nacionales y la percepción al respecto en Estados Unidos, México y
Canadá. Por último, la tercera parte conjunta trabajos relacionados con el endure -
ci miento de los controles fronterizos y los sentimientos nacionalistas, antiinmigrantes
y la crisis de los modelos de integración en la Unión Europea.
Iniciamos la primera parte de la obra con una visión general de los sentimien -
tos, acciones y políticas antiinmigrantes en América del Norte y la Unión Euro pea.
Para ello, el primer artículo que realiza Mónica Verea, nos plantea las principales
aproximaciones teóricas y conceptuales para entender las más recientes manifes -
taciones xenófobas de la primera década del siglo XXI. Con el fin de entender estas
manifestaciones, inicia explicando cómo se formula una política migratoria en los paí -
ses receptores de migrantes y su intrínseca relación con las opinio nes y debates
públicos en torno a este fenómeno, los cuales tienen gran in fluen cia para la formu -
lación de propuestas e iniciativas de corte restrictivo. Describe las posiciones de los
restriccionistas, como corrientes de opinión que influyen en la for mu lación de polí -
ticas migratorias sobre la admisión de migrantes en una determi nada sociedad. Entre
la corriente restriccionista, Verea analiza al racismo y su expresión más común: la
discriminación; al nativismo y etnocentrismo y su persistencia hacia una política de
asimilación; y, finalmente, a la xenofobia como una corriente que se expresa me -
diante actitudes antiinmigrantes, fomentando la segregación e impidiendo una inte -
gración para beneficio de la sociedad en general y de los migrantes en particular.
Finalmente, ejemplifica el aumento de la xenofobia, el nacionalismo y el importante
aumento de actitudes antiinmigrantes en Estados Unidos en general y en algunos
estados en particular, durante la última década. 
Tanto en América del Norte como en Europa la criminalización de la migración
y la discriminación y el odio generan conflictos sociales de diversas magnitudes,
desde manifestaciones hasta disturbios étnicos, toma de lugares públicos y funda -
mentalismos, objeto de análisis del ensayo de Ariadna Estévez. Plantea que ambas
acciones constituyen violaciones a los derechos humanos y en consecuencia, confor -
man una falta de reconocimiento intersubjetivo que deriva en conflicto. Utilizando
las teorías de Coutin y Honneth, examina cómo la criminalización de la migración
y marginación derivada de la discriminación conforman un espacio de desprotec -
ción social y jurídica que constituye una falta de reconocimiento in tersubjetivo
que puede derivar en conflicto. Ello lo ilustra con ejemplos específicamente sobre
las violaciones a los derechos humanos en la criminalización de la migración y la
discriminación, causas fundantes del conflicto social que involucra a los migrantes. 
El análisis de los sentimientos antiinmigrantes en la región de América del
Nor te constituye la segunda parte de esta obra. Se inicia con el extenso examen de
Es tados Unidos donde han proliferado de manera sumamente agresiva estos sen ti -
mientos. Así, tenemos que en el tercer capítulo escrito por Liette Gilbert y Kathy
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Kolnick se explica cómo las acciones antiinmigrantes locales han emergido como
reacción a la incapacidad del gobierno federal para controlar la inmigración “ilegal”
y securitizar sus fronteras. Estas ordenanzas locales constituyen la extensión de la
política de seguridad nacional que criminaliza cada vez más al inmigrante. A nivel
de municipalidades y comunidades, estas medidas intentan controlar las prác ticas
cotidianas de los migrantes indocumentados, en lugar de “componer” los pro cesos y
políticas migratorias, sobre los cuales no tienen jurisdicción. Para ello Gilbert y Kolnick
utilizan el concepto de “molestia pública”, como el fundamento para la explicación
de estas ordenanzas locales con el objeto de criminalizarlas. Estiman que los polí -
ticos han legitimizado sus acciones señalando que es necesario aplicar la autoridad
del poder de la policía local. Este concepto ha sido utilizado para describir una acti -
 vidad que, sin razón, afecta o interfiere con los derechos de la sociedad. De esta
manera, aquellos que apoyan el reforzamiento de las leyes migratorias utilizan el
concepto de “molestia pública” para controlar y repeler a migrantes a nivel local
desde sus jurisdicciones, a pesar de ser competencia federal, constituyéndose en
otra es tra tegia para criminalizar las ofensas civiles de los migrantes, tales como su
ingreso “ilegal”. Utilizando un enfoque interdisciplinario, las autoras argumentan que
el uso de “molestia pública” para referirse a migrantes indocumentados es proble-
mático dado que promueve un “interés público” discriminatorio que criminaliza a
“otros” no sólo por violar ordenanzas locales sino simplemente por su presencia en
una determinada área urbana. Finalmente, puntualizan las numerosas contradiccio -
nes entre medidas antiinmigrantes lo cales y la ley federal, evaluando las limitaciones
ideológicas y legales de la policía, como la autoridad para vigilar y aplicar las leyes
sobre inmigración en Estados Unidos. 
En el cuarto artículo, Frederic I. Solop y Nancy A. Wonders revisan datos pro -
venientes de encuestas sobre el tema migratorio para comprender las actitudes pú -
blicas sobre los inmigrantes y las políticas migratorias que revelan las encuestas
nacionales estadunidenses. Plantean que la opinión pública estadunidense es más
compleja que la revelada por los medios y para explicarla, exploran reacciones a una
variedad de temas migratorios, propuestas y estrategias fronterizas. Utilizan datos
que evidencian que la opinión pública no es homogénea, particularmente entre la
población latina que habita en las poblaciones fronterizas, que difiere significati -
vamente de la opinión de la “corriente predominante”. Lo demuestran haciendo una
comparación entre las actitudes nacionales y aquellas expresadas en Arizona y Cali -
fornia. Dados los cambios demográficos que han sido proyectados a nivel nacional,
el análisis que realizan Solop y Wonders demuestra el papel tan importante que
jugarán los latinos en la formación de la opinión pública estadunidense en el futu -
ro cercano. 
Robert Donnelly analiza la multiplicidad de legislaciones relacionadas con la
inmigración en varios estados de la Unión Americana, las cuales se han duplicado
durante los últimos cinco años, de 570 en 2006 a 1 374 en 2010. Considera que
esta tendencia irá en aumento a corto plazo con iniciativas populares similares a la
SB1070 de Arizona, ello en virtud a la percepción que se tiene del fracaso de la po -
lítica migratoria a nivel federal, de la todavía porosa frontera con México y de la
28 MÓNICA VEREA
INTRODUCCIÓN 29
incapacidad de controlar los crecientes flujos de “ilegales”. En contraposición, las
propuestas de iniciativas proinmigrantes han sido muy modestas, sobre todo aque -
llas que contienen provisiones que conducirían a una eventual avenida hacia la
ciu dadanía. Donelly apunta que existen otros factores que han influenciado el
timing para la introducción de otras iniciativas de ley, como es la emergencia con
gran furor del movimiento ultraconservador Tea Party, los crímenes cometidos por
mi grantes no autorizados enfatizados constantemente por los medios, y las recien -
tes tendencias demográficas de los hispanos, entre otros. Dados estos factores, el
autor examina algunas iniciativas presentadas durante 2010, plantea las tendencias
posi bles a corto plazo y analiza el papel que juega el nativismo en el desarrollo de
las legislaciones antiinmigrantes.
En el sexto artículo, Michal Kohout analiza la situación en “Inland Empire”, una
región situada en el sur de California tradicionalmente conservadora, destino de
muchos migrantes. El continuo flujo de migrantes hacia esta región ha causado reac -
ciones violentas en la percepción de esta población “blanca” contra la posible ame -
naza de los migrantes indocumentados. Los activistas conservadores han ins tado a
algunas ciudades a restringir la inmigración mediante ordenanzas como la E-Verify
apo yado iniciativas semejantes a la SB1070 de Arizona, con el objeto de ahuyen tar
a los indocumentados. En virtud de esta situación, el autor describe estas inten cio -
nes e iniciativas locales para regular la migración y unirlas a la política migratoria na -
cio nal por medio del análisis, en primer término, de transcrip ciones de reuniones en
los municipios donde se proclaman iniciativas antiinmigran tes. La segunda parte
consti tuye un examen de datos secundarios de las políticas nacio nales, estatales
y lo cales que contextualiza las iniciativas antiinmigrantes en el “inland Empire”.
Anna Ochoa O’Leary y Azucena Sanchez utilizan algunos resultados del estu -
dio binacional del sistema de salud reproductiva para demostrar cómo surgen las
políticas antiinmigrantes y cómo impactan en “mixed immigration status households”.
Esta categoría constituye una unidad doméstica bajo la cual conviven miem bros con
diferentes estatus migratorios. Este tipo de organización social de facto no sólo com -
plica la aplicación de políticas estatales que por su diseño “singularizan” o excluyen al
indocumentado, sino que induce a profundizar las divisiones sociales ya existentes
y las disparidades del cuidado de la salud, principalmente en Ari zona, basadas en
raza y etnicidad. Plantean la historia legislativa en este estado, la cual pro vee un con -
texto antiinmigrante en donde se han aplicado medidas que niegan la realidad de
que existen, precisamente, hogares de migrantes con múltiples estatus migratorios.
Elaine Levine, en el octavo artículo, hace un análisis profundo de los senti -
mien tos antiinmigrantes en el estado de Georgia. Parte del análisis de que durante
las dos últimas décadas, la población inmigrante de Georgia ha crecido marcada-
mente, de 173 000 en 1990 a aproximadamente 929 000 en 2008. Alrededor de dos
ter cios de los inmigrantes radican en la zona metropolitana de Atlanta; un poco más
de la mitad provienen de América Latina y un tercio del total son mexicanos. Tam -
bién se calcula que más de la mitad de los inmigrantes en el estado son indocu men -
 ta dos. Este hecho no se consideraba tan problemático durante los años de auge
eco nómico de la década de los noventa e inicios del siglo XXI; es sabido que a mediados
de los años noventa, los migrantes mexicanos no autorizados fueron reclu tados acti -
vamente para trabajar en la construcción de las instalaciones olímpicas en Atlanta,
las fábricas de alfombras de Dalton y las procesadoras de pollos en Gains ville. Sin
embargo, una década después el clima económico y político había cam bia do consi-
derablemente. A partir del 2006 Georgia inició aprobando leyes restrictivas y pu ni -
tivas para migrantes indocumentados. Cuatro condados con altos porcentajes de
inmigrantes latinos han establecido acuerdos 287g con la agen cia de Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (ICE), cuyo resultado ha sido la depor tación de miles de perso-
nas; cuyas causas y efectos de estas políticas antiinmigrantes en el estado de Geor gia
que precisamente Levine analiza.
Claire Joysmith analiza cómo los sentimientos antiinmigrantes han contribui -
do a alimentar el imaginario racista anti(in)migrante estadunidense que ha cobrado
auge sobre todo después del 11 de septiembre de 2001 (11-S). Plantea varias pers -
pectivas que provienen de las comunidades chicanas y latinoestadunidenses en
cuanto sujetos (a lo que denomina una narración de compasión), y como objetos
de dichos sentimientos y dicho imaginario racista antimigratorio. Joysmith se basa
en varias voces-escritos testimoniales. “Godzilla con sombrero de charro” proviene
de un testimonio-ensayo cuya autoría pertenece al reconocido performancero “chi -
calango” (léase un híbrido de chicano y chilango, proveniente de la ciudad de Mé -
xico) Guillermo Gómez Peña, en el cual desglosa una visión crítica, pensante y sin -
tiente, en torno a las secuelas xenófobas surgidas con mayor auge a partir del 11 de
septiembre. Éste es uno de los testimonios que evocó el imaginario racista anti(in)mi -
grante estadunidense así como la narración de compasión por parte de las comu -
ni dades latinoestadunidenses.
Julie Dufort, en el décimo artículo, estudia el fenómeno de los grupos civiles que
patrullan la frontera con México, uno de ellos el tan publicitado Minutemen Project.
Analiza detalladamente la actuación de los presidentes de este movimiento en el
debate contemporáneo sobre políticas migratorias y seguridad fronteriza. Se cues -
tionan la razón por la cual este movimiento se ha constituido en un símbolo que re -
pre senta a todos aquellos que apoyan la aplicación de estrictas leyes migratorias en
territorio estadunidense. Estiman que la influencia que han tenido es significativa,
objeto de análisis de este estudio; examinan algunos casos clave de miem bros de este
movimiento como sus presidentes Jim Gilchrist y Chris Simcox y el de the Minu -
teman Civil Defense Corps, respectivamente, percibidos como “em pren dedores en
la seguridad”, comprometidos a iniciar un cambio en política con una agenda de segu -
ridad propia, dentro del movimiento contemporáneo de patrullas fronterizas civiles
y la influencia que han tenido en el debate migratorio en la primera década del
siglo XXI.
Anna Kaganiec-Kamien´ska es la autora del último de los ensayos del libro que
analizan los sentimientos acciones y políticas antiinmigrantes adoptadas en Estados
Unidos. Estudia el movimiento “English-Only”, el cual tiene como objetivo estable -
cer el inglés como el idioma oficial de Estados Unidos, una de las manifestaciones
más importantes de los sentimientos antiinmigrantes en general y antihispánicos
en particular. A pesar de que no ha sido aprobada ninguna regulación a nivel federal,
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se han adoptado medidas como ésta en la mayoría de los estados. La autora plantea
cómo este movimiento ha contribuido a fomentar los sentimientos antiinmi gran -
tes a nivel nacional en la última década y desarrolla un contexto amplio para analizar
intentos en diferentes épocas para restringir el uso de lenguas extranjeras.
El doceavo artículo es el único que se centra el caso de México. Manuel Ángel Cas -
tillo y Germán G. Guerra analizan cómo la historia de México ha registrado acti tudes y
comportamientos diversos frente a la inmigración. Más recientemente, se ha visto desa -
fiada por la creciente presencia de extranjeros que transitan por su terri to rio de paso
hacia Estados Unidos. En primer término se enfocan en los con tenidos de las pos-
turas oficiales, materializadas en la legislación y las regulaciones adop tadas por las
autoridades migratorias en distintos momentos de la historia con tem poránea. Poste -
riormente, abordan las posturas que han mostrado distintos sec tores de la sociedad
mexicana, un ámbito poco trabajado y conocido. En virtud de ello, nos comentan
que uno de los problemas con los que se enfrentaron es la ausen cia de fuentes que
permitan sistematizar y concluir en algún tipo de genera liza cio nes. Este trabajo aspi-
ra a plantear una primera aproximación a las características e impor tancia del fenó -
meno; para ello, recurren a la Primera Encuesta Nacional sobre Discriminación en
México 2005, la cual permite acercarse a ciertas percep cio nes de los mexicanos hacia
los inmigrantes. Analizan el debate sobre la pertinencia de algu nas ideas que imperan
en el imaginario respecto del trato de la política me xicana hacia los inmigrantes en Mé -
xico, así como la calidad moral del Estado me xi cano para exigir una procuración de
derecho y de protección a sus inmigrantes en otros territorios, a la luz del tratamiento
que los inmigrantes reciben en el país. Final mente, señalan la necesidad de una po -
lítica migratoria que, basándose en la perspec tiva de derechos humanos, erradique las
expresiones xenó fobas en el trato institucional y cotidiano con el inmigrante que llega
a México o transita hacia Esta dos Unidos.
Los siguientes tres artículos analizan la situación en Canadá. Yolande Pottie-
Sherman y Rima Wilkes ad vierten cómo, a pesar de que los canadienses se distinguen
en el mundo por haber tenido actitudes positivas hacia los inmigrantes, éstas han
venido modificándose. Realizan una revisión histórica de cómo, hasta 1962, Ca na -
dá tenía una política migratoria explícitamente racista “blanca”, caracterizada por la
selección de inmigran tes acorde con una jerarquía racial y étnica, que tuvo como
resultado la prohibición del in gre so de chinos, así como la negación de la aceptación
a refugiados del holocausto y el internamiento de los japoneses durante la segunda
guerra mundial. Una vez planteados estos antecedentes, las autoras analizan las
actitudes de los canadienses hacia la inmigración y los inmigrantes. En particular
enfatizan tres etapas históricas: la his toria hasta 1962, el periodo de la posguerra
hasta 1988 y, por último, el periodo con temporáneo hasta nuestros días. Plantean
que la perspectiva positiva de los cana dien ses hacia la inmigración es el resultado
de una política oficial sostenida por los beneficios que la migración aporta a la eco-
nomía y a su identidad nacional; des tacan particularmente la política oficial del
multiculturalismo adoptada a partir de 1971, la cual ha dado como resultado que la
sociedad canadiense evalúe positiva mente la inmigración y por ende, a los inmigran -
tes. No obstante lo anterior, apuntan los recientes temores y pánicos morales que
han surgido, y cómo se ha cuestiona do el apoyo que su gobierno debe seguir dando
a las políticas huma nitarias de inmigra ción y a las del multiculturalismo.
Por su parte, Jeffrey G. Reitz analiza la manera en que, a pesar de que la mayoría
de la opinión pública canadiense apoya el ingreso de altos niveles de inmigración,
algunos la perciben como un problema. Para ello observa las recientes tendencias
de las actitudes hacia la inmigración y examina las raíces sociales del apoyo a altas
tasa de aceptación, basado en un análisis de una encuesta de opinión nacional rea -
lizada por Environics Institute for Survey Research en noviembre de 2010. Dos son
los hallazgos: por un lado, que la inmigración constituye una oportunidad econó mica
para el país sin desplazar a los nacionales, y un orgullo sobre la política de multi-
culturalismo, que demuestra su identidad nacional e incluye una agenda pro gre siva en
torno a los derechos de los homosexuales y el control de armas, entre otros temas. Esta
política también incluye el deseo de que los inmigrantes se integren plenamente
a su sociedad y que se adhieran a valores predominantes, aunque existe la preocupa -
ción de si ellos los adoptarán realmente. Esta situación ha sido expre sada por el
Partido Conservador, que ha puesto énfasis en ello recientemente.
Graciela Martínez-Zalce se ocupa, por un lado, la producción televisiva cana -
diense para la emisora pública anglohablante Canadian Broadcasting Corporation.
Como prefacio, analiza la serie Frontera, zona de guerra (Border wars), producción
estadunidense para National Geographic, por la diferencia de niveles de audiencia
que puede alcanzar en relación con las producciones canadienses (tanto en núme-
ro de personas como de extensión geográfica) y porque, a pesar del tono pseudo -
cien tífico del canal y de sus miras de aparente difusión de las culturas mundiales,
el tono de estas series de programas es escandaloso y conduce a la creación de este -
reotipos negativos en relación con los migrantes mexicanos que allí aparecen. Por
otro lado, realiza un detallado análisis de dos documentales producidos por la com -
pañía independiente White Pines Pictures, así como de una miniserie ficticia de
televisión, Human Cargo, los cuales abordan la compleja situación de los inmigrantes
ilegales en Canadá desde una perspectiva que pretende ser objetiva. Aunque las pro -
ducciones se alejan de lo convencional en tanto procuran no estereotipar (como lo
hizo el cine fronterizo hollywoodense durante décadas), en ocasiones contienen grie -
tas en la narrativa por las cuales se filtra la tendencia hacia un perfil racial, mis mo que
se traduce en un cierto sentimiento antiinmigrante. El análisis estudia los resulta -
dos, involuntariamente ambiguos, en estas producciones.
La tercera sección de esta obra comprende la conjunción de varios ensayos
sobre las acciones y sentimientos antiinmigrantes emprendidas por la Unión Euro pea
en general y algunos países en particular. Xavier Escandell, en el artículo dieciséis,
nos describe cómo la Unión Europea continúa enfrentándose a desafíos econó -
micos y políticos, debido a la reciente crisis económica mundial. Parte de la base
de que en un contexto de desaceleración económica y tasas de desempleo ram -
pan tes, la actitud de la opinión pública hacia los inmigrantes y la política de inmi -
grantes varía. Para encontrar este cambio, utiliza el Eurobarómetro que proporciona
datos del 2009. Explora la relación entre predictores de confianza individuales y
contextuales sobre sentimientos antiin migrantes, examinando en particular el papel
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que juegan las percepciones de la opinión pú blica sobre las crecientes limitaciones
económicas, el bienestar financiero y el Estado de bienestar social del sistema euro-
peo. Los resultados encontrados indican una relativa importancia entre el modelo
de competitividad económica vis-à-vis la impor tancia de la asimilación cultural de
los nuevos inmigrantes, resultados que se ana lizan en un contexto más amplio de la
literatura sobre el futuro de la política social europea y el surgimiento de senti-
mientos antiinmigrantes.
En el artículo diecisiete, Anthony M. Messina nos plantea que a partir de las
políticas públicas establecidas por los actos terroristas del 2001, y actos subsecuen -
 tes en Europa occidental, los históricos y tradicionales compromisos del Estado
li beral hacia políticas abiertas a la inmigración y generosas políticas de incorpora -
ción del inmigrante a las diversas sociedades entran en conflicto al tener la respon -
 sabilidad de salvaguardar la seguridad física de sus ciudadanos. Messina explora
datos disponibles de la opinión pública de Gran Bretaña, Francia, España y otros
países occidentales, para plantearse los siguientes cuestionamientos. Primero: ¿la
Unión Europea se ha vuelto más liberal en cuestiones relacionadas con la inmigra -
ción desde el 11 de septiembre? Y, segundo: ¿el público se percibe menos se guro
en términos económicos, sociales y físicos? A pesar de que la encuesta realizada
evidencia que los asuntos sobre la inmigración han adquirido políticamente mayor
visibilidad desde el 2001, concluye que en la mayoría de los países de Euro pa occiden -
tal permanecen, como ha ocurrido históricamente, preocupaciones no prioritarias.
Por su parte, Christophe Bertossi, en el artículo dieciocho, analiza la reciente
reacción en contra de la ciudadanía liberal en Francia, Gran Bretaña y Holanda. A
partir de la década anterior estas reacciones han tenido como resultado nuevas
políticas antiinmigrantes en países que han sido reconocidos por practicar una po -
lítica de integración. Bertossi argumenta que entender la política y las tradiciones
ideológicas como “modelos nacionales de integración” impide la comprensión de
la actual politización y culturización de las políticas de ciudadanía e inmigración en la
Europa occidental de hoy. Destaca el cambio ocurrido en la última década de un marco
socioeconómico a uno sociocultural, basado en identidad, utilizados para definir la
integración de los inmigrantes y los subsecuentes parámetros antiinmigrantes y anti -
musulmanes. Asevera que nunca hubo “modelos multiculturales” en Europa, ni
fueron institucionalizados bajo una normativa coherente. Analiza detalladamente
consecuencias de esta nueva culturización de la ciudadanía de inmigran tes y su inte -
gración en Francia, Gran Bretaña y Holanda.
En el artículo diecinueve, Monika Banas´ parte de la premisa de que a partir de
la entrada en vigor del tratado Schengen, el fenómeno migratorio y sus problemas
colaterales se han convertido en uno de los principales tópicos en el discurso socio -
político de la región. La retórica varía entre países de moderados a extremadamente
conservadores y nativistas. Algunos países miembros de la Unión Europea alta -
men te desarrollados como Gran Bretaña, Francia, Alemania y los países escandi -
navos, todos ellos países receptores de migrantes, están formulando sus propias
políticas de acuerdo o en concordancia con sus intereses económicos, vida política
y social. La percepción pública de estas políticas no siempre es amistosa, y Banas´
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advierte que existe un descontento social en contra de los inmigrantes que ha sido
utilizado por los partidos conservadores de derecha, quienes pugnan por un incre -
mento en el endurecimiento de sus políticas migratorias hacia el ingreso indiscrimi -
nado de inmigrantes, argumentos que han recibido apoyo popular. Banas´ presenta
el caso de tres países nórdicos: Dinamarca, Suecia y Finlandia; analiza los discur -
sos pronunciados por los políticos en estos tres países, la necesidad de reformar sus
políticas migratorias y cómo los han cubierto los medios de comunicación masiva
entre 2005 y 2010. 
El penúltimo artículo, escrito por Guillermo Alonso y Michal Weres descri-
be, con un esquema cronológico, los principales hitos que conocieron los procesos
en España, Polonia y Estados Unidos en relación con las distintas rutas y flujos mi gra -
torios. Durante los últimos años, en España, con varias fronteras terrestres y ma rí ti -
mas que vigilar, se produjo la “obstaculización” de algunas de ellas y el consi guiente
desvío de flujos migratorios. El caso de Polonia, de ser la Cortina de Hierro se
con vir tió en la frontera oriental de la Unión Europea; y en Estados Unidos se estable-
cieron varios cambios en su política fronteriza. El ensayo compara el proceso de cons -
truc ción de la vigilancia de las respectivas fronteras entre los tres países, los cam bios
radicales que ocurrieron durante las últimas dos décadas y delinea las diferencias
y similitudes ideológicas y coyunturales, así como las particularidades de cada nación
como solucio nes “locales” establecidas en los tres países.
Pablo Nicolás Biderbost Moyano, en el último artículo, analiza el caso espa ñol.
Examina, en primer término, la posición de los partidos políticos, específicamente
el Partido Po pular y el Partido Obrero Socialista. Sus interlocutores han expresado,
con matices circunstanciales, su adhesión a la idea de integración de los inmigran-
tes en la sociedad de acogida. No obstante, existen otros partidos minoritarios que
expresan abiertamente consignas antiinmigración, como Democracia Nacional y
Plataforma per Catalunya. En se gundo término, y a la luz de las grievance theories se
examina cómo han influido me didas tales como tasa de inmigración, porcentaje de
escolarización de los inmigran tes y nivel de desempleo en el rendimiento electoral
de estos partidos en aquellos sitios en los que, en comparación con otros distritos, han
logrado presencia legislativa. Final mente, se describe cuál ha sido la influencia de
estas agrupaciones en la elaboración de legislación y políticas públicas cuando han
obtenido representación parlamentaria. 
Estamos convencidos que esta obra brinda los principales lineamientos y orien -
taciones para el entendimiento de lo que ocurre hoy día en dos regiones que reci -
ben un importante número de inmigrantes: América del Norte y la Unión Europea.
Creemos que no es exhaustivo el análisis de los sentimientos, políticas y acciones
antiinmigrantes en estas regiones, pero nos brinda un panorama general y nos invita
a continuar, en forma interdisciplinaria, con el análisis de este importante tema
que afecta a millones de migrantes provenientes de diversas regiones del mundo.
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Confrontados con altas tasas de desempleo debido a la recesión económica más se -
vera desde la Gran Depresión de 1929, los países receptores de migrantes han es -
tablecido una serie de medidas mucho más restrictivas en sus políticas migratorias
que en el pasado inmediato. El principal objetivo ha sido desalentar y frenar los flu -
jos migratorios securitizando aún más sus fronteras. Han establecido medidas com -
plementarias, como limitar los permisos o visas de trabajo, admitir a un nú mero menor
de inmigrantes y, en general, establecer mucho más requisitos para su in gre so, con
el fin de proteger sus mercados laborales para beneficio de sus nacio nales. Ciertos
países como Estados Unidos han limitado el ingreso de trabajadores alta mente ca -
lificados y han hecho mucho más difícil que el migrante sin documen tos ingrese o
permanezca por el incremento en el reforzamiento de la frontera y las crecientes
e inhumanas redadas en lugares de trabajo. Otros, como España, han lle gado a pro-
poner esquemas de compensación para retornar a su lugar de origen y atenuar las pre -
siones provenientes de los desempleados (Verea, 2010a: 94-100).
Una crisis económica afecta mucho más a los inmigrantes que a los nacio -
nales de cualquier país y, en la mayoría de los casos, son más susceptibles de ser
despedidos de sus trabajos. En general están concentrados en sectores más sensi bles
a una crisis económica como son la construcción, las manufacturas y los servicios.
Los migrantes indocumentados responden más rápidamente a las fluctuaciones en
las economías debido a que tienden a satisfacer la demanda de los empleadores no
satisfecha por los trabajadores legales (Papademetriou y Terrazas, 2009: 18-20).
Una de las desafortunadas consecuencias ha sido que los migrantes han encontrado
una mayor discriminación que no han tenido más remedio que aceptar, puesto que
temen regresar a su lugar de origen, en donde creen encontrar una situación peor
a la que se enfrentan.
El creciente número de residentes extranjeros y migrantes indocumentados
en determinados países receptores ha hecho a estos conscientes de quiénes y cómo
están conformados como sociedad, pues percibe al migrante negativamente y pre sio -
nan a los formuladores de políticas a adoptar medidas mucho más restrictivas para
con trolar este flujo. Las características y valores inherentes de ciertas etnias —len -
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guaje, comportamiento, apariencia física, entre otros—, enclavados en un lugar espe -
cífico debido a su continuo crecimiento, se han hecho más visibles, mo dificando su
per cepción, los cuales se han traducido en políticas migratorias más restrictivas.
Éstas son algunas de las razones por las cuales ha surgido un ambiente antiin -
mi grante mucho más vehemente que en el pasado y ha conducido a la proliferación
de más estrictas y restrictivas políticas migratorias a nivel federal y local en varios paí -
ses. Se han generado múltiples movimientos sumamente agresivos y excesivos en
contra de los migrantes indocumentados en particular, culpándolos de todos los
males que no necesariamente se justifican, y que se agudizan en crisis económicas
como la actual. Estos sentimientos han afectado tanto a residentes legales como a
migrantes indocumentados.
Para comprender estas actitudes y percepciones, a lo largo de este ensayo inten -
taré analizar las principales aproximaciones teóricas y conceptuales para entender
las más recientes manifestaciones xenófobas. Para ello inicio explicando cómo se
formula una política migratoria en los países receptores de migrantes y su intrín se -
ca relación con las opiniones y debates públicos en torno a este fenómeno, los
cuales tienen gran influencia para la formulación de propuestas e iniciativas de corte
restrictivo. Describo las posiciones de los restriccionistas como corrientes de opinión
que influyen en la formulación de políticas migratorias sobre la admisión de mi -
gran tes en una determinada sociedad. Dentro de esta corriente, analizo específi -
ca mente al racismo y su expresión más común: la discriminación; al nativismo y
etnocentrismo, así como su persistencia hacia una política de asimilación y, final men te,
a la xenofobia como una corriente que se expresa mediante actitudes antiinmigran -
tes, fomentando la segregación e impidiendo una integración para beneficio de la
so ciedad en general y de los migrantes en particular. Finalmente, analizo la nueva era
xenófoba del siglo XXI, concentrándome exclusivamente en el caso estadunidense.
Influencia de la opinión pública 
en la formulación de las políticas migratorias
Una política migratoria puede ser definida como el derecho fundamental que tiene
un Estado soberano para controlar y vigilar los intereses nacionales de su territorio.
Para llevar a cabo dicha política se requiere que el Estado establezca los límites te -
rritoriales o fronteras terrestres y marítimas, según sea el caso y, posteriormente, for -
mular los lineamientos y mecanismos de admisión bajo diferentes categorías, con
el fin de que ingresen ciertos extranjeros en forma temporal o permanente. Es
decir, ejercen su poder de soberanía para establecer quién entra a su territorio, bajo
qué condiciones, temporalidad y categoría. Se selecciona a los “inmigrantes”, ex tran -
 jeros que son admitidos por las autoridades para poder residir en forma per ma nente,
de un cúmulo importante de solicitudes de individuos de diferentes nacio nes, razas
o etnias. Se otorga un número de visas con base en los objetivos de admisión, de
acuer do con un sistema de preferencias previamente establecido en relación con
sus intereses nacionales, que por lo general son razones de empleo, reunificación
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familiar o refugio. Los inmigrantes pueden obtener la naturalización después de
haber residido legalmente por un tiempo determinado. Los “no inmi grantes” son
personas admitidas por un determinado tiempo o propósito definido; en esta si tua -
ción se encuentran los turistas, estudiantes, profesionistas y trabajadores tempo-
rales. El Estado rechaza a quienes no reúnen los requisitos previa mente esta blecidos
(Verea, 2003).
La migración indocumentada o no autorizada no existiría de no haber una
política migratoria que restringiera la entrada o estableciera límites a la estancia
de ciertas personas. Por lo general, el país receptor sanciona a quienes ingresan al
país sin haber incursionado por los procedimientos señalados, es decir, en forma
subrepticia, a los que utilizaron documentos falsos para su ingreso; y a aque llos que
habiendo ingresado al país de destino con la visa adecuada, prolongan su estancia
más allá del periodo estipulado y, con ello, su visa expira, por lo que auto mática mente
se convierten en extranjeros indocumentados. Los migrantes irregula res, no autori -
zados, ilegales o indocumentados violan las leyes o el derecho migra torio de los
países receptores, ya que su presencia no es legal en términos migratorios, por lo que
están sujetos a deportación.
El establecimiento de categorías de inmigrantes, es decir, quién entra a un de -
terminado país por razones específicas, no necesariamente está relacionado con
las necesidades intrínsecas de sus mercados laborales, a la falta de oferta de traba -
jadores locales, o a la necesidad de reunificar a familias de extranjeros que han
cambiado su estancia de una temporal a una permanente. Son muy pocos los países
que planean sus políticas migratorias de acuerdo con sus tasas de natalidad y la de -
manda de mano de obra necesarias en sus mercados laborales, ya sea de altas o
bajas capacidades. Por lo general, en las sociedades industrializadas importadoras de
mano de obra extranjera, los empleadores no satisfechos con las cuotas deter mi -
nadas previamente por el Estado, prefieren contratar inmigrantes informalmen te,
es decir, migrantes indocumentados. El tiempo que toma al empresario llevar a cabo
los trámites burocráticos para importar mano de obra y los salarios más altos que
implica contratar a trabajadores locales, hacen que el proceso informal sea más atrac -
tivo. Esta práctica ha aumentado significativamente durante las últimas tres dé -
cadas, a pesar de las rígidas medidas de seguridad establecidas en cada país para
controlar el creciente flujo de indocumentados.
A lo largo de la historia, la opinión pública de las naciones receptoras de mi -
grantes ha reaccionado de diferentes formas con respecto al ingreso cotidiano de
flujos migratorios. Estas reacciones por lo general han influido para engendrar un
debate al interior de sus sociedades en donde se han manifestado sus sentimientos,
actitudes y posiciones ideológicas. Por lo regular este debate ha influido en forma
determinante en las posiciones de los formuladores de políticas públicas y, por ende,
en cambios específicos de las políticas migratorias tanto a nivel federal como local
y estatal.
Durante los últimos años, los debates públicos en las naciones receptoras de
una cantidad importante de migrantes han sido extremadamente complejos, sen -
sibles y éticamente difíciles de discutir. En términos generales, dichos debates han
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estado centrados en los aspectos negativos de los migrantes no autorizados, que se
repliegan o aumentan temporalmente según los auges económicos o crisis coyun -
turales. En épocas de crisis económicas, además de culparlos por violar las leyes
migratorias, pasan a ser los chivos expiatorios y causa de todos los males y, general -
mente, se culpa a las autoridades responsables por el laxo control de sus fronteras.
Como resultado de ello, surgen propuestas, iniciativas y reformas de ley de corte
restriccionista provenientes tanto de la opinión pública como de autoridades, lo
que impacta las políticas migratorias. Reforzar las fronteras para impedir el ingre -
so de migrantes sin autorización, establecer una mayor vigilancia en los lugares de
trabajo para detectarlos y deportarlos a su lugar de origen, constituyen algunas de las
políticas que más aplican las autoridades de los principales países receptores de
mi grantes. Por lo general, éstas concentran sus esfuerzos en la aprehensión de los mi -
grantes en su trayecto al cruzar la frontera o llegar a puerto de entrada, ya que es
menos costoso para el Estado receptor. El hecho de localizar al migrante en el inte -
rior del país implica castigar a empleadores y a empleados en perjuicio de los ne -
go cios, y en ocasiones no existe el deseo de hacerlo. Generalmente, las sanciones que
sí existen en los principales países receptores para penalizar a los patrones que a sa -
biendas contratan a migrantes sin documentos, no son aplicadas.Además, en muchas
ocasiones, los gobiernos y congresos de los estados no sólo no castigan al emplea -
dor, sino que buscan veladamente satisfacer sus demandas y constantes pre siones
por la admisión de mano de obra extranjera. Por ello, muchos países recep tores de
migrantes presentan importantes contradicciones con su realidad, ya que las visas
emitidas anualmente para la contratación de trabajadores extranjeros no res ponde a
sus necesidades laborales, de ahí la necesidad de contratar migrantes no autoriza dos.
Las políticas migratorias centradas en seguridad, encaminadas a reforzar la fron-
tera exclusivamente, no conducen sino a la elevación del costo por migrar y los que
lucran con ello son los traficantes.
No obstante, el rechazo a los migrantes que se encuentran en forma no auto -
ri zada residiendo en determinadas sociedades no sólo responde a crisis económi cas
sino también a actitudes xenófobas. Abiertamente se cuestionan la posibilidad, ca -
pacidad y deseo de que éstos se asimilen plenamente a sus sociedades. Temen que
como miembros de minorías perpetúen precisamente su condición de minoría,
es decir, que no se asimilen plenamente y que, por ejemplo, no aprendan el idioma
oficial y mantengan una identidad fuerte con su país de origen, y que poco a poco se
vayan desdibujando los valores del mainstream del país receptor.
Políticas migratorias restrictivas
Existen diferentes posiciones y visiones sobre la admisión o establecimiento de
migrantes con documentos o sin éstos en los principales países receptores. Las
corrien tes de opinión denominadas restriccionistas, por lo general estiman que
sus socie dades ya tienen suficientes migrantes y que es necesario limitar la inmi -
gración por diversas razones, motivos o principios, desde modestos límites hasta
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reducciones significativas. Esta corriente es contraria a la que plantean los expan -
sionistas, quie nes propician el ingreso de cuantiosos flujos migratorios tratando de
influir sobre los representantes de las instancias responsables —congresos o par -
lamentos—, para facilitar su ingreso.
Peter Schuck, prestigiado especialista en migración, estima que la mayoría de
los expansionistas está de acuerdo con una política flexible de puertas abiertas y
que los flujos deben limitarse con aumentos moderados y periódicos. No favore -
cen una política de fronteras abiertas, ya que por lo general están en contra de la
migración no autorizada. Consideran que la migración enriquece su sociedad con
individuos provenientes de otras culturas y sus talentos aportan nuevos conoci -
mientos. Los expansionistas de principios —generalmente activistas, académicos
o periodistas, entre otros—, creen que una política de puertas abiertas maximiza
los derechos individuales en transacciones voluntarias entre individuos y que, por
ello, el gobierno no debe limitarlas. En cambio, los expansionistas pragmáticos opi -
nan que esta práctica les reporta beneficios personales y no piensan que sea nega -
tiva para sus sociedades. Los principales impulsores son, por lo general, algunos
empresarios que requieren de mano obra más barata que la local; grupos étnicos o
residentes extranjeros legales que buscan reunirse con sus familiares; sindicatos que
necesitan fortalecer sus agrupaciones, y organizaciones civiles, entre otros gru pos
(Schuck, 1998a: 4). Los expansionistas generalmente son tolerantes ya que tienen
una actitud permisiva hacia el ingreso de extranjeros a su país, no nece sa ria mente con
las mismas características físicas ligadas a la raza, valores o creencias que las propias.
De la misma manera, Schuck considera que en una sociedad receptora de
migrantes se encuentran los más intolerantes, a quienes denomina “restriccio nis -
tas de principios”, y los menos, a quienes llama “restriccionistas pragmáticos”. Los
restriccionistas de principios piensan cotidianamente que los niveles de inmigra -
ción son muy altos y que amenazan ciertos valores de la sociedad o metas políticas;
son intolerantes por principio. Por ejemplo, estiman que un crecimiento de pobla -
ción “cero” es esencial para preservar la estabilidad ecológica y que las altas tasas
de natalidad de ciertos inmigrantes amenazan dicha estabilidad. Otros han expre -
sado que estas tasas de natalidad son una amenaza para su composición étnica y, la
gran mayoría, considera que desplazan a trabajadores locales, absorben los esca sos
recursos de los programas de bienestar social —principalmente servicios educa -
tivos y de salud—, justificando que éstos deben beneficiar principalmente a los
ciudadanos. Asimismo, les preocupa la unidad lingüística, la tolerancia reli giosa y
la coherencia cultural que, en un momento dado, pueden afectar actitudes de soli -
daridad nacional. Los planteamientos tan controversiales expresados por Samuel
Huntington en su libroWho Are We? (2004) son un ejemplo claro de esta corriente.
Estima que debido al crecimiento desmedido de flujos de inmigrantes a Estados
Unidos se advierte una pérdida de las normas y los valores co munes de la pobla -
ción estadunidense, destacando que una América multicultural se conver tirá en
una América multicredal, situación que no puede sobrevivir debido a que “el credo
común estadunidense” constituye la esencia o el pegamento que amalgama a su
sociedad.
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Así, mientras que los restriccionistas de principios perciben en la inmigración
una amenaza a sus valores y metas, los restriccionistas pragmáticos perciben estos
conflictos como inherentes e inevitables. Los pragmáticos no se oponen a la inmi -
gración por principio, sino que tienen una posición más abierta, incluso esta rían
dispuestos a apoyarla, siempre y cuando los inmigrantes proporcionen beneficios
económicos o políticos para su economía y sociedad. Es decir, toman en conside -
ración sus raíces históricas como inmigrantes, les atrae la diversidad cultural pero les
preocupa su capacidad de asimilación. No obstante, creen que es indispen sable es -
tablecer ciertos controles para evitar niveles altos de inmigración, es decir, están fa vo -
rablemente dispuestos a una inmigración regulada y legal (Schuck, 1998a: 240).
Bajo la corriente de pensamiento restriccionista, en el sentido más amplio, ana li za -
remos al racismo y su expresión más común: la discriminación; al nativismo y etno cen -
trismo y su persistencia hacia una política de asimilación y, finalmente, a la xenofobia,
con la que las comunidades o sectores de una sociedad expresan sen ti mien tos antiin-
migrantes o resentimientos xenófobos reprimidos y sus conse cuen cias para la segre-
gación e integración de los migrantes a sus comunidades. Si bien estas actitudes se
pueden distinguir analíticamente, a veces las diferencias entre sí se pierden en el de -
bate público; por ejemplo, suelen adjudicar a un acto xenófobo el calificativo de racista.
RACISMO Y DISCRIMINACIÓN
El racismo expresa explícitamente una diferencia en tanto procedencia y color de
la piel. Es la identidad consciente que tiene una población o un grupo de personas
con sus ancestros, en la que el color de la piel cumple un papel determinante. Asi -
mismo, se puede definir como la creencia o el prejuicio de que la raza constituye
la determinante principal de las capacidades humanas y que, en consecuencia,
existen ciertas razas superiores a otras, es decir, su eje central es la inferioridad
o superioridad de una raza sobre otra.
Históricamente, la categoría “raza” ha sido utilizada como una distinción en la
estratificación social de una determinada sociedad, así como para la clasificación de
personas o grupos humanos que comparten rasgos físicos y biológicos, como el color
de la piel, la estatura, el tipo de pelo, la forma de la cara, entre otras ca rac terísticas,
que en realidad son diferencias genéticas. Las sociedades “racializa das” se distin-
guen de otras porque consideran que su estatus sociocultural (edu cación, ingresos,
riqueza, etc.) es utilizado como un criterio para definir raza (Harrison, ed., 2005: 9).
El racismo ha influido en guerras, prácticas de esclavitud, legislaciones y polí -
ticas migratorias. El ejemplo más notorio fue la esclavitud; cuando algunas poten -
cias europeas, así como Estados Unidos, importaron africanos para trabajar como
esclavos, bajo la creencia de que eran menos humanos, especies “deficientes o sal -
vajes” y que podrían realizar trabajos arduos sin problema.1 En un momento dado,
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1 En la rica bibliografía existente sobre los términos de raza y etnia en Estados Unidos, frecuentemen-
te se señala que los estadunidenses “blancos” establecieron una relación de subordinación con todos los
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se llegó a creer que una persona podría ser menos humana que otra debido a su
tipología o rasgos físicos e intelectuales que la caracterizaban. En la segunda mi -
tad del siglo XIX, algunos científicos, mayoritariamente europeos, trataron de com -
probar la supremacía de los blancos sobre los de origen judío, culminando con su
trágica aniquilación. Así, el racismo ha existido siempre y se ha proyectado por me -
dio de creencias y prácticas sociales que conforman una estructura opresiva de rela -
ciones de poder e incluso instituciones (Harrison, ed., 2005: 145-166). El efecto ha
sido discriminar y marginalizar severamente a una clase de personas que comparten
una designación racial común, actitudes que violan los derechos bási cos de la dig -
nidad humana.
La discriminación, que proviene del prejuicio de las diferencias raciales, es decir,
que favorece a una raza, grupo étnico o género sobre otro en una sociedad de ter -
minada, por lo general dificulta la aceptación social y por lo tanto su integra ción
y asimilación a sus sociedades. Si una decisión adoptada a nivel federal o es tatal,
cualquiera que ésta sea, está basada en cuestiones raciales, constituye una discri -
minación y ésta, por lo general, está prohibida por la ley de varios países. Des gra cia -
damente, las prohibiciones en contra de la discriminación no proveen una guía
aceptable de cómo lograr alcanzar una justa equidad. De la misma manera, nin-
guna teoría comprensiva de equidad determina las prohibiciones legales que se re -
quieren para combatir la discriminación; en cambio, sí existen muchas teorías que
explican lo que se requiere para alcanzar la equidad, las cuales pueden ser invo cadas
para entender el concepto de discriminación o “daltonismo” (colorblindness). Muchos
teóricos, tanto conservadores como liberales, a través de diferentes mé todos de
razonamiento, consideran la necesidad de prohibir la discriminación en su sentido
más ampliamente aceptado, es decir, como una acción en contra de los miem -
bros de un grupo minoritario, que tiene derecho a solicitar su protección. Estoy de
acuerdo con Rutherglen (2004), quien considera que la discriminación racial es ile-
gal, inmoral, inconstitucional y destructiva para una sociedad democrática, y estima
que es indispensable reconocer los derechos de grupos discriminados para que lo -
gren equidad y reconocimiento en sus sociedades.
Durante las últimas décadas se han firmado varios tratados internacionales con
el fin de terminar con el racismo. Dichos tratados no sólo prohíben la discrimi na -
ción racial sino incentivan a que las sociedades se comprometan a establecer políti -
cas que promuevan la equidad. Esta obligación es particularmente importan te no
únicamente en materia de discriminación directa, sino también en la indirecta —que
discrimina a un grupo contra otro, reflejada por lo general en desventajas particu -
lares—, resultado de problemas estructurales en una determinada sociedad. La ONU,
por medio de la Convención internacional para la elimi nación de todas las for mas de
discriminación racial, adoptada en 1965, estableció la nece sidad de eliminar la dis -
cri minación racial en todas sus formas y manifesta cio nes y asegurar la compren -
que no provenían de Europa occidental; aquéllos crearon una conciencia de raza o etnia —la predo -
minancia de una raza sobre otra.
sión y el respeto de la dignidad de las personas.2 Es decir, se establecen sanciones
para las naciones que apliquen este tipo de políticas y se garantiza el derecho de
toda persona a la igualdad ante la ley sin distinción de raza, color y origen nacional
o étnico.
Es un hecho que la percepción de un trato diferente o actos de prejuicio ba -
sados en raza, etnicidad o género han tenido impactos negativos o acciones o com -
portamientos no esperados en diferentes sociedades. La formación de asociaciones
o coaliciones —institucionalizadas o informales— surge, pues, para canalizar las de -
mandas de intereses y percepciones comunes por parte de un grupo que se siente
discriminado (Garcia, 2000: 265-266).
NATIVISMO Y ETNOCENTRISMO: 
LA PERSISTENCIA HACIA UNA POLÍTICA DE ASIMILACIÓN
Los nacionalistas son por lo general ciudadanos que sienten una extraordinaria
leal tad a su país, y perciben sus tradiciones y su cultura más importantes que las
de cual quier otra nación. El nativismo constituye una corriente de pensamiento
an glo sajón que pretende conservar a su nación predominantemente blanca, de ori -
gen europeo y de preferencia protestante, por lo que es claramente racista. John
Higham define al nativismo como intensa oposición a una minoría, bajo la premi -
sa de sus conexiones extranjeras. Sostiene que a través de cada muestra de hosti-
lidad, corre, si multáneamente, la fuerza energizante del nacionalismo moderno
(Higham, 1963: 4). Así, los nativistas tienden a ser aislacionistas, pues pretenden
conservar a su nación con personas que presenten los mismos rasgos físicos y carac -
terísticas culturales.
Los nativistas estiman se debe otorgar a los ciudadanos nacionales más de -
rechos que a los extranjeros, y por ello, contribuyen a la formación del pensamien-
to xenófobo. Perciben a los inmigrantes como un grupo potencialmente problemá -
tico, social y culturalmente diferente, y que se puede constituir en una amenaza
para la nación; representa la oposición más radical a las minorías internas, sobre la
base de sus lazos con extranjeros (Delaet, 2000: 24). 
El nativismo, en el caso de Estados Unidos y Canadá, no se refiere a las comu -
nidades indígenas, sino a las de origen anglosajón que se convirtieron, desde la
for mación del Estado-nación, en la población dominante en términos demográ fi cos,
políticos y culturales. El nativismo estadunidense, por ejemplo, ha tomado varias
formas: en primer término, se impuso el retorno de negros a sus países de origen
—inicialmente importados como esclavos—. A principios del siglo XX, se recurrió
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2 Dicha convención señala: “[…] convencidos de que toda doctrina de superioridad basada en la dife-
renciación racial es científicamente falsa, moralmente condenable y socialmente injusta y peli grosa
y que nada en la teoría y en la práctica permite justificar, en ninguna parte, la discriminación racial
[…]” (ACNUR, 1965).
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a la biología, la antropología y la psicología para demostrar que las otras razas o
etnias —en ese entonces era claramente tendencioso en contra de los judíos, los
europeos del este y los asiáticos—, contaminarían y terminarían por acabar con la
genuina y “casi perfecta” raza blanca. Posteriormente, la corriente nativista de la
segunda mi tad del siglo XX puso énfasis en las fronteras con el fin de limitar su terri-
torio y con servar su cultura. Desde entonces, éstas han sido definidas como muros
o murallas altas y rígidas, que se deben construir con el fin de dividir, vigilar y, en
su caso, detener la entrada de extranjeros “no autorizados”, a quienes en prin cipio
consideraban personas “no deseables”, vagos y semicriminales, que según la per cep -
 ción de ese entonces decoloraban, afeaban, contaminaban y agredían su primacía
blanca. Es decir, que ciertas razas eran intelectual y culturalmente inferiores a la de
la mayoría blanca, y que presentan dificultades para asimilarse.
Las antipatías culturales y los juicios etnocéntricos constituyen las caracte rís -
ticas más evidentes de los nativistas, y son generalmente las armas que utilizan
para destruir a sus enemigos no pertenecientes a su nación. El etnocentrismo —que
se refiere a la posesión de un ancestro común— es el mecanismo de protección
que utiliza un determinado grupo cuando se siente amenazado por condicionantes
externas. En la ideología estadunidense, por ejemplo, las rivalidades etnocéntricas y
las presiones demográficas han tenido un papel importante en la conformación del
mito fundacional (Higham, 1999: 45).
David Gutierrez define la etnicidad como una categoría socialmente cons -
trui da que incluye elementos culturales de genotipo, lengua y de un determinado
grupo social (Gutierrez, 1995: 7). Peter Schuck la define como la percepción que
una sociedad tiene sobre “lo que distingue” (distinctiveness), lo singular a un deter -
minado grupo basado en características físicas, ancestrales o culturales (Schuck,
2003: 9).
Se podría decir, entonces, que el nativismo constituye una ideología que amal -
gama a sus miembros por los valores comunes que profesan y que, por cierto, son
heredados y no se pueden aprender. Estiman que la cultura, hábitos e ideas de
ciertos extranjeros —no anglosajones en el caso estadunidense—, son inferiores
a los de ellos. La cultura puede definirse desde diferentes perspectivas, una de las
cuales es muy simple: es comparable a una “caja de herramientas”, en la cual dis -
tintos símbolos, historias, rituales y formas de ver el mundo ayudan a los individuos
a percibir y resolver problemas concretos (Joppke, 2000: 145-158).
En general, el nativismo constituye una posición más discriminatoria que la
xenofobia, una especie de racismo, ya que cree en la superioridad racial y moral
de los habitantes originarios, pero sobre todo presupone la homogeneidad de una
nación. Ser nativista demanda no sólo la exclusión de ciertos grupos extranjeros
considerados como “inferiores” racial y culturalmente, sino que conduce a posicio -
nes de dominio de unas culturas sobre otras en el mismo país.
Estas corrientes de pensamiento nativistas y exclusionistas han surgido en di -
ferentes estratos de las sociedades y, por lo general, han estado presentes en la
historia de la inmigración de varios países receptores de inmigrantes. La actitud de
ostracismo adoptada por algunos nativistas en épocas de crisis económicas ha es -
tado dirigida a utilizar soluciones extremas, como repatriar o deportar masiva mente
a inmigrantes considerados como los chivos expiatorios de todos sus males.
Independientemente del concepto o categoría de que se trate, los repre sen -
tantes del nativismo anglosajón casi siempre han considerado que su cultura debe
predominar sobre cualquier otra. Para ellos, las cuestiones étnicas siempre han sido
percibidas como un problema de asimilación. En el caso de la cultura estaduniden-
se en las primeras décadas del siglo XX, se pensaba que el continuo flujo de inmi -
gran tes con diversas tradiciones y culturas propiciaría relaciones entre los
diferen tes grupos étnicos y que, al interactuar, poco a poco irían conformando
una sociedad cada vez más homogénea. Por ello surgió el proceso de “americani-
zación”, propi ciado por los nativistas por el temor del arribo de inmigrantes no
blancos y bajo el cual el inmigrante debía adaptarse a los parámetros de una cul-
tura anglosajona. Se estimó que este proceso aliviaría las tensiones raciales que
habían emergido con gran fuerza. Por ende, los inmigrantes debían paulatinamen-
te “asimilarse” a la so ciedad receptora, lo que equivalía a una imposición de los
valores de la cultura pre dominante sobre cualquier otra.
La asimilación es el proceso de adaptación social a la sociedad receptora, ocul -
tando o incluso perdiendo los valores de identidad de su cultura de origen. Milton
Gordon plantea varias etapas para lograr este proceso y advierte las múltiples ba -
rreras a las cuales se enfrenta el inmigrante, una de las cuales es la discriminación
por parte de la cultura receptora (Gordon, 1966: 72). Esta discriminación proviene
pre cisamente de las características raciales y étnicas que distinguen claramente
al inmigrante de la mayoría de los miembros de la sociedad receptora.
XENOFOBIA: UN IMPEDIMENTO
PARA LA INTEGRACIÓN DE LOS MIGRANTES
Xenofobia, como su nombre lo indica, expresa una fobia o temor hacia los extran -
jeros, a la “otredad”, a lo “extraño” y diferente en una determinada comunidad, mu -
chas veces irracional, pero que puede alcanzar sentimientos de odio agudos. Por
lo general, la xenofobia surge cuando un grupo de personas de origen extran jero
que habita en una ciudad o comunidad determinada es crecientemente visible, lo
cual provoca reacciones de rechazo porque los nacionales desean distanciarse y di -
fe renciarse de ellos.
A través de los años han surgido movimientos xenófobos o antiinmigrantes
como una respuesta de rechazo al crecimiento del flujo de migrantes en un de ter -
minado lugar. Por lo general, los inmigrantes arriban a sitios que son deman dados
por diferentes razones, principalmente por ofertas de trabajo o reunificación fami -
liar, lugares que constituyen los enclaves en donde, simultáneamente o como con -
secuencia, surgen y florecen los movimientos xenófobos. Aun más, la situa ción se
agrava cuando flujos migratorios no esperados arriban en cantidades mayores a las
que normalmente se esperan o aceptan y los sentimientos antiinmigrantes tienden
a florecer y, por ende, a exaltarse. En ocasiones llegan a adoptar actitudes vio len -
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tas, como ha ocurrido en diversas etapas de la historia europea, estaduni dense,
cana diense, entre varios países.
En virtud del crecimiento tan importante de la migración a nivel mundial du -
rante las últimas décadas propiciado por la globalización, muchos países reciben
extranjeros que hablan una lengua diferente, que mantienen creen cias y tradicio -
nes culturales opuestas a las suyas, y es común que muestren temor a lo desconoci-
do con actitudes xenófobas que justifican sus temores (Bordeau, 2010: 7). En
tiem pos de crisis económicas, cuando las tasas de desempleo ascien den signifi -
cativa mente, estos temores se acentúan y se culpa a los migrantes.
Por el contrario, las sociedades receptoras de inmigrantes no xenófobas tienen
políticas de aceptación e integración que facilitan su inclusión a comunidades espe -
cíficas o sociedades en general. Mediante el proceso de integración el migrante
se incorpora social y económicamente a una comunidad sin perder o abandonar su
identidad cultural, simultáneamente respetando la cultura con la cual debe convi -
vir. Las diferentes olas migratorias a países receptores han pasado por diversos
procesos de integración: a través de la unión y residencia con sus familiares, me -
diante las relaciones intermatrimoniales que han surgido de la convivencia durante
un periodo específico de estancia en el país receptor, entre otros factores (Mc Da niel,
1995: 179-197). En teoría, los procesos de integración deben permitir una creciente
homogeneización o aceptación de las culturas, y se debe conformar un ambiente
plenamente multicultural en las sociedades receptoras de migrantes; por ende, el
temor a la “otredad” debe de diluirse, y como consecuencia deben dis mi nuir las acti -
tudes xenófobas.
Cabe destacar que el multiculturalismo es un concepto flexible, incluso den -
tro de una sociedad específica y se ha aplicado de diferentes formas. Pero, en tér -
minos generales, esta noción se refiere a un amplio rango de formas de interacción
en sociedades que contienen una variedad de culturas. Habitualmente, el término
multiculturalismo se usa en contextos de movilizaciones que utilizan símbolos ra -
ciales y étnicos para demandar derechos culturales y sociales, así como el derecho
a la representación política. El multiculturalismo debe ser visto como parte de la
lucha de las minorías que gozan de una “inclusión igualitaria” y es al mismo tiempo
la afirmación de las diferencias culturales a partir de las demandas de autenti ci -
dad étnica o racial (Solomos y Schuster, 2000: 407-424). Para los estadunidenses
nativistas, el melting pot o “crisol de razas” constituía el proceso idóneo por medio
del cual la fusión de varias culturas conllevaría al surgimiento de la cultura ameri cana.
Ingenuamente suponían que estos migrantes convivirían en armonía y lucharían por
esta nueva nación que los acogía y, por ende, abandonarían sus propias culturas
para formar una nueva. No obstante, a lo largo de las décadas, el proceso de la fusión
de culturas tan diferentes a la predominantemente anglosajona (asiáticas, latinas, ára-
bes, africanas, entre otras), no ha sido tan simple como los nativistas suponían.
Por ello, Nathan Glazer estimó que el continuo flujo de inmigrantes impedía la
cohesión de una comunidad, pues no les permitía insertarse plenamente en una so -
ciedad determinada (Glazer, 1985: 216). Joppke diferencia al multiculturalismo
estadunidense que considera la inmigración una respuesta a la opresión de los afro -
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americanos, indígenas e hispanos, mientras que el multiculturalismo inglés o alemán
es una respuesta simple a la inmigración.
En virtud de que los inmigrantes forman parte de una clase socioeconómica
y de una comunidad cultural en una determinada sociedad, por lo general no son in -
corporados o integrados totalmente, a menos que el Estado receptor acepte, con
cierto compromiso, sus diferencias culturales. De ahí que existen ciertos países que
han adoptado políticas de integración. Un ejemplo destacado ha sido la política
del multiculturalismo que implementó el gobierno de Canadá en octubre de 1971,
la cual encuentra su fundamento teórico en el pluralismo cultural. Dicha teoría
plan tea la convivencia de diversas comunidades etnoculturales en una misma so cie -
dad, respetando la identidad y los derechos de las comunidades ajenas a la propia.
Es decir, dicha política no tiene como objetivo homogeneizar una identidad na cio -
nal única, sino conformar una nación mediante la preservación, coexistencia y colabo -
ración de y entre diversas identidades culturales.3 En el caso canadiense, la política
del multiculturalismo sirvió como punto de partida de la identidad social de Ca -
na dá como nación, con el fin de que los individuos de diversas culturas o identi -
dades, por lo general minorías visibles no anglosajonas, pudieran integrarse y
participar en la vida democrática de forma igualitaria y no fuesen relegados de las
estructuras políticas y sociales del país.4
En términos generales, el inmigrante selecciona los elementos culturales (la
lengua) y socioeconómicos (vivienda o empleo) indispensables para su sobreviven -
cia en la sociedad receptora, pero no necesariamente tiene que desechar sus valores
culturales (religión, lengua, indumentaria, etc.); se integran a la comunidad recep -
tora sin perder su identidad. En los debates contemporáneos sobre la identidad,
el término se ha relacionado con el hecho de “pertenecer”, o sentido de pertenencia,
como miembro a un grupo determinado, el cual puede ser étnico. La identidad
contiene conceptos de inclusión y exclusión: para ser “nosotros” se necesita de unos
“otros”, no obstante, en ocasiones se requiere un enemigo externo para unificarse
y tener una identidad común. Así, el término identidad social se refiere al sentido
que tiene una persona de pertenecer a un determinado grupo y el valor que éste le
otorga al hecho de pertenecer (Schildkraut, 2011: 5). Las identidades colectivas
están formadas por un determinado grupo que se reconoce a sí mismo con un pa -
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3 El primer ministro Pierre Elliott Trudeau, del Partido Liberal, en su discurso para implementar la
política del multiculturalismo en 1971 señaló: “El pluralismo cultural es la esencia propia de la so -
ciedad canadiense. Todos los grupos étnicos tienen el derecho de preservar y enriquecer la cultura y
los valores que les son propios. Al decir que existen dos lenguas oficiales, no decimos que tenemos
dos culturas oficiales, y ninguna cultura determinada es más oficial que otra. Los objetivos consisten en
pro teger las libertades básicas, desarrollar la identidad canadiense, ampliar la participación de los
ciudadanos, reforzar la unidad canadiense y fomentar la diversidad cultural (Helley, 2007).
4 Con el fin de implementar esta política se establecieron las siguientes medidas: a) apoyo estatal a los
grupos étnico-culturales para el reforzamiento de su identidad cultural; b) derrocamiento de las ba rre -
ras culturales para promover la completa participación en la sociedad canadiense; c) establecimiento
del intercambio cultural entre los diversos grupos étnico-culturales y d) enseñanza oficial del idioma
a los inmigrantes (Gagnon e Iacovino, 2008: 179).
sado común, es decir, una memoria colectiva que los une y los identifica. Esta me -
moria colectiva va acompañada de nociones, ideas y recuerdos sobre las identi da -
des de otras naciones, por lo que los debates sobre las diferencias culturales caen
fácilmente en el nacionalismo y la tramposa suposición de la superioridad de un
grupo sobre otro (Solomos y Schuster, 2000: 74-91). Así, en una sociedad en donde
existe una gran diversidad de razas, etnias y culturas procedentes de diversas regio -
nes del mundo, resulta inevitable la interacción entre éstas, y es precisamente a
través de este intercambio que se establecen las diferenciaciones culturales entre
las que interactúan, y surge la concepción de lo otro, lo diferente, es decir, las razas
y las etnias.
Estimamos que el eje central de la unificación o de la integración se da bajo
el supuesto respeto de una cultura hacia otra con la que tiene que convivir. Robert
Miles considera que es un proceso en el cual un grupo con una cultura distinta (in -
cluida la religión, la lengua y la vestimenta) se adapta a (y es aceptada por) un gru po
más amplio sin ser forzado a cambiar sus rasgos culturales y prácticas asociadas a
favor de las de la mayoría (Miles, 1992: 146-149). 
Para muchos, este proceso de integración ha sido definido como pluralismo
cultural, en el sentido de la coexistencia mutuamente aceptada de culturas. Por
esta razón, cualquier acto de discriminación de una sociedad determinada hacia un
ex tran jero o un grupo de ellos, producto de su intolerancia que conlleva a actitu -
des xenófobas, impide la aceptación plena de la diversidad cultural y racial de otras
etnias o culturas y, por ende, dificulta o impide la integración plena a su sociedad.
La nueva era xenófoba 
del siglo XXI en Estados Unidos
Durante la primera década del siglo XXI, los flujos migratorios se han incremen -
tado significativamente en varias regiones del mundo y con ello se ha generado
una creciente diversidad de grupos étnicos en varias naciones. Algunos países de la
Unión Europea, así como Estados Unidos y Canadá, y crecientemente China y
Australia, continúan siendo importantes receptores de migrantes. En virtud de este
rápido cre cimiento de migrantes, necesario para sus mercados laborales, simultá nea -
mente han surgido movimientos sumamente agresivos que se oponen a su ingreso
por di ferentes razones, principalmente por su diversidad, por ser extraños y dife -
rentes, exaltando una retórica antiinmigrante y evocando precisamente la importan -
cia de conservar una identidad social colectiva. En el caso de Estados Unidos, el
creciente incremento de la diversidad etnorracial se ha percibido como una ame -
na za a su so ciedad y ha surgido la necesidad imperante de debatir sobre el ingreso
y perma nencia de los nuevos flujos migratorios. Grupos nativistas xenófobos, con
ciertos tintes racistas, como serían los restriccionistas de principios, han mostrado
sentimientos antiinmigrantes que se agudizan conforme la diversidad aumenta,
espe cialmente hacia los grupos “no blancos”, como son los latinos, asiáticos y afro -
ameri canos. Algunos de estos sentimientos se han expresado mediante ataques
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bruta les, en forma violenta, hacia migrantes principalmente no autorizados y de
raza no blanca que, por lo general, son más visibles y ocupan trabajos de baja capa -
citación que los locales rechazan.
Simultáneamente el terrorismo y los frecuentes ataques por grupos extre mis -
tas durante la última década, por lo general de origen musulmán, han agravado la
situación. Los ataques terroristas al World Trade Center en Nueva York y al Pen tá -
 gono en Arlington, Virginia, el 11 de septiembre de 2001, perpetuados por musul-
manes extremistas asociados con la organización Al Qaeda y su líder Osama Bin
Laden, así como los acaecidos enMadrid, también un día 11 de marzo de 2004 con la
destrucción de una estación de tren, y los ataques a varias las estaciones de metro en
Londres el 7 de julio del 2005, han tenido como consecuencia reacciones altamente
xenófobas en contra de los extranjeros, principalmente quienes ten gan apariencia
árabe. La reacción inmediata ha sido la securitización de las políticas exteriores en
general y el establecimiento de políticas migratorias aún más restric tivas que antes.
Ello ha ocasionado la exacerbación de sentimientos antiinmi grantes que han sur gido
con gran vehemencia, de corte racista, semejantes a los antisemíticos.
El surgimiento de la islamofobia, la xenofobia dirigida a todos aquellos que se
definen como musulmanes y que profesan el islam, ha aumentado durante esta
última década, ya que esta religión se ha relacionado con actitudes violentas y
destructi vas. Por ello, el perfil racial (racial profiling) se ha exacerbado en Estados
Unidos y en algunos países de la Unión Europea, y puede definirse como el proceso
por el cual se singulariza (singling out) a ciertos individuos, basado en sus ante ce -
dentes étnicos como un medio para determinar la proclividad a cometer crímenes.
Es evi dente, entonces, que el perfil racial es una forma de racismo y, por supuesto,
de xeno fobia, ya que estimula el comportamiento de sospechar, prejuiciar y este -
reo tipar al extranjero y refuerza la intolerancia a la “otredad” y el temor basado exclu -
si va mente en la raza y la etnicidad.
Como señalé con anterioridad, una de las razones que han influido en el re -
punte de estos severos sentimientos antiinmigrantes ha sido la aguda crisis econó -
mica y financiera a nivel mundial del fin de la primera década del siglo XXI, que
ha tenido como consecuencia altas tasas de desempleo. Ello ha conllevado a nuevas
y vehementes percepciones de sociedades envejecidas que, a pesar de que están
conscientes de que requieren de mano de obra extranjera barata y joven, pues la
local es insuficiente para satisfacer sus múltiples necesidades laborales, simultá -
neamente responden con acciones antiinmigrantes, rechazando su ingreso y apoyan -
do su deportación.
En este sentido, es indispensable mencionar al movimiento ultraconservador Tea
Party, del cual muchos de sus exponentes son conocidos por sus ataques virulen tos,
principalmente a inmigrantes indocumentados. Este movimiento ha emer gido como
una fuerza política significativa y amalgama miembros de los sectores más con ser va -
do res. Sus seguidores han batallado para ganar el alma del Partido Repu bli cano,5
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5 En varios estados, los miembros del Tea Party han ganado la nominación de varios candidatos como
senadores contra republicanos que previamente habían anunciado su nominación.
quienes buscan canalizar su frustración contra el gobierno de Barack Obama, con la
ex gobernadora de Alaska, Sarah Palin, como protagonista. El Tea Party ganó visibili -
dad en abril del 2010 con la convocatoria de centenares de ma nifestaciones simul-
táneas en todo el país, para protestar por el elevado gasto públi co de la Casa Blanca
para sacar al país de la crisis.
Estados Unidos es la nación que recibe más migrantes con y sin documentos,
pues absorbe el 20 por ciento de la población que se mueve en el mundo. Acepta
aproximadamente un millón de inmigrantes anualmente, residentes permanentes.
Asimismo, es el país que más trabajadores temporales extranjeros contrata anual -
mente, sea con o sin documentos.6 Es inconcebible que 11 500 000 indocumen -
ta dos se encuentren residiendo en forma irregular y que muchos de ellos hayan
colaborado laborando por varios años para el desarrollo económico de su país, y no
tengan derechos laborales y en muchas ocasiones se violen sus derechos humanos.
Pocas veces se les ha reconocido que su mano de obra y los gastos erogados e in ver -
tidos por ellos en su territorio han sido de gran beneficio para su economía.
De acuerdo con el censo de 2010, la población de origen latino era de 50.5
millones que constituyó el 16.5 por ciento de una población de 308.5 millones de
habitantes, una aumentó del 43 por ciento en una década, ya que esta población
era de 35.3 millones en 2000 (12.5 por ciento). Es evidente que la inmigración y
fertilidad son los factores que inciden en el terreno ganado por los latinos en la
demografía estadunidense. El número de personas de origen o nacidas en México
que residen en territorio de Estados Unidos se elevó a 31.8 millones, que repre -
sentan dos terceras partes de la población latina y 12.5 por ciento de la estadu ni -
dense.7 La creciente presencia de estos extranjeros, la mayoría de ellos “no blancos”
como los latinos, especialmente los mexicanos, se han concentrado en ciertos es -
tados del sur de Estados Unidos, en donde el rechazo es aun mayor. Acorde con su
físico y estatus legal, los estadunidenses WASP tienden a estereotiparlos, categori -
zarlos y hasta discriminarlos, por lo que se han reforzado sus actitudes xenófobas
y sus temores a lo extraño. Ello no sólo ha aminorado las posibilidades de lograr
la integración a las comunidades donde se encuentran residiendo, sino por el con -
trario, las actitudes y percepciones se han polarizado en forma extrema, pues se ha
llegado a adoptar posiciones altamente restrictivas, como frenar la inmigración defi -
nitivamente o actitudes intolerantes e intransigentes, como forzar su asimilación
mediante medidas coercitivas (Telles y Ortiz, 2007: 292). Esta situación indica lo
inoperante y contradictorio de su actual sistema migratorio, en el que se en cuen tra
el número más cuantioso de indocumentados a nivel mundial, quienes han sido bien -
venidos como mano de obra barata cuando su mercado de trabajo los de man da, pero
también los rechaza, cuando no los ocupa, con actitudes xenófobas e impulsos nati -
vis tas, conservadores y extremistas que llegan a estereotiparlos como migrantes
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6 Durante el 2007, se emitieron 337 321 visas para trabajadores temporales extranjeros, la mayor cifra
registrada. Posteriormente descendió, debido a la crisis económica.
7 Se calcula que 11.7 millones nacieron en México (37 por ciento), 20 por ciento son ciudadanos esta-
dunidenses y 63 por ciento llegaron después de 1990 (Pew Hispanic Center, 2011).
criminales o no asimilables, cuando en la mayoría de los casos tan sólo han viola do
sus leyes migratorias para laborar.
Esta situación ha provocado que muchos grupos y organizaciones antiinmi -
grantes con fuertes resentimientos hayan cometido actos hostiles o adversos contra
la presencia de migrantes principalmente no autorizados en “su” territorio. En
forma colectiva se han pronunciado con juicios negativos, protestan por canales
informales o institucionales y realizan actos contra grupos o minorías determinadas,
por lo general “no blancos”. Es importante destacar que estos grupos u organiza -
ciones se encuentran bien organizados, de tal forma que sus quejas han sido esbo -
zadas en un tono muy alto y con mucho más vigor que la mayoría silenciosa y, por
desgracia, han sido escuchadas y han tenido un gran impacto entre la opinión pú -
blica estadunidense. Los culpan de todos sus males, sobre todo de que representan
una carga económica y social no sólo en sus países, sino en cada una de sus locali da -
des (municipios, estados o provincias). La percepción ha sido negativa desde hace
dos décadas, con la diferencia que en los noventa gozó de un incremento sos tenido
y fueron contratados múltiples migrantes indocumentados en los mercados labo -
rales. A fines de la década de los noventa se consideraba:
la percepción actual sobre los inmigrantes ha cambiado radicalmente pues son califi -
cados como problemáticos y representan una carga importante para su sociedad. Los
conservadores estiman que el flujo de inmigrantes es demasiado alto y utilizan los servi -
cios sociales en mayor proporción al pago de sus impuestos. Los culpan de que son los
causantes de impuestos altos por dólares mal gastados en los servicios sociales; por la pér -
dida de empleos; por los altos costos para la educación; por incrementos sustanti vos
en el crimen; y aún más contradictorio: por traer enfermedades a Estados Unidos. Si
a estos argumentos les aunamos otros más ya muy sabidos del pasado como que les
quitan a los trabajadores nativos sus empleos, abaratan los sueldos, no se asimilan rápi da -
 mente porque no aprenden inglés e introducen costumbres extranjeras del todo inacep -
tables en la sociedad norteamericana, entre otros, encontramos que son percibidos muy
negativamente (Verea, 1999a: 98).
¿Qué podríamos añadir a los argumentos esbozados en aquel entonces? Que dada
la creciente política restrictiva, sobre todo a partir de los ataques terroristas del
2001, los acusan de que les quitan los recursos que podrían ser utilizados por los ciu -
dadanos o residentes legales; que están aún más dispuestos a trabajar por salarios
muy por debajo del estándar, y que son percibidos como una amenaza para la segu -
 ridad del empleo; que atentan contra la seguridad ya que son criminales poten cia -
les, y no se aplican sanciones a los ambiciosos y poco escrupulosos empresarios
que los contratan como mano de obra mucho más barata que la local, entre otros.
Es importante destacar que los medios de comunicación masiva han desempe -
ñado un papel muy importante para promover un ambiente antiinmigrante. Varios
programas de radio y televisión y fuentes de Internet han transmitido programas
o mensajes antiinmigrantes, caracterizando a los migrantes provenientes de México
y Centroamérica como criminales, invasores o hasta los llaman “cucarachas”. Es
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decir, se ha creado una retórica cada vez más hostil y un aumento significativo de
los “discursos de odio”. Cabe destacar que los crecientes sentimientos antiinmigran -
tes no reflejan exclusivamente los puntos de vista de la mayoría de los estadunidenses,
ni necesariamente constituyen la mayoría de los comentarios de los medios. En
2006, antes de la crisis económica, muchos estadunidenses estaban de acuerdo con
la necesidad de aprobar una reforma migratoria (Schildkraut, 2011: 37).
Otro cambio significativo en la última década ha sido el surgimiento de grupos
civiles extremistas, nativistas, altamente organizados para colaborar en la detección
y deportación de migrantes indocumentados. Un ejemplo claro es el Minuteman
Project, grupo extremista nativista que desde la década anterior se ha dedicado a vi -
gilar la frontera Estados Unidos-México, pues estiman que la realizada por el go -
bier no federal y local no es suficiente; consideran a los migrantes personas vio len tas
y criminales que no tienen problema en robar y atacan a ciudadanos estadu niden -
ses (Bordeau, 2010: 21). Estos grupos civiles, también denominados de “odio”,
realizan actividades a su juicio indispensables para frenar el flujo de mi grantes “no
controlado por las autoridades competentes”.
A pesar de que se realizaron esfuerzos importantes por llevar a cabo una re -
forma migratoria integral, no fue aprobada en 2007.8 Tardíamente el presidente
George W. Bush apoyó el proyecto McCain-Kennedy, pero estos esfuerzos fueron
insuficientes para persuadir a la mayoría en el Senado sobre la importancia de apro -
bar una reforma migratoria (Verea, 2008a). Los conservadores —restriccionistas de
principios— se opusieron fundamentalmente al programa de amnistía, en virtud
de que a los inmigrantes “ilegales” se les brindaría la posibilidad eventual de un
“paso a la ciudadanía”. Asimismo se criticó la competencia del gobierno para moni -
torear la frontera, a pesar de las cuantiosas inversiones erogadas en su frontera
sur.9 Los republicanos más liberales —restriccionistas pragmáticos— ponderaron
la emisión de más visas de trabajo temporales a extranjeros, quizás por el mismo
hecho de que, dada la cuantiosa oferta de mano de obra “no autorizada”, la cual brin -
daba mayores beneficios económicos a sus importantes negocios, hipócritamente
estiman que no es necesaria. Algunos, sin embargo, consideraron la necesidad de
contar con mano de obra extranjera temporal, con la advertencia de que un pro grama
de trabajadores huéspedes atraería a nuevos migrantes no autorizados, tal como
sucedió con el Convenio de Braceros 1942-1964 (Verea, 2003).
En virtud del fracaso de la reforma migratoria y como consecuencia de ello,
simultáneamente han surgido innumerables y crueles iniciativas estatales durante
8 La Comprehensive Immigration Reform Bill (CIRB) fracasó por tercera vez en dos años. Los sena -
dores Edward Kennedy y John McCain, así como Mel Martinez y Chuck Hagel, plantearon en diver-
sas ocasiones proyectos de reforma migratoria, los cuales no se aprobaron (para mayor informa ción
con súltese Verea, 2010: 37-38).
9 Durante las dos gestiones de la administración de Bush (2000-2008), el gobierno federal y el Con -
greso aprobaron impresionantes recursos para reforzar aun más la frontera con México. Ello conllevó a
una mayor institucionalización y sofisticación de la tecnología aplicada para la vigilancia fronteriza y
a un aumento impresionante del número de aprehensiones en su frontera sur. Para mayor información
consúltese Verea, 2008a: 109-130.
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la década anterior, las cuales han construido desconfianza y odio entre las comu -
nidades. Sin la plena conciencia y aceptación de que los migrantes se encuentran
en múltiples estados trabajando para su desarrollo económico, algunos estados están
desempeñando un papel clave y muy activo, y ya no se limitan exclusivamente a
la jurisdicción federal para el control a la migración, lo cual crea una percepción
aun más negativa de la presencia de indocumentados. Bajo la premisa de que el
Congreso no ha actuado ante el tema migratorio que es de competencia federal,
y la supuesta Reforma Migratoria se encuentra hasta ahora congelada, prácti ca -
mente cada legislatura estatal está discutiendo y, en algunos casos aprobando, me -
didas de control migratorio muy estrictas en contra de la presencia de migrantes
indo cumentados, lo que ha propiciado un importante incremento en los senti mien -
tos y actitudes antiinmigratorias. A pesar de que las iniciativas difieren entre estados,
los de Arizona y California son de los más “prolíficos” y agresivos, quizás porque han
experimentado un rápido crecimiento poblacional de inmigrantes, lo que ha in fluido
en cambios culturales que causan fricciones entre sus residentes. Dichos estados
han aprobado iniciativas de ley altamente antiinmigratorias, y llenan el vacío que
no ha llenado una reestructuración de su quebrantado sistema migratorio.
La ley SB1070 de Arizona aprobada parcialmente, ya que fue considerada por
el gobierno federal como anticonstitucional,10 da derecho a la policía a dete ner y
expulsar personas “a partir de sus apariencias, y la principal apariencia es el color
de la piel”. Esta ley ha tenido consecuencias muy serias y sentó un precedente de
una actitud altamente xenófoba que, por desgracia, ha contaminado a otros sec tores
de la sociedad. Estados como Alabama y Georgia han aprobado inicia tivas simila-
res, y también autorizan a las policías locales verificar el estatus migratorio de los resi-
dentes y a arrestar a quienes no puedan comprobar su resi dencia legal dentro del
país.Asimismo, sanciona a las personas que faciliten el trans porte y el albergue de indo -
cumentados. Adicionalmente, exige que los negocios con más de cinco em pleados
utilicen el programa de verificación migratoria “E-Verify”, que se ha cuadru plicado
en los últimos dos años.
Los restriccionistas de principios han llegado más allá de lo imaginable. En
varios estados11—obviamenteArizona encabezando, durante nueve meses, des pués
de que la go bernadora Jan Brewer promulgara la polémica ley SB1070 (Verea,
2010b; 2010c)— se han presentado propuestas de ley para eliminar la ciudadanía
automática, y no permitir que los hijos de migrantes indocumentados que nazcan
en territorio estadunidense o el estado que lo propone adquieran la ciudadanía
estadunidense, un derecho garantizado por la Decimocuarta Enmienda de la Cons -
10 Una juez federal logró nulificar ciertos elementos de la medida antes de que ésta entrara en vigor
en 2010. La reciente iniciativa SB1117 propuesta en Arizona otorga poder para contratar abogados
que inicien procesos legales ante las cortes estatales y federales en defensa de la SB1070.
11 Pensilvania, Delaware, Idaho, Indiana, Michigan, Misisipi, Montana, Nebraska, Nueva Hampshire,
Oklahoma, Texas y Utah se encuentran entre éstos. Estados como Misisippi, Tennessee, Kentucky
y Virginia —que normalmente no son lugares donde la inmigración indocumentada sería un pro ble -
ma— están considerando proyectos de ley que tratan de reprimir a los inmigrantes indocumentados.
titución de Estados Unidos.12 En realidad, la meta del proyecto no es que cada
estado de la nación promulgue dicha ley, sino llevar la disputa a las cortes, con la
esperanza de reducir los costos asociados con otorgar la ciudadanía automática,
pero refleja una actitud nativista y xenófoba.13
Reflexiones finales
La incapacidad para llegar a un acuerdo o reforma migratoria durante la primera
década del siglo XXI, y las escasas perspectivas en 2011, dado que no cuenta con
el apoyo suficiente del presidente Barack Obama ni del liderazgo demócrata y re -
publicano en el Congreso, dejan abiertas las puertas para que varios estados recru -
dezcan sus acciones contra los inmigrantes ilegales. Entre la comunidad migrante
latina permea un severo enojo ante la falta de liderazgo de Obama en el tema
migratorio, incluso lo culpan por haber incrementado las acciones seguidas por Bush,
no sólo para refronterizar aún más la frontera sur, sino para incrementar las depor -
taciones (Verea, 2010b; 2010d). A falta de un consenso en Washington, los poderes
legislativos estatales seguirán teniendo la última palabra en el tema, y no precisamen-
te para bien de los migrantes no autorizados, incluso para los residentes lega les. El fin
de 2010 marca una década perdida en la lucha por una reformamigratoria en la Unión
Americana y un incremento sustantivo en las tendencias xenófobas.
Es un hecho que los sentimientos, acciones y políticas antiinmigrantes han
aumentado sustantivamente y se encuentran presentes en varias zonas de Estados
Unidos, propiciando abusos contra migrantes no autorizados y la violación a sus de -
 rechos humanos. La intolerancia y la discriminación no son actitudes nuevas, pero
el sentimiento antilatino, específicamente antimexicano, ha aumentado considera -
 blemente. Creemos que las actitudes xenófobas, nativistas y restriccionistas podrían
disiparse cuando la inmigración se analice y debata a nivel nacional con un lide -
razgo conciliador, reconociendo los beneficios y aportaciones que los migrantes han
hecho a su economía, cultura y sociedad.
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12 De acuerdo con el Pew Hispanic Center, cuatro de cada cinco niños de padres indocumentados nacieron
en Estados Unidos y son ciudadanos estadunidenses y se calcula que del total de 4.3 millones de niños
na cidos en Estados Unidos, 340 000 son hijos de padres extranjeros cuya estancia en el país no es legal.
13 Legisladores republicanos están intentando que un tribunal dictamine que un niño nacido en Esta -
dos Unidos sólo será ciudadano estadunidense si alguno de sus padres lo es.
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Introducción
En América del Norte y Europa existe una creciente tendencia a la criminalización
y a la discriminación de la migración indocumentada. Esta criminalización no frena
la inmigración, sino que construye a los migrantes socialmente como fuera de la ley,
con el fin de controlarlos, marginarlos e invisibilizarlos, y de esa manera hacer que
los empleadores obtengan mejores dividendos de su trabajo. La criminalización
como mecanismo de explotación se legitima con las actitudes discriminatorias, xenó -
fobas y racistas de las sociedades receptoras. 
Así, la combinación de una estructura social en la que los migrantes se en -
cuentran en la parte más baja, con los elementos culturales que la justifican, tiene
como resultado varios grados de impunidad en las violaciones a los derechos huma -
nos de los migrantes, pues si un migrante es en sí mismo “ilegal” no puede haber
actos “ilegales” en su contra, y se ve imposibilitado para denunciar violaciones o
exigir sus derechos. La criminalización y la discriminación son, pues, mecanismos
de control de los migrantes para mantener bajos los costos del trabajo migrante
por concepto de derechos sociales y económicos no retribuidos. Estas ganancias,
sin embargo, se relativizan al largo plazo, ya que la criminalización y la ilegalidad tienen
un precio social muy alto.
Este ensayo mostrará que en ambos lados del Atlántico la criminalización de
la migración y la no protección de los derechos humanos de los migrantes indocu -
mentados frente a la explotación laboral, la discriminación y el odio, generan con -
flicto social de diversas magnitudes: desde manifestaciones, hasta disturbios étnicos,
toma de lugares públicos y fundamentalismos. Para ello se explicará, primero, la
forma en que la criminalización de la migración y la discriminación a migrantes y
residentes constituyen violaciones a los derechos humanos. Después, recurriendo
a los trabajos de Coutin (2003) y Honneth (1997), se examinará cómo la crimina -
lización de la migración y marginación derivada de la discriminación constituyen un
espacio de desprotección social y jurídica que implica una falta de reconoci miento
intersubjetivo que derivaría en conflicto. Posteriormente, se citan ejemplos que
ilustran cómo las violaciones a los derechos humanos en la criminalización de la
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migración y la discriminación son la causa principal del conflicto social que invo -
lucra a los migrantes.
Criminalización, discriminación y derechos humanos
Por su carácter universal y no nacional, los derechos humanos no deben ser condi -
cionados a un estatus migratorio regular, sin embargo, en la realidad, la crimina li za ción
y la discriminación coartan los derechos humanos de los migrantes. Mientras que
la criminalización genera un miedo fundado a ejercer derechos, y la marginación
social, derivada de la discriminación, coloca a los migrantes en condi ciones en las que
no los pueden ejercer. Por un lado, con la criminalización de la migración, los mi -
grantes no pueden ejercer sus derechos, ya que temen, con fundamento, a ser dete -
nidos y expulsados si son ellos quienes no tienen papeles, o de que ubiquen a sus
familiares, si es el caso de familias compuestas por migrantes documentados e indo -
cumentados. Es frecuente que este temor detenga a los mi grantes a buscar asisten -
cia médica, denunciar haber sido víctimas de un delito o de explotación laboral,
revelar abusos por parte de los caseros, capacitarse y apren der la lengua de la so cie -
dad receptora, etc. Estas actividades contravienen los derechos económicos, sociales
y culturales reconocidos en los principales instrumentos de la ONU: la Declaración
Universal de los Derechos Humanos (1948) (DUDH); el Pacto Internacional de De -
rechos Económicos, Sociales y Culturales (1966) (PIDESC); el Pacto Internacional
de Derechos Civiles y Políticos (1966) (PIDCP); la Con ven ción Internacional sobre la
Eliminación de todas las Formas de Discriminación Racial (1965); la Convención
sobre la Eliminación de Todas las Formas de Discri minación contra la Mujer (1979);
la Convención contra la Tortura y Otros Tratos o Penas Crueles, Inhumanos o De -
gradantes (1984); la Convención sobre los Dere chos de las Niñas y los Niños (1989)
y la Convención Internacional sobre la Pro tec ción de los Derechos de Todos los Tra -
bajadores Migratorios y sus Familias (1990).
Por otro lado, tampoco el hecho de ser migrante o hijo(a) de migrantes debe
ser motivo para no recibir protección contra la discriminación, la cual en su expre-
sión máxima llega a atentados contra el derecho a la vida. La no discriminación y la
igualdad frente a la ley son más que un derecho, son un principio general del de -
recho internacional. Prácticamente todas las convenciones fundamentales de de re -
chos humanos en el sistema universal y los sistemas regionales apelan al principio
de no discriminación. Según la Convención sobre los Derechos de las Mujeres (art. 1)
y la Convención sobre Discriminación Racial (art. 1, inciso 1), la discrimi nación es
toda distinción, exclusión o restricción que tenga por objeto o resultado menos -
cabar o anular el reconocimiento, goce o ejercicio de los derechos humanos y las
libertades fundamentales en las esferas política, económica, social, cultural y civil
o en cualquier otra esfera. El Pacto Internacional de Derechos Civiles y Políticos
(art. 2, inciso 1) y el Pacto Internacional de Derechos Económicos, Sociales y
Culturales (art. 2, inciso 2) explican que la distinción que constituye discriminación
es la que se da por motivos de “raza, color, sexo, idioma, religión, opinión política o
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de otra índole, origen nacional o social, posición económica, nacimiento o cualquier
otra condición social”. Estos convenios establecen también que los Estados parte
se comprometen a garantizar los derechos reconocidos en aquéllos, sin ninguna
discriminación con base en esas características. 
Al ser una norma imperativa para todos los Estados que se han adherido al
sistema internacional de derechos humanos, el principio de no discriminación en
el caso de los migrantes significa que cualquier diferencia en el trato de las per so -
nas migrantes debe tener fundamento legal y no debe violar los derechos humanos
reconocidos universalmente. Sin embargo, las diferencias que se hagan en el trato
de los migrantes no solamente deben tener una base legal —la ley es una cons truc -
ción social que a veces tiene funciones represivas si así conviene al statu quo—
sino representar una preocupación social legítima, tener una justificación objeti-
va y no chocar desproporcionadamente con el derecho en cuestión. Por ejem plo, se
justifica que los trabajadores temporales no tengan derecho al voto, pero es des pro -
porcionado negar auxilios médicos a un migrante indocumentado o la educación
a niñas y niños hijos de migrantes indocumentados.1
La paulatina criminalización de la migración es la que no permite a los mi -
gran tes indocumentados acceder a los derechos económicos, sociales, culturales
y a la justicia; asimismo, la discriminación obliga a que los migrantes residentes,
o en situación precaria como los trabajadores temporales, permanezcan en situa -
cio nes de marginación social en la que la violación a sus derechos es sistemática.
Esto es cierto en la Unión Europea y en Norteamérica. Las expresiones más dra -
máticas de la discriminación hacia las minorías étnicas son los crímenes de odio, los
cuales afectan también a migrantes residentes y sus hijos nacidos o criados en el
país receptor. La discriminación llega a estos niveles cuando el Estado no garantiza
la protección adecuada ni el acceso a la justicia. Tanto en la Unión Europea como
en Norteamérica la discriminación hacia las minorías étnicas y los migrantes es muy
generalizada y tiene expresiones más graves en los países europeos o Esta dos y
provincias estadunidenses y canadienses donde la migración (blanca o no) es un
fenómeno relativamente nuevo.
Las relaciones sociales que se construyen a través de la negación de derechos
humanos con la criminalización y la discriminación los describe con precisión Coutin
(2003), quien ha analizado y conceptualizado como el “espacio de no existencia”.
Éste resulta de la disyuntiva entre la presencia física y la legal, pues aun cuando
las personas están físicamente presentes, en términos jurídicos no lo están, pues
su entrada no ha sido registrada. Al no tener presencia jurídica, el nombre de los
migrantes no aparece en cuentas de servicios y no pueden establecer contratos arren -
datarios, entre otras cosas. Oficialmente tampoco trabajan, por lo que no generan
los derechos que corresponden a la antigüedad laboral, incluyendo los derechos
sociales y —en los países donde la regularización es una práctica— acogerse a leyes
de amnistía (Coutin, 2003).
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1 Esto fue reiterado en Opinión Consultiva de la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos de
2003 (oc/18), la misma que estableció la obligación de respetar y garantizar los derechos humanos y
el carácter fundamental del principio de igualdad y no discriminación (CIDH, 2003).
El espacio de no existencia excluye a las personas, les niega derechos, les res -
tringe los servicios y, en sentido estricto, les borra la identidad jurídica. En conse -
cuencia, se convierte en un espacio de subyugación donde la identidad como per-
sonas también se erosiona (Coutin, 2003: 172). Se materializa como experien cias
de exclusión cotidiana, especialmente en centros de trabajo, y toma la forma de
efectos reales que van desde el hambre y el desempleo, hasta la violencia y la
muerte (Cintron et al. citados por De Genova, 2002). Los límites espaciales del espa-
cio de no existencia son difíciles de definir, pues éste se encuentra en todos lados:
barrios, tiendas, lugares de esparcimiento y en centros de trabajo. En realidad, el
espacio de no existencia corresponde al país receptor en su totalidad; en la medida
en que la presencia de los migrantes es “ilegal”, oficialmente están “afuera” del terri -
torio del país donde viven. En estricto sentido, su presencia se encuentra espacial
y temporalmente en un espacio de no existencia (Coutin, 2003: 179).
Las implicaciones de la criminalización y la discriminación para los migrantes
documentados y los hijos de migrantes nacidos en el país receptor son graves si se
toma en cuenta que el espacio de no existencia no se encuentra en un limbo de rela -
ciones sociales: los migrantes documentados e indocumentados conviven y com -
parten su vida cotidiana. Estos lugares solamente se vuelven prohibidos cuando
se encuentran los indocumentados. Por ello, la construcción social de la “ilegalidad”
opera para estigmatizar a todo aquel que viene de fuera, independientemente de
si tiene o no documentos. 
En los hechos no hay comunidades de migrantes indocumentados que se en -
cuentren selladas. Los indocumentados viven o trabajan en el espacio donde habitan
diversos tipos de residentes documentados e incluso ciudadanos nacionales, que pue -
den ser cónyuges, hijos, sobrinos, amigos, etc., que viven en el mismo barrio que con
la presencia de indocumentados se vuelve un espacio de no existencia. Por esta coin -
cidencia espacial, la marginación de las minorías, derivada de la discriminación por
origen nacional, es otra consecuencia de la criminalización y la discriminación. 
Las minorías son grupos cuya presencia se considera indeseable y una amena-
za al orden público y la identidad nacional. La marginación social contra las mino -
rías étnicas de migrantes es evidente cuando se concentran en áreas residenciales
marginadas, y se dedican a trabajos de bajo estatus social, además de que su acceso a
servicios y derechos está limitado por su condición de extranjero o no ciudadano
(Castles y Miller, 2004). 
Pareciera que la criminalización desincentiva la migración, pero, como ya se
discutió antes, no logra ese objetivo y en su lugar constituye las relaciones sociales
del espacio de no existencia. En realidad, es este efecto y no la disminución real de
la migración lo que se busca con la criminalización y la discriminación. La despro -
tección jurídica y la clandestinidad del espacio de no existencia tiene una función
político-económica. Como la ley en general está conformada por tácticas y estra -
tegias que los Estados implementan para mediar las contradicciones de las crisis
sociales y las luchas políticas en torno al trabajo, en particular, las leyes migratorias
se convierten en tácticas para establecer los parámetros de la disciplina y la coerción
que permita controlar el trabajo migrante. La legislación migratoria tiene, entonces,
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la función de construir socialmente a los migrantes como fuera de la ley para con -
trolarlos y marginarlos, y de esa manera obtener mejores dividendos (Calavita, 2004;
De Genova, 2002; Bustamante, 2002; Solanes Corella, 2008; De Lucas, 2003). La
plusvalía del trabajo de los migrantes se encuentra en los gastos no devengados en
derechos económicos, sociales, civiles y políticos, como seguridad social, salarios
justos, seguros contra accidentes en el trabajo, acceso a la justicia, entre otros. Como se -
ñala Calavita, “el castigo que un inmigrante recibe por su situación administrativa de
ilegalidad es denegarles plenos derechos económicos. Esta sanción y su margi na ción
económica contribuye a reforzar la ‘flexibilidad’ que los inmigrantes suministran
a la economía posfordista” (Calavita, 2004: 3); o en palabras de Sola nes Co rella: los
migrantes “No aparecen reflejados en las estadísticas oficiales porque representan
nuestra fuerza de trabajo esclavizada, esa válvula de seguridad imprescindible para un
sistema económico marcado por la adquisición de la fuerza de tra bajo al precio más
bajo posible, con la consiguiente cesión de derechos” (2008: 146).
Bustamante (2002) es quien ha buscado, empíricamente, el vínculo entre ile-
galidad-retribución político-económica. Él asegura que la vulnerabilidad social en la
que se hallan los migrantes indocumentados con la criminalización y la discrimi-
nación son elementos que no sólo no detienen el flujo de éstos, sino que ge neran la
demanda del trabajo indocumentado. Para Bustamante, la combinación de una estruc -
tura social en la que los migrantes se encuentran en la parte más baja, con los ele-
mentos culturales que la justifican, tiene como resultado varios grados de impunidad
en las violaciones a los derechos humanos de los migrantes (Busta man te, 2002: 339).
La impunidad —la cual se entiende como la ausencia de costo social, económico o po -
lítico para violadores de derechos humanos, como los patrones— desempodera a los
migrantes y los vuelve vulnerables. 
No es la raza ni otra característica inherente al migrante, en tanto sujeto, lo que
lo hace vulnerable: es el desempoderamiento derivado de la impunidad en la que per -
manece el perpetrador de violaciones a los derechos humanos (Bustamante, 2002:
340). Si un migrante es en sí mismo “ilegal”, no puede haber actos “ilegales” en su
contra, y se ve imposibilitado para denunciar violaciones o exigir los derechos que,
de ser otorgados, tendrían como consecuencia una renta menor a la obtenida por el
empleador.
La vulnerabilidad asociada a la impunidad en la que permanecen las violacio nes
a los derechos humanos de los migrantes es necesaria para mantener el bajo costo
de los servicios que proporcionan los migrantes, lo cual crea la demanda de este tipo de
trabajo en las sociedades receptoras y explica el incremento en el número de migran-
tes en algún lugar, en un momento determinado. Para Bustamante, si se reduce la vul-
nerabilidad, el costo del trabajo migrante se incrementará y, en consecuen cia, dis-
minuirá la demanda por migración económica (Bustamante, 2002: 344). Sin embargo,
a pesar de los importantes dividendos que reditúa la vulnerabilidad de los migran -
tes, a mediano y largo plazo ésta tiene un alto costo para las sociedades receptoras, ya
que deriva en un conflicto de diversas proporciones.
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La criminalización y la discriminación 
como desconocimiento intersubjetivo: 
explicación del conflicto
La criminalización y la discriminación de los migrantes en el corto y mediano plazo
tiene un precio muy alto para la sociedad receptora en su conjunto, debido a lo que
Honneth (1997) ha denominado como “reconocimiento intersubjetivo”. Según Hon -
neth, éste es el reconocimiento que se da de sujeto a sujeto y cuya experiencia
fundamenta la confianza, el autorrespeto y el honor, cuya función es generar la auto -
estima y los sentimientos positivos en las personas. Existen tres formas de reco-
nocimiento intersubjetivo: el amor, el derecho y la solidaridad. Cuando otros suje-
tos o la sociedad en su conjunto no reconocen a otros individuos, los afectados lo
viven como un menosprecio expresado de tres formas, correspondientes a las tres
formas de reconocimiento: violación, desposesión y deshonra. 
En primer lugar, la violación es el tipo de menosprecio resultante de no reco-
nocer a un individuo a través del amor. El amor garantiza la autonomía corporal y la
confianza en uno mismo y los demás. En contraste, la violación corporal —a través
de la tortura o la violencia física— tiene como consecuencia la pérdida de con-
fianza en uno mismo y los demás (Honneth, 1997). El fundamento de esta falta
de reconocimiento es “que cualquier intento de apoderarse del cuerpo de una per-
sona contra su voluntad, sea cual sea el objetivo buscado, provoca un grado de humi -
llación, que incide destructivamente en la autorreferencia práctica de un hom bre
con más profundidad que las demás formas de menosprecio; ya que lo específico
en tales formas de lesión física, como ocurre en la tortura o la violencia, lo constituye
no el dolor corporal, sino su asociación con el sentimiento de estar indefenso fren-
te a la voluntad de otro sujeto hasta el arrebato sensible de la realidad” (Honneth,
1997: 161). 
En el ámbito del espacio de no existencia encontramos violación en prácticas
como la detención temporal, las deportaciones colectivas y forzosas, las redadas
en centros de trabajo, entre otros. Los migrantes son humillados con estas accio-
nes porque se les equipara con criminales y se les tiene físicamente detenidos sin
haber cometido delito alguno.
En segundo lugar, la desposesión es el resultado de no reconocer a los indi-
viduos a través del derecho. La desposesión se relaciona con la marginación social
y la negación de derechos que las personas reclaman como miembros de una so -
ciedad en la que participan activamente. La secuela de la desposesión de derechos
es la pérdida de respeto en sí mismo y la convicción de no ser una persona tan moral -
mente valiosa como los demás (Honneth, 1997). La desposesión cambia de acuerdo
con el contexto social, “porque el contenido de significación de lo que vale como
persona moralmente responsable ha cambiado en el desarrollo de las relaciones
jurídicas; por ello la experiencia de la desposesión de derechos se mide no sólo según
el grado de universalización, sino también en cuanto al perímetro material de los
derechos institucionalmente garantizados (Honneth, 1997: 163). Los migrantes pagan
impuestos y contribuyen positivamente en la sociedad receptora y aun así no son
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sujetos de derechos como los ciudadanos nacionales. En este contexto, el espacio
de no existencia en su conjunto se constituye con prácticas sistemáticas de des-
posesión, entre las que destacan la pérdida de movilidad, la falta de acceso a la
educación para los hijos, no acceso a servicios de salud, etcétera.
Finalmente, la deshonra es la consecuencia de no reconocer a las personas a
través de la solidaridad. Aquélla resulta de la falta de reconocimiento del estatus
de las personas en la sociedad, es decir, de no respetar su dignidad y no reconocerlos
socialmente. La solidaridad lleva a la autorrealización a través de la aprobación so -
cial. Como lo apunta Honneth:
tales tipos de infravaloración cultural un sujeto puede referirlos a sí, en tanto que per-
sona singular, en la medida en que los modelos de valorización social enraizados ins-
titucional e históricamente se han individualizado y, por consiguiente, se refieren a las
capacidades individuales en lugar de a las cualidades colectivas, por eso, esta experien -
cia de menosprecio, como la de desposesión de derechos, está sujeta a un proceso de
cambios históricos (Honneth, 1997: 163).
Los migrantes y las minorías experimentan deshonra porque se les mantiene
al margen como si no tuvieran la dignidad y el valor moral suficientes para perte-
necer a la sociedad receptora. La estigmatización social de los migrantes produce
un tipo de deshonra para los individuos de ciertos grupos sociales, como los árabes
y los musulmanes, en Europa, o los latinos en Estados Unidos. La deshonra es el
tipo de menosprecio que se extiende a las minorías étnicas en su conjunto, pues
los residentes y los migrantes indocumentados solamente pueden ser separados
jurídicamente.
Los sujetos, para lograr realizarse, dependen del reconocimiento intersubje-
tivo, y si no lo tienen les queda un “hueco psíquico” en el que se albergan senti-
mientos negativos, como la vergüenza, la cólera y el desprecio. Entre las reacciones
de estos sentimientos “puede venir el impulso motivacional de una lucha por el re co -
nocimiento, pues la tensión motivacional en que el singular es forzado a entrar por
el sufrimiento de humillaciones, sólo puede disolverla cuando vuelve a encontrar la
posibilidad de un nuevo obrar” (Honneth, 1997: 168). El “nuevo obrar” puede ser
la organización política, pero ésta no es inevitable. Tampoco es siempre pacífica. La
vergüenza, la cólera y el desprecio se expresan también en un tipo de conflicto que
no lleva a la construcción de los migrantes como sujetos políticos, sino que se queda
en la mera resistencia —violenta o pacífica— que no moviliza a otros para buscar un
cambio emancipatorio, pero sí desestabiliza socialmente. En la siguiente sección se
demostrará cómo la resistencia frente a las condiciones del espacio de no existen -
cia puede adquirir matices conflictivos con diversos grados de violencia. El con-
flicto violento sería la forma de resistir la violación, la desposesión y la deshonra que
provoca la negación y el desconocimiento de los derechos humanos.
Desconocimiento intersubjetivo y conflicto 
derivado de la criminalización de la migración
La criminalización de la migración viola los derechos humanos de la asociación y la
manifestación, la libertad de conciencia; la seguridad y salud públicas; la privaci-
dad y la vida privada; no ser privado arbitrariamente de los bienes propios; la liber-
tad y seguridad personales; la justicia pronta, expedita, en la lengua materna y sin
distinción frente a los nacionales; no ser detenido o encarcelado arbitrariamente;
no ser expulsado por no cumplir con un contrato de trabajo; que sus documentos
de identidad o migratorios no sean destruidos o confiscados arbitrariamente; reco-
nocimiento de personalidad jurídica; derechos laborales (desde salario justo y sin
discriminación, hasta sindicalización y asociación laboral); la seguridad social y las
prestaciones vinculadas al empleo, así como el derecho a la salud en casos de emer -
gencia. Estas violaciones a los derechos humanos son una forma de desconocimien-
to intersubjetivo en la forma de desposesión, y se expresa en dos tipos de conflicto:
1) protestas por la explotación laboral o la inacción gubernamental frente a ésta;
2) demandas de protección y regularización jurídicas.
PROTESTAS POR LA EXPLOTACIÓN LABORAL
Y LA INACCIÓN GUBERNAMENTAL FRENTE A ÉSTA
Por la falta de reconocimiento jurídico que limita o impide el emplazamiento a huel -
ga, los trabajadores migrantes protestan violentamente para demandar salarios jus tos
y castigo y alto a la explotación por parte de los empleadores; explotación que in -
cluye (mas no se limita a) la retención de salarios y documentos migratorios en caso
de trabajadores temporales; detenciones arbitrarias dentro de los centros de trabajo; des -
pidos injustificados; la denuncia de argucias de los empleadores para denunciar
su situación irregular a las autoridades y así evitar pagar sus sueldos, por ejem plo,
exámenes toxicológicos, llamadas anónimas a las autoridades migratorias, así como
la denuncia de despido sin pago, o de despido luego de intento de organización
sindical. 
Este tipo de conflictos se han registrado tanto en Europa como en América del
Norte. Las demandas se hacen al gobierno para que los proteja de los abusos de los
empleadores y estallan violentamente luego de que la explotación laboral llega a
un punto de crisis en total impunidad. Por ejemplo, en Ilia, Grecia, en abril de 2008,
hubo un enfrentamiento entre agricultores de fresas y trabajadores agrícolas mi -
grantes que demandaban incremento salarial. Según los sindicatos que apoyan a
los migrantes, unos cuatrocientos de éstos fueron atacados por los agricultores. 
Los enfrentamientos ocurrieron en la plaza de Neo Manolada, en Ilia, donde
se produce 90 por ciento de las fresas en Grecia. Los trabajadores reciben salarios
por debajo del promedio nacional, viven en barracas y se ven obligados a pagar más
de la mitad de su salario al empleador por rentarlas. La semana previa al enfrenta-
miento, inmigrantes del sur de Asia y de los Balcanes se fueron a huelga para pedir
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un incremento de 36 a 47 dólares, pero los agricultores aseguraron que eso los arrui -
naría (Coenders et al., 2003).
En Francia, en julio de 2007, trabajadores indocumentados de la cadena de
comida rápida Buffalo Grill ocuparon las oficinas centrales de la cadena restau-
rantera en Viry-Chatillon, en el sur de París, luego de haber sido despedidos y de -
nunciados ante las autoridades migratorias. Los inmigrantes, en su mayoría africa nos
con años de trabajar allí, enfrentaban deportación. El año anterior, un empleado
había anunciado su candidatura para representación laboral, y meses después su
situación irregular fue denunciada “anónimamente” ante la policía, la cual proce-
dió a inspeccionar los papeles de los más de seiscientos empleados extranjeros de
la cadena. 
Un grupo de trabajadores indocumentados, apoyados por la Federación de
Comercio, Distribución y Servicios, protestaron por la decisión ocupando las ofi-
cinas. La ocupación, en el estacionamiento de las oficinas, duró un mes y resultó en la
regularización de los veinte trabajadores que ocuparon el restaurante. En otro caso
más reciente (en septiembre de 2008), decenas de inmigrantes africanos ocu paron
el antiguo y famoso restaurante la Tour d’Argent, el cual es un símbolo cultural de
París, para exigir la regularización de siete empleados de Mali, quienes se habían
declarado en huelga y fueron expulsados del restaurante. Como otros empleadores
en casos similares, el dueño dijo que no sabía que eran trabajadores irregulares.
En junio de 2009, en Inglaterra, decenas de estudiantes tomaron las instala-
ciones de la Escuela de Estudios Africanos y Asiáticos de la Universidad de Lon -
dres demandando la reinstalación de los trabajadores que deportaron luego de una
redada. En represalia, la compañía de limpieza subcontratada ISS llamó a las auto-
ridades migratorias porque un grupo de migrantes indocumentados pertenecien-
tes a un sindicato afiliado a la central obrera nacional Unison se fueron a huelga
para protestar por el despido de uno de sus compañeros. Los estudiantes deman-
daron también que la Universidad de Londres prohibiera la entrada de oficiales de
migración en sus instalaciones, pues mientras la llamada la hizo ISS, fueron las
autoridades escolares las que permitieron que los más de cuarenta policías antimo -
tines entraran a la sala de juntas donde los trabajadores fueron convocados para
una supuesta “reunión urgente de empleados”.
DEMANDAS DE PROTECCIÓN Y REGULARIZACIÓN JURÍDICAS
Ante la falta de reconocimiento como sujetos de derechos, los migrantes protestan
para demandar regularización migratoria, suspensión de su inminente deportación
y un trato igualitario frente a los lugareños. En este tipo de conflicto destaca el
caso de España, donde, en junio de 2006, la policía desalojó a unos quinientos inmi -
grantes que tomaron la Catedral de Barcelona para pedir que se regularizara su
situación. Otros quinientos desalojaron voluntariamente después de que la Secre -
taría de Migración les prometiera no identificarlos si desalojaban la catedral. Los
inmigrantes pedían regularizar a todos los inmigrantes indocumentados; la mayoría
provenía de India, Bangladesh, Pakistán, Ecuador y Colombia. En 2001, un grupo
de migrantes había hecho lo mismo y había logrado su regularización.
En Paola, Malta, en julio de 2006, unos doscientos inmigrantes indocumen-
tados se amotinaron e hirieron con piedras a tres policías y dos soldados cuando las
fuerzas de seguridad los detuvieron en su camino a la oficina del primer ministro.
También resultaron heridos cuatro inmigrantes. El grupo fue interceptado en Paola,
cerca de la capital Valletta, por cientos de policías y soldados, algunos de ellos
portaban trajes antimotines. Los inmigrantes se quejaban por la detención en la
que permanecen cientos de inmigrantes que han sido interceptados en su camino
a Europa continental, pues Malta detiene durante 18 meses a los inmigrantes indo -
cumentados para desalentar la inmigración irregular, incluso antes de la Directiva
sobre Retorno. Asimismo, otro caso es el de los treinta solicitan tes de asilo, en Bru -
selas, Bélgica, quienes en julio de 2008 hicieron un plantón sobre seis plumas de cons -
trucción en varias obras, a lo largo de la capital europea, demandan do el derecho de
trabajar y vivir en la ciudad. Los quejosos estaban mo lestos por la tardanza en el trá-
mite de sus documentos. El grupo de inmigrantes (mayoritariamente argelinos)
empezó su plantón en una pluma cerca de la Grand Place y luego ocuparon varias
cerca de la sede de la Unión Europea. 
En Nápoles, Italia, en julio de 2008, indigentes africanos se enfrentaron a la
policía en el Duomo, luego de que mantuvieran un plantón fuera de la catedral.
La violencia se desató cuando la policía trató de desalojar a los inmigrantes del edi-
ficio y dos personas fueron arrestadas. Los inmigrantes —originarios de Ghana, Cos ta
de Marfil y Burkina Faso— protestaban porque un incendio los dejó sin casa y las
autoridades no los reubicaron, mientras que a los italianos sí.
En Estados Unidos, las marchas y la represión a manifestaciones por la reforma
migratoria frecuentemente terminan en disturbios. En mayo de 2007, se registra-
ron manifestaciones de migrantes en diversos puntos de la Unión Americana: en
Alabama, Maryland y Washington, D.C., fueron detenidos varios individuos que
intentaban atacarlos con granadas, pistolas semiautomáticas y de municiones. En
el caso específico de Washington D.C., la policía local arrestó a Tyler J. Froatz, luego
de que atacara a los marchistas. Le decomisaron dos cuchillos, un martillo, dos
pistolas y gas pimienta. En un posterior cateo en su casa, la policía encontró tam-
bién quince pistolas, bombas molotov, una granada y más de mil cargas de muni-
ciones. Los incidentes en los tres estados recibieron poca atención de la prensa.
En mayo de 2010, en Santa Cruz, California, un grupo anarquista destrozó
e in cendió comercios y pintó grafitis, demandando una reforma migratoria luego de
que se decretara la represiva Ley SB 2010. Lo mismo ocurrió en Los Ángeles, donde la
policía reaccionó ante la provocación de una persona que quizá ni estaba involu -
 crada en una manifestación por los derechos de los migrantes documentados e in do -
cumentados, convocada por la Multi-Ethnic Immigrant Workers Organizing Network.
Mientras que los provocadores lanzaron botellas de plástico vacías, la policía res-
pondió con balas de plástico e hirió a 24 personas, incluyendo a periodistas.
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Conflicto y desconocimiento intersubjetivo 
relacionado con la marginación social 
derivada de la discriminación
La discriminación y la marginación derivada de la discriminación hacia las minorías
étnicas, en las que confluyen migrantes recién llegados, residentes y sus descen-
dientes, niegan o desconocen los derechos humanos a la vida; estar libre de tor-
turas, tratos o penas crueles, inhumanos o degradantes; libertad de pensamiento,
conciencia y religión; decidir sobre la religión de los hijos; la libertad y seguridad
personales; la justicia pronta, expedita y en su lengua materna y sin distinción frente a
los nacionales; derechos laborales (desde salario justo y sin discriminación, hasta
sin dicalización y asociación laboral); la seguridad social y las prestaciones vincu-
ladas al empleo; la educación y nacionalidad para sus hijos; conservar su cultura;
el derecho a la educación y la vivienda dignas, así como a la no discriminación. Estas
violaciones se viven como desposesión y deshonra, expresadas en 1) apoyo a ideo -
logías extremistas y 2) disturbios sociales con detonante racial.
APOYO A IDEOLOGÍAS EXTREMISTAS
La exclusión de las minorías étnicas se relaciona con el apoyo que algunos de sus
miembros dan a ideologías extremistas. Esto es particularmente cierto en el caso de
migrantes de origen árabe o musulmán. Existe una fuerte tendencia en la política pú -
blica a ligar el “terrorismo” con los migrantes recién llegados, cuando en realidad
éste es un problema más añejo, relacionado con lo que se traduciría como “jihadistas
hechos en casa” (homegrown jihadists), es decir, los hijos de los residen tes musulma -
nes, quienes se sienten excluidos de la mayoría cristiana y encuentran en el islamismo
—que no el islam— una forma de expresión.2
De hecho, a partir del 11 de septiembre, cuando empezó a establecerse el dudo-
so vínculo entre migración y terrorismo debido a que los perpetradores de los ataques
eran extranjeros, solamente en un caso de terrorismo posterior a los ataques en Nueva York
se encontró la participación directa de inmigrantes: los ataques terroris tas en la red ferro-
viaria de Madrid, España, el 11 de marzo de 2004. Todos los de te ni dos eran ciudadanos
marroquíes residentes en territorio español. Uno de ellos ob tuvo una beca del gobierno
español para estudiar un doctorado en economía, aunque se desempeñaba como ven-
dedor de bienes raíces (Jordán y Wesley, 2006). 
Por el contrario, en los ataques del 7 de julio de 2005 en Londres, tres de los
hombres que llevaban las bombas eran ciudadanos británicos de origen pakistaní.
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2 El islam acoge a una comunidad religiosa que alcanza 1.57 billones de personas alrededor del mundo.
En contraste, el “islamismo” es un conjunto de ideologías políticas que buscan aplicar la Sharia o Ley
Islámica en la rectoría del Estado. Las preocupaciones fundamentales en el islamismo son la pobreza
y el lugar de las mujeres en la sociedad y, por ello, son naturalmente antagónicos con Occidente. Algunas
corrientes islamistas utilizan medidas violentas en su proyecto de imponer la Sharia en el mundo.
El cuarto nació en Jamaica, pero fue llevado a Gran Bretaña a la edad de cinco
meses. Todos ellos eran musulmanes y británicos —parte de los cuatro millones
que componen las minorías étnicas de la isla (7 por ciento del total de población
británica)—. Una investigación realizada en Estados Unidos reveló que mientras
en los últimos años las agencias vinculadas con la migración han tenido como su
principal función las acciones antiterroristas, entre 2004 y 2006 solamente se de -
tuvo a un total de doce personas bajo la acusación de terrorismo, para una labor
a la que han estado dedicadas 814 073 personas (Associated Press, 2007). 
Hay evidencia de que la mayoría de las asociaciones musulmanas que brindan
apoyo espiritual a los jóvenes socialmente excluidos no promueven el extremismo ni
la violencia (Tanveer, 2004), y en cambio la discriminación religiosa sí es un motivo
de conflicto entre las minorías étnicas y la mayoría de una sociedad (Fox, 2000). 
No es la migración, sino el enojo de jóvenes que viven en minorías migrantes, lo
que construye identidades defensivas que se articulan en redes políticas manipu-
ladas por los líderes de organizaciones políticas extremistas como ciertas ramas del
islamismo político. Esto se ha demostrado en trabajos sociológicos que exami na ron
que algunas de las personas que detonaron las bombas del 11 de septiembre tu -
vieron los primeros contactos con grupos extremistas después de haber sido víctimas
de discriminación en su empleo y centros de esparcimiento (a uno de ellos no le per-
mitieron el ingreso a una discoteca por ser asiático).
DISTURBIOS SOCIALES CON DETONANTE RACIAL
Los disturbios sociales son ocasionados principalmente por tres detonantes: 
a) ata ques xenófobos, 
b) racismo institucional hacia minorías étnicas y 
c) enfrentamientos entre dos minorías.
Ataques xenófobos
Los disturbios iniciados por ataques xenófobos ocurren regularmente como reac-
ción luego de que algún migrante presunta o realmente haya cometido algún acto
criminal. Se presenta en localidades donde la inmigración es un fenómeno recien-
te y tiende a ser copiosa. La sociedad receptora percibe a los inmigrantes como la
causa de problemas que en realidad son más añejos y complejos, como el desem-
pleo o el incremento de los índices de delincuencia. También desaprueba los hábi-
tos y costumbres de los recién llegados, de ahí que el enfrenta miento adquiera tin-
tes racistas, como se han presentado muchos casos en Europa y en Norteamérica. 
En Europa el problema es endémico. En Almería, España, en febrero de 2000,
los residentes locales atacaron tiendas y coches de inmigrantes después de que una
mujer fue presuntamente asesinada por un inmigrante marroquí. Anteriormente,
un trabajador norafricano había sido acusado de matar a dos hombres; la policía dijo
que esto no era evidencia de que los inmigrantes cometieran más crímenes que
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la comunidad local, pero la violencia contra ellos les impide incluso salir a trabajar,
pues temen ser agredidos. 
La situación también es grave en Italia, donde el racismo institucional es alar-
mante. En enero de 2010, en la localidad de Rosarno, Calabria, se registraron dis-
turbios luego de que dos trabajadores africanos —un nigeriano indocumentado y
un profesionista originario de Togo— fueran atacados por jóvenes blancos, quie-
nes les dispararon con pistolas de aire comprimido. Esto tuvo lugar luego de que
se corriera el falso rumor de que los africanos habían atacado a una italiana emba-
razada que, a consecuencia del ataque, había perdido a su bebé. Los disturbios
iniciados por este hecho se agravaron luego de que otros dos migrantes fueran ata-
cados con barras de metal. El conflicto se prolongó durante días e involucró a dece -
nas de migrantes africanos que trabajan como jornaleros para empresas controladas
por Ndrangheta, la mafia local. 
Los africanos duermen en fábricas abandonadas porque pocas personas les
rentan viviendas, además de que apenas ganan unos 36 dólares por jornadas de
más de doce horas. El enfrentamiento involucró a unos setecientos africanos y unos
trescientos pobladores locales. Un italiano intentó atacar a los africanos con un trac -
tor. Al final, la policía reportó 37 heridos, 18 de ellos policías y cinco migrantes.
En Saltillo, Coahuila, México, en septiembre de 2009, un hondureño fue acu -
sado de robar y matar a puñaladas a una comerciante local. En respuesta, un albergue
para migrantes, la Posada Belén, fue apedreada por desconocidos, y su coordina-
dor, Pedro Pantoja Arreola, recibió amenazas telefónicas de muerte. El albergue
Belén recibe entre ochenta y cien migrantes todos los días, y se quedan como má -
ximo un par de días. El legislador local derechista Carlos Orta Canales abogó por la
regulación de los refugios para migrantes, porque éstos “por lo regular” cometen de -
litos. En Estados Unidos, los ataques xenófobos son fecuentes, aunque no hayan
desatado todavía conflictos.
Racismo institucional hacia minorías étnicas
Los disturbios de este tipo son una reacción hacia el racismo institucional, fre-
cuentemente de tipo policiaco. Es común que los perpetradores permanezcan
impunes, aunque en casos como los de Ingla terra las crisis han llevado a cambios
sustanciales para abatir o por lo menos registrar el racismo policiaco. El caso que más
atención mediática y académica internacio nal ha recibido fue el ocurrido el 27
de octubre de 2005 en París, Francia, que duró dos semanas (Koff, 2009; Koff y
Duprez, 2009). Jóvenes descendientes de inmigrantes norafricanos quemaron coches
y saquearon tiendas luego de que dos muchachos murieran electrocutados en una
subestación eléctrica en el popular barrio de inmi grantes Seine-Saint Denis, cuan-
do eran perseguidos por la policía. El saldo fue de más de siete mil autos quemados
y unos dos mil detenidos. 
Menos sonado (pero igualmente grave) fue el caso de Bélgica, donde se han
registrado diversos episodios. Antes de los disturbios de París, en noviembre de
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2002, en Amberes, el asesinato a balazos de un marroquí de 26 años desató dis-
turbios en esta ciudad. El joven fue asesinado por un belga de 66 años, quien le
hizo varios disparos. El asesinato causó gran descontento en el distrito de Borger -
hout, el cual tiene una población inmigrante mayoritaria. El padre de la víctima y
los miembros de la mezquita intentaron calmar a los jóvenes, pero no tuvieron éxito.
Sin embargo, también estuvo presente Abou Jahjah, un personaje importante de la
Liga Árabe Europea, quien inició una campaña de patrullaje por las calles de Bru se -
las para asegurarse de que no se acuse falsamente a inmigrantes de cometer crímenes.
Como Francia, Bélgica tiene un gran número de población inmigrante, espe cial -
mente de origen marroquí, entre quienes hay desempleo alarmante. Sin embargo,
a diferencia de Francia, los inmigrantes no se concentran en guetos alrededor de
las ciudades grandes.
Como eco de los disturbios de París, en la capital y provincias belgas de Am -
beres, Lokeren, Mechelen y Ledeberg, jóvenes musulmanes provenientes de fami -
lias de inmigrantes hicieron numerosos desmanes, entre los que se incluyó la quema
de quince automóviles. Los disturbios se extendieron durante cuatro noches en
no viembre de 2005. Un año después de estos disturbios, también en Bélgica, al
parecer para conmemorar los ocurridos en París en 2005, jóvenes musulmanes de
familias inmigrantes celebraron el Ramadán tirando piedras a transeúntes, así como
destruyendo e incendiando autos estacionados. De igual manera arrojaron bombas
molotov a un hospital. Los jóvenes estaban furiosos por el deceso de Fayçal Chaaban,
un joven de 25 años de edad que murió en custodia.
En Inglaterra, el conflicto también es de larga data y se han dado diversos con -
flictos parecidos al de París en 2005. En mayo de 2001, en Oldham, Manchester,
jóvenes de origen asiático se enfrentaron a una banda de jóvenes blancos. El en -
frentamiento se convirtió en un ataque racial masivo en el que hombres, mujeres
y niños de origen asiático fueron objeto de ataques verbales y físicos. Oldham es un
condado multiétnico compuesto de sajones, pakistaníes y bangladeshíes. El de sem -
pleo entre los asiáticos es de 25 por ciento. Después de los enfrentamientos en
Oldham, el racista Nacional Front intentó organizar una marcha, en Bradford,
York shire, que prohibió el secretario del Interior. La Anti-Nazi League intentó rea-
lizar una contramarcha que fue permitida; en el transcurso se rumoró que los del
National Front se juntaron en un pub, y poco después se armó una confrontación
fuera de éste, donde un pakistaní resultó apuñalado. Esto ocasionó disturbios en los
que la policía fue atacada y varios restaurantes tuvieron daños por actos vandálicos.
Al menos trescientos policías y seis civiles resultaron heridos. 
En Londres, en julio de 2006, la policía, armada con macanas, esposas y es -
cudos antimotines, patrullaba la ribera del Támesis para amortiguar las tensiones
entre pescadores deportivos e inmigrantes del este de Europa. Se culpó a los inmi -
grantes de contribuir a la escasez de peces por guardar su pesca para el consumo,
en vez de regresarlos al río. Meses después, en octubre, se registraron enfrentamien -
tos similares en la ciudad de Windsor. La mayoría blanca se enfrentó a la mi noría
asiática, después de que una lechería musulmana fuera incendiada y de que rompie-
ran las ventanas de la mezquita.
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Por otra parte, en Milán, Italia, hubo una marcha para denunciar la muerte a
golpes de un joven de Burkina Faso a manos de los dueños de un bar donde lo des -
cubrieron llevándose dos paquetes de galletas. Los quejosos destrozaron motoci-
cletas y voltearon botes de basura en su camino. Éstos no eran trabajadores indo-
cumentados, sino hijos de inmigrantes africanos nacidos en Italia. Asimismo, en
Tesalónica, Grecia, en agosto de 2007, inmigrantes nigerianos y lugareños se en -
frentaron después de que un inmigrante muriera al aventarse por el balcón de una
cafetería pensando que lo estaba persiguiendo la policía. El inmigrante vendía dis-
cos compactos y pensó que dos hombres eran policías y lo iban a detener. Los nige-
rianos se reunieron afuera de la cafetería y empezaron a arrojar piedras a la policía,
que respondió al ataque. 
En Estocolmo, Suecia, en junio de 2010, unos cien jóvenes de ascendencia
somalí quemaron una escuela y lanzaron piedras a la policía en los disturbios ra -
ciales que duraron dos noches. La razón fue que les negaron el acceso a un baile que
se llevaba a cabo en la escuela. 
En Canadá, el racismo institucional ha estallado en disturbios en lugares como
Montreal, Quebec. En agosto de 2008, el asesinato del joven hondureño de 18
años, Freddy Villanueva, quien murió a manos de la policía. Freddy jugaba dados
con su hermano Danny y otros seis amigos en el barrio de migrantes de Montreal
Nord, cuando la policía llegó a arrestar a Danny por un presunto robo. Freddy se
interpuso entre su hermano y la policía para evitarlo, y les pidió que se fueran; sin
embargo, como sacó las manos de los bolsillos, la policía interpretó el gesto como
una amenaza y le dispararon. El asesinato provocó una manifestación pacífica que
terminó en disturbios en los que los inconformes cometieron actos de vandalismo
en comercios y paradas de autobús. Un policía resultó herido de bala. Los barrios
de migrantes en Montreal son similares a los guetos de las minorías donde se re -
gistraron los disturbios de París en 2005.
En Estados Unidos no ha habido conflictos en fechas recientes a causa del
racismo institucional relacionado con los migrantes, pero lugares como Los Ánge-
les han sido escenarios de disturbios motivados por racismo institucional hacia
afroamericanos, como ocurrió con los enfrentamientos que devinieron de la trans-
misión televisiva del video en el que unos policías asesinaron a golpes al auto mo vi -
lista afroamericano Rodney King, en 1992. Los disturbios se extendieron por varios
días en esa ciudad, así como en San Francisco, Nueva York y Atlanta.
Enfrentamientos entre dos minorías
Este tipo de violencia tiene que ver con la creciente marginación de las minorías
étnicas, las cuales tienen que competir por re cursos y territorio en iguales condi-
ciones de marginación. Por ejemplo, en Atenas, Grecia, el 30 de agosto de 2008,
se registró en la Plaza Omonoia, en el centro de Atenas, un enfrentamiento entre
unos ciento cincuenta inmigrantes africanos que trabajaban como vendedores
ambulantes. El incidente dejó trece personas heridas, algunas de ellas de gravedad.
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Según testigos, los inmigrantes llevaban armas blancas y peleaban por territorio. Un
policía herido disparó a un inmigrante y a un transeúnte. Se arrestó a 56 perso-
nas. En Grecia viven un millón de inmigrantes, alrededor de una décima parte de
la población griega.
Un caso grave ocurrió en Almería, España, el 6 de septiembre de 2008. Aquí
los inmigrantes africanos se amotinaron en el barrio marginal de Roquetas del
Mar —que se constituye de unas doscientas casas— luego de que un inmigrante
senegalés de 28 años fuera asesinado. Según testigos, el africano fue agredido por
un español de origen gitano cuando el primero trató de intervenir en una disputa
entre africanos y gitanos. Los amotinados incendiaron dos casas de parientes del
presunto culpable, así como varios automóviles. Los disturbios duraron siete horas
y se repitieron la noche siguiente. La víctima trabajaba en los invernaderos almerien -
ses y tenía tres años de radicar en España, donde vivía con su esposa y dos hijas.
Otro ejemplo lo encontramos de nuevo en Inglaterra. En octubre de 2005, en
Birmingham, jóvenes afrobritánicos (cristianos) y asiaticobritánicos (musulmanes)
se enfrentaron luego de que una adolescente de origen caribeño y estatus migra-
torio irregular fuera víctima de una violación tumultuaria por parte de jóvenes asiá -
ticos. Al parecer, la joven fue sorprendida robando en la tienda de un asiático, quien
ofreció no denunciarla a cambio de favores sexuales. Después de esto, se dice que
la chica fue violada por un grupo de entre 8 y 19 hombres asiáticos, aunque también
se asegura que no hay evidencia lo suficientemente sólida para confirmar la exis-
tencia del ataque tumultuario. Sin embargo, la posibilidad suscitó enfrentamien-
tos entre jóvenes pertenecientes a ambas minorías y derivaron en disturbios en los
que murieron dos jóvenes y se vandalizaron comercios y lugares comunitarios de
sus respectivos barrios.
También en Bradford, Inglaterra, en enero de 2008, hubo un enfrentamien-
to entre británicos de origen asiático y polacos, iniciado por los británicos. Los jó -
venes argumentan que los inmigrantes económicos de Europa del Este les quitan
los trabajos. En Bradford hay un gran número de asiáticos y ya ha habido enfren-
tamientos antes entre asiáticos y blancos. Los inmigrantes se han asentado en cinco
de los barrios más pobres, los cuales tienen altos porcentajes de minorías étnicas. Por
ahora, los enfrentamientos se limitan a amenazas verbales, vandalismo contra coches
y pequeñas peleas. Los líderes comunitarios sostienen que la actitud de estos jóve-
nes es una especie de revanchismo por lo que ellos han tenido que sufrir durante años
a manos de la mayoría blanca. Los asiáticos se defienden de acu saciones de racismo,
arguyendo que no se trata de raza sino de número, pues perci ben que están llegando
demasiados polacos, quienes se dedican a vender mercancías en las calles, como bi -
su tería y otras baratijas.
Asimismo, en la ciudad inglesa de Dewsbury, en febrero de 2008, inmigrantes
húngaros y pakistaníes se enfrentaron con machetes y cuchillos en Ravensthorpe,
una comunidad multirracial. El choque empezó porque supuestamente los hún-
garos tocaron a una chica pakistaní. Hubo varios heridos. Ya había habido un en -
frentamiento entre iraquíes y pakistaníes el verano de 2007, cuando los iraquíes
kurdos hostigaban sexualmente a las chicas pakistaníes. 
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Hay otros casos en los que la violencia deriva de las actividades de bandas
rivales que se organizan étnicamente. En Madrid, España, el 21 de enero de 2007,
unos mil jóvenes españoles arrojaron piedras a la policía y prendieron fuego en un
suburbio madrileño luego de un fin de semana de enfrentamientos contra una ban da
de jóvenes latinoamericanos conocida como los Latin Kings. Los jóvenes españoles
culpan a éstos del incremento de la delincuencia; muchos jóvenes ecuatorianos
se han sumado a las filas de los Latin Kings por el alto desempleo que hay entre los
inmigrantes. También en Los Ángeles, California, se suscitó un motín en la cárcel
Pitchess, que se prolongó durante cinco días luego de que bandas de latinos y afro -
americanos se enfrentaran en febrero de 2009. El motín involucró a más de tres-
cientos internos, treinta de los cuales resultaron heridos. Este enfrentamiento es un
reflejo de las crecientes tensiones entre afroamericanos y la cada vez más copiosa
minoría latina, quienes compiten por los trabajos con mejores salarios y el acceso
a los beneficios sociales.
Conclusiones
En este artículo se demostró que la negación y el desconocimiento de los derechos
humanos que se dan con la criminalización y la discriminación conforman lo que
Coutin (2003) denomina el espacio de no existencia, y constituyen lo que Honneth
(1997) ha denominado “una falta de reconocimiento intersubjetivo”. Si bien la
vulnerabilidad de los migrantes (Bustamante, 2002) es lo que genera su deman-
da y un beneficio político-económico para las sociedades receptoras, ésta tiene un
impacto social a corto, mediano y largo plazo: conflicto social de diversos calibres.
El conflicto va desde apoyo a ideologías extremistas, hasta motines en los centros
de detención y disturbios raciales.
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Over the last five years, local anti-immigration actions have emerged in reaction
to the U.S. federal government’s perceived inability to secure national borders and
control “illegal” immigration. Local restrictionist measures have sought to control,
deter, and incapacitate the presence of immigrants by using police authority to re gu -
late public health and safety and to maintain peace and public welfare. Although such
ordinances defend the need to control “illegal” immigration by localizing immi gra tion
enforcement efforts at the level of municipalities and neighborhoods, anti-immi gra -
tion measures have attempted to control the everyday practices of undocumented
immigrants rather than the processes and policies of undocumented immigration.
Local regulations have therefore purposely been conceived to restrict services to un -
documented immigrants, forcing them to leave the country or at least relocate to
another city. 
Since 2006, local anti-immigrant ordinances, officially termed “illegal immi-
gration relief acts,” have been introduced across the United States, but very few have
been enacted.1 They have had limited legal and constitutional success, but they
have had a tremendous impact in furthering anti-immigrant sentiment by reinforcing
the construct of the immigrant as “illegal” and “criminal.” Local ordinan ces have
inflamed a fierce divide on how best to address the current and future presence
of unauthorized immigrants. On one side are those who hold unauthorized immi-
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grants responsible for all the country’s economic and social ills; on the opposing side
are those who see unauthorized immigration as the result of foreign and economic
policies benefiting U.S. employers and ultimately consumers. 
In this article, we examine the concept of “public nuisance” as the foundation
of these local anti-immigration ordinances and the particular reference to undoc-
umented immigrants as “public nuisances” in order to criminalize them. We look
at the narrative of local anti-immigration ordinances inscribed in the larger federal
regime of criminalization and securitization prevalent in recent years in the United
States. We observe profound changes and tensions in the legislative enforcement
of immigration policy and the numerous mixed signals sent to local authorities
wishing to get involved in regulating and curtailing immigration. Immigration has
long been viewed as a “broken system.” Expanding legislation to create new immi-
gration crimes has further strengthened this image of it as a problem. Local autho r -
ities have increasingly felt compelled to enforce immigration control on their ter-
ritories given the lack of progress in enacting comprehensive immigration reform at
the federal level. Proponents of local anti-immigration ordinances have marshalled
their authority to regulate and remove the “illegals” around the very construct of this
“illegality” and through local police powers to regulate public health and safety and
to maintain public peace and welfare. 
Municipal anti-immigration ordinances in the United States have used the le -
gally broad concept of “public nuisance” to criminalize the presence of immigrants
in public and private spaces of their territories. While localities have the power
to abate a public nuisance, the particular rationality of how they have become
“empowered and mandated…to abate the nuisance of illegal immigration by dili-
gently prohibiting the acts and policies that facilitate illegal immigration and pun-
ishing the people and businesses that aid and abet illegal aliens” (City of Hazelton
2006a) is a socio-legal misconstruction used in many ordinances that has been ruled
unconstitutional and preemptive to federal authority. Equating “illegal” immigration
to public nuisance has nevertheless boosted anti-immigration sentiments, instilled
fear, and created the perception of urgency to do whatever is needed to control, deter,
and remove unauthorized immigrants from communities. Our argument is that, de -
s pite the almost complete legislative failure of local anti-immigration ordinances,
their success in mobilizing support and sustaining anti-immigrant sentiment rests
on both the discursive use of public nuisance and the broader criminalizing nar-
rative associated with immigration as risk and security management. 
The Broken Immigration System 
And the Criminalization of Immigrants
Immigration has traditionally come solely under federal jurisdiction but has held
a relatively low, marginalized status within the federal bureaucracy until it was pro m -
inently brought to the foreground of the domestic security regime after Sep -
tember 11, 2001 (Bigo 2002; Tirman 2004; Coleman 2005). Although immigration
86 LIETTE GILBERT AND KATHY A. KOLNICK
law has traditionally been preoccupied with protecting sovereignty by controlling
national borders, its rationality and implementation fluctuated according to foreign
relations, labor demands, and discretionary powers. Probably more than in any other
sector of the federal administration, the legal culture of immigration has been in -
fluenced by past and present currents of nativism and xenophobia, putting further
political pressure on a process split between market efficiencies and exclusionist po l -
icies (Nevins 2002; Tichenor 2002; Ngai 2004). The conflicted perception of the
immi gration regime extends automatically to the most concerned, immigrants them -
selves, who, in accordance with their status, generally lack legal, cultural, and polit-
ical recognition. Whether authorized or unauthorized, immigrants have customarily
been blamed for the shortcomings of immigration policy, economic vibrancy, and
national homogeneity. These shortcomings then legitimize the necessity of immi-
gration reforms and immigrant control (Chavez 2008; Newton 2008; Koulish 2010).
Immigration has long been associated with securitization issues to justify sov-
ereignty. In the past few decades, control of immigrants and immigration has linked
the sovereignty narrative to a new security and risk-management narrative (Walters
2006, 2008). The 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act, adopted during the
Reagan administration, and the 1990 Immigration Act, passed just afterward, in -
creased sanctions and criminal fines for immigration-related offenses. Partisan lines
notwithstanding, the Clinton government adopted both the 1996 Illegal Immi gration
Reform and Immigrant Responsibilities Act (IIRIRA) and the 1996 Antite rrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act, both of which sought to eliminate judicial reviews,
strengthen and expedite removal proceedings, create new federal crimes, and in ten -
sify law enforcement.
The disquieting events of September 2001 provided an astonishing opportu-
nity and justification for consolidating the earlier efforts of immigration control
reforms as risk and crime management. Anti-terrorism statutes enacted under the
Bush government were laden with immigration-related criminalizing provisions, all
in the name of national security. Under popular and bi-partisan pressure to secure
borders, immigrants were redefined through the lens of national security, leading
to preemptive strategies, often with little attention to due process or the rule of law.
Among the most penalizing crime-control legislation enacted by the last Bush gov -
ern ment, the 2001 Patriot Act provided extensive powers to intercept and detain
suspected terrorists; the 2005 Real ID Act increased immigration enforcement and
authentication mechanisms; and the 2006 Secure Fence Act sought to control
“illegal” immigration by building a wall along the U.S.-Mexican border. Programs
related to these legislative initiatives increase immigration-related criminal con-
victions through the erosion of the judicial process, the expansion of law enforcement
and surveillance technologies, and the growth of preventive and indefinite deten-
tions (Kanstroom 2004; Koulish 2010). Unauthorized immigrants were seen as a
domestic threat to national security. Although “illegal” immigration is largely a civil
offense, such a threat justified the redefinition of immigrants as cri minals and ter-
rorists. As Koulish argues,
CONSTITUTIONAL FAILURE 87
Criminalization is a tactic in the war on immigrants. It is a form of social control that
uses law and legal culture to ostracize and control segments of the population through
a myriad of techniques including surveillance, biometrics, extending the reach of the
criminal law, and using civil laws to help criminalize people. (2010, 39)
Conflating civil and criminal immigration law, the new risk-management dis-
course condemned undocumented entry as a criminal nuisance misdemeanor (rather
than a violation of civil immigration law). Such discourse therefore depicts immi-
grants as criminals who put the nation and society at risk and consequently justifies
a range of punitive preemptive measures, such as the unprecedented border wall
construction and increased immigration law enforcement on local streets, as the
necessary fix for the broken immigration system (Nevins 2002; Newton 2008;
Doty 2009; Brown 2010). 
Entangled Enforcement of Immigration Law
Civil immigration offenses have been criminalized and other aspects of immigration
legislation have created a series of new immigration crimes resulting in unprece-
dented collaboration between the Department of Justice and the Department of
Homeland Security (Tirman 2004; Chishti 2006-2007; Legomsky 2007; Aldana
2007-2008; Koulish 2010). Official cooperation in immigration law enforcement,
federally authorized by the 1996 IIRIRA Section 287(g), as well as local enforce-
ment attempts, as in the recent anti-immigration ordinances targeting direct polic-
ing or indirect control strategies, have been some of the many ways to expand the
securitization and the criminalization of immigration at the local level (Walters 2006,
2008; Coleman 2007; Varsanyi 2008). Legislative proposals, such as the Border
Protection, Antite rro rism and Illegal Immigration Control Act of 2005 (SB4437)
by Representative Jim Sensenbrenner (R-Wisconsin), although not passed by the
U.S. Congress, nevertheless contributed to the punitive and criminalizing climate
surrounding immigrants —and in this particular case, also immigration supporters
and advocates.
In recent years, immigration law enforcement has expanded from customs and
border patrol agents to numerous untrained and unaccountable hands such as deten -
tion officers, airline agents, state officials, sheriff ’s deputies, and local politicians
(Walters 2002; Koulish 2010). The problem with this outsourcing of immigration
control from the federal level is that it creates the myth that a multitude of actors are
suddenly enforcing immigration law, from police to landlords to vigilante groups.
It accentuates the risk for harassment and, again, reifies the idea that the immi-
gration system is broken and therefore requires these local and exceptional measures
(Newton 2008). While states and localities might have a larger role to play in the man-
agement of immigration given their more direct contact with immigrants, the threat
of piecemeal immigration policy and inconsistency in enforcement is highly prob-
lematic, especially given the discretionary powers and vagaries of legal norms and
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processes related to immigration (Campbell 2007; Rodriguez 2008). As a result, it
seems like immigration jurisprudence constantly negotiates with, and is negotiated
between, the boundaries of law and exception.2 New actors and tactics of immigra -
tion law enforcement have raised many challenges to its constitutionality at the
local level. 
The U.S. Supreme Court has consistently ruled that the federal government
has broad and exclusive power to regulate immigration, even though such power is
not expressly drawn from the U.S. Constitution, but from the Constitution’s Su -
premacy Clause. Immigration power is a plenary power authorizing the legislative
and executive branches to regulate immigration free of judicial review in order to
invoke the federal government’s prerogatives over national sovereignty and secu-
rity. The federal government can therefore decide to enter into agreements with
state law enforcement agencies to perform immigration law enforcement func-
tions, as it has done through IIRIRA Section 287(g). The Tenth Amendment of the
U.S. Constitution, however, prevents the federal government from compelling a state
to enforce federal regulation. Nevertheless, under specific conditions and agreements
state and local police might be given “inherent authority” to make arrests in cases
of criminal as well as civil immigration law in the narrow yet quite expandable name of
security.3 However, as McKanders clarifies, “Even though the federal govern ment has
authorized state and local governments to cooperate with them in enforcing fed-
eral immigration laws, the federal government has not enacted laws that give state and
local governments full authority to create laws targeting immigrants” (2009, 36).
The blurred line between deputizing the enforcement of federal immigration law and
proposing new immigration law exceeding the terms of Section 287(g) agreements
raises much debate about the inherent power of state and local governments to make
arrests for violation of federal immigration law (Keblawi 2003-2004). State and local
police can actually only use 287(g) authority when people are already in custody as
a result of violating other state or local criminal laws (Koulish 2010). 
As states and localities have increasingly sought to enact their own measures
to control immigration and ordinances defending their “inherent powers,” courts
across the country have so far reaffirmed the unconstitutionality of most state and
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2 Plenary powers imply that the federal government can decide how to enforce immigration law. The
absence of normal judicial restraint means that the government can justify the criminalization of
immigrants because of the security argument or what Giorgio Agamben (2005, 7) describes as the state
of exception (i.e., “exceptional circumstances of necessity or emergency”). Koulish rightly states, “Perhaps
more than any other field of law, immigration practices occur in the exceptional space where petty
sovereigns assert their will upon the bare life of individual immigrants, specifically, the undocumented
immigrants” (2010, 27). “Petty sovereigns” is a term borrowed from Judith Butler (2004) to describe
the emergent class of control officials and risk managers (see also Bigo 2002).
3 According to the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement agency, as of October 29, 2010, ICE cu r -
rently “has 287(g) agreements with 71 law enforcement agencies in 25 states. Since January 2006, the
287(g) program is credited with identifying more than 185 000 potentially removable aliens —most-
ly at local jails. ICE has trained and certified more than 1 213 state and local officers to enforce immi-
gration law” (2011).
local immigration initiatives that attempted to regulate any aspects of immigration.4
The widely-known refrain of anti-(“illegal”) immigration proponents reviling the
federal government’s incapacity to regulate borders and enforce immigration law
is justified in their view given municipal police authority and mandate to protect
the general welfare of the people.5 State and local police power has traditionally
encompassed some authority to enforce criminal provisions, but until 1996, civil
provisions of immigration were an exclusively federal responsibility. Civil enforce-
ment of immigration law remains contentious terrain. Many state and local police
agencies feel that enforcing civil provisions of immigration law clearly exceeds their
mandate, training, and resources, and undercuts the last decades’ community po -
li cing efforts to gain the trust of communities (Harris 2006; Chishti 2006-2007). It
also exposes the police force to civil liability since the enforcement of civil provisions
of immigration law is greatly misunderstood and can easily result in civil rights viola -
 tions stemming from racial profiling practices that target “illegal” immigrants —immi -
gration status is, of course, impossible to profile.
The problem with immigration enforcement is that it has been broadly deployed
with no consideration for constitutional protections for immigrants. Enforcement agen -
cies have “pretextually relied on the more flexible immigration law enforcement to
conduct criminal investigations to also charge persons with non-immigration crimes,
including allegations of identity theft, terrorism, and drugs” (Aldana 2007-2008,
1129).6 Recent years of immigration enforcement clearly reveal that the civil offense
of “illegal” entry and the administrative process of deportation are far more often
sanctioned than an employer’s criminal offenses of hiring undocumented people
(Legomsky 2007). Legomsky concludes that the criminal justice system has asym -
 metrically incorporated criminal justice norms into immigration control without the
procedural and substantive rights recognized in criminal cases. As he suggests,
from a procedural standpoint, this asymmetry leaves policymakers with little political
appetite for allowing adjudicative fairness and accuracy to temper cost and efficiency
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4 Numerous state and local measures have been ruled unconstitutional on the basis that they infringed
the federal government’s exclusive jurisdiction over matters relating to immigration. Among the most
notorious cases are the California’s 1994 Proposition 187 (Save Our States initiative) that sought to
prohibit “illegal” immigrants from using health care, public education, and other social services, and
the 2010 Arizona State Bill 1070 (Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act),
adopting an “attrition through enforcement” approach and granting Arizona’s state and local agencies
the power to identify, prosecute, and deport “illegal” immigrants. A federal injunction prevented the law
from going into effect. At the municipal level, the most scrutinized and comprehensive anti-“illegal”
immigration ordinance was drafted by Hazleton, Pennsylvania. Hazleton’s illegal immigration relief act,
tenant registration program, and English-only ordinances were adopted in 2006 but, in a verdict long-
awaited by other small towns considering Hazleton-like legislation, were ruled unconstitutional.
5 Anti-(illegal) immigrant proponents turned to the Bybee Immigration Memo of 2002, which finds
inherent sovereignty in the state’s police power; a state can enforce federal civil immigration law
when actions are authorized by state law and not preempted by federal law (Koulish 2010).
6 Civil and criminal immigration enforcement conflates to the point that detention, once reserved for
the most dangerous, is now broadly applied to all removal cases. Immigration detention is currently the
fastest growing segment of jail population in the U.S. (McKanders 2009; Koulish 2010).
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concerns. From a substantive standpoint, it leaves them little incentive to balance the
government interests in deterring and incapacitating immigration offenders against
either the interests of the immigrants themselves or the interests of the U.S. citizen fam-
ily members, friends, employers, and communities who are left behind. (2007, 473)
Indeed, in recent years, immigrants and their families across the U.S. have lived
in fear of arrest in their worksites, neighborhoods, shopping malls, and homes, and of
detention and charges of immigration crimes leading to their removal.
Anti-immigrant measures have drawn on exceptions of law; they have enabled an
indiscriminate climate of enforcement where people have been targeted, arrested,
and detained without probable cause or reasonable suspicion of having commit-
ted a crime. They have done so targeting the “illegality” of residents outside estab-
lished legal and constitutional norms preventing them from identifying the status
of immi grants and because they are driven by and further a populist anti-immigrant
agenda motivated by NIMBYism and prejudice (Chavez 2008; Newton 2008).
The Ambiguous Success 
Of Local Anti-immigration Ordinances
Local ordinances are defended as acts resulting from the federal inability to control
national borders and efforts to give local and state government (police, department
of motor vehicle clerks) and non-government actors (employers, landlords) control
powers over “illegal” immigrants’ everyday spaces and encounters and apprehend them
to force them out of their communities. Conflating immigration control with threats
of terrorism, anti-(“illegal”) immigration ordinances sought to extend the Depart -
ment of Homeland Security’s post-9/11 security regime away from the border, into
small towns and neighborhoods (Gilbert 2009). 
Based on a common template allegedly prepared and promoted by the Immi -
gration Reform Law Institute, the public-interest legal body of the conservative
Federation of Americans for Immigration Reform (FAIR 2007), the adoption of the
model ordinance spread quickly across the country and took roots in localities that
felt uneasy in the face of the growing presence of immigrants. Local ordinances ge n -
erally sought to discourage the residency of “illegal” immigrants by declaring English
an official language, eradicating gathering places for day laborers, establishing re g -
istration policies, forcing landlords to verify potential renters’ immigration status,
and restricting hiring practices and access of services beyond federal standards. In
doing so, they make enforcement agents out of local landlords, employers, munic-
ipal clerks, and police, all of whom have had no training in immigration law and
no accountability.
In creating new forms of regulation for immigrants, local ordinances blatantly
violated constitutional and civil rights, and key cases have been ruled unconstitu-
tional. Their unconstitutionality has been clearly expressed by Judge Munley’s ruling
in the case of Lozano v. City of Hazleton (2007). Because “federal law pre-empts IIRA
[Illegal Immigration Relief Act] and RO [Registration Ordinance],” Munley argues
that these ordinances “violate the procedural due process protection of the Four -
teenth Amendment of the United States Constitution” and, therefore, that “enacting
unconstitutional laws is beyond the defendant’s police powers” (191-192). Hazleton
was therefore permanently enjoined from enforcing its ordinances by the courts,
first in 2007, and again in 2010. Other municipalities have experienced similar
legal challenges resulting in the same preemption and unconstitutionality rulings.
Despite the public expressions of support for Hazleton-like ordinances, their un -
constitutionality has been clearly established and regulatory authority over immi-
gration remains concentrated at the federal level. But the controversy does not
end here. 
Equally contentious is the discriminatory motive behind local ordinances. Pro -
ponents of anti-immigration ordinances (among others, Hazleton’s former mayor
and now U.S. Representative Lou Barletta [R-Pennsylvania] and Kris W. Kobach,
former legal counsel with the Immigration Law Reform Institute and now Kansas
secretary of state) “readily admitted that the true goal behind the listed protections
is to have immigrants relocate or self-deport” (McKanders 2009, 117). The most vi cious
aspect of anti-immigration ordinances is the belief that local police authorities can
determine who may be legal and “illegal” without prejudice and discrimination, by
observing such attributes as race, accent, appearance, or surname profiling. Such
a flawed assumption indicates a profound conviction that undocumented immi-
grants are “illegals” and “criminals” and that constitutional provisions of protection
and due process do not apply to those entering or present in the country “illegally.”
However, in the Lozano v. City of Hazleton ruling, Judge Munley unambiguously
insisted that people unlawfully entering or present in the country are guaranteed due
process of law by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
We cannot say clearly enough that persons who enter this country without legal autho -
rization are not stripped immediately of all their rights because of this single act. The
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that no State may
“deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due process of law; nor deny
any person within its jurisdiction with the equal protection of the laws.”…The United
States Supreme Court has consistently interpreted this provision to apply to all people
present in the United States, whether they were born here, immigrated here through
legal means, or violated federal law to enter the country. (Lozano v. City of Hazleton
2007, 43-45)
In his conclusion, Judge Munley goes even further by suggesting that the crisis
of perception of “illegality” experienced by Hazleton has no bearing on the constitu -
tional provisions of due process and equal protection. He states, 
Whatever frustrations officials of the City of Hazleton may feel about the current
state of federal immigration enforcement, the nature of the political system in the United
States prohibits the City from enacting ordinances that disrupt a carefully drawn fed-
eral statutory scheme. Even if federal law did not conflict with Hazleton’s measures,
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the City could not enact the ordinances that violates rights the Constitution guaran-
tees to every person in the United States, whether legal resident or not….Hazleton,
in its zeal to control the presence of a group deemed undesirable, violated the right of
such people, as well as others within the community. (Lozano v. City of Hazleton 2007,
188-189)
Nevertheless, local governments used their political power to challenge fed-
eral regulation and to legitimize their ambitions by capitalizing on a climate of na -
tional insecurity in order to build consensus in the extremely contentious “illegality”
debate. Beyond the constitutional argument, the discriminatory motive under -
lying the ordinances was promoted by local politicians who seized political op -
portu nities to fast-track political careers in the name of morality and patriotism.
Politicians’ obsession with “illegal status” was refuted by court rulings, but never-
theless prevailed in sustaining and furthering the anti-“illegal” immigration senti-
ment. Such sentiment criminalizing a vulnerable segment of the population was
supported by a strong current of populism, nativism, and neoconservatism fed by
mainstream and conservative media. According to Newton, “Political elites rely on
emotion in justifying political choices; they employ stories that are instinctually
appealing to their audiences, packing them with language and symbols that tap into
widely understood notions of who and what comprises the American immigrant
experience” (2008, 3). 
Oscillating between the discourses of security threat and economic scape-
goating, the narratives of “illegality” and criminality continue to add confusion to
the “broken federal immigration policy” discourse and to the entangled relation-
ships of immigration enforcement. Meanwhile, in the complementary narratives of fear
and urgency about reforming the so-called broken system, preemptive immigra-
tion law enforcement finds political and public support, and therefore means that
exceptions and abuses will likely occur, be tolerated and, even more problematically,
be rationalized through law (McKanders 2009; Koulish 2010). Central to this horta-
tory language of local politicians and local policies is the construction of immigrants
and their practices as a public nuisance.
“Illegal” Immigration as Public Nuisance
Public nuisance has been used preemptively as the operative foundation of local
anti-immigration ordinances. The legal concept of “nuisance” has traditionally been
used to describe the activity or condition that unreasonably harms, annoys, or
interferes with the rights of individuals (private nuisance) or with the rights of the
general public (public nuisance). A nuisance is controlled by local police powers
derived from a fundamental role of government (authorized by the Tenth Amend -
ment of the U.S. Constitution) to regulate public health, safety, and welfare. The
common law concept of nuisance deals with violations of common interests after
they occur, such as the already-operating factory that contaminates a neighbor-
hood’s air, soil, or water. In such a case, neighbors can demand the abatement of
a nuisance that inhibits their health, safety, and welfare. A police agency or court
would then make a judgment in the particular case as to whether or not a nuisance
exists (and a tort or breach of duty has been committed). Nuisance in fact always
requires proof of the act and its consequences; and its outcome, if any, will be com -
pensatory rather than a solution to the problem. Municipal corporations also have
the right and responsibility under the police power to adopt regulations to limit the
uses and occupations either considered nuisances per se or that tend to become
nuisances in certain situations and conditions.7
Legal scholars have described public nuisance as an “impenetrable jungle” and
a “legal garbage can” full of “vagueness, uncertainty, and confusion” and “notori-
ously contingent and unsummarizable” (quoted in Faulk and Gray 2007). The con -
cept nevertheless provides a flexible judicial tool to address conflict in land use and
social welfare and to prove substantial interference. Although the principle has since
been replaced by more precise legislation, governmental authorities generally used
public nuisance to stop conduct that was considered quasi-criminal because, although
not strictly illegal, it was deemed potentially harmful to the general public’s peace,
comfort, and morals (Faulk and Gray 2007). Moreover, police power is the most com -
prehensive of government powers, but also the vaguest, as the precise components
and definitions of public health, safety, and welfare are not unanimous and fixed;
rather they vary according to the social, economic, and political conditions of a place.
Thus, the determination of nuisance as serious crime or simple annoyance is not only
difficult to establish but also requires proof of wrongdoing and consequent harm.
Anti-immigrant local politicians have legitimized their control-oriented actions
by using their police power authority “to abate public nuisances…and…to abate
the nuisance of illegal immigration by diligently prohibiting the acts and policies to
facilitate illegal immigration” (City of Hazleton 2006a). Proponents of anti-immi-
gration ordinances translate “illegal” presence in the country into criminal pres-
ence within their town boundaries. As perceived criminals, immigrants are seen as
illegitimate members of local communities who are undeserving of social benefits
and protections.
“Illegal” immigration as a whole and “illegal” immigrants more specifically are
understood as a “public nuisance,” a perceived aggravation and threat to the local
quality of life and neighborhoods. Embedded in the “illegal” and nuisance narratives
are the explicit collective beliefs and affirmations that legitimate members of soci-
ety are victimized by the presence of criminals among them. In anti-immigrant
sentiment and, in the texts of ordinances, the annoyance and menace of “illegal”
im migrant others legitimize arrests and deportations because undocumented im mi -
grants are not authorized to be in the country. By using the concept of public nui-
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7 In 2009, the City of Hazleton developed and adopted “Chronic Nuisance Properties, providing a new
process for enforcement and abatement of certain nuisance activities that repeatedly occur or exist
at chronic nuisance properties within the confines of the city” (City of Hazleton 2009).
sance, local advocates for tightening U.S. immigration laws evoke local police powers
to control, deter, and repel immigrants from their jurisdictions. 
The particular use of the nuisance rhetoric in anti-immigration ordinances res -
ponds to a series of unsubstantiated assumptions (expressed in the preamble sec-
tions) contending that “illegal immigration leads to higher crime rates, subjects
our hospitals to fiscal hardship and legal residents to substandard quality of care,
contributes to other burdens on public services, increasing their cost and decreasing
their availability to legal residents, and diminishes our overall quality of life” (City
of Hazleton 2006a). The initial use of the concept of nuisance in immigrant-related
ordinances might actually be linked to the control of day laborers in an early —and
rejected— ordinance in San Bernardino, California (prepared by Joseph Turner of
Save Our State in 2006). In that particular ordinance, “illegal” immigration, people
driving any vehicle used to solicit day laborers, as well as the vehicle itself, are de -
clared a nuisance (Turner 2006). Although targeting the use of property, the proposal
seems better intended for the eradication of day laborers’ presence by criminalizing
both immigrants and employers, and more broadly the regulation of public space.
Other increased social controls in public space ordinances have also been unsuc-
cessfully linked to immigration.
In fact, anti-immigration ordinances are reminiscent of past attempts by local
police to regulate disorder by enforcing criminalizing laws for vagrancy, loitering,
panhandling, and homelessness through property regulation tools like zoning laws.
When recent anti-immigration ordinances specifically attempted to control the pre s -
ence of immigrants by using trespassing laws, courts ruled that criminal trespas sing
charges were unconstitutional attempts at regulating immigration (Var sanyi 2008).
The use of trespassing laws was seen as just another disingenuous strategy to reg-
ulate “undesirable” persons or activities. 
The use of “public nuisance” to refer to undocumented immigrants is, however,
misleading. The legal concept of public nuisance cannot be used preemptively. Nui -
sance is usually determined after the fact and requires proof of harm. In the case
of local anti-immigration ordinances qualifying “illegal” immigration as public nui-
sance, proof of harmful conduct and consequent harm of the perceived negative
impacts of immigrants is merely impossible as it would require proof that “illegal”
immigrants have offended the rights of the public at large. As confident as they are,
anti-(“illegal”) immigration proponents are rather equivocal in their proof of harm.
In the case of Hazleton, the mayor clearly admitted he did not have data sub -
s tan tiating his claims but insisted that the claims were simply well-known facts
(McKanders 2009). Such threat and truth narratives become pervasive and work
particularly well because the basic premises are taken for granted (Chavez 2008). 
Moreover, in his work on the control of misconduct in city spaces, Ellickson
asserts that nuisance can only be created by acts, and not by status. He writes,
“Both classical-liberal ideals and the Constitution demand that the law of street
nuisances regulate a person’s choices, not some unalterable status. In particular, it
is impermissible to criminalize either the status of poverty or the status of home-
lessness” (1996, 1186-1187). Rationalizing “illegal” immigration as a nuisance is
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therefore highly problematic because it promotes a discriminatory “public inter-
est” that criminalizes a particular group with immigrant traits (however defined and
identified) not for any breach of local ordinances, but rather for their mere presence in
the urban setting. The latter point takes us back to the disguised and unconstitu-
tional attempt to regulation immigration locally. 
The spirit of local anti-immigrant ordinances that make it “illegal” for undoc-
umented immigrants to loiter in public spaces, occupy housing, or secure employ-
ment goes against the Fourth Amendment (curtailing abuses of policing powers)
because it attempts to justify their arrest (often without reasonable suspicion or pro b -
able cause) in public, quasi-private, and private spaces because their constructed
“illegality” makes them neither deserving nor reasonably expectant of the protec-
tion of their privacy (Aldana 2007-2008). Local anti-immigration ordinances and
their associated registration programs offer neither due process nor due protection
(and some would argue privacy and confidentiality of the gathered information)
and there fore increase the likelihood of people being subjected to excessive searches
by private and public officials. Though recent appellate court decisions have found
that anti-immigrant statutes are a violation of the application of police power, the
use of “public nuisance” in anti-immigration ordinances continues and conflates
cri minal and civil violations, national and local sovereignties, preemptive security
and anti-immigrant discrimination. Equating “illegal” immigration and nuisance is
mo tivated by the politics of exclusion and oppression.
It is also important to note that in many cases, local police do not wish to be -
come involved in immigration enforcement because it is counterproductive to
police work and threatens the efforts of community policing. The mandate of the
local police force is to prevent criminal acts rather than civil violations of immigra -
tion law. The level of discretion associated with enforcing civil offenses leads po -
licing agencies to abuse, discrimination, and profiling. Discretionary police powers
might serve as a bridge (as in community policing), but might also serve as a wall
(with deep foundations in discrimination). Sossin identifies three types of discre-
tion: legal (authority to determine); interpretive (accountability of meanings); and
communicative (modes of interactions and engagement) (1996). It is particularly
because of these discretionary latitudes that police power must be subjected to
constitutional rights in order to protect people. The Fourth Amendment of the
U.S. Constitution curtails abuses of policing powers (particularly against vulnerable
people), and such protection applies to non-citizens despite the regulatory expan-
sion of immigration enforcement into everyday spaces and practices. In the face of
such protection and the often vague and ambiguous definition of nuisance and
extended police power, the courts have imposed liability on a wide variety of activities
and conducts deemed to violate public health, safety, and welfare. Historically, the
concept was used to condemn socially undesirable forms of behavior and alleged
misconduct to protect public interest, health, safety, and morality (Keetin 1984 and
Wood 1893, quoted in Faulk and Gray 2007). Nowadays, local police are asked to
conduct immigration enforcement in the name of national security, even though
immigration control has in fact very little to do with terrorism prevention (Harris
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2006; Keblawi 2004; Koulish 2010). Still, the oversimplified message linking immi -
gration to “illegality,” criminality, and national security continues to gain much
support among anti-immigration and conservative forces (Chavez 2008; Newton
2008; Doty 2009).
Conclusion
Immigration is a complex issue with contentious social, political, and economic
implications, of which law enforcement is presented as the most apparent in the
current debate. Immigration was nevertheless always subjected to legislative ambi -
valence and judicial lassitude, making it a perfect conduit to fully advance a post-
September 11 security regime. Rationalizing the urgency to fix the “broken immi-
gration system,” congressional and local anti-(“illegal”) immigration proponents were
able to develop policy measures that exploited the pervasive anti-immigrant sen-
timent. Undocumented immigrants were no longer seen just as undesirable; their
presence in the U.S. was described by anti-immigrant proponents as “illegal,” who
argued that such “illegality” meant that a crime had been committed against the
na tion and that this crime warranted arrest and deportation. How “illegality” is
constructed is a contentious debate in and beyond the rule of law, but it remains
one of the most powerful myths surrounding immigration. 
With the increasing presence of undocumented immigrants throughout the
country, and the federal government’s persistent inability to control and reform immi -
gration policy, numerous local governments “took the law into their own hands” with
anti-(“illegal”) immigration ordinances that sought to regulate immigration in their
territories. With the goal of punishing and eliminating the crime of “illegal” im mi gra -
 tion, local anti-immigration ordinances represented the impacts of “illegal” immi-
gration as public nuisances to be abated. However, as Rose reminds us, “programs of
crime control have always had less to do with control of crime than they have to
do with more general concerns with the government of moral order” (2000, 321).
This is most evident in local anti-immigration ordinances that have alleged the de -
pletion of resources and services as a rationale for passing (unconstitutional) laws
that apply the vague legal concept of public nuisance to certain immigrants to dis-
courage them from entering and residing in a given locality. These ordinances succes s -
fully remind us that immigration continues to be about “who we are as people and
who we wish to include as part of the nation” (Chavez 2008, 23). 
Local anti-immigration ordinances, despite their constitutional failures in court,
have been able to extend the discourses of preemptive criminalization and enfor ce -
ment. They have done so by using the legally broad concept of public nuisance to
regulate crime, annoyance, and inconvenience in which they found rhetorical and
emotional comfort. However, ordinances failed to reasonably demonstrate that
the “illegality” of some residents is indeed an offense to the public at large. The im -
possibility of linking “illegal” presence or entry to harmful intent and proving that
a tort has been committed refutes the premise of nuisance. In disguising their
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intent to regulate “illegal” immigration under the concept of public nuisance, ordi -
nances propose to use nuisance and police power preemptively when the enforce-
ability of this law is customarily reactive. 
Local anti-immigration ordinances can nevertheless be seen as powerful events
that publicize the perceived untenable state of immigration, the alleged crimes
committed by undocumented immigrants, and the urgency of reforming immi-
gration policy. Local ordinances have not only been instrumental in spreading the
immigration debate to local communities throughout the U.S.; they have intensi-
fied that debate by reaching out to conservative and general patriotic emotions
reifying the construct of “illegality,” and therefore justifying the need for protec-
tion against it. 
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Immigration has long been a dominant thread in the fabric of United States his-
tory. Indeed, virtually every U.S. history book characterizes the country as “nation
of immigrants.” Despite this national identity, over the last decade, the U.S. and
international press have devoted a great deal of attention to anti-immigrant senti-
ment and anti-immigration policies within the United States. News coverage sug-
gests that the general public has become increasingly hostile to immigration and
that unfavorable attitudes toward immigrants are widely and uniformly held. We
believe that the current media spin on immigration is linked to important social
realities, including the quickening pace of globalization, the increased securitiza-
tion of the U.S.-Mexico border, the tragic jump in the number of border deaths,
global economic crisis, and the development of anti-immigrant policies and prac-
tices in many states and local jurisdictions. At the same time, it is our view that media
coverage of immigration issues is a poor gauge of the actual attitudes of the U.S.
public. In this article, we aim to more accurately characterize these attitudes by
reviewing what public opinion polls in the United States say about immigrants and
immigration policies. 
We argue that U.S. public opinion, including what appears to be “anti-mi grant”
sentiment, is, in fact, more complex than commonly reported by the media. To
reveal this complexity, we explore U.S. public reaction to a variety of immigration
issues, public policy proposals, and border strategies. We use recent polling data to
evidence that public opinion in the United States is not homogeneous. In particular,
Latino public opinion on immigration issues is markedly different from that of the
general population. Further, public opinion about this topic in border states deviates
significantly from the mainstream of opinion in the United States. We demonstrate
this by comparing national attitudes with attitudes in Arizona and California, two
border states with a substantial body of polling on this topic, providing ample data
with which to demonstrate and analyze the complexity of U.S. public opinion on
immigration.
In a democracy, public opinion research is a way to give “voice” to ordinary
people. Public opinion reflects the values, attitudes, and beliefs of specific popula-
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tions, such as residents of a nation, citizens, voters, or people who self-define as
being of a particular racial or ethnic group. Public opinion is also a dynamic com-
ponent of the policy process. Significantly, public opinion can lead to critical social
change; opinions sometimes crystallize around a particular political agenda, peo-
ple mobilize for change, and important policy changes are enacted. As research
has demonstrated, public opinion has played a critical role in the development of
key social movements for change throughout U.S. history (Piven 2006; Tarrow
1998). We believe that an analysis of public opinion provides critical insight into
public attitudes, including those that pose barriers to constructive policy change, as
well as those that may create valuable opportunities for future policy reform.
Public Attitudes
In order to discern public attitudes about immigration, we draw here on previous
literature reviewing U.S. public opinion in the 1990s and 2000s (Lapinski et al.
1997; Buck et al. 2003; Pantoja 2006; Segovia and Defever 2010). When looking
across years of data, it is striking to see that general attitudes toward immigration
have actually been relatively stable over time in the United States. Perhaps sur-
prisingly, it has never ranked highly when respondents are asked in an open-ended
format to identify the most important issues facing the nation today. Yet, when
directly asked to comment on the magnitude of the immigration “problem” in the
United States, three-quarters of respondents say immigration is either a “very big
problem” or a “moderately big problem” (Pew September 2002, March 2006). Yet,
on the whole, most people in the United States think immigration is a “good thing”
for the nation (Gallup Polls June 2001, 2002, 2003, 2005, 2006) and enhances
U.S. society (Hamilton College/Zogby International February 2003). 
Previous public opinion research has revealed that attitudes toward immigra-
tion tend to be more negative as the number of immigrants coming into the U.S.
increases and when economic conditions become unfavorable (Lapinski et al.
1997). Research has also shown that attitudes toward specific immigrant groups
vary, with European immigrants viewed more favorably than those from Asia and
Latin Amer ica (Lapinksi et al. 1997; Buck et al. 2003). Despite the fact that U.S.
residents think immigrants contribute more than detract from the nation’s well-
being, majorities of the U.S. public wish to decrease the flow of illegal immigrants
into the country (Lapinksi et al. 1997; Buck et al. 2003) and deny legal and illegal
immigrants access to a variety of public services (Pantoja 2006). Residents want
to see U.S. immigra tion policy totally overhauled; yet, there is little confidence in the
ability of elected officials to implement federal policy on the issue (Segovia and
Defever 2010).
When survey questions about immigration become more specific and provide
contextual information, positive public attitudes are dampened. Referencing the
“growing number of newcomers,” polls find that the country is divided as to whether
recent immigrants do or do not pose a threat to traditional American values (Pew
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August 2002, August 2003, January 2007). When the survey question is framed in
terms of “immigrants today,” 52 percent of people say that immigrants are a “burden
on our country” rather than strengthen the country (Pew December 2005, March
2006). Opinion on this topic was more divided from 2003 through the end of 2005,
with less than half of polling respondents saying immigrants are a “burden on our
country.” Pew surveys in 2006 and 2010 suggested that opinion is currently looking
more like it did in the 1990s when 63 percent of polling respondents thought of immi-
grants as a burden on the nation (Pew March 2006, June 2010).
Although many believe that immigrants place a burden on U.S. society, at the
same time, there is widespread recognition that immigrants play an important role
in its economy. From the early 1990s through today, a majority of survey respon-
dents in the United States agree that immigrants fill jobs that U.S. citizens do
not want, rather than take jobs away from U.S. residents (CBS/New York Times
June 1993, December 1995; CBS/New York Times January 1994, July 2005, Octo -
ber 2005; Pew March 2006). 
Beyond the general questions about immigration and immigrants outlined
above, some polls have focused on particular issues, policies, and/or groups of mi -
grants. To further reveal the complex and contingent character of attitudes about
immigration, we explore polls that have addressed governmental regulation of immi -
gration, the distinction between legal and illegal immigrants, various policy options, and
pathways to citizenship.
GOVERNMENTAL REGULATION OF IMMIGRATION
Public opinion polls indicate that U.S. residents look to the federal government for
solutions to immigration issues. Consistently, three-quarters of the population agrees
that the nation should “restrict and control” the flow of immigrants into the coun-
try “more than we do now” (Pew June 1992, July 1994, November 1997, Sep tem -
ber 1999, August 2002, August 2003, January 2007). How can immigrant flows be
better controlled? People would like to see the numbers of immigrants coming into
the U.S. decreased, rather than increased (CBS/New York TimesMay 2007). At times,
a majority of survey respondents have called for reductions in the flow of immi -
grants into the United States. This was especially evident immediately following the
September 11 terrorist attacks. Today, the percentage of people favoring decreas-
es in immigration hovers in the mid-30- to mid-40-percent range. The percentage
of people who would like to see immigration increased hovers in the mid-teens. 
It is clear that the tragedy of September 11, 2001, had an effect on immigration
attitudes in the U.S. The perpetrators of the attacks were foreign nationals who
came into the U.S. across seemingly porous borders. People today believe that stricter
immigration controls might have prevented their arrival on U.S. soil. When the
issue of immigration is contextualized with reference to September 11, survey res -
pondents take a firm stand against immigration. A February 2003 Hamilton Co l -
lege/Zogby International survey told voters that the U.S. has severely restricted
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the flow of “refugees” into the nation since September 11. When asked if the U.S.
should go back to pre-September 11 levels, 70 percent said, “No.”
To reiterate, whenever the conversation turns toward how best to control immi -
gration into the United States, people expect the federal government to take the
lead in this policy area. The U.S. public supports increased government spending
and increased government control in this field. At the same time, residents lack
confidence in the ability of their elected officials to effectively implement immi-
gration policy. 
LEGAL VS. ILLEGAL IMMIGRANTS
Immigrants can be in the U.S. legally or illegally. United States residents distinguish
between the two groups and have different attitudes toward them. While atti-
tudes toward legal immigrants are moderately supportive, attitudes toward illegal
immigrants are consistently negative. 
Heightened concern about illegal immigrants is not new. ANew York Times/CBS
News poll asked people in the mid-1980s if most recent immigrants are here legally
or illegally. Virtually half of the respondents (49 percent) said they thought recent
immigrants were here illegally (June 1986). One-third (32 percent) thought most im -
migrants were here legally and 19 percent were not sure. Following 9/11, the per centage
thinking most recent immigrants were here illegally moved up to the mid-fiftieth
percentile (NPR/Kaiser/Harvard University October 2004). In 2006, attitudes looked
much like they did in 1986, suggesting that the word “immigration” continued to
evoke illegal rather than legal immigration (Pew March 2006). Illegal immigration was
thought to be a “very serious problem” by a strong majority of re gistered voters in the
mid-2000s (Quinnipiac Poll February 2006). Roughly another 30 percent said ille-
gal immigration is a “somewhat serious” problem. In another survey, 67 percent say
illegal immigration is an “extremely important” or “very im portant” issue (CNN/Opi n -
ion Research Corporation September 2006).
In the mid- to late 2000s, polls found that the U.S. public believes that ille-
gal immigrants are filling unwanted, low-paying jobs in the U.S., rather than taking
jobs away from legal residents (CBS/New York TimesMay 2007). Regardless of the
types of jobs illegal immigrants are thought to hold, illegal immigration has a neg-
ative connotation. Illegal immigrants are believed to hurt the economy by driving
down wages and draining available funding for social services (CNN/USA Today/Ga l -
lup December 2005; NPR/Kaiser/Harvard October 2004; CNN Poll June 8-11,
2006). In contrast, legal immigrants are considered to be helping the U.S. economy
or to have no impact on the economy at all. Not surprisingly, the strength of the
economy affects public attitudes toward immigration and employment, and atti-
tudes toward illegal immigration are more negative during times of economic cri-
sis (Lapinski et al. 1997).
Whereas the U.S. public is concerned about the economic impact of illegal
immigration, it tends not to link illegal immigration and crime together. Most people
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think legal and illegal immigrants commit crime at the same rate as “native-born
Americans” (NPR/Kaiser/Harvard October 2004). Research supports the view
that crime is no more common among illegal immigrants, and some research has found
crime rates to be lower among migrants than among U.S. citizens (Valenzuela
and Martinez 2006).
POLICY OPTIONS
Polls in the mid-1990s explored policy options for handling illegal immigration,
including creating paths to citizenship, the merits of guest worker status, or de por -
tation of illegal immigrants. The policy debate expanded in the mid-2000s and in -
cluded discussion of many variants of citizenship and guest worker status. Newer
options include sending the National Guard to the border, building an impene-
trable fence on the border, denying a variety of social services to illegal immigrants,
and empowering citizen groups to patrol the borders. The expanded policy debate
has emerged from the failure to pass comprehensive immigration reform. New voic-
es have come to the table today and more policy alternatives are being identified.
The federal government is a major focus in the immigration debate. Three
out of five people think the federal government is “not tough enough” on immigra -
tion, and a majority say the government should spend more money “prevent[ing]
illegal immigrants from coming to this country” (NPR/Kaiser/Harvard October 2004).
There is majority support among voters in the United States for militarizing the
borders with federal agents and the National Guard (56 percent-78 percent), for
imposing fines on employers who hire illegal immigrants (60 percent), and for de -
porting immigrants who are not in the country lawfully (55 to 57 percent) (Fox
News/Opinion Dynamic Polls May 2005, April 2006, May 2006; Pew March 2006;
CNN June 2006). However, the country is divided over building a wall to stop ille-
gal immigration (45 percent in favor, 50 percent oppose), eliminating all forms of
public assistance to illegal immigrants and their children (43 percent in favor, 45
percent oppose), and sending employers who hire illegal immigrants to jail (40 per -
cent in favor, 55 percent oppose) (Pew January 2007; CNN September 2006).
There is tremendous support in the U.S. for centralizing and strengthening the
powers of government to more effectively enforce citizenship laws. Three-quar-
ters of the population support a national identity card that would prove whether
someone is a legal citizen or not (Pew March 2006). Two-thirds support a gov-
ernment database defining who is and is not legally eligible to work in the United
States and requiring employers to consult it before hiring new employees (Pew
March 2006).
Given the lack of comprehensive immigration reform, increased pressure has
been brought to bear in many states to have local police officers and, significant-
ly, U.S. citizens, play a larger role in monitoring and reporting immigration viola-
tions (Wonders 2006, 2008). Public opinion data indicate that the U.S. public
tends to support greater involvement of local police and ordinary citizens in immi-
THE COMPLEXITY OF IMMIGRATION ATTITUDES 107
gration enforcement efforts. Eighty-three percent of the U.S. public wants the
police to check citizenship status when someone is arrested; nine out of ten people
want social service agency workers to check the citizenship status of new applicants;
a similar proportion of respondents say employers should be required to check the
citizenship status of new employees (CNN Poll June 2006). Hospital workers are
the only group spared from the expectation that agencies and citizens ought to
routinely enforce immigration law; the country is divided over whether hospitals
should check citizenship status before tending to an injured person (CNN Poll
June 2006).
The public is very concerned that illegal immigrants are taking unfair advan-
tage of social service benefits provided by the government. Two-thirds say illegal
immigrants should not be eligible for state or local government benefits (Pew March
2006). The public does hold a special place for allowing the children of illegal immi -
grants to attend public school. Seventy-one percent say they should be allowed,
while 26 percent say they should not (Pew March 2006).
If the federal government is not going to do the job, should citizen groups be
allowed to enforce the border, especially citizens armed with weapons? Attitudes
toward the “Minutemen,” a group composed of citizen volunteers who patrol the
U.S. border with Mexico, divides the public. One-third or more of the U.S. pub-
lic support the work of the Minutemen, while another third considers them to be
little more than vigilantes (Pew March 2006; CBS News Poll October 2005; Fox
News/Opinion Dynamics Poll April 2005, May 2006). Two-thirds of the country
prefers having government rather than a voluntary group of citizens play the role
of border enforcer.
CITIZENSHIP VS. AMNESTY FOR ILLEGAL IMMIGRANTS
Over the last decade, a variety of proposals have called for new pathways to citi-
zenship as a policy response to illegal immigration in the United States. Many
undocumented immigrants have been living in the United States for a long time.
They are raising families here, working regular jobs, and paying taxes. How should
the nation respond to long-term illegal immigrants, as distinguished from recent
border crossers? Policy proposals run the gamut from deporting all illegal immi-
grants back to their country of birth to creating a path forward for these immigrants
to achieve legal citizenship. What does the public think about these proposals? The
answer is framed by the wording of the question itself.
If asking for a thumbs-up or thumbs-down on deporting all illegal immigrants, the
country says “thumbs-up.” Two-thirds of the nation approves of the U.S. govern ment
deporting illegal immigrants back to their native country (CNN Poll June 2006).
Opinion mellows slightly when deportation is played against granting “some kind of
legal status” to illegal immigrants already living in the U.S. Under this scenario,
40 percent of respondents think illegal immigrants should be allowed to stay in the
country (Pew March 2006). Significantly, two-thirds of registered voters support a
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middle path whereby illegal immigrants would be allowed to stay in the U.S. with
“temporary worker” status and then required to return to their home countries
(Ayers, McHenry & Associates June 2006; Quinnipiac University Poll November
2006).
It appears that the public does not support making it easier for undocumented
workers to become citizens (Gallup June 2005). However, opinion shifts 180 degrees
when the policy question is qualified to narrowly focus on immigrants who have
been in the U.S. for more than five years, are working, and would be required to
pay back taxes. Seventy-seven percent of residents support such a policy (CNN April
2006). The distinction between older undocumented workers living in the U.S.
and newer border crossers makes a significant difference in U.S. reaction to pro-
posed solutions. Upwards of 59 percent of survey respondents say workers who
have been in the U.S. for several years should be allowed to earn legal working
status and not be deported (Pew April 2006, January 2007). 
Finally, a significant proportion of the public prefers creating a path to citi-
zenship for undocumented migrants, rather than creating a temporary worker pro-
gram or deporting them back to their home countries (NPR/Kaiser/Harvard Octo -
ber 2004; USA Today/Gallup April 2006).
The Complexity of Public Opinion: 
Latinos and Border States
Thus far, we have focused on general U.S. public opinion about immigration. In
reviewing this data, it is evident that it is highly contextual and dependent upon
question wording. Still, we have outlined broad trends suggesting that the public
is more supportive of immigration than might be expected from media accounts; at
the same time, the general public consistently expresses concern about certain aspects
of immigration, particularly illegal immigration, and seeks greater governmental
involvement in this policy area.
In the following section, we seek to further reveal the complexity of U.S. public
opinion through more focused attention on key groups and locales central to the
immigration debate. First, we will explore Latino attitudes, followed by the exami -
na tion of two key border states, Arizona and California.
LATINO ATTITUDES
The Pew Hispanic Center conducted a National Survey of Latinos in 2006 just
before the November election. The results are interesting and bear mentioning
here. First, it is quite evident from the polling data that attitudes of Latinos living
in the U.S. (both native and foreign-born) are different from attitudes among the
population as a whole. Whereas the general public favors increasing border control
by deploying more federal agents and the National Guard, Latinos oppose these
measures (Pew July 2006). While the U.S. public is divided over proposals to build
a bigger, stronger fence at the border, Latinos oppose this fence by a two-to-one
margin (Pew July 2006). Ninety-three percent of Latinos prefer the U.S. developing
a route to citizenship for illegal immigrants already living in this country, though
the population divides over the question of allowing all illegal immigrants a chance
to become citizens or only those who have been here a minimum of five years
(Pew July 2006).
Arizona legislators recently signed SB1070 into law, requiring all law enforce-
ment personnel to check the immigration status of anyone suspected of being in
the country illegally. Although currently placed on hold by the federal courts, the
issue has become a lightening rod for divergent attitudes. According to a 2010 Pew
Hispanic Center survey of Latinos in the U.S., 64 percent of U.S. residents sup-
port SB1070. On the other hand, 79 percent of Latinos oppose Arizona’s immi-
gration law (Lopez, Morin, and Taylor 2010).
Significantly, the 2006 Pew study also shows there is growing concern with-
in the Latino community that ongoing debate over immigration is furthering dis-
criminatory attitudes in this country. About a third of Latinos in the 2010 survey report
that they or a family member have experienced discrimina tion within the past five
years due to their ethnicity.
At the same time, one result of recent immigration debates is a new solidarity
being forged within the historically divided U.S. Latino community (Pew July 2006).
Latinos believe their community will mobilize around discrimination issues and
express their voice in the voting booth and in the streets with renewed social mo ve -
ment activity (Pew July 2006). This is a significant finding given the growing presence
of Latinos in the United States and the potential of a proportionately large consti -
tuency like the Latino community for wielding power in the electoral system. As the
immigration debate continues to unify Latino identity and mobilize Latino power,
the character of politics in the United States will inevitably change.
TRENDS IN BORDER STATES
The complexity of U.S. public opinion about immigration is thrown into high relief
when we look specifically at attitudes in border states. Detailed investigation of
public opinion in border states demonstrates that attitudes and politics there are
not necessarily in tune with national U.S. attitudes, and they are certainly not homo -
genous. To illustrate, we explore public opinion toward immigration in two border
states: Arizona and California. Table 1 provides a quick glimpse of key demograph-
ic features of both, as compared to the U.S. as a whole.
As Table 1 indicates, there are significant differences in the proportion of the
Latino population in California (36 percent), and Arizona (30 percent), in contrast
with the United States as a whole (15 percent). Despite the similar percentage of
Latinos in each state, the sheer number of Latinos in California is six times larger than
in Arizona, a fact that we believe is important for understanding the differing atti-
110 FREDERIC I. SOLOP AND NANCY A. WONDERS
THE COMPLEXITY OF IMMIGRATION ATTITUDES 111
tudes within each state. Pew Hispanic Center estimates that Cali for nia heads the
list of “Estimates of the Unauthorized Migrant Population for States” with approx-
imately 2.55 million illegal immigrants in 2011, or 6.9 percent of the population
(Passel and Cohn 2011). Many of California’s “unauthorized immigrants” are from
a variety of nations, not just Spanish-speaking ones. Unauthorized immigrants con-
stitute 6.1 percent of the Arizona population with 400 000 illegal im migrants in 2011
(Passel and Cohn 2011).
One noteworthy difference between California and Arizona is that growth in
the population of “unauthorized immigrants” in the latter from 2000 to 2005 was
more dramatic than in the former. California saw a 15-percent increase in the “un -
authorized immigrant” population from 2000 to 2005 (Passel and Cohn 2010); in
contrast, Arizona witnessed a 50-percent increase during this period. As we have
evidenced, illegal immigration seems to be one of the largest sources of anxiety
about immigration within the U.S. In the 1990s, California experienced a rapid rise
in illegal immigration and correspondingly strong anti-immigrant sentiment, as shown
by public opinion data and the Proposition 187 debate (Daniels 2004).  It appears
that recent anti-immigrant sentiment in Arizona is similarly linked to a large new
increase in undocumented migration to the state.   
In the section below, we provide more detailed analysis of how attitudes in
these two border states differ from the nation, and from one another. Our analysis
demonstrates that differences in public opinion about immigration in Arizona and
California may be due, in part, to the timing of illegal migration. We also emphasize
the increased diversity of the population in these border states, especially the rel-
atively large and growing percentage of Latinos. The California example, in particu-
lar, suggests that as the Latino community expands in size, Latino attitudes take
on increased weight in statewide surveys, leading toward a moderation of opinion on
immigration issues. 
TABLE 1
KEY DEMOGRAPHIC FEATURES OF CALIFORNIA AND ARIZONA
U.S. California Arizona
Population (million)1 307 36.9 6.6
Percent Hispanic/Latino2 15 36 30
Numbers and percent 
of Undocumented 11.2  2.55 400 000 
Immigrants (million)3 (3.6%) (6.9%) (6.1%)
1 U.S. Census Bureau (2009).
2 American Community Survey (2005-2009).
3 Passel and Cohn (February 2011).
ARIZONA
Arizona shares the longest border with Mexico, some 322 miles. Over the last decade,
federal policy has made it more difficult for people to cross from Mexico into the
U.S. at historic crossing points in California and Texas (Daniels 2004; Nevins
2010). This policy has had the effect of making Arizona the most active crossing
point for irregular entry (McDowell and Wonders 2010), a fact that has likely had
a significant effect on state-wide attitudes and does a great deal to explain the recent
divergence of Arizona attitudes from those of the nation.
In a national survey that included a five-city oversample, Pew Hispanic Center
found that Phoenix residents express greater concern about immigration issues
than tends to be true elsewhere. This is noteworthy because Phoenix is the state’s
population center and, therefore, dominates statewide politics. People were asked
in an open-ended format to say the most important issue facing their local com-
munity. Nationally, 3 percent listed “immigration.” In Phoenix, 18 percent said “immi -
gration” is the most important issue (Pew March 2006). Nationally, 41 percent of
the public defines immigration as either a “very big problem” or a “moderately big
problem,” according to the Pew study. In Phoenix, 78 percent of the public says immi -
gration is a very big or moderately big problem (Pew March 2006). In fact, a majority
of Phoenicians (55 percent) says immigration is a “very big problem.” In the na tio n -
al study, one-third of the U.S. public said they approve of the job the Minutemen
are doing (Pew March 2006), while in Phoenix, one-half of city residents approve,
suggesting greater frustration in the nation’s fifth largest city at how the federal
government is handling immigration.
Northern Arizona University’s Social Research Laboratory, one of Arizona’s
major public opinion polling groups, did a series of public opinion polls on immi-
gration issues in the state. According to their results, border and immigration issues
have steadily moved to the forefront of statewide concern in Arizona. In spring
2003, just 6 percent of Arizona adults said “immigration” was the most important
issue in the state (NAU Social Research Laboratory). By February 2007, 52 per-
cent of Arizonans said “immigration/border issues” were the most important topic
in the state. 
By more than a 2:1 margin, Arizonans think that immigration of people from
abroad to the United States in recent years has been “bad” (53 percent) rather
than “good” for the country (24 percent) (NAU Social Research Laboratory Spring
2005). This contrasts dramatically with national opinion as expressed in a recent
Gallup Poll in which two-thirds of people say immigration has been a good thing
for the country vs. 28 percent who say it is a bad thing. 
A majority of Arizonans (57 percent) would rather see the federal government
spend more money on limiting the flow of immigrants into the U.S. than on inte-
grating new immigrants into U.S. culture and society (NAU Social Research Labo -
ratory Spring 2005). 
When asked about strategies for addressing illegal immigration, Arizonans pre -
fer law enforcement options that penalize undocumented immigrants rather than
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options designed to help undocumented immigrants. Eighty-four percent want more
money to be put into border enforcement, 70 percent want enforcement of laws
that prohibit hiring of undocumented immigrants, and 61 percent would direct
funds to deporting undocumented immigrants back to their home countries (NAU
Social Research Laboratory Spring 2005).
In contrast to the national data, there is less support in Arizona for programs
to facilitate immigrant access to services. Fifty-one percent of Arizonans support
spending more money on legal services for immigrants wishing to apply for legal
residency status. Spending on English language instruction for undocumented
immigrants is supported by 46 percent. One-third of Arizonans (38 percent) sup-
port expenditures for programs to place undocumented immigrants in jobs where
workers are needed, and 19 percent support funding social services for undocu-
mented workers.
Arizonans want to see something —practically anything— done to address
immigration and border issues. Sixty percent of Arizonans polled expressed support
for former Arizona Congressman J.D. Hayworth’s proposal to increase penalties for
employers who hire illegal immigrants (NAU Social Research Laboratory Fall 2005).
He also wanted to require all U.S. citizens to obtain a Social Security identification
card with a photograph. Fifty-nine percent support Arizona Senator Kyl’s proposal
to require illegal immigrants living in the U.S. to leave the country and allow them to
return legally to work temporarily if there are no U.S. workers available to fill a job.
Fifty-eight percent support Arizona Senator John McCain’s earlier proposal to allow
illegal immigrants to pay a fine and apply for a temporary work visa. They could
apply for permanent residence and eventually citizenship after a number of years. 
Half of Arizonans (50 percent) expressed support for a proposal that would have
allowed some illegal immigrants currently in the U.S. to legally stay for several years
as long as they hold jobs that no U.S. citizen wants. Forty-eight percent indicated
support for a proposal to use military technology to help the U.S. Border Patrol look
into Mexico to locate and track the movements of potentially illegal immigrants
before they cross the border.
More recently, Arizona’s SB1070 has captured international attention. SB1070
compels state officials and agencies to enforce immigration law and also crimina l -
izes those who employ or assist undocumented migrants. According to the May 5,
2010, Rocky Mountain Poll, 52 percent of Arizonans and 56 percent of registered
Arizona voters support the Arizona legislation. Significantly, sixty-nine percent of
Arizona Latinos, on the other hand, oppose SB1070. 
CALIFORNIA
California is another state that shares a border with Mexico. As noted previously,
one major difference between California and Arizona is that California’s experi-
ence of undocumented migration, while significant, has been less dramatic than
Arizona’s during the last decade. Additionally, given that the most significant period
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of Latino migration occurred in previous decades, the Latino population now con-
stitutes a long-standing and vital part of the state’s social and political life. It is
likely that these important differences between the two states shape critical dif-
ferences in public opinion.
One of the most consistent and available sources of public opinion data in
California is the Field Poll. The Field Poll has conducted surveys on immigration
across several years. Whereas Arizonans have a more negative perspective on the
contributions of all immigrants to the United States, Californians hold a more
moderate viewpoint, especially when it comes to evaluating the effect of illegal immi -
grants on the state overall.
Californians are very concerned about the issue of illegal immigration, though
the level of that concern has subsided over time. In February 2006, three-quarters
of the California population said they were either “extremely concerned” or “some -
what concerned” about immigration (Field Poll February 2006). This level of con-
cern is quite similar to that seen in Phoenix where 55 percent say immigration is a
“very big problem” and 23 percent say it is a “moderately big problem” (Pew March
2006). While high, this is somewhat lower than levels of concern in the mid-1990s
when 90 percent of Californians were concerned about this issue (Field Poll
October 1993).
Attitudes toward the impact illegal immigration has had on the state of Cali -
fornia have also improved over time. In 2006, the population was divided, with 47
percent saying undocumented immigrants have a favorable effect and 45 percent
saying they have an unfavorable effect on the state (Field Poll February 2006). In
the early 1980s, 78 percent said illegal immigrants had an unfavorable effect on the
state (Field Poll January 1982) and in the mid-1990s 68 percent of Californians
held this view (Field Poll April 1994). 
According to Field Poll findings, attitudes on this question bear a significant
relationship to the race of the respondent. In 2006, just 33 percent of white non-
Hispanics in California said illegal immigrants have had a favorable effect on the
state, while 75 percent of Latinos say they have had a favorable effect (Field Poll
March 2006). Forty-three percent of respondents whose race is defined as “other”
(Asian, Native American, etc.) say illegal immigrants have had a favorable impact
on the state. 
Similarly, in 2006, 70 percent of Californians said illegal immigrants are doing
jobs others do not want rather than taking jobs away from other Californians (Field
Poll March 2006). In contrast, in 1994, 58 percent said illegal immigrants were
doing jobs others do not want (Field Poll April 1994). In the 2006 survey, Latinos
once again expressed a different viewpoint from that of white non-Hispanics (Field
Poll March 2006). Eighty-five percent of Latinos said illegal immigrants are doing
jobs others do not want, compared to 65 percent of white non-Hispanics.
It appears that as the proportion of Latinos and people of color residing in Cali -
fornia grows, the proportion of people saying illegal immigrants have had a favor-
able impact on the state has increased. According to U.S. Census Bureau figures,
Latinos were 26 percent of California’s population in 1990 (1990) and 36 percent
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of the population in 2009 (2009). This steady, large increase in the proportion of
the population that is Latino, combined with increased Latino unity surrounding the
immigration debate, has begun to crystallize into more favorable public opinion
toward immigrants and immigration issues.
In 2005, almost two-thirds of Californians said that the number of illegal immi -
grants entering California from Mexico had increased over the past several years
(Field Poll August 2005). In response, Californians expressed very strong preferences
for particular policy responses. Unlike what we see in polling elsewhere, the num-
ber-one option favored by Californians (83 percent) is to create a program whereby
illegal immigrants living in the U.S. for a number of years can apply for citizenship if
they have a job, learned English, and pay back taxes (Field Poll April 2007). Unlike in
Arizona, programs that enable undocumented workers to become citizens or at least
acquire legal status are consistently favored over programs that rely on law enforce -
ment to keep illegal workers out of the country or charging illegal immigrants with
the felony of unlawful presence (Field Poll April 2006).
Increasing the number of border agents is supported by 71 percent of people,
and temporary worker programs that move illegal immigrants toward being legal are
supported by 67 percent of Californians. Similar to the rest of the nation, build-
ing a wall between the U.S. and Mexico and requiring all illegal immigrants to leave
the country are not favored policy responses in California. A bare majority disap-
proves of allowing undocumented workers to obtain a California driver’s license
(Field Poll February 2006, March 2005, September 2003), and people are gener-
ally opposed to Minutemen activities (Field Poll August 2005, September 2003).
More recently, according to Field Poll results, Californians are divided over
the merits of Arizona’s SB1070 legislation. Just under half of California residents
(49 percent) say they approve of the law, while 45 percent oppose it (Field Poll July
2010). Within California, white non-Hispanic voters support the law by 58 percent.
Latino voters oppose the Arizona law 71 percent to 24 percent.
Complex and Changing Attitudes 
This article has synthesized a large number of public opinion polls on immigration
to create a complex portrait of U.S. attitudes about this important topic. Despite the
media frenzy about immigration, attitudes toward immigration among the U.S. pub-
lic have been relatively stable over time. Perhaps surprisingly, the U.S. public does not
place immigration at the top of their list of concerns for the country. The public gen-
erally has positive feelings toward immigration, particularly past immigration, and
recognizes the contributions immigrants make to the economy and culture of the
United States. In this regard, we remain a nation of –and for– immigrants. 
At the same time, people today are concerned that much immigration is ille-
gal immigration. The public wants the federal government to play a larger role in
moving forward immigration reform and, since the September 11 tragedy, has
expressed heightened concern that the nation’s borders should be secured. Survey
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respondents consistently say they want the federal government to take more lead-
ership in this area and to spend more tax dollars to secure the nation’s borders and
identify and prosecute people who violate immigration statutes.
Analysis of Latino attitudes and public opinion in border states further reveals
the complexity of U.S. attitudes toward immigration. Latinos are now the largest
minority population in the United States, and, significantly, the U.S. Census Bureau
(2008) projects that by 2050, Latinos will constitute 30 percent of the U.S. pop-
ulation, a proportion consistent with their current percentage in Arizona and Cali for -
nia. As we have documented, surveys consistently reveal that Latinos view the
immi gration issue differently than other population groups in the United States.
For example, Latinos are more concerned than other groups that immigration
debates fuel discriminatory attitudes in the country, and at least some research has
found these concerns to be warranted (McDowell and Wonders 2010). At the same
time, the immigration debate is bringing greater unity to Latinos, a population group
that has historically been split across many divides (e.g., older immigrants vs. new
arrivals, religious vs. non-religious Latinos, as well as differences based on country of
origin). The immigration issue is helping to forge a more unified perspective around La -
tino rights and social justice. Also, as part of this new unified perspective, polling data
indicate that Latinos anticipate heightened political mobilization in the future,
including greater involvement in electoral politics.
Finally, this article moves from national level data about public opinion to
examine differences in border state attitudes. One would imagine that two states
like Arizona and California, adjacent states that both experience the impact of large
numbers of irregular migrants crossing national borders, would share similar per-
spectives on the topic. This is not the case. While attitudes in Arizona have taken on
a punitive character, corresponding to a dramatic increase in undocumented migra -
tion, attitudes in California are becoming more moderate over time. We suggest that
one key factor influencing attitudes in California is the growth of the Latino pop-
ulation over the last two decades, particularly their unique perspective on immi-
gration and their increased presence in community life and state politics.
Given the demographic changes currently projected for the nation, we believe
that the analysis provided here suggests that Latinos will play an important role in
shaping national public opinion about immigration in the future, particularly as La -
tinos begin to exercise social and political power at the local and state level. This
will further heighten the complexity of attitudes toward immigration within the
United States and will continue to create challenges for those wishing to character-
ize “the nation” with overly broad claims.
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Introduction
In the face of perceived federal inaction, the U.S. states are more aggressively de -
bating and enacting immigrant-related legislation. Thematically, bills may be grouped
in two main camps: 1) pro-enforcement legislation aimed at making life harder for
unauthorized migrants through enhanced criminal sanctions and the denial of social
services, and 2) pro-integration legislation intended to help legal immigrants through
integration, citizenship, and education policy. As explained in greater detail in a
subsequent section, this research found that pro-enforcement bills were enacted
at more than twice the rate of pro-integration bills. Geographically, legislation was
introduced in almost every state, with the most conspicuous growth in the South;
in the first half of 2010, all 46 assemblies then in session recorded the introduction
of immigrant-related bills, and 44 legislatures passed legislation. Politically, sup-
port for immigrant-related legislation appeared bi-partisan, and the most efficient
combination for passage of pro-enforcement legislation appeared to be the duo of
a Republican governor and a Republican legislature (ImmigrationWorks USA 2011). 
The increase in immigrant-related legislation —throughout the country, mostly
to enhance enforcement, and with the support of both parties— calls for a research
plan to better understand its influences and effects. What does the rise in legislation
tell us —if anything— about “xenophobia,” “nativism,” or anti-immigrant sentiment
in the United States? And, what does it augur for comprehensive immigration re -
form at the federal level? This chapter will address these and other questions
through an analysis of the immigrant-related legislation passed at the state level
in the first half of 2010.
A principal objective of this research is to better understand the motivations
behind the legislation. Is it, on balance, disposed against or for immigrant families?
What share of bills can be qualified as restrictive/punitive and what share as ben-
eficial to immigrant and refugee households? Have the media overemphasized the
punitive/restrictive aspects of high-profile legislation, such as Arizona’s SB1070,
while giving less coverage to other bills that might help immigrant families quiet-
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ly and non-controversially? In numbers, does legislation in support of immigrant
integration, citizenship, and English-language education outweigh legislation that
denies social services, enhances criminal sanctions, and creates new barriers to law -
ful employment? Which bills straddle the line and overlap both categories? And
finally, how does immigrant-related legislation divide geographically and break
down by party? 
Another interest of the research is to better understand the political factors
contributing to the increase of such legislation in this decade. The refrain that the
federal government’s ineffectiveness at controlling the southern border explains
the growth of state-level initiatives may be true. However, there are also other factors
at play, e.g., the emergence of the Tea Party movement, the staying power of bor-
der vigilante groups in local immigration politics, etc., and these will be discus sed
over the succeeding pages. The chapter additionally examines the impact that the
state-level legislation as well as the political circumstances shaping it are having
on the national comprehensive immigration reform (CIR) debate, as well as on
prospects for CIR passage in the short term. Finally, it examines the overlapping
issues of “nativism,” “xenophobia,” and anti-immigrant sentiment, and discusses
their role in shaping legislation.
State-Level Immigrant-Related Legislation: 
Why Now?
A frequent argument to explain the expansion in state-level legislation faults the
federal government for failing to either secure the southern border or pass com-
prehensive immigration reform. The argument goes that these shortcomings have
forced state assemblies to step in to meet constituents’ demands for action on immi -
gration. “The federal government’s failure to enforce our border has functionally turned
every state into a border state.…The states are stepping in and filling the void left
by the federal government,” said Randy Terrill, a Republican law maker in Oklahoma,
one of the half-dozen or so states in 2011 pursuing SB1070-like legislation (Preston
2010). The U.S. Congress is famously seemingly paralyzed on a range of policy issues
and not just immigration, but the argument has validity given the high salience
that “undocumented immigration” obtains across the country. In fact, national and
state polls show that respondents rate “undocumented immigration” as a pressing
concern, even in locations far from the southern border with small foreign-born
populations. This is still the case even as the unauthorized migrant population de -
clines in many parts of the United States and falls from its 2007 peak (Pew Hispanic
Center 2011). Moreover, the enhanced roles that state and local authorities are now
playing in federal immigration enforcement also suggests that constituents may be
ex pecting state officials to step forward more vigorously on these matters. Mean -
while, in im migrant-friendly locales with large foreign-born populations, such as San
Jose, Cali fornia, the failure of CIR and the absence of strong federal leadership
have forced local governments to compensate with their own integration, citizen-
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ship, and edu cation efforts in order to meet growing demand.1 Another recent cat-
alyst for pro-integration legislation at the state level was the U.S. Senate’s inability
to bring to a vote the DREAM Act in December 2010, considered the last best chance
for such a vote in the foreseeable future. Nevertheless, what constituted a failure for
the bill’s backers has helped to fuel support for state-specific DREAM Acts, such
as those being talked about in Massachusetts and Maryland (Vedantam 2010).
Anti-immigrant politics have contributed to the rapid growth in state legisla-
tive activism. In the run-up to the November 2010 midterms, candidates for assem-
bly offices throughout the country scored points with voters by pronouncing in
favor of copycat laws to Arizona’s SB1070 and by voicing support for the revision of
state and federal birthright citizenship laws. Turning campaigns into referendums
on undocumented immigration proved a smart strategy for some politicians, as the
politics surrounding the passage of Arizona’s SB1070 showed in April 2010. Facing
a tough reelection bid, incumbent Governor Jan Brewer used her support of the
bill as a shield, strongly deflecting a tough primary challenge from the right and forc-
ing her main rival to drop out. In the general election, Brewer easily trounced the
Democratic candidate, former state Attorney General Terry Goddard, winning by
12 percentage points. Even though the main provisions of the controversial bill
have been suspended following a federal judge’s injunction in July, the mere sign-
ing of the bill into law proved a boon for Brewer (Donnelly 2010).
Beyond Arizona, candidates in 2010 blasted opponents with anti-immigrant
rhetoric. Nevada Republican Senate candidate Sharron Angle called her opponent,
Sen. Harry Reid, “the best friend an illegal alien ever had,” while Louisiana Sen.
David Vittier made a similar accusation against his opponent (Chishti and Ber -
geron 2010). Elsewhere, candidates from California, Colorado, and Kansas lined
up for endorsements from Maricopa County, Arizona, Sheriff Joe Arpaio, a leading
proponent of “get tough” enforcement measures against unauthorized persons
(Chishti and Bergeron 2010). Media coverage also appeared to affect the timing
and sequence of legislative activity. The widely publicized March 2010 slaying of
Cochise County rancher Robert Krentz fueled support for SB1070 in the month
before it was eventually voted —although initial suspicions of an unauthorized border-
crossing killer have so far gone unproven. In Virginia, news re porting on the August
2010 death of nun Denise Mosier, killed in a car crash caused by a drunken un do c -
umented immigrant with two prior drunk-driving convictions, probably con tri buted
to pro-enforcement public opinion (Archibold 2010; Buske and Dug gan 2010).
Trends hint that pro-enforcement state legislative activism will continue in the
short term. The presence of border vigilante groups as a kind of semi-permanent
backdrop in the media and the appeal of the politically influential Tea Party move-
ment are two such forces, shaping local immigration politics at the border and else -
where. In her book, The Law into Their Own Hands (2009), Roxanne Lynn Doty
suggests that border vigilante groups help socially construct undocumented immi-
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grants as dangers to the social order that require extraordinary controls. Though
unsupported by the existing data, the assertion that undocumented immigrants
are would-be terrorists and violent criminals undeserving of social, political, and
economic rights operates as a powerful rallying tool for some politicians, she says.
Furthermore, she argues, constituting migrant populations as “enemies” and defin-
ing non-migrant U.S.-born populations as “friends” advances a simple yet effective
dichotomy, which, in an increasingly diverse society, helps to unambiguously define
American essentialism and national identity.
Another trend-shaping force is the politically influential Tea Party movement.
At the 2010 midterms, contenders endorsed by the conservative Tea Party won
several key Republican Senate primary contests, in Alaska, Delaware, Kentucky,
and Colorado; and some Tea Party candidates won general elections, such as the
senatorial and gubernatorial races in Florida, among others. Heading into the 2012
elections, the movement is expected to exert influence over the selection of Repu b -
lican candidates in many different races, amplifying the importance of its mem-
bers’ views on immigration.2
Nativist and Xenophobic Impulses
What are the consequences of such legislative activism at the state level? Do the
bills passed by the different assemblies reflect a pervasive nationwide disgust with
undocumented immigrants and, possibly even, with the legal foreign-born? Could
this sentiment culminate in tough enforcement laws like SB1070 or repeal of the
Fourteenth Amendment and its birthright citizenship provisions? To what extent
is such legislative activism properly classified as xenophobic or nativist? Or is this
cycle’s wave of punitive/restrictive legislation more consonant with the anti-wel-
fare discourse of the mid-1990s, reflected in the immigration and welfare reform
laws Congress passed in 1996?
This analysis found that most recent state-level legislation can be classified
as punitive/restrictive. Yet, it also found that the long arm of these laws appears
to extend only to undocumented immigrants. Legal foreign-born residents, such
as asylum seekers, refugees, legal permanent residents, etc., see no similar degra-
dation of rights. They do not face the same punishments that undocumented per-
sons face, and, in fact, this analysis found that support for pro-enforcement leg-
islation did not necessarily preclude a legislature’s passage of pro-integration bills
to help legal immigrants. What is more, several states have made provisions for
citizenship promotion, English-language education, and refugee services —efforts
to help the legal foreign-born— while promoting heavier restrictions and penal-
ties against the undocumented foreign-born. 
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2 At rates above those of moderate voters, Tea Party sympathizers assert that immigration should be
decreased and that it causes the displacement of U.S. workers, according to a poll conducted by the
University of Washington Institute for the Study of Ethnicity, Race, and Sexuality (2010). 
Rather than manifest outright xenophobia, the state-level legislation signals a
bifurcated and ambivalent approach to the management of foreign-born popula-
tions. On the one hand, undocumented foreigners face new restrictions brought
on by the recent legislative changes, as well as by the “devolution of enforcement”
trend that has beefed up interior enforcement. They may now face pressures from
local officials deputized to enforce federal immigration law under 287(g) agreements
or who are partners in the government’s Secure Communities program, requiring
participating local police to check the fingerprints of all arrested individuals against
a Department of Homeland Security (DHS) database. In addition to the stress of
possible deportation should they be arrested —though not necessarily convicted—
for committing a traffic violation, undocumented migrants must also now contend
with the prospect of new state criminal penalties for lacking papers, the central
thrust behind the SB1070 law being imitated nationwide. 
By these comparisons, legal foreign-born residents enjoy many more rights and
face many fewer restrictions than the undocumented. But this characterization is
challenged, too, after taking into account the hardships that punitive/restrictive
legislation places on mixed-status households and the heightened discrimination
and racism that such laws —and the adverse political climate surrounding their
passage— places on all Latino co-ethnics, whether “legal or “illegal.”
What can the latest wave of punitive/restrictive legislation tell us about anti-im -
migrant sentiment in the United States? Is this sentiment a matter for concern, but
not too much concern? Is it a blip on a progress chart that in time will culmi nate
in the gradual integration of today’s immigrant population, following the trajectory
of prior generations? Does the principal benefit of today’s punitive/restrictive leg-
islation lie in its theatrical political-symbolic import and its effectiveness as a ral-
lying message at election time? 
While state and local initiatives are limited in immediate scope to their re -
s pective jurisdictions, they can have national repercussions. On the one hand, state and
local politics affect the positions that national-level politicians are willing to stake
their reelection bids on, while political rhetoric can “move the goalposts” closer to or
farther from policy objectives. Comprehensive immigration reform (CIR) is arguably
one such goal, whose achievement has become even more remote be cause of the
tone of the immigration debate at the local level. And some prognos tications sug-
gest that a serious debate on CIR is impossible until, at the earliest, January 2013
and then only if the Republicans lose control of the House of Repre sentatives and
President Barack Obama is reelected. Local and state immigration politics can also
have a tangible effect on federal enforcement policy and strategy. For example, local
politics conditions support at the ground level for the continuation of “devolution
of enforcement” measures such as the 287(g) and Secure Communities programs. As
noted in the recent edited volume Taking Local Control (Varsanyi 2010), which
compiles studies of recent immigrant-related legislative activism in the United States,
federal enforcement policy has historically relied on the sometimes tacit and some-
times more overt support of local authorities. But today’s enforcement policies appear
to take a qualitative step further, explicitly forging binding partnerships.
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Analysis of 2010 State-Level Immigrant-Related Legislation
This study analyzed data collected by the National Conference of State Legis la -
tures (NCSL) of state-level immigrant-related legislation passed in the first half of
2010. The objective was to determine what share of the bills conformed to a “puni -
tive/restrictive” definition and what percentage fit, rather, in an “integrative/be ne -
ficial” category. The purpose was to provide a definitive breakdown between these two
important categories, in order to determine the aggregate direction of immigrant-
related legislation at the state level. Is most of it “punitive/restrictive” or “integra-
tive/beneficial”? In what cases does legislation straddle both categories? Although
the NCSL data do sub-divide the bills into five or so categories, these topical fields
avoid judgment on the essential question of whether a particular bill is designed to
make life easier or harder for a foreign-born person. At the same time, another objec-
tive of the study was to better pinpoint the geographic distribution of the legislation
and to identify trends in party composition and legislative outcome.
Methodology
Each bill was evaluated using its NCSL-drafted summary and in consultation with
the actual legislation as published on the respective state legislature’s website.
After initial evaluation, bills were organized into one of three categories. Group A
included “punitive/restrictive” legislation, such as bills dealing with enhanced local
enforcement, denial of social services and benefits, higher barriers to employment
and licensing, and the like. Group B encompassed “integrative/beneficial” legisla-
tion, such as bills related to refugee resettlement, funding for English-language
classes, and citizenship acquisition. Bills fitting both groups, such as appropria-
tions, were placed in Group C. 
Some of the NCSL-collected legislation was disregarded for this study. Reso -
lutions like a successful motion to institute a Louisiana Irish Week were thrown
out. Entries whose summaries were ambiguously or vaguely worded and legislation
that was only obliquely “immigration-related” were also discarded after consulting
the actual law. Dilemmas arose in the study; the greatest involved the inadequa-
cy of the monolithic categories to enable sufficient nuance for the different kinds
of legislation being passed. For example, Arizona’s SB1070, the strongest pro-
enforcement bill passed at the state level in 2010, was given the same weight in
Group A as Florida House Bill 971, which placed a licensing restriction on tow truck
operators who contract with the state. (In fact, a spectrum may enable a more
nuanced visual representation of the different forms of legislation, especially of the
enforcement-related kind, the category with greatest variation.) The original NCSL
data compiled 195 pieces of legislation, which this analysis reduced to 116, also
lowering the number of corresponding states from 43 to 37.
The analysis found that 67 (about 58 percent) of all bills belonged to Cate gory
A, with the remaining 49 evenly split between Group B (24 bills) and Group C (25).
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The geographic distribution found that the Northeast accounted for the fewest
bills, with only 8, compared with the Midwest (34), the South (43), and the West
(31). The geographic quadrant with the most Category A (pro-enforcement) bills
was the South, with 32, followed by the Midwest and West with 17 and 16, res pec -
tively. The Northeast posted only two pro-enforcement bills in the first half of the
year. For Category B (pro-integration), the Midwest and the West posted the high-
est number of bills, with nine and eight respectively, while the South posted only
five, and the Northeast, two. Southern states passed six times as many Group A bills
as they passed Group B bills. In comparison, the other three quadrants reported
greater parity between the two dominant categories. Group A bills led Group B
bills by only a 2:1 rate in both the Midwest and the West, while in the Northeast both
categories had the same number of bills (two). After considering the 116 bills, the
analysis came to the following conclusions:
• Most bills favor enhanced enforcement and/or denial of social services to un -
documented immigrants.
Approximately 58 percent of the bills passed at the state level in the first half of
2010 conformed to Group A, the category for bills related to enhanced enforcement,
denial of social services, and higher barriers for employment and licensing. About
21 percent of all bills fit Group B, the “integrative/beneficial” category, and an equal
number belonged in Group C.
Geographic Distribution
• Southern states account for just under half of all pro-enforcement bills in the
first half of 2010.
The states of the South, as defined by the U.S. Census, accounted for 32 of the
total 67 Group A bills passed in the period studied. In that same period, the southern
states passed six times as many Group A bills as Group B bills (32 versus 5).3
3 According to the census, the South is made up of Delaware; Maryland; Washington, D.C.; Virginia;
West Virginia; North Carolina; South Carolina; Georgia; Florida; Kentucky; Tennessee; Alabama;
Mississippi; Arkansas; Louisiana; Oklahoma; and Texas. However, the following states were exclud-
ed from the study either because they were not in session in first half of 2010 (Texas) or because
their legislatures passed no immigrant-related legislation in that period, according to the NCSL data:
Delaware, North Carolina, and Arkansas. Washington, D.C., is not a state and does not have a state
legislature, so it was not captured in the NCSL data.
• In mid-western and western states, Group A bills outpace Group B bills 2-to-1.
Group A bills surpassed Group B bills by 2-to-1 in both the Midwest and the West.4
• The Northeast reports the fewest bills passed in the time period.5
The northeastern states passed as many Group A as Group B bills in the time period,
two for each category.
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GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION OF STATE-LEVEL IMMIGRANT-RELATED
LEGISLATION (FIRST HALF OF 2010)*
* Passed legislation.
SOURCE: Developed by the author using data from the National Conference of State Legislatures (n.d.).
4 The census defines the Midwest as Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Iowa,
Missouri, North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska, and Kansas. Of these 12 states, only Ohio and North
Dakota (because it was not in session) did not record the passage of any piece of immigrant-related
legislation in the period. The western states are Montana, Idaho, Wyoming, Colorado, New Mexico,
Arizona, Utah, Nevada, Washington, Oregon, California, Alaska, and Hawaii. Of these, neither Mon -
tana nor Nevada recorded immigrant-related legislation in the time period as they were out of session,
and the legislation passed in Wyoming, New Mexico, and Alaska was excluded from this analysis.
5 The Northeast, by Census Bureau definition, encompasses Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massa -
chusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania. Immigrant-related
legislation was passed in all of these states in the first half of 2010 except for New Jersey, while the
New Hampshire legislation was omitted from this analysis.
STATE-LEVEL IMMIGRANT-RELATED LEGISLATION 131
Partisan Distribution
• Support for pro-enforcement legislation appears to be bi-partisan.
Support for pro-enforcement legislation appeared significantly bi-partisan. Twenty-
seven pro-enforcement bills were passed and signed into law by divided govern-
ments, where the legislature and the governor were from different parties or where
the legislature was evenly split. Where Democrats controlled both the governor-
ship and the legislature, 14 pro-enforcement bills were passed, but, as of the date
of this study, only 10 had been formally enacted, with four awaiting the governor’s
signature, all in Illinois.
• Republican governors signed 12 more Group A bills into law than their De mo -
cratic counterparts: 39 to 27.
The most activist legislatures for immigrant-related legislation appeared to be those
in which Republicans controlled the legislature and the governor was a Repu bli can.
A large percentage of Group A legislation (26 of 67) and a large share of all legis-
lation (39 of 116) met both of the following two criteria: 1) the originating chamber
had a Republican majority; and, 2) the governor was a Republican. Of the 26 pro-
enforcement bills that passed, all but one was enacted, and the vetoed bill, Georgia
Senate Bill 291, which placed permit restrictions on immigrant gun owners, went


















GROUP A (PRO-ENFORCEMENT): LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE
COMPOSITION AND BILLS PASSED
*Tennessee state Senate.
**Mississippi state Senate and Louisiana House of Representatives.
SOURCE: Developed by the author using data from the National Conference of State Legislatures (n.d.).
6 In a news release, the pro-immigration reform group National Immigration Forum offers seven char-













GROUP B (INTEGRATIVE/BENEFICIAL: LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE COMPOSITION
AND BILLS PASSED


















TOTALS: LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE COMPOSITION AND BILLS PASSED
*Tennessee state Senate.
**Mississippi state Senate and Louisiana House of Representatives.
SOURCE: Chart developed by the author using data from the National Conference of State Legislatures
(n.d.).
highly motivated potential bill sponsor; 2) A legislature where a similar bill has already been introduced
or that has passed a supportive resolution; 3) A conservative governor and conservative majority in the
legislature (Vargas 2010).
Post-2010 Legislation
Although far from exhaustive, this analysis does show the basic patterns and trends
that shaped immigrant-related legislation at the state level in the first half of 2010.
The policy thrust for the majority of the legislation was on enhanced enforcement
through “attrition” and the denial of social services and/or through tougher crim-
inal penalties similar to SB1070. Geographically, the center of pro-enforcement
legislative activism was located closer to the South than to any other region, with the
Midwest and the West in not-too-distant second place. And, politically, support
for pro-enforcement policies was bi-partisan, although the most efficient combina -
tion for successful passage appeared to be the duo of a Republican governor and
a Republican-controlled legislature. While trends can change, in the short term,
it appears that these basic characteristics will hold or even harden in 2011 and
beyond. Take the following most recent trends in immigrant-related legislation
and debate at the state level:
SB1070 COPYCAT BILLS
Lawmakers in several states are expected to introduce bills modeled on Arizona’s
SB1070, in spite of the fact that in July a federal court enjoined the bill’s core en -
forcement provisions. States where the legislation is popular include those locat-
ed in politically conservative regions of the country, such as the South, and where
long-term immigrant settlement is still considered a recent phenomenon dating
to the 1990s. Among states where the legislation is expected to be discussed are
Georgia, Mississippi, Nebraska, Kansas, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and Okla -
homa. Emboldening legislators to take up bills may be the political bonus to be
gained from publicly supporting “get tough” measures on undocumented immi-
grants. And the absence of a conclusive ruling on the constitutionality of SB1070
by the U.S. federal judiciary, as well as support by the executive for “devolution of
enforcement” policies, may have opened the door wider ideologically for the con si d -
eration of such laws. “States will push ahead regardless of the 9th Circuit [court
decision upholding the injunction against SB1070’s core enforcement provisions],”
Kansas’s new Secretary of State Kris Kobach was quoted as saying in a New York Times
article (Preston 2010). As of January 2011, Mississippi’s state Senate had passed
an SB1070-like bill, while Colorado lawmakers planned to introduce similar leg-
islation, though with some important differences (La Plaza 2011a).
BIRTHRIGHT CITIZENSHIP REPEAL
Assertions that undocumented immigrants are motivated to give birth to “anchor
babies” and exploit the U.S. birthright citizenship tradition have fueled a move-
ment to repeal the Fourteenth Amendment. Additionally, efforts are afoot to make
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statutory changes at the state level that would deny “state citizenship” to the chil-
dren of undocumented immigrants, blocking access to state social services, edu-
cation benefits, and licensing privileges (driver’s licenses). Such efforts could
symbolize a final race to the bottom for “attrition through enforcement” advo-
cates, considering that many states already have sharply curtailed social services
for non-U.S. citizens. Anti-immigrant sentiment appears to inform the positions
of some supporters of these measures. One backer of a coordinated movement to
repeal citizenship in Oklahoma, Missouri, Pennsylvania, and Arizona said that the
goal of the project was to eliminate “an anchor baby status, in which an illegal alien
invader comes into our country and has a child on our soil that is granted citizenship
automatically,” he was quoted as saying in The New York Times (Preston 2010).
Conclusion
Underlying the intense legislative activity of 2010 have been concerns deeper than
dissatisfaction with the government’s perceived failure to control the southern border
or to implement comprehensive immigration reform. Immigration can alter the social
fabric quickly. It can introduce new “foreign” elements into the society. And it can
wreak a kind of unexpected creative destruction. At the same time, it can also con-
structively transform communities; it can renew and revitalize the city and the suburb;
and it regenerates America’s national self, culturally, politically, and economically.
These are the two very distinct visions of immigration that are playing out at
the state and local levels in the United States. On the one hand, states with high
legal permanent resident populations with long histories of immigrant settlement
and where present-day political leaders may themselves be the sons and daughters
of immigrants may have more sanguine outlooks on immigration and greater local
demand to implement pro-integration measures. On the other hand, so-called non-
traditional immigrant-receiving states, where Latino settlement is new, and those
in historically conservative regions, may be more intensely focused on the ques-
tion of “illegality,” responding with measures designed to shun immigrants (denying
social services) or sanction them (through new criminal justice penalties). This
dichotomy is complicated by differences between certain states and certain local
governments, as well as within local governments themselves, such as the conflicts
that exist between cities and counties on the merits of enhanced immigration-
enforcement powers.
Attitudes toward immigration are highly varied in the United States and dif-
fer not only from state to state but from state to county and from county to city.
Across the country, as this analysis of state legislation has shown, immigration po l -
itics are a variegated patchwork, reflecting the diversity of opinion that this con-
troversial subject inspires, but also showing the way that it can inhibit the basic issue
consensus needed to foster federal-level policy reform. While the growth in state
legislation is commonly blamed on federal inaction, it may be as much a cause of this
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Introduction
In summer 2010, eight cities in the Inland Empire (IE), a region located east of Los
Angeles (Figure 1), passed mandatory E-Verify1 ordinances and/or proclamations
supporting Arizona’s SB1070.2 National and local media covering the events argued
the cities’ actions were the product of partisan conservative pressure on city councils
in conservative places (Horseman and Hill 2010; Lovett 2011). The observation is
accurate. The IE is more conservative than the rest of California and the eight cities are
more conservative than the rest of the IE (Table 1). The region’s increasingly militant
Tea Party activists,3 who champion punitive immigration po li cies including crim-
inalization and deportation, targeted city council meetings urging local officials to
protect their communities from undocumented immigration and its effects.
For the past 15 years, state and local anti-immigrant politics and policies have
been challenging federal authority to regulate immigration. In 1996, the Clinton
admi nistration focused its immigration policy on militarizing the U.S.-Mexico border
and shifted some domestic immigration enforcement to the states (Varsanyi 2008).
Since then, states and localities began legislating against immigrants arguing they
are an economic burden and cultural threat. The resulting political and legal chaos
stems from what Varsanyi labels the “liberal paradox” (2008, 881): competing eco-
nomic and political interests in a neoliberal state concur on policies that champion free
movement of goods and services and a deregulated, flexible labor market, while tight -
ening controls over immigration and limiting immigrant and labor rights. Others
point out that the paradox is played out differently depending on the nexus of na tio n -
al, state, and local politics one finds in a particular place (Sparke 2006). Such varied
topography of immigration politics leads to a chaotic legal framework where flexi-
ble labor markets are desirable, but some who work in them are criminalized and
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Proclamation supporting Arizona’s SB1070













INLAND EMPIRE CITIES CONSIDERING/PASSED E-VERIFY ORDINANCES AND/OR
PROCLAMATIONS SUPPORTING ARIZONA’S SB1070
SOURCE OF INSET MAP: Barr (2010).
TABLE 1
SELECTED POPULATION, ECONOMIC, AND POLITICAL CHARACTERISTICS
OF INLAND EMPIRE CITIES THAT PASSED E-VERIFY ORDINANCES AND/OR
PROCLAMATIONS SUPPORTING ARIZONA’S SB1070
Population Voter registration
ethnicity (percent)1 (percent)3
City/Inland White Hispanic Unemployment
Empire/California (alone) (all races) (percent)2 Republican Democrat
Hemet 58.0 32.0 18.2 45.4 33.8
Highland 33.1 46.6 17.5 41.0 38.5
Lake Elsinore 41.4 46.4 14.2 38.5 34.0
Menifee n.a. n.a. n.a. 46.3 31.6
Murrieta 55.7 25.7 9.7 50.1 25.8
Norco 54.2 33.8 11.9 51.8 26.8
Temecula 59.4 24.7 10.0 49.8 25.4
Wildomar 58.9 32.4 12.9 47.8 27.5
Inland Empire 39.4 44.9 14.3 40.2 37.6
California 42.5 36.1 12.4 31.0 44.1
1 U.S. Department of Commerce (2010b). 
2 California Employment Development Department (2010).
3 California Secretary of State (2010).
impeded from becoming formal participants. Without legal status they are vul nera ble
to employers, who exercise complete authority over them in every aspect of work.
This arrangement has powerful backers in the U.S. business community, who
frequently oppose any attempts to constrain access to the large pool of disposable
labor. Conversely anti-immigrant activists are convinced that this arrangement is
harmful, portraying undocumented immigrants as an economic burden and a social
threat. They have turned their politics into legislative action by targeting conser-
vative politicians and voters at the state and local levels to challenge the federal go v -
ernment’s excusive authority over immigration. Currently, anti-immigrant acti vists
are exploiting a provision in the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) that they
argue allows state and local governments to regulate immigration. Passed in 1986,
IRCA addressed the magnet of employment that attracted undocumented immigrants
by imposing sanctions against employers who hired them. Employers became im -
migration enforcers because they were forced to report all workers they hired, but
it was still up to the federal government to scrutinize the submitted data and remove
unauthorized workers (Cunningham 2010, 415). IRCA also imposed anti-discrimina-
tion provisions meant to prevent employers from pre-screening or punishing workers
based on presumed immigration status. Despite widespread consen sus that IRCA’s
intent was to strengthen federal authority over immigration, citing one of its pro-
visions,4 state and local legislatures are enacting new business licensing laws to
impose additional requirements on employers for enforcing immigration law and
sanctions if they do not.
Court decisions about state laws have been mixed, depending on whether ju -
rists classified state and local laws as licensing (upheld) or immigration (struck
down). The most prominent case is Arizona’s Legal Arizona Worker’s Act (LAWA),
which mandates the use of E-Verify by all employers in the state and penalizes vio -
lators who do not use the program or willingly hire undocumented workers, by re -
voking their business licenses. LAWA was upheld by federal courts on the grounds
that it is a licensing law.
Emboldened by LAWA’s court victories, anti-immigrant activists advocate the
mandatory use of E-Verify as a solution to immigration problems. This is evident
in the IE where Tea Party activists have mobilized conservative politicians for their
cause to pass local versions of LAWA throughout the region. This article examines
this process in two parts. The first details the debates surrounding the proposed
E-Verify ordinances and pro-Arizona proclamations. The second examines these
debates in the context of U.S. national and state immigration politics.
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4 “The provisions of this section preempt any State or local law imposing civil or criminal sanctions
(other than through licensing and similar laws) upon those who employ…unauthorized aliens.” (U.S.
Legal Services Corporation 1986) (author’s emphasis).
Local E-Verify Ordinances and Proclamations 
In the Inland Empire
In summer 2010, local Tea Party activists targeted several cities in the western IE,
prodding them to pass mandatory E-Verify ordinances and to support Arizona’s
latest anti-immigrant law SB1070, which contains the same E-Verify provision as
LAWA (Figure 1). The resulting mandatory E-Verify ordinances are based on LAWA
and Southern California’s first local ordinance, implemented in January 2010 by
Lancaster in Los Angeles County. All the ordinances are complaint-based, tie the
use of E-Verify to licensing, and are enforced by city staff and city managers. They
differ slightly in the penalties they impose. Some merely suspend business licenses
of habitual violators while others “may” revoke them permanently at the discre-
tion of city managers. Like LAWA, none provide protection against discrimination
from employers. The proclamations supporting Arizona portray it as heroic in its
struggle against undocumented immigration and condemn the federal government’s
unwillingness to deal with the problem. The information used here to detail each
city’s case comes from videotaped and/or printed city council meeting minutes
and from media reports.
During public debate over mandating E-Verify in Lake Elsinore, two Tea Party
activists, who are actively involved in trying to pass E-Verify in all IE cities, spoke of
E-Verify’s accuracy and its negligible burden on business and city budgets. They
also dismissed any threats of lawsuits against the city claiming that the federal court
decisions upholding LAWA have opened the door for E-Verify to be implemented
in cities across the U.S. One activist said that E-Verify is necessary to protect the
American dream now being hijacked by illegal aliens, who are taking all the good
starter jobs (e.g., fast food) and not allowing young workers to enter the job market.
For their part, City Council members agreed that the council needed to do something
about the growing problem of undocumented immigration, but they disagreed on
whether the city could afford to enforce an E-Verify ordinance. One council mem-
ber who wanted the more robust E-Verify ordinance, whereby the city would require
employers to submit documented proof that they are using the program, argued it
was necessary to be able to drastically lower very high local unemployment rates.
He cited a Heritage Fund study on the cost of undocumented immigrants to com-
munities and claimed that the city’s investment in a harsher ordinance would be
offset by the benefits of higher employment. However, based on a city staff report
detailing the prohibitive costs of aggressively enforcing E-Verify, the council voted
for the complaint-based option. Conspicuously absent from the debate were rep-
resentatives from the local business community. City staff reported that the city’s
chamber of commerce asked for more time to study E-Verify, but were not explic-
itly opposed to the ordinance.
After its discussion of E-Verify the council passed a proclamation supporting
Arizona’s SB1070. Council members were almost unanimous in praising Arizona
for standing up to the federal government and forcing a legal showdown over bor-
der security and immigration reform (City of Lake Elsinore 2010). To further jus-
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tify the council’s proclamation, the former mayor of Lake Elsinore wrote an op-ed
piece in a local newspaper summing up the impact of undocumented immigration as
detrimental to national security, economic prosperity, and national unity. She claimed
that the law correctly divides “law-abiding people from lawbreakers,” and argued that
those opposing Lake Elsinore’s proclamation seek to “alienate people along racial lines
(pitting Latinos against Anglos).” She concluded that Lake Elsinore and other cities
support Arizona because it “took a stand on the side of the law,” which, along with
“the relentless defense of freedom,” is what unites all Americans regardless of race and
background (Melendez 2010).
Temecula became another target of Tea Party activists advocating a man da tory
E-Verify ordinance during council meetings. They repeated their talking points touting
the program’s accuracy, assuring council members that Arizona’s court victo ries
cleared the way for mandating it, and arguing that implementing it will have a dra-
matic positive effect on the local labor market making jobs available to legal residents
who need them. Business owners present stated that they wanted to use E-Verify
to weed out undocumented workers. Other members of the public commented that
local government has to enforce immigration law because the federal government
violates it by telling undocumented workers to come here and work. One known
anti-immigrant activist accused all “Hispanics” running busines ses in Temecula of
laundering money from the drug trade. Another said that the reason undocumented
workers come to the U.S. is because their countries are “sewers,” and that they
should instead stay at home and fight for their rights there. A claim was made that
E-Verify is “color blind,” and its use does not discriminate on the basis of race and
ethnicity. Others turned that argument on its head saying that what is happening in
the U.S. labor market is racial profiling against U.S. citizens by some employers
who prefer undocumented immigrants who are paid less and have no rights. One
person said that white people always sat back and have been made to feel guilty
about their purported discrimination against minorities, and now it was time for
them to stand up for themselves.
The City Council seemed to be most concerned about the enforcement costs of
mandating E-Verify, but members remained united in their condemnation of ille-
gal immigration. They all felt that it was their duty as local leaders to do some-
thing about an issue that they felt is harming their community. One council mem-
ber argued that “illegals have no stake” in the community and no rights. In passing
the ordinance they concluded the E-Verify process would not be a burden on the city
or its businesses (City of Temecula 2010).
When the Murrieta City Council debated its ordinance, Tea Party activists
argued that E-Verify would stop Mexico from getting a “double dip” from Mexican
workers sending money home and U.S. companies outsourcing jobs to Mexico. One
anti-immigrant activist said that “the labels Latinos and Hispanics are sugar-coat-
ed terms for illegals,” and that local governments should not be responsible for them
but for “American creeded” citizens. Tea Party activists challenged the council to pro -
tect their citizens and stand up to the federal government. They called the city’s
proposed resolution for voluntary use of E-Verify “wimpy,” and urged the city to
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pass a strict ordinance, arguing that if it did not follow its neighboring commu -
nities, it would be flooded with undocumented workers from those cities.
Most council members were concerned about the fiscal impact of implement-
ing E-Verify, but were partially reassured by the local chamber of commerce pre s -
ident, who commented that he saw no serious cost burden. The city manager
seemed reluctant about E-Verify, arguing that Murrieta was immune to an influx
of low-skill undocumented workers because its businesses demand mostly highly
skilled workers. Some council members were concerned the city might be sued,
but Tea Party activists pointed out that not one city that passed E-Verify has been
sued. While the council members seemed apprehensive, they expressed the need
for acting in some way to address what they saw as a pressing economic issue in
their community. One council member declared that E-Verify will eliminate the
shadow labor force “that [businesses] don’t need to take care of ”; thus, “Murrieta will
no longer condone slavery here” (City of Murrieta 2010). In the end, the council
passed E-Verify as an economic and moral imperative.
The City of Menifee is not a legal entity; however, once incorporated, the city
has plans of enacting E-Verify. There was a large presence of Tea Party activists at
council meetings who supported the city’s decision. In addition, the City Council de -
bated a proclamation in support of Arizona’s SB1070. Public comments came once
again from a large group of Tea Party activists. They urged standing up to the “left
wing, socialist, communist Obama administration,” which does not “love our coun-
try” and is “trying to destroy our country.” They urged “Buycotting Arizona,” meaning
buying as many things as possible from Arizona businesses to offset boycotts
launched by California cities such as San Diego, Los Angeles, and San Francisco.
Although the majority of council members felt that this was not a local issue, they
were angry enough at California cities that launched boycotts against Arizona to
condemn them for their actions (City of Menifee 2010).
The following cities in the IE had much scarcer documentation of their coun-
cil meetings but were approached by Tea Party activists to pass E-Verify and pro-
Arizona proclamations. The City of Wildomar passed an amendment to its contract-
ing language requiring contractors to use E-Verify. Although it was urged by Tea
Party activists to apply E-Verify to all businesses in the city, the council did not sup-
port the idea on the grounds that the city does not have the necessary enforcement
capacity (Williams 2010). The City of Norco requires that all city contractors and
vendors and their sub-contractors file affidavits with the city manager that they are
using E-Verify. Norco also approved a proclamation supporting SB1070. According to
press reports, Tea Party activists rallied at city hall before the council meeting and
many spoke in the meeting urging support of the proclamation (Pa rrilla 2010). The
Hemet City Council unanimously passed a proclamation supporting SB1070. From
the minutes, it appears there was substantial public debate, with comments from 30
people. Supporters of the proclamation also urged a mandatory E-Verify ordinance,
but were outnumbered by opponents almost two-to-one. Despite the significant
public opposition, council members declared their support for the proclamation
arguing that illegal immigration is an economic drain on the state and cities, that
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the immigration process is broken, and that many people live in fear of illegal immi -
grants (City of Hemet 2010, 11). The City of Highland in San Bernardino County
also passed a proclamation supporting Arizona’s SB1070. During public comments,
three persons supported the proclamation arguing that local governments must
enforce national laws if the federal government does not. They pointed out that
SB1070 has gained overwhelming public support because it deals with local prob-
lems of criminality, overpopulation, and unemployment caused by undocumented
immigration (City of Highland 2010). After the resolution passed unanimously, the
mayor of Highland said that the resolution was “for the people that pay their taxes”
and that if “people don’t like it, then they don’t have to live here.” One council mem-
ber said that the vote was against amnesty for “illegals,” while another claimed that
“all of Highland’s residents agree with the resolution” (Sorba 2010).
National, State, and Local Nexus
To understand what is happening in the Inland Empire, it is important to understand
immigration politics in the national, state, and local contexts. Connecting anti-immi -
grant politics and policies at all levels explains IE anti-immigrant activists’ current
strategy and its impact on local immigration politics. Although the following ana l -
ysis is divided into three categories (economic, political/legal, and social-cultural),
there was significant synthesis among these categories as anti-immigrant activists
built their case for mandatory E-Verify ordinances and other regulations. Never -
theless, it is useful to untangle these arguments and look at them separately to
evaluate their role in anti-immigrant politics at every level.
ECONOMIC
An argument used often by IE anti-immigrant activists in favor of mandatory E-Ve r -
ify ordinances was that they will resolve the current unemployment problem. They
argue that once implemented, E-Verify would lead to firings of undocumented
immigrants, and their jobs would be taken by authorized workers. Furthermore,
E-Verify would act as a deterrent, preventing employers from hiring undocumented
workers, and undocumented workers from seeking work. Surprisingly, business
organizations whose members would be most affected by such ordinances were hard-
ly present during council meetings and seemed indifferent when their opinion was
sought by decision-makers.
This differs from the national and state contexts where business organizations
are leading the legal charge to strike down mandatory E-Verify. The U.S. Chamber
of Commerce was the lead plaintiff in the Supreme Court case against Arizona’s
LAWA, in which it argued that LAWA is not merely a licensing law because it impos-
es civil and criminal sanctions on employers that surpass federal sanctions, mean-
ing LAWA is unconstitutionally preempting federal law. The chamber also argued
that E-Verify would be costly and burdensome to businesses and lead to discrim-
inatory hiring (Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting-Argued 2010).
In California, the state legislature passed a bill that prohibited all levels of
government in the state from mandating the use of E-Verify (Around the Capitol
2011). The bill cited chamber claims that mandatory E-Verify use would impose
crushing costs on business. It also stated that since E-Verify was error-prone, it hurts
potential employees and therefore must remain voluntary as stipulated by the fed-
eral government. Finally, the bill declared that since California is suffering from
high unemployment, it is prudent to remove any potential obstacles to job creation
in the state. Although the bill passed by an overwhelming majority, Governor
Schwarzenegger vetoed it, claiming that the bill raised constitutional issues by
imposing the state’s authority on counties and cities on “matters that may consti-
tute municipal affairs” (2010). This gave California cities a green light to mandate
E-Verify without inviting legal challenges from the state.
Locally, IE cities that passed E-Verify ordinances have lower unemployment
rates than the regional average (Table 1), but in comparison with pre-recession un -
employment rates, they have experienced a significant increase. Between the fourth
quarter of 2006, the peak of the IE’s housing and economic boom, and the fourth quar -
ter of 2009, the region lost almost 11 percent of its jobs, one of the highest totals in
the U.S. Ironically, the hardest hit sectors were those dominated by Latinos such as
construction, food services, and hospitality. Losses in these sectors have not been
offset in other emerging sectors of Latino employment such as transportation and
warehousing (author’s calculations from U.S. Department of Commerce 2010b).
The remarkable finding about the past three years of the recession in the IE is that,
while the Mexican-origin population continued to grow, reaching 41 percent of all
inhabitants, the percentage of Mexicans who are not U.S. citizens declined from 10
percent of residents in 2006 to almost 9 percent in 2009 (author’s calculations from
U.S. Department of Commerce 2010b). These numbers have led the local media
to speculate that the lack of employment opportunities has resulted in an out-mi -
gration of undocumented migrants from the IE (Olson 2010).
These observations discredit the anti-immigrant activists’ claims that undoc-
umented workers are taking potential jobs from authorized workers. It may be true
that labor market competition has increased dramatically in the region, but the com -
petition seems to be primarily among authorized workers. It is also noteworthy that
activists in these communities were silent on immigration issues just a few years
ago when the IE was in the middle of its economic boom and unemployment hov-
ered around 5 percent.
Part of the explanation for anti-immigrant activists’ misrepresentations of labor
markets dominated by undocumented immigrants is that they grossly overesti-
mate immigrant numbers. For example, Arizona’s residents vastly overestimated
the number of undocumented workers in their state. According to a 2005 poll they
believed that 40 percent of private sector workers were undocumented. This trans -
lated into a misperception that 70 percent of Arizona’s Latino population was ille-
gal. In fact, 74 percent of Arizona’s Latinos are U.S. citizens (Behavioral Research
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Center 2005). Although similar polls are not available for the IE, a quote from a
local anti-immigrant Tea Party activist recently elected to the California assembly
reveals the same misperception: “It is not a stretch to picture a revolt in Los Ange les,
whose population is comprised of over 50 percent illegal aliens. At the rate of influx
and births, it will be 80 percent illegal alien within a decade....None of this bodes
well for the citizens who live in Southern California now, nor will it improve the life
of the poor alien, but it is well on its way to wiping out everything that was once good
in Southern California” (Maddaus 2010). In fact, the Pew Hispanic Center estimat-
ed that in California, undocumented immigrants made up less than 7 percent of the
population and about 9 percent of the labor market. In addition un documented
workers hardly come into direct competition with native workers be cause they create
complimentary services or take jobs unwanted by others (Card and Lewis 2007).
The gap between anti-immigrant activists’ claims about economic impacts of
undocumented immigrants and the real impacts suggests that economic arguments
are not convincing most people that undocumented immigrants are taking jobs from
authorized workers. Those who are convinced use the economic impact of undoc-
umented immigration in combination with political and cultural factors to mobi-
lize support for anti-immigrant politics and policy in the IE and the nation. In other
words, it is only when the economic factors are politicized and racialized that they
become convincing to people who believe that mandatory use of E-Verify could
save their communities from economic hardship.
POLITICAL/LEGAL
The political and legal arguments made by Tea Party activists and council members
who supported the implementation of E-Verify and Arizona’s SB1070 focused on
the necessity of local immigration regulation in light of the federal government’s
willful abdication of its responsibilities. Given this, it is up to local and state gov-
ernments to enforce federal laws and protect their citizens’ interests. Mandatory use
of E-Verify is a way to enforce immigration laws through business licensing, which
they argue is expressly allowed under IRCA (see Introduction).
Lawsuits against Arizona were twice dismissed by federal courts on the grounds
that LAWA is a licensing law, not an immigration law and, therefore, is not preempted
by federal immigration laws. The courts also ruled that the mandatory use of E-Ve r -
ify is not preempted by the current federal policy of voluntary use, and that its
sanctions against employers do not exceed federal law (Chicanos por la Causa v.
Na politano 2008). The case was appealed to the Supreme Court where the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce argued that LAWA is not a licensing law because it sanctions
investigation and adjudication of immigration status by state authorities encroach-
ing on federal jurisdiction. They also argued that it is permissible for states to “add
on” sanctions through licensing laws after the federal government investigates immi-
gration law violations, but that LAWA illegally usurps the entire process of immigration
regulation (Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting-Argued 2010, 17). Conversely, the state
of Arizona argued that IRCA allowed state and local governments to use the licens-
ing law to punish employers who violate any laws including immigration statutes, and
gave states the authority to investigate and adjudicate these violations. Arizona’s
argument was that the state’s escalating problems with immigration warrant LAWA.
This argument found an ally in Justice Scalia who stated, “Perhaps Congress never
expected that the States would have to resort to such massive measures, and they
probably wouldn’t have…if the law had been uniformly enforced and vigorously
enforced; right?” (Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting-Argued 2010, 30). Arizona
seized on this point to argue that Congress may have not foreseen the current mas -
sive immigration problems, but it may have foreseen that immigration has variable
geographic effects, and therefore it did not fully preempt state law.
In May 2011, the Supreme Court upheld LAWA; with the majority argued that
it is indeed licensing law, not immigration law. Writing for the majority, Chief
Justice Roberts argued that LAWA falls within states’ authority given to them by
Congress when it passed IRCA (Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting-Decided 2011, 2).
In their dissenting opinion, Justices Breyer and Ginsburg argued LAWA ’s li censing
provision encroaches onto immigration law and should be preempted. They were
concerned that the law would undermine IRCA ’s efforts to protect lawful workers
from discrimination and erroneous prosecution and punishment (Chamber of Com -
merce v. Whiting-Decided 2011, 33).
The politicization of this case even in the Supreme Court indicates that the most
important indicator that turns anti-immigrant politics into policies is the degree of
partisanship and politicization at different levels (Ramakrishnan and Wong 2010,
74). As one IE Tea Party activist said, “You go to places where you can win....You go
to places where there are conservative city council members” (McAllister 2010).
The strategy is that local activism will shift national politics as demonstrated by the
Supreme Court decision.
At the national level the debate about immigration reform has abated in Con -
gress, but immigration enforcement has increased under both the Bush and Obama
administrations. In fact during each of its first two years, the Obama administration
deported more immigrants than the Bush administration did in its record last year
(Slevin 2010). Part of the reason may be that the Obama administration wants to de -
 monstrate it is determined to enforce immigration law to keep local enforcement
initiatives at bay, and to score political points in states where immigration has be come
a key issue for Republican candidates (Preston 2010). Despite the admi n istra tion’s
efforts, conservative state legislators continued to argue that the federal government
was not doing enough. From 2005 through 2010, state legislatures across the U.S.
considered over 6 600 immigration-related bills. Of those, 976 became law and 385
were adopted as resolutions (National Conference of State Legislatures 2011a).
Although nationwide there are as many state laws and resolutions seeking to ex pand
immigrant rights as there are seeking to restrict them, this statistic changes when one
zooms in on a state or region. The more conservative states and places tend to be,
the more likely they are to pass anti-immigrant laws and ordinances (Ra ma krishnan
and Wong 2010, 86).
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E-Verify laws are a good example of this. According to the National Con fe r -
ence of State Legislatures (2011b), 14 conservative states require E-Verify, three
of which mandate its use for all public and private sector employees. The most
prominent of these is Arizona’s LAWA, passed in 2007. It was signed into law by then-
Governor and now Department of Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napoli tano,
who argued that Congress was incapable of addressing state needs, and therefore state
immigration action was warranted. 
Arizona is a conservative state where registered Republican voters outnum-
ber Democrats by almost five percentage points. In the state legislature, Repu bli -
cans outnumber Democrats more than two to one. Republican leader, state Senator
Russell Pierce, who is responsible for both LAWA and SB1070, was elected in 2000
when immigration was not a major issue for Arizona’s voters. But as the migration flow
shifted from California to Arizona due to Clinton-era border militarization policies,
Pierce’s aggressively anti-immigrant politics became popular and his puni tive and
restrictive bills began to sail through the state legislature (Riccardi 2011).
The political context is different in California, where Democratic voters out-
number Republicans by 14 percentage points and the state legislature is dominated
by Democrats. This difference is reflected in state-wide perspectives on immigra -
tion, which are more tolerant. A recent survey indicated that voters who supported
immigration reform that would allow undocumented migrants to become citizens
outnumbered those who opposed it by 19 percentage points (Decker 2010).
However, considering the backlash against immigrants in parts of California,
such as the IE, one must be aware that this is a large and diverse state segregated into
ethnic and political enclaves that are products of urban fragmentation and politi-
cal gerrymandering. The political context in the IE cities that passed E-Verify and
pro-Arizona proclamations differs greatly from the rest of the state. Regis tered Re -
publican voters are a majority, almost 18 percentage points above the state average,
while Democrats are a minority, 16 percentage points under the state average (Table 1).
In comparison with the rest of the IE, which is rapidly becoming majority Latino and
politically moderate (Ramakrishnan 2007), those cities remain ma jority white and Re -
publican. An explanation for this may be that they have attracted many conservative
white voters from neighboring Republican bastions in San Diego and Orange coun-
ties (Horseman and Hill 2010). 
The conservative profile of the region’s voters is reflected in their political
representatives, who are actively producing and championing anti-immigrant leg-
islation at all levels of government. The recently-created Reclaim American Jobs
Caucus in the U.S. Congress has four IE members and touts its goal as job creation
through immigration enforcement. Other IE Republicans are also active in pre-
senting anti-immigrant bills. Representative Miller introduced the LEAVE Act that
would strip undocumented immigrants of all access to housing, birthright citizen -
ship, access to credit or bank accounts, and use of alternate identification. In addition,
the act would continue the militarization of the border, proceed with tamper-
proof identification proposals, establish mandatory cooperation between federal
and local law agencies in immigration enforcement, prohibit in-state tui tion for immi -
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grant students, eliminate sanctuary cities, and make E-Verify mandatory for all
employees nationwide (U.S. Congress 2009). This legislation was co-sponsored by
two of his IE colleagues. Miller wanted to make local attempts at immigration reg-
ulation part of federal law, therefore encouraging and legalizing local anti-immi -
grant ordinances. Other bills written or co-sponsored by IE Republicans are HR997
(to introduce English as the official language of the U.S.), HR1868 (to strike
down citizenship as a birthright), HR4548 (banning in-state tuition for undocu-
mented immigrants, even if they were brought to the U.S. as children), HR98 (cre-
ating tamper-proof Social Security ID), and HR19 (making E-Verify mandatory). In
addition some IE representatives have defended Arizona’s SB1070 and asserted
that the federal government should not challenge LAWA in courts.
At the state level most of IE’s state senators and assembly members are also Re -
publican, but up to now they have not been very outspoken on immigration. How -
ever, the most recent state election radicalized some voters who elected Tea Party
activists vowing to make immigration reform a state issue. Tim Donnelly, who was
elected on such a platform, articulated his immigration politics this way: 
We are told the illegal alien is now a resident of our communities, entitled to all the pro -
tections of the law, but none of its penalties....Really. As an American, I am not accus-
tomed to being “told” anything. In fact, it is “we” who generally do the telling. “We the
people” are finished listening....The facts are incontrovertible that allowing an illegal
invasion of the United States will destroy the American Southwest, and very probably
wipe out the freedoms we American Christians enjoy. (Maddaus 2010) 
Donnelly’s views are shared by the IE’s Tea Party activists who radicalize IE
politicians and then support them as they write and vote for anti-immigrant reg-
ulations. The activists also rely on successful models from other places, such as Ari -
zona, to gain leverage over reluctant local politicians and politicize the electorate.
Arizona’s defense of LAWA in federal courts is one of these models because it gives
local anti-immigrant ordinances legal legitimacy.
The recent Supreme Court decision upholding LAWA was a significant boost
to local anti-immigrant activists. It legalized state and local mandatory E-Verify
ordinances, but did not address the potential for discriminatory hiring or firing prac -
tices by employers seeking to avoid licensing sanctions. Although likely to produce
illegal discriminatory practices by employers, for anti-immigrant activists this de -
cision achieves the desired effect of immigrant attrition. In other words, the lack
of protection against discriminatory use of E-Verify implicitly sanctions racial pro-
filing that may lead immigrants and citizens to leave the cities that implemented these
ordinances. This is discussed in more detail in the next section.
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SOCIAL/CULTURAL
The issue of discrimination was brought up by E-Verify opponents during city
council debates throughout the IE. Anti-immigrant activists countered by claiming
that E-Verify is “color-blind” and that undocumented workers do not have rights
anyway because of their status. Throughout the debates, undocumented immigrants
were criminalized and presented as race-baiters and opportunistic cowards. City
council members were urged to support E-Verify as a solution to high crime rates
perpetrated by “illegals,” who purportedly open businesses to launder drug cartel
profits, steal taxpayers’ money by consuming social entitlements, and must be made
to pay for being “law breakers” in the name of a “relentless defense of freedom.”
Activists and politicians alike labeled “illegals” and their supporters as race-baiters
saying that “those who bring up race as an issue are undermining national unity,”
because laws such as Arizona’s SB1070, LAWA, and local E-Verify ordinances do not
engage in “racial profiling,” but merely separate “law abiders” from “law breakers.”
In short, justice is blind. Despite this, many activists brought up race frequently,
arguing for example that the labels of “Latino” and “Hispanic” are pseudonyms for
“illegals” because “creeded citizens” do not need to call themselves anything but
American. Some also asserted that businesses discriminate against Americans in
favor of undocumented workers whom they can exploit, and that businesses and
their allies in the immigrant rights movement cover their misdeeds by making white
people feel guilty and labeling them as racist if they point out this illegal arrange-
ment. Anti-immigrant activists argue that white people need to stand up for them-
selves. Their frustrations are once again summed up by Tim Donnelly, the recent-
ly-elected state assemblyman, who said, “We are told that ‘diversity’ is a goal, and
although it is unclear when we will reach this utopian dream, it involves more His -
panics and fewer of everyone else. We are told that anyone who does not go along
with the above program (or pogrom) is a ‘racist,’ ‘xenophobe,’ or a ‘vigilante’” (Mad -
daus 2010). Lastly, undocumented immigrants are labeled as opportunistic cowards
because they “don’t want to stand up and fight for change within their country.”
Instead they “zap [sic] the vitality of a nation” by coming here and taking advan-
tage of generous U.S. communities in which they “have no stake.”
Such rhetoric galvanizes public support in conservative areas and politicizes
conservative voters who demand that their representatives act to protect them from
criminal aliens and their supporters. Mandatory E-Verify ordinances and procla-
mations supporting Arizona’s anti-immigrant law are meant to legitimize anti-immi -
grant politics because they supposedly do not judge people on race, but only
immigration status. Therefore anti-immigrant activists whose racialized politics
are an obstacle to gaining broader popular support now point to E-Verify as a tool
that strips race from the debate and impartially separates law breakers from law
abiders. The activists tout E-Verify as flawless technology that makes objective
decisions no matter what prejudices people may have. They convinced city coun-
cils that E-Verify is so “color blind” that not one saw the need to incorporate anti-
discriminatory provisions into their ordinances. This, despite evidence of racial
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profiling from Arizona and federal provisions in IRCA that developed a robust frame -
work of anti-discriminatory laws meant to safeguard workers from arbitrary deci-
sions by employers.
In 2009, a study of E-Verify found that it places a heavy burden on employers
to process employees correctly, which has led to several types of improprieties.
Employers have gamed the system by checking documents but keeping on undoc-
umented workers at lower wages off the books, leaving it up to government pros-
ecutors to discover their fraud. Employers admitted they discriminated against
potential employees who looked or sounded like immigrants. Some stated they
would not hire even immigrants who can legally work in the U.S. (Meissner and
Rosenblum 2009, 3). One-quarter of employers using E-Verify said they illegally
punished workers by forcing them to take unpaid leave or dismissing them if they
had to adjust their flagged status. Many employers also prescreened potential
employees with E-Verify, passing over workers with flagged status (Meissner and
Rosenblum 2009, 13). These findings point to significant enforcement problems that
must be addressed before E-Verify can become mandatory. However, state and local
leaders who support its mandatory use overlook or dismiss these flaws. In most
cases, they cite its 97-percent immigration-status return rate that they label as fast,
accurate, burden-free, and non-discriminatory.
LAWA was challenged in courts partially on the grounds that it denies workers
due process and equal protection because it exposes them to employer discrimi-
nation. However, the Federal Appeals Court found the claims of increased poten-
tial for employer discrimination against workers to be speculative, arguing that one
cannot say there will be discrimination if the law is not in effect (Chicanos por la
Causa v. Napolitano 2008). This ruling was a boost for anti-immigrant activists, who
portrayed it as proof that E-Verify prevented discrimination. Nevertheless critics
in Arizona continue to point out the erroneous assumptions of E-Verify’s impartiality
as well as its uneven implementation and enforcement. They argued that LAWA’s
enforcement is left up to the politically malleable discretion of county attorneys who
decide whether or not to prosecute anonymous complaints, therefore enhancing
the potential for racial profiling (Hansen 2007). There is also evidence that LAWA
is being used as a pretext to raid businesses looking for undocumented workers as
opposed to prosecuting unscrupulous employers. After its implementation, over 130
workers have been arrested in raids around Phoenix on charges of using forged do c -
uments or false identities to get work (Billeaud and Sherman 2010). As a result,
some companies stopped hiring or fired Latino workers, something they can do
with impunity because LAWA does not contain anti-discriminatory measures like
those contained in federal law. Because of LAWA, businesses are leaving Arizona
and a growing number of workers are shifting to an underground labor market,
costing the state much-needed tax revenue (Rosenblum and Gorman 2010, 128).
These facts do not seem to bother anti-immigrant politicians in Arizona whose goal
is to purge the state of  Latinos at all costs. Section one of SB1070 reads, “The le g -
islature declares that the intent of this act is to make attrition through enforcement
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the public policy of all state and local government agencies in Arizona” (Arizona
Senate 2010).
Similarly local E-Verify ordinances in the IE are meant to purge cities of pur-
ported undocumented immigrants. Local politicians’ refusal to acknowledge po -
tential discrimination against workers is due to local conservative partisanship, and
the pressure exerted by populist anti-immigration activists who have politicized
local constituents. This produces a political environment where the evidence of
discrimination is angrily denied or ignored, leading to increases in discriminatory
practices that overwhelmingly impact the Latino community, which is portrayed
as undocumented and without rights. 
Conclusion
Pushing local ordinances targeting immigrant workers and their families has been
a frequent strategy by anti-immigrant groups in Southern California. For the most
part their efforts have been stymied by the courts until the recent rulings uphold-
ing LAWA. Emboldened by Arizona’s example, local Tea Party and other anti-immi-
grant activists politicized partisan conservative IE city councils and voters to pass
mandatory E-Verify ordinances supposedly meant to punish businesses employing
undocumented workers. However, following LAWA, the ordinances have no provisions
to protect workers against discrimination associated with employer hiring prac tices
that have tended to profile workers based on their perceived, rather than real, immi-
gration status. Such profiling seems acceptable to Arizona and IE politicians, who
are aligning themselves with partisan conservative groups that use ra cially-charged
rhetoric generating false perceptions that the entire Latino commu nity is undoc-
umented or at least complicit in aiding and abetting undocumented immigrants.
The Latinos’ intent, the rhetoric asserts, is to increase their population in order to
take political control of the nation and recast its values and morals. Such stated
racist perceptions are combined with baseless “facts” portraying a group of people
as an economic, social, and cultural threat to communities. The only way to reverse
the threat is to make the undesirables leave, which is the objective of Arizona’s
SB1070, the proclamations supporting it in the IE, and the IE ordinances based
on LAWA. The recent Supreme Court decision upholding LAWA legitimizes these
discriminatory anti-immigrant policies. In the case of the IE, these attrition policies
probably face imminent demise because of local demographic and political trends.
Within five years, Latinos and moderate independent voters will be a ma jority in
the region, and anti-immigrant activists will likely run out of partisan conservative
places that support their politics.
LOCAL ANTI-IMMIGRATION POLITICS 151
Bibliography
ARIZONA SENATE
2010 “Senate Bill 1070,” www.azleg.gov, accessed January 20, 2011.
AROUND THE CAPITOL CALIFORNIA POLITICAL NEWS & OPINION
n.d. “AB1288, Fong. Employment: Hiring Practices: Electronic Employment
Verification,” Around the Capitol California Political News & Opinion,
www.aroundthecapitol.com, accessed January 21, 2011.
BARR, ALISTAIR




2005 “Rocky Mountain Poll III-11,” Behavioral Research Center, Inc., October
5, www.brcpolls.com, accessed October 16, 2010.
BILLEAUD, JACQUES, and MARK SHERMAN
2010 “Arizona Immigration Law Arguments on Employer Sanctions to Be Heard
by Supreme Court,” The Huffington Post, December 4, www.huffingtonpost
.com, accessed December 10, 2010.
CALIFORNIA EMPLOYMENT DEVELOPMENT DEPARTMENT, 
LABOR MARKET INFORMATION DIVISION
2010 “Current Industry Employment and Unemployment Rates for California,”
Labor Market Info, December, http://www.labormarketinfo.edd.ca.gov/,
accessed January 14, 2011. 
CALIFORNIA SECRETARY OF STATE, ELECTIONS AND VOTER INFORMATION
2010 “October 18, 2010 – Report of Registration,” California Secretary of State
Debra Bowen website, http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/ror/ror-pages/
15day-gen-10/, accessed January 14, 2011.
CARD, DAVID, and ETHAN G. LEWIS
2007 “The Diffusion of Mexican Immigrants during the 1990s: Explanations and
Impacts,” in George J. Borjas, ed., Mexican Immigration to the United States,
Chicago, University of Chicago, pp. 193-228. 
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE V. WHITING-ARGUED SUPREME COURT
2010 www.supremecourt.gov, December 8, accessed December 10, 2010.
152 MICHAL KOHOUT
LOCAL ANTI-IMMIGRATION POLITICS 153
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE V. WHITING-DECIDED
2011 www.supremecourt.gov, May 26, accessed June 1, 2011.
CHICANOS POR LA CAUSA V. NAPOLITANO
2008 www.aclu.org, Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, September 17, accessed No -
vember 11, 2010.
CITY OF HEMET
2010 “Minutes Regular Meeting of the Hemet City Council June 22, 2010,”
June 2010, www.cityofhemet.org/, accessed January 20, 2010.
CITY OF HIGHLAND
2010 “Minutes Redevelopment Agency and City Council Regular Meeting July
13, 2010” July, www.ci.highland.ca.us, accessed January 17, 2011.
CITY OF LAKE ELSINORE
2010 “Minutes Regular City Council Meeting City of Lake Elsinore, Tuesday,
June 22, 2010,” City Clerk, June, http://www.lake-elsinore.org/, accessed
December 12, 2010.
CITY OF MENIFEE
2010 “City of Menifee City Council Meeting Minutes June 15, 2010,” City of
Menifee, City Council, June, http://www.cityofmenifee.us/, accessed Ja n -
uary 20, 2011.
CITY OF MURRIETA
2010 “City of Murrieta Council Meeting August 17, 2010,” City Council,
August, videotape, www.murrieta.org, accessed December 12, 2010.
CITY OF TEMECULA
2010 “Temecula City Council A Regular Meeting June 22, 2010,” June 22,
www.cityoftemecula.org, accessed November 10, 2010.
CUNNINGHAM, PATRICK S.
2010 “The Legal Arizona Worker’s Act: A Threat to Federal Supremacy over Immi -
gration?” Arizona State Law Journal vol. 42, no. 2, pp. 411-438. 
DECKER, CATHLEEN
2010 “For GOP, State Is a Deep Blue Hole,” Los Angeles Times, November 19,
www.latimes.com, accessed November 19, 2010.
HANSEN, RONALD
2007 “What is Unclear About the Law?” Arizona Republic, December 30, www
.azcentral.com, accessed October 16, 2010.
154 MICHAL KOHOUT
HORSEMAN, JEFF, and JOHN F. HILL
2010 “Tea Party Movement Builds Inland Momentum,” Press-Enterprise, Sep tem -
ber 18, www.pe.com, accessed January 25, 2011.
LOVETT, IAN
2011 “Part of California Takes on Illegal Hiring,” New York Times, January 4,
www.nytimes.com, accessed January 26, 2011.
MADDAUS, GENE
2010 “Tim Donnelly, Tea Party Republican, Introduces Arizona-Style Immi gra -
tion Law,” LA Weekly, December 7, www.laweekly.com, accessed January
2011.
MCALLISTER, TONI
2010 “Tea Party Patriots Push For Action in Region Against Illegal Immigration,”
Southwest Riverside News Network, June 23, www.swrnn.com, accessed
November 27, 2010.
MEISSNER, DORIS, and MARC R. ROSENBLUM
2009 The Next Generation of E-Verify: Getting Employment Verification Right, Migra -
tion Policy Institute, www.migrationpolicy.org, accessed November 10, 2010.
MELENDEZ, MELISSA
2010 “Unite Against Illegal Immigration,” Press-Enterprise, July 10, www.pe.com,
accessed November 18, 2010.
NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES
2011a “2010 Immigration-Related Laws and Resolutions in States,” Immigrant
Policy Project, January 5, www.ncsl.org, accessed January 21, 2011.
2011b “E-Verify: Frequently Asked Questions,” Immigrant Policy Project, Ja nuary,
www.ncsl.org, accessed January 21, 2011.
OLSON, DAVID
2010 “Reverse Migration: Economy Forces Some Mexican Nationals to Return
Home with Varying Emotions,” Press-Enterprise, May 23, www.pe.com,
accessed November 9, 2010.
PARRILLA, LESLIE
2010 “Norco City Council Backs Arizona’s Immigration Law,” Press-Enter prise,
August 4, www.pe.com, accessed January 20, 2011.
PEW HISPANIC CENTER
2010 “Unauthorized Immigrants in the US,” Pew Hispanic Center, www.pew
hispanic.org, accessed October, 7, 2010.
PRESTON, JULIA
2010 “Deportations from US Hit a Record High,” New York Times, October 6,
www.nytimes.com, accessed December 5, 2010.
RAMAKRISHNAN, S. KARTHIC
2007 Survey of Political and Civic Engagement in the Inland Empire, University
of California Riverside, www.politicalscience.ucr.edu, accessed Septem -
ber 10, 2010.
RAMAKRISHNAN, S. KARTHIC and TOM WONG
2010 “Partisanship, Not Spanish: Explaining Municipal Ordinances Affecting
Undocumented Immigrants,” in Monica W. Varsanyi, ed., Taking Local Con -
trol: Immigration Policy Activism in U.S. Cities and States, Stanford, Cali -
fornia, Stanford University Press, pp. 73-96. 
RICCARDI, NICHOLAS
2011 “Arizona’s Relentless Conservative Voice,” Los Angeles Times, January 17,
www.latimes.com, accessed January 22, 2011.
ROSENBLUM, MARC R., and LEO B. GORMAN
2010 “The Public Policy Implications of State-Level Worksite Immigration Enfor ce -
ment: The Experiences of Arizona, Mississippi, and Illinois,” in Monica
W. Varsanyi, ed., Taking Local Control: Immigration Policy Activism in U.S.
Cities and States, Stanford, California, Stanford University Press, pp. 115-134.
SCHWARZENEGGER, ARNOLD
2010 “AB1288 Fong Veto,” Project Vote Smart, October, www.votesmart.org,
accessed January 21, 2011.
SLEVIN, PETER
2010 “Deportation of Illegal Immigrants Increases Under Obama Adminis tration,”
Washington Post, July 26, www.washingtonpost.com, accessed October 22,
2010.
SORBA, MICHAEL J.
2010 “Highland Council Backs Arizona,” Press-Enterprise, July 17, www.pe.
com, accessed November 18, 2010.
SPARKE, MATTHEW B.
2006 “A Neoliberal Nexus: Economy, Security and the Biopolitics of Citizen -
ship on the Border,” Political Geography vol. 25, no. 2, pp. 151-180.
LOCAL ANTI-IMMIGRATION POLITICS 155
U.S. CONGRESS LIBRARY OF CONGRESS
2009 “Bill Text 111th Congress (2009-2010) H.R.994.IH,” February 11, www
.thomas.loc.gov, accessed November 27, 2010.
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU
2010a “Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynamics,” http://lehd.did.census
.gov/led/, accessed November 4, 2010.
2010b “2005-2009 American Community Survey,” http://www.census.gov/acs/
www/, accessed January 11, 2011.
U.S. LEGAL SERVICES CORPORATION, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
1986 “Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986,” November 6, www.oig.lsc
.gov/legis.gov, accessed January 25, 2011.
VARSANYI, MONICA W.
2008 “Rescaling the ‘Alien,’ Rescaling Personhood: Neoliberalism, Immigration,
and the State,” Annals of the Association of American Geographers vol. 98,
no. 4, pp. 877-896.
WILLIAMS, MICHAEL J.
2010 “Wildomar: Council Adopts Limited E-Verify Policy,” North County Times,
August 11, http://www. nctimes.com/news/local/wildomar/article_4034
ecea-5f0d-575b-9ee6-ea37758dc8d1.html, accessed January 10, 2010.
156 MICHAL KOHOUT
Introduction
In this article, we highlight some of the results from a study in which researchers
working on both sides of the U.S.-Mexican border addressed related questions
about reproductive health care strategies of migrant and immigrant women. The
research was contextualized within the broader developments on a global scale,
which increasingly engage women by integrating them into global labor markets.
Paralleling these trends are recent policy developments in Arizona. We thus focus
this article on some of the results of the research on the Arizona side of the border,
as this state’s legislative history since 2004 provides the opportunity to examine the
impact of an “anti-immigrant” climate on immigrant populations that have settled
there (O’Leary 2009a). In turn, this examination can be used to predict the widening
of health care disparities through the “disentitlement” politics of social welfare po l -
icy reform (Marchevsky and Theoharis 2008, 90) that began as early as 1986 with
California’s unsuccessful Prop 187. The concept of the mixed-immigration-status
household is a useful analytical approach for explaining how emerging anti-immi-
grant policies adversely impact more than those who have been singled out be cause
of their immigration status to include non-immigrants who share intersecting ethnic
and racial characteristics. 
Key to our argument is the concept of the mixed-immigration-status house-
hold. In this domestic unit, the immigration status of at least one member is diffe rent
from that of the others. This may include family members who are “undocumented,”
legal residents, U.S.-born, or naturalized citizens (Romero 2008; Tala vera 2008).
Although the category of undocumented is in itself ambiguous, it has both real and
symbolic consequences for immigrants (Plascencia 2009). In the United States,
the growing category of undocumented immigrants has become the focus of state-
level immigration enforcement policies. Because there are different ways for indi-
viduals to fall under this label, for our research we relied on Cornelius to help us
formulate the following description:
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The undocumented are those individuals who enter the United States without inspec-
tion (at a place other than a port of entry) and are present without authorization. They
may have entered legally but subsequently overstayed the term limit of their visa.
They may have entered legally and are legally present but are not legal residents and,
therefore, not entitled to public benefits. They may be present without the legal autho -
rization but not apprehended at the time of the interview, nor are they under suspen-
sion of deportation orders at the time they are studied. (1982, 378) 
While it is difficult to ascertain how prevalent the mixed-immigration-status
household is, its development is rooted in history and the adaptive processes of
Mexican families in the border region (Heyman 1991; Sheridan 1992).
Migration’s Global Stage  
Understanding how women have come to be increasingly impacted by anti-immi-
grant policies stems from our grasp of how macro-economic policies have increas-
ingly driven them into the global labor market for survival, eventually to migrate
to the U.S. To be sure, the neoliberal economic philosophies that have worked to
callously disrupt subsistence economies in sending communities in Mexico also
underpin the political philosophies that steadily work to undermine migrants’
integration in their new destinations.
Neoliberalism is a market-driven approach to economic and social policy based
on a private enterprise sector allowed to operate unfettered by government regula -
tions. Not confined to mere economic principles, neoliberalism has been instrumen-
tal in setting both political and social priorities of the state. In this way, neoliberal
approaches often parallel social conservative views that include the belief that go vern -
ments should not run large economic deficits due to public spending. Neoliberals
consider government subsidized entitlement programs such as services for the poor,
primary education, public transportation, and publicly funded health care programs
to be wasteful, and that they place undue tax burdens on individuals and businesses.
In fact, international economic aid for developing countries in the form of loans from
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank are contingent on the
adoption of neoliberal principals (Pomeroy and Jacob 2004). Thus, it should not
come as a surprise that the wide adoption of neoliberal plans such as the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) by a state such as Mexico in 1994 would
adversely impact the economically disadvantaged. Indeed, the literature is replete
with scholarly analysis of how neoliberal economic changes re sulted in the dis-
ruption of rural and agriculture-based communities (Hing 2010; McCarty 2007a).
For example, with NAFTA, Mexican smallholders could not compete with U.S. sub-
sidized corn on the market and were forced to migrate in search of jobs, resulting in
eventual greater migration in general. Given these conditions, women especially
have been compelled to migrate (Andrews, Ybarra, and Miramontes 2002; McCarty
2007b; McGuire 2007; Pomeroy and Jacob 2004; White 2004).   
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The adoption of neoliberal policies in Mexico has been blamed for increased
poverty and less support for those devastated by the changes. Moreover, although
migration in general to the United States from Mexico and Latin America as a re -
sult of these policies has steadily increased, the most significant change has been
the greater participation of women (Marcelli and Cornelius 2001). This is due in
part to the implementation of structural adjustment programs (SAPs), the condi-
tions for loans set up by the IMF and World Bank. Also known as the Washington
Consensus (McGuire 2007), some of these free-market-oriented conditions include
cutting social welfare expenditures, the deregulation of labor relations, and the de -
valuation of a nation’s currency to remain globally competitive (Canales 2000). In
this way, SAPs result in harsher conditions for Mexico’s poor, especially for women
who increasingly contend with rising education and health care costs for their
families (McCarty 2007b), diminishing employment opportunities, and declining
purchasing power (Crummett 2001; Labrecque 1998; Marchand and Runyan 2000).
To compensate for this, an unprecedented number of women have entered the
labor market through migration, a combination known to produce the feminiza-
tion of migration (McGuire 2007; Sadasivam 1997).
The disruption of local economies and the ensuing migration undermines the
process whereby social cohesion is preserved. Characterized as a “fracturing expe-
rience,” migration places burdens on both those who leave their communities and
those who stay (McGuire 2007). Splintering families can lead to negative health
outcomes while at the same time offering hope of finding better opportunities. In
tracing the migration of women engaged in the tomato industry, Barndt (2001) relies
on the explanatory power of the Marxist concept of “alienation” to advance our un -
derstanding of how, over time and geography, industrial agriculture, fueled by free
trade principles, capitalizes on the displacement of subsistence farmers. As men and
women are dislodged from the land as their means of production, they become
distanced from the elementary process that defines households: production, re -
production, and consumption (Netting, Wilk, and Arnould 1984). However, the
process of alienation pertains not only to workers but also to the “deeper separa-
tion of us all, producers and consumers alike, from the social dynamics, context,
and conditions that bring things into being (Barndt 2001: 35). How labor is repro-
duced and reinvented in terms of U.S. needs is one example.
Migration intensifies the changes for women and moves them toward greater
independence (Hirsch 2002; Safa 1999). With the distancing of labor and pro-
duction, immigrant women are also distanced from their reproductive roles. This
includes choosing to have fewer children (Lindstrom and Saucedo 2002; Wilson and
McQuiston 2006), marrying later in life (Raley, Durden, and Wildsmith 2004),
and having less time to devote to other reproductive activities such as the social-
ization of family members and the care and monitoring of dependent children, the
elderly, and the infirm (Wilson 2000). Flexible employment patterns also fracture
hours worked for wages from the costs of reproducing the labor force, to the
advantage of businesses (Barndt 2001; Canales 2000; O’Leary 2006). Anti-immi-
grant policies advance this fracturing process by helping the state determine and
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institutionalize differences among family members through the construction of
legal categories (Romero 2008, 132), many of which support a state-regulated pro cess
in which immigrants benefit industry.
Anti-Immigration Policies: 
Implications for Widening Health Disparities 
Anti-immigrant policies and the public discourse that promotes and advances them
have only recently come to the attention of researchers. A previous publication by
one of the authors of this article traces Arizona’s legislative actions from 2004 to
show how political pressures to restrict immigrants from accessing social welfare pro -
grams have intensified (O’Leary 2009a). California’s unsuccessful Proposition 187
proposing limits to health care program access (Chavez 1988; Chavez, Cornelius,
and Jones 1986) and the 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Res -
ponsibility Act (IIRIRA) (Inda 2006) were premised on the idea that immigrants
were imprudent and incapable of behaving ethically (Inda 2006, 24). Indeed, many
anti-immigrant propositions have gained traction from the circulation of myths
that malign immigrants to justify support for the measures. King (2007) lists these
myths as: 
• U.S. public health insurance programs are overburdened with immigrants.
• Immigrants consume large quantities of limited health care resources. 
• Immigrants come to the United States to gain access to health care services.
• Restricting immigrants’ access to the health care system will not affect U.S.
citizens. 
• Undocumented immigrants are “free-riders” in the U.S. health care system.
In Arizona, House Bill 2030 (known as “Public Programs, Citizenship”) was
premised on misrepresenting Latinos as welfare-seeking intruders. Although vetoed
by Arizona’s governor in 2005, it passed in 2006 by focusing the electorate’s attention
on immigrants’ access to public programs. This bill requires Arizona state govern-
ment employees to verify an applicant’s immigration status with the Department
of Homeland Security’s Secure America with Verification and Enforcement (SAVE)
program before providing services.
Conventional wisdom holds that the lack of health care and health care access
has a negative impact on all facets of life: from economic productivity and educa tio n -
al attainment to the prevention of crime and the spread of disease. However, health
care and health care access is a particular problem for Latino populations. Many
Latino immigrants arrive in the United States undocumented, already markedly
poor, less healthy, less educated, and less connected to the rest of society (Andrews,
Ybarra, and Miramontes 2002). Latinos are more likely to be engaged in high-risk
occupations, such as construction and farm labor. Latinos are also likely to face
obstacles to access caused by poverty and the lack of culturally competent, Spanish-
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language-proficient medical service providers (Brown and Yu 2002). Because of
the high cost of premiums and Latino employees’ limited accessed to employer-
based health insurance (EBHI), the group also has low rates of health insurance
coverage (Brown and Yu 2002; King 2007). Despite Latinos’ high employment rates
—the unemployment rate reached a historic low of 4.9 percent at the end of 2006
(Kochhar 2008)— the lack of EBHI significantly contributes to Latinos’ limited access
to health care. Many Latinos work in Latino-owned businesses, which cannot afford
to offer their employees EBHI. The type of jobs they hold is another factor. A dis-
proportionate number of Latinos work in formal and informal service-sector jobs
(as janitors, domestics, and care-givers), construction, and food-service occupations
and are, therefore, more likely to be employed part-time, temporarily, or seasonally,
making them ineligible for EBHI. Even when they are eligible, such occupations and
the low wages they earn are not enough to pay their portion of cost-sharing health
insurance plans (Brown and Yu 2002). Many Latinos are thus unable to meet their
most basic health care needs: regular check-ups, routine immunizations, and nec-
essary medications.
The Research
In this section, we highlight results from a study that examined immigrant women’s
access to reproductive health care programs in the climate created by Arizona’s
anti-immigrant legislation. For this reason, we focus here on the results from the U.S.
field work, which necessarily encompasses important historical and geogra phical
realities that have given rise to the mixed-immigration-status household. 
The household is the most fundamental unit of social organization and a well
established scientific unit of analysis (Netting, Wilk, and Arnould 1984). House -
holds are strategic groupings of individuals who may be, but are not necessarily
related by blood. As the most basic of decision-making structures, individual deci-
sions inevitably impact the entire unit (Hackenberg, Murphy, and Selby 1984). For
our research, a special effort was made to include study participants whose house -
holds were of a mixed immigration status. Ferreira-Pinto (2005) suggested that the
application of policies aimed at excluding those who were undocumented would, in
practice, have a generalized adverse “chilling effect” on health care access (Marchevsky
and Theoharis 2008, 82). Since individuals do not live in isolation but are part of
social groupings, we examined households where by definition individuals share
a multitude of task-oriented and symbolic activities with others. In this way, we
relied on the scientific understanding of the household as a “locus of negotiation”
(Hackenberg, Murphy, and Selby 1984, 187), where collective decision-making
ne cessarily weighs its interest in light of the often conflicting interests of its indi-
vidual members. This is essential to understanding why policies of attrition will fail
to achieve their stated goals and work instead to undermine the basic rights and the
health and human capital development of an incalculable number of the state’s
residents who are not by definition undocumented immigrants.
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RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS
The research project “A Multidisciplinary Binational Study of Migrant Women in
the Context of a U.S. Mexico Border Reproductive Health Care Continuum” was
designed to document and analyse the reproductive health care strategies of immi -
 grant women, and their access to reproductive health care services.1 Conducted
in 2008-2009, the study shows that the reproductive health care strategies immi-
grant women adopt are couched within increased exposure to various types of risks
associated with the migratory process, including the risk of death (Cornelius 2001;
Goldsmith et al. 2006; O’Leary 2008, 2009b), sexual assault (Falcon 2001), and ill-
ness when health care services in settlement communities are restricted, denied,
or under-utilized (Marchevsky and Theoharis 2008; Tala vera 2008). Such services
are seen as critical to women’s health and safety in the course of migration, and
ultimately, to their well-being in destination communities.
Fieldwork in Tucson, Arizona, consisted of survey research using a short de m -
ographic- and health-indicators survey with both open- and closed-ended questions
to immigrant women. Once permission was obtained from respondents, inter -
views were recorded for accuracy. 
Researchers partnered with the Mexican Consulate’s health referral program,
“Ventanilla de Salud” (A Window on Health), and El Rio Community Health Center
to help recruit an initial 40 respondents (for subsample C) who had solicited re -
pro ductive health care services. A snowball sampling process was chosen to pro-
duce another 40 respondents for subsample D, women who might be responsible for
the health care needs of at least one undocumented individual, which by defi ni tion
might complicate their receiving services. No direct questions about respondent’s
legal status were asked. Instead, proxy questions were used as indicators for behavior
consistent with efforts to avoid attention, and specifically in terms of accessing
health care services. In other words, questions about the difficulties immigrants
might deal with for accessing health care programs for family members were used
to determine if respondents were assigned to subsample C or D. Upon analysis of
the responses, certain questions and answer combinations allowed us to claim with
reasonable certainty that we had met our goal of interviewing and identifying at
least 40 respondents in which at least one member of the household was undoc-
umented. We used the statistical program SPSS for quantitative analysis, and open-
ended questions were transcribed for later content analysis.
FINDINGS
To determine if the anti-immigrant climate in Arizona had an impact on a respon-
dent’s access to health care, researchers in Tucson, Arizona, where the U.S. com-
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1 The research was funded by the Programa de Investigación de Migración y Salud (Migration and Health
Research Program) (PIMSA) in 2008-2009, administered by Health Initiatives of the Americas (HIA).
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ponent of the bi-national study was conducted, gathered data from two purposeful
subsamples of immigrant women. The first subsample (C) represented those situa -
tions where eligibility for health services posed no problem. The second subsample
(D) represented a situation where health care eligibility, presumably due to immi-
gration status of at least one family member, posed a problem for accessing health
care. Issues for accessing health care generally arise from an immigration status
that makes the applicant ineligible, such as the category “undocumented.” 
To test if there were differences between the two subsamples (C and D) with
regard to the ability to access some form of health care plan or program, respon-
dents from both samples were asked if they had any type of aseguranza (health
insurance). Because it was anticipated that many might not be able to afford com-
mercial forms of health insurance, the definition of health insurance included any
health care program in which they were enrolled. Consistent with the notion that
the combined anti-immigrant rhetoric and the ensuing policy restrictions produce
a “chilling effect” on health care access (Ferreira-Pinto 2005; Marchevsky and Theo -
haris 2008), our null hypothesis posited that there is no difference between sub-
samples C and D. Table 1 shows the X2 (Chi-Square) test results of the comparison
of these two groups. The Pearson X2 and Fishers tests yield significant differences
between subsamples C and D. The difference between the two samples is informed
by the research context, and it suggested that for those respondents who live in
households with at least one undocumented member, access to health care pro-
grams is a problem. 
TABLE 1
CHI-SQUARE TESTS FOR SUBSAMPLE (C AND D) 
DIFFERENCES IN ACCESS TO INSURANCE
Asymp. Sig. Exact Sig. Exact Sig. 
Value df (2-sided) (2-sided) (1-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square 7.6221 1 .006
Continuity correction2 6.338 1 .012
Likelihood ratio 7.893 1 .005
Fisher's exact test .008 .005
Linear-by-Linear association 7.514 1 .006
Number of valid cases 71
1 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 12.68.
2 Computed only for a 2 x 2 table.
SOURCE: Developed by the authors based on O’Leary (2008-2009).
A content analysis of the narratives of women interviewed in the study con-
firms this assertion. For those unable to access health care programs, reasons noted
included that they did not have the documents necessary for the application, or
that that they did not have all of the documentation necessary with them at the time
they applied for assistance. Fifty-nine percent stated that they had difficulty in
accessing services, while 41 percent did not report having issues. In addition, a ma -
jority of the respondents (65 percent) stated they had felt in some way unwelcome,
discriminated against, or otherwise made to feel uncomfortable by medical staff.
These accounts are consistent with findings by Marchevsky and Theoharis (2008)
and Talavera (2008). 
The application of such measures is predicted to be sure to have a “ripple
effect” throughout the broader immigrant community. The two subsamples of res -
pondents recruited are shown in Chart 1, which compares the overall size of those
impacted when all household members are considered. Comparing subsamples C
and D, this chart shows that as the sample size goes up, even a small difference
in the number of respondents becomes significant. The lower number of women
who were categorized as subsample C (n=30), where immigration status does not
seem to be an issue, translates into a total of 107 household members. By con-
trast, the slightly larger number of women who were categorized as subsample D
(n=41), where at least one member of the household is thought to be undocument-
ed, translates into a total of 209 household members who are potentially impacted









































HOUSEHOLD COMPOSITION BY TOTAL NUMBER OF INDIVIDUALS
BY CATEGORY (“COUNT”) AND SUBSAMPLE
SOURCE: Developed by the authors based on O’Leary (2008-2009).
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by household decisions. For example, if household heads in this category decide
for any reason not to apply to a health service program, nearly twice the number
of individuals, including a total of 105 U.S.- and foreign-born children, are more
likely to be affected by these decisions.
The data also reveals that 55 percent of the immigrant women interviewed
had children born in the United States. This is broken down by women in each
of the two subsamples, showing that women belonging to subsample D (mixed
immigrant-status households) were more likely to have U.S.-born children. By the
same token, about half of the immigrant women interviewed (48 percent) had
children born outside the United States. In practice, then, women who live in
households where at least one household member is undocumented may engage
in household decisions to seek health care made difficult because of the fear that
their application will invite additional scrutiny and possible reporting to authori-
ties. As such, these decisions may result in de facto restrictions to health care ser -
vices for members who are eligible for them, including children. 
One way in which women are seen as contending with the cost of reproduc-
tive health care services when restrictions cannot be negotiated is avoiding them
altogether. Although more research in this area is needed, some of the evidence
from the current study suggests that choosing permanent sterilization as a con-
traceptive method may be a solution. Chart 2 shows that among the women sur-
veyed in Tucson, those who belonged to mixed-immigration-status households were































































































CURRENT METHOD OF CONTRACEPTION
SOURCE: Developed by the authors based on O’Leary (2008-2009).
Discussion
In sheltering populations from —and forming resistance to— the emerging dis-
course of intolerance, the research by Vélez-Ibáñez (1996) is useful for showing
that households are not strictly economic adaptive mechanisms, but also key to re -
producing value systems that directly or subtly oppose the non-collective nature of
the capitalist mode of production. To be sure, the mixed-immigration-status house-
holds are not the ideal family model that is at the heart of the U.S. legal structure,
as Heyman points out (1991, 197). However, this household make-up, which takes
advantage of cross-border movement and the mounting restrictions to the free mo ve -
ment of people, commerce, and ideas, is representative of a cultural reality of the
U.S.-Mexico border region (Vélez-Ibáñez 1996) and beyond (McCarty 2007a).
Related by marriage, friendship, and children, vast networks of households straddle
the border and fluctuate over time in terms of size, composition, and functions con -
sistent with cooperative arrangements, such as the care of children and the elderly,
borrowing, lending, and the cultural ideologies that give them meaning. In this way,
households build up and restore social bonds. Above all, bonds of trust (confianza) also
work to buffer its members from symbolic violence, i.e., the use of denigrating lan-
guage, labels (e.g., “illegals”), and images (e.g., criminals) that repro duce and legiti -
mize relations of domination (Bourdieu 1989), and other assaults on their dignity.
Thus, devastation to households and families on the U.S. side of the border inflict
“collateral damage” to those on the Mexican side (McCarty 2007, 106).
Perhaps such resistance has resulted in a backlash in the form of virulent
anti-immigrant sentiment and overt hostility. Marchevsky and Theoharis (2008, 76)
report that states with large minority populations (black and Latino) have adopt-
ed stricter policies for accessing social welfare programs and have higher sanction
rates than states where their clientele is white. The consequences of such acri-
mony on the health and human development of immigrants and non-immigrants
alike has only recently stimulated academic interest and public outrage. Research
by O’Leary and Romero (2011) shows that university students, a quarter of whom
had immigrant parents, experienced stress produced by anti-immigrant rhetoric.
A 2007 report by the National Council of La Raza raised concerns about the damage
to families caused by intensified workplace raids in 2006 and 2007 that terri fied
and separated small children —many U.S.-born— from parents (Capps et al. 2007).
The report presents the implications of these raids: long- and short-term learning
problems in children due to the fear they triggered. Romero has argued that such
state practices serve to “intimidate and stigmatize mixed-status families, deter poli t -
ical, social, and cultural integration of communities, and socialize citizens to a sec-
ond-class status” (2008, 132). The public intimidation exhibited by police during
immigration raids in Chandler, Arizona, in the form of unwarranted stops and search-
es of presumed undocumented immigrants serve to normalize disrespect and con-
tempt for immigrants. The public spectacle, often in front of other immigrants or
family members, in shopping areas and neighborhoods contributes to the social-
ization and identity formation processes. This argument is consistent with the
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findings from the research by Goldsmith, Romero, Rubio Goldsmith, Escobedo,
and Khoury  (2009), who find that policing authorities mistreat barrio residents who
exhibit more Mexican ethno-racial characteristics than those with Anglo characte r -
istics, and that citizenship, class, and educational level offer them little protection,
which is useful in light of criticisms of SB1070 for its potential to encourage racial
profiling (also see Short and Magaña 2002). More to the point, although there are
real differences between legal and “illegal immigrants,” the ability of the public and
the media to make this distinction is less clear, making Latinos in general more
susceptible to prejudice and discrimination because they share many phenotypical
and cultural traits with immigrants (Short and Magaña 2002, 709; Plascencia 2009).
Therefore, although the proposed policies are di rected at restricting undocumented
immigrants, they are expected to have broader ramifications throughout the com-
munities where immigrants live —often heavily Latino— regardless of legal status.
Conclusion
Anti-immigrant sentiment normalizes generalized disrespect for and suspicion of
immigrants. This encourages their being policed by social service agents. As more
women enter the labor force through migration, they initiate a process whereby pro -
ductive activities are separated from their reproductive activities (Wilson 2000).
The distancing from these two activities is institutionalized with outward acts of
disrespect, such as those articulated and effected by anti-immigrant sentiment. In
2011, Arizona’s legislators debated a proposal to deny birthright citizenship to the
children of undocumented parents born in the United States. This was also de -
bated in the U.S. Congress in spring 2011. In addition to articulating contempt for
immigrants, this debate delineated the relationship between the state and the re pro -
duction of its immigrant work force. Although the idea never gained meaningful
traction, the political discourse it engendered represented one more in a long list of
attempts to separate immigrant workers from the social context that ultimately
brings the work force into being. A “deeper separation” (Barndt 2001, 35) of worker
from family ensures more profit for the employer because the costs of reproduction
remain foreign and thereby the responsibility of the foreign state. More importantly,
this attempt to further separate the productive from the reproductive counters the
historical use of birthright citizenship to encourage assimilation, unity, and alle-
giance among children of immigrants to their country of birth (Ngai 2007). As
U.S. citizens, the costs of educating them and keeping them healthy would fully
reside in their country of birth and the site of production, expenses that fundamen -
tally counter the neoliberal agenda.  
Such disciplining becomes internalized as household members contend with
the possibilities of being an object of suspicion and subjected to such treatment.
This results in opting out of health care services. For women, a logical outcome of
this internalized understanding of their situation may include their unwillingness
to expose themselves to the scrutiny of official agents charged with administering
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or accessing health care. Indeed, in the research by Marchevsky and Theoharis
(2008), case workers perceived Latina immigrants as undeserving of the same be n -
efits as U.S. citizens. Latina immigrant women reported being misinformed,
humiliated, and harassed by case workers. For those whose families included a
person ineligible for health care, the lack of health care program participation can
be explained by the fear of being openly scrutinized and perhaps even denied service.
However, it is important to realize that such decisions also impact those legally
entitled to receive such services, many of whom are children of immigrant parents; in
turn, many of these children are U.S. citizens. Community reports such as those exa m -
ined by Marchevsky and Theoharis (2008) suggest growing disparities between
immigrants and citizens in terms of their access to public assistance programs.
When combined with other anti-immigrant policies, progress for human develop-
ment is stifled. Take for example, Arizona’s Prop 300, which became law in 2007.
This legis lation affected adult education programs and immigrant students’ access
to institutions of higher learning. The adult education provisions restricted eligi-
bility for state-funded services offered by the Arizona Department of Education
Divi sion of Adult Education. Adult education programs were targeted because of
a perception that Spanish-speaking undocumented immigrants were the bulk of
the students taking these English classes. The law now requires state-funded pro-
grams in school districts and other institutions and agencies to provide adult edu-
cation ser vices only to U.S. citizens, legal residents, or people otherwise lawfully
present in this country. Prop 300 also prohibits adults who are not U.S. citizens or
legal resi dents from receiving childcare assistance from the Arizona Department
of Eco nomic Security.2 Thus, just when English became the state’s official lan guage,
creating legal impediments to conducting official business in Arizona, the state
legislature mandated obstacles to learning English.
Prop. 300 also restricted access to public higher education. Previously, students
only had to prove local residency to qualify for in-state tuition rates at Arizona’s
colleges and universities and for state financial aid. Now, with Prop 300 in place,
immigrant students in Arizona are impacted in several ways:
• A student with unauthorized immigration status does not qualify for in-
state tuition. 
• A student in this country unlawfully is not entitled to state-funded finan-
cial assistance. 
• A student whose immigration status is unauthorized cannot be classified as
an in-state student or a county resident.
On January 1, 2008, Arizona’s employer-sanctions law went into effect. It tar-
geted businesses that intentionally or knowingly employ unauthorized immigrants
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2 One particularly insidious stipulation of Prop 300, a third component that received little attention during
the November 2006 elections, was that in addition to addressing eligibility requirements for educa-
tion, it also restricts eligibility for childcare assistance to parents, guardians, and caregivers.
and largely replicated provisions of the 1996 Immigrant Responsibility and Immi -
grant Reform Act. Under the Arizona law, any employer who employs unautho-
rized workers —not just those who provide services to the state— can have their
business licenses suspended for up to 10 days and be put on probation. Although
the long-term economic impact of the law on Arizona’s economy is not yet clear, there
are historic indications that people with a tenuous hold on social and economic
life, like immigrants, will suffer the ramifications of the implementation of anti-immi -
grant legislation. This could include increased policing by employers, and embolden
racial profiling of newcomers from cultures increasingly perceived as problematic.
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La población inmigrante del estado de Georgia ha crecido marcadamente en las
últi mas dos décadas, de 173 000 en 1990 a aproximadamente 920 000 en 2009.
Ahora, el 9.4 por ciento de la población estatal es inmigrante, comparado con so -
la mente el 2.7 por ciento en 1990, y el 41.4 por ciento de ellos han llegado a par-
tir del año 2000. Alre dedor de dos tercios de los inmigrantes radican en la zona
metro politana de Atlanta. Un poco más de la mitad (54.6 por ciento) provienen de
Amé rica Latina y cerca de un tercio del total (29.8 por ciento) son mexicanos
(MPI, 2011). Georgia, un estado con muy pocos inmigrantes veinte años atrás, en la
actualidad se encuentra entre los diez estados con el mayor número de inmigran -
tes a nivel nacional.
Por otra parte, se halla entre los estados que tienen los números más altos de
inmigrantes indocumentados, y donde éstos constituyen los porcentajes más altos
de la población total (Passel y Cohn, 2011). También es uno de los estados con
los números y porcentajes más altos de indocumentados en la población económi -
camente activa. Se calcula que cerca de la mitad de los inmigrantes en Georgia son
indocumentados. Este hecho, que ahora parece provocar tanta consternación entre
los residentes del estado, no fue considerado tan problemático durante los años de
auge económico de la década de los noventa e inicios del siglo XXI. Es sa bido que, a
mediados de los noventa, migrantes mexicanos no autorizados fueron reclutados
activamente para trabajar en la construcción de las instalaciones olímpicas enAtlan -
ta, así como en las fábricas de alfombras de Dalton y en las procesadoras de pollos
en Gainsville.
Al pasar por el estado de Georgia en el verano de 2000 me llamó la atención la
opinión bastante generalizada sobre las virtudes de los trabajadores migrantes mexi ca -
nos. En diversos contextos o ámbitos laborales, y desde varias perspectivas, es cu ché
numerosos elogios de estas personas que fueron descritas como diligentes, cumpli -
das y excelentes trabajadores. Sin embargo, al realizar una estancia sabática en ese
estado, casi diez años más tarde encontré que el panorama había cambiado consi de -
 rablemente.A partir del 2006, Georgia empezó a aprobar leyes restrictivas y puni tivas
para migrantes indocumentados. Cuatro condados con altos porcentajes de inmigran -
tes latinos han establecido acuerdos 287g con la agencia Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE), cuyo resultado ha sido la deportación de miles de personas.
SENTIMIENTOS ANTIINMIGRANTES 
EN EL ESTADO DE GEORGIA
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Actualmente se discuten nuevas medidas en la legislatura estatal (Georgia
General Assembly) que penalizará transportar, albergar o proteger a un inmigrante
indocumentado, así como introducirlo al estado de Georgia.Además, obligaría a todos
los empleadores de cinco personas o más a verificar el estatus migratorio de éstas.
Este ar tículo analizará el crecimiento de la población inmigran te en Georgia y ex -
plorará las posibles causas de los sentimientos antiinmigrantes que han brotado y, por
ende, de las políticas antiinmigrantes que se han implementado allí en años recientes.
Breves antecedentes históricos
Desde el establecimiento de Estados Unidos como nación independiente, la his -
toria de Georgia —como la de los demás estados del llamado “sur profundo” (Deep
South) donde se instauró el sistema de plantaciones agrícolas desde la época colo -
nial— fue hasta finales del siglo XX, sobre todo, una historia en blanco y negro,
mar cada por el racismo que tiene sus raíces en el pasado esclavista de esta región.
Tampoco hay que olvidar las motivaciones racistas y económicas que propiciaron
la expulsión de los grupos indígenas en la década de 1830. Pero de ahí en adelante,
hasta la época de las luchas por los derechos civiles de los afroamericanos, la vida en
el sur había transcurrido, básicamente, en dos mundos paralelos, el de los blancos
y el de los negros. Después de la derrota en la guerra civil y la abolición de la escla vi -
tud, los blancos dueños de plantaciones implementaron leyes segregacionistas que
res tringieron los derechos de la población negra y los relegaban a espacios, tanto pú -
bli cos como privados, separados de los blancos.
Cabe mencionar que, en el sur, los judíos, muchos de ellos hijos o nietos de inmi -
grantes europeos, aparentemente formaban parte del mundo de los blancos. Sus
hijos asistían a las mismas escuelas que los niños blancos y se sentaban adelante,
no atrás como los negros, en los vehículos del transporte público. Sin embargo, había
barrios donde no podían comprar casa y clubes privados que les negaban la entrada.
Los judíos, al igual que los católicos y desde luego los negros, eran objeto de di ver -
sos tipos de agresiones y ataques verbales y físicos por parte de los grupos racistas
como el Ku Klux Klan (KKK) que proclamaba, y sigue proclamando hoy día, la su -
premacía de los blancos arios.
El movimiento por los derechos civiles de la población negra, cuyos inicios se
remontan a fines del siglo XIX, empezó a lograr victorias significativas a mediados
del siglo XX. La decisión de la Suprema Corte de Estados Unidos en el caso Brown
vs. Board of Education en 1954 marcó el principio del fin de la segregación racial,
sancionada por las leyes, en los estados sureños. William B. Hartsfield, quien fue
alcalde deAtlanta de 1937 a 1941 y de 1942 a 1962, tuvo la previsión suficiente para
dar los pasos que encaminarían a esta ciudad a ser un centro neurálgico de la aviación
comercial del país. Junto con su sucesor, IvanAllen Jr. —ambos en constante comu -
nicación y consulta con Robert W. Woodruff, presidente de la empresa Coca-Cola
de 1923 hasta 1955, cuando al cumplir 65 años se vio obligado a jubilarse, aun -
que en realidad fue el líder extraoficial de la compañía hasta su muerte en 1985—
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fo mentaron la idea de que Atlanta es “una ciudad demasiado ocupada para odiar”
y evitaron en parte los estallidos de violencia que sacudieron a otras ciudades su -
reñas en esta época de transición.
No obstante el pragmatismo y la apertura al cambio de algunos eminentes
políticos y hombres de negocios de la ciudad de Atlanta, el proceso de desegre ga -
ción en Georgia tuvo sus conflictos y contradicciones (Pomerantz, 1996; Allen,
1996). En enero de 1965, Martin Luther King Jr. fue homenajeado, tras recibir el
Premio Nobel de la Paz, con un banquete “birracial” al que acudieron los líderes
y personajes más destacados de ambas comunidades. A través de los medios, los ojos
del mundo estaban puestos en este evento que tuvo lugar a unas cuantas cuadras de
donde, en 1960, King había sido arrestado y, en consecuencia, encarcelado por
primera vez, por intentar obligar al restaurante de una de las tiendas departa men ta -
les más importantes del sureste, a atender a comensales negros.
Dos años después de que la Suprema Corte ordenó la desegregación escolar,
en protesta, Georgia modificó su bandera estatal para incluir las barras y estrellas
de la bandera de guerra de la antigua confederación, ampliamente reconocida como
un símbolo racista. Las exhortaciones para que se enmendara esta afrenta a la dig -
nidad de todos los seres humanos, y en particular de los afroamerica nos, antes de la
realización de los juegos olímpicos de 1996, no fueron escuchadas. Fue hasta 2003
cuando se quitó por completo este símbolo de la bandera estatal.
En 1965, Lester Maddox, un restaurantero de Atlanta, desacató la orden fede -
ral (de la Civil Rights Act de 1964) de admitir a los negros en su establecimiento;
prefirió cerrar su negocio antes de atender a clientes afroamericanos. Maddox se
había postulado sin éxito para ser alcalde de Atlanta en 1957 y nuevamente en 1961,
y para el cargo de “lieutenant governor” (vicegobernador) en 1962, pero llegó a ser
gobernador del estado en 1966. Cuando estuvo en este cargo, se negó a poner las
ban deras de las oficinas estatales a media asta para la procesión fúnebre de Martin
Luther King Jr. en 1968. 
Hoy, la casa donde nació King es un sitio histórico al igual que la estación de
bomberos que está en la esquina de la misma calle. En la siguiente cuadra está la
tumba de King y más adelante la iglesia donde predicaron él, su padre y su abuelo.
Éstas y otras instalaciones forman parte del Martin Luther King Jr. National His -
toric Site, ubicado en la Avenida Auburn. Esta calle siempre ha sido una arteria vital
de lo que es todavía un barrio negro en el centro de Atlanta, ahora visitado por
personas de todas partes del país y del mundo.
A partir de mediados del siglo XX, con el trasfondo de su pasado segregacio -
nista, Georgia y el resto del sur estadunidense empezaron a experimentar profundos
cambios sociales, políticos y económicos que en décadas recientes han propiciado
una ola de escritos y estudios, académicos y otros, sobre el llamado “nuevo sur”,1 e
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1 El término nuevo sur ha sido utilizado en diversos momentos para señalar cambios importantes en
esta región de Estados Unidos que por sus antecedentes de una economía basada en las plantaciones
agrícolas se consideraba menos propicia al cambio que otras regiones. Fue usado por primera vez
después de la Guerra Civil para referirse a un sur que ya no era esclavista.
incluso ahora algunos hablan del “nuevo sur latino”. Fue la región de mayor cre -
cimiento económico del país en las últimas décadas del siglo XX y como tal atrajo a
muchos residentes nuevos provenientes de otras partes de Estados Unidos y tam bién
de otros países, entre los cuales destaca México.
Auge de los flujos migratorios
La competencia internacional obligó a una reestructuración de la economía esta -
dunidense, cuyos efectos empiezan a sentirse a finales de la década de los setenta.
La flexibilización laboral, la deslocalización y el debilitamiento de las empresas
llevó a algunas industrias a reubicarse totalmente fuera de Estados Unidos y a otros
a dejar los sitios tradicionales de noreste y medio oeste del país para ubicarse en el
sureste. Se empezaba a hablar de esta zona como el “sun belt” (cinturón del sol), en
alusión a su clima más benigno y en contraste con el término de “rust belt” (cin -
turón del óxido) que se utilizaba para referirse a la zona de las viejas instalaciones
industriales que ya quedaron vacías y literalmente oxidándose. Entre los principales
atractivos del sur para inversionistas, tanto nacionales como internacionales, se
con taban los gobiernos estatales y locales dispuestos a ofrecer generosos subsidios
para las empresas que se ubicaban en la región y una oferta abundante de mano
de obra relativamente barata y sin tradición sindical (Murphy et al., eds., 2001; Cobb
y Stueck, 2005; Odem y Lacy, eds., 2009).
Además de ser la región del país con mayor dinamismo económico en los ochen -
ta y noventa, Cobb (2005:1) dice que el sur es probablemente la región más globa -
lizada. Este autor señala que el sur atrajo más de la mitad de las empresas extrajeras
que llegaron en la década de los noventa y que, en esta región, uno de cada ocho tra ba -
jadores de la manufactura es empleado por una empresa extranjera. El fuerte cre ci -
 miento económico del sur llevó al Departamento de Estado a escoger esta región como
destino para refugiados admitidos al país, en los casos de quienes no fueron patro -
cinados por familiares que ya residían en otros estados (Duchon y Murphy, 2001:1).
Al mismo tiempo, la fuerte demanda para mano de obra barata y poco calificada
para la construcción, el procesamiento de alimentos, servicios deman te nimiento y lim -
pieza y trabajos similares, despreciados por la población nativa local, atrajo flujos
importantes de inmigrantes de México, sobre todo, y también de Cen troamérica
(Murphy et al., eds., 2001; Cobb y Stueck, eds., 2005; Odem y Lacy, eds., 2009).
Siete de los diez estados con las más altas tasas de crecimiento de la población
inmigrante entre 2000 y 2009 (Carolina del Sur, Alabama, Tennessee, Arkansas,
Georgia, Kentucky y Carolina del Norte) están ubicados en el sureste del país (MPI,
2011). Estos siete también registraron altas tasas (arriba del cien por ciento) por el
mismo concepto entre 1990 y 2000. Sin embargo, el número absoluto de inmigran -
tes en estos estados suele ser bajo en comparación con el de los estados receptores
tradicionales. Ahora —de hecho desde el 2000— Georgia, el estado más grande al
este del ríoMisisipi, también se encuentra entre los diez estados con el mayor núme -
ro de inmigrantes.
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El estado de Georgia, y en particular la zona metropolitana de Atlanta, han
adqui rido prominencia como un nuevo destino para inmigrantes durante la prime-
ra década del siglo XXI (Singer et al., 2008). El número de inmigrantes se calculó en
920 000 en 2009, que representa un incremento de 432 por ciento respecto de la
cifra de 1990. Según los cálculos del MPI (2011), el 12 por ciento de los inmigrantes
que residen en este estado llegaron antes de 1980, el 14.9 por ciento entre 1980 y
1989, el 31.7 por ciento llegaron en la dé cada de los noventa y el 41.4 por ciento
llegaron del año 2000 en adelante. Ahora, los inmigrantes constituyen el 9.4 por
ciento de la población del estado, en comparación con el 7.1 por ciento en 2000
y solamente el 2.7 por ciento en 1990.
En 2009, el 34.5 por ciento de los inmigrantes, unas 317395 personas, se habían
convertido en ciudadanos de Estados Unidos, en comparación con solamente el
29.3 por ciento, o 169 232 personas en 2000. En general, como sería de esperarse,
la tasa de naturalización está altamente correlacionada con el número de años en
el país. Datos de 2009 muestran que el 80.2 por ciento de los que entraron antes de
1980 ya son ciudadanos, así como el 65.2 por ciento de los que llegaron durante la
década de los ochenta, frente al 35 por ciento de los que llegaron durante los no -
venta y solamente el 9.9 por ciento de los que llegaron de 2000 en adelante. Estas
cifras reflejan la alta proporción de indocumentados mexicanos que llegaron en
números crecientes desde mediados de los noventa, en respuesta al auge en la de -
manda de su mano de obra en varios sectores hasta 2007, cuando se inició una crisis
económica generalizada.
No obstante que los inmigrantes en Georgia provienen de una gran variedad
de países y prácticamente todas las regiones del mundo, más de la mitad (54.6 por
ciento) son latinoamericanos. La cuarta parte son asiáticos, un 10 por ciento son
europeos y el 8.2 por ciento son africanos. Cerca de un tercio (29.8 por ciento) de
todos los inmigrantes nacieron en México (MPI, 2011). Éste es un hecho importan -
te para las percepciones que han formado los residentes del estado respecto de los
inmigrantes y, por ende, de las actitudes y los sentimientos que mani fies tan frente a
ellos, puesto que ningún otro país de origen tiene un peso tan significativo. Se suma
a lo anterior el hecho de que a menudo, al oír que hablan espa ñol, muchos nativos de
Georgia suponen que inmigrantes de otros países latino ameri canos sean mexicanos.
Por otra parte, los lugares de origen que siguen a México en importancia son
India, con 5.9 por ciento del total, y Corea, con 4.1 por ciento. Sin embargo, los
inmi grantes de estos dos países, como los que provienen de Asia en general o de
Europa, suelen tener niveles de escolaridad y de manejo del inglés muy superiores
a los mexicanos. Estas diferencias se reflejan en los niveles de ingresos. En 2009,
la mediana anual de ingresos para los trabajadores hombres de tiempo completo
que nacieron en Asia fue de 47006 dólares al año, y la de los que vienen de Euro -
pa fue de 60 988 dólares, frente a sólo 25 731 dólares para los inmigrantes latino -
ame ricanos, e inclusive 35 600 dólares para los africanos. En el caso de las mujeres
migrantes las medianas del ingreso anual fueron de 35069 dólares para las africa nas,
40553 para las asiáticas y 40360 para las europeas, mientras que la mediana anual
de las latinoamericanas fue de 24 102 dólares (MPI, 2011).
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En vista de la alta proporción de latinos entre los inmigrantes en Georgia y el
hecho de que la mayoría (52 por ciento) de los latinos en el estado son inmigrantes
(Pew Hispanic Center, 2009), existe una tendencia a equiparar a estos dos grupos
de personas y confundir muchas de sus características. Aunado al hecho de que
los inmigrantes latinoamericanos tienen ingresos menores que otros, la población
latina en general tiene ingresos menores que los blancos o negros no hispanos. Las
medianas del ingreso anual en 2008 para cada uno de estos grupos fueron 19 349,
32 588 y 24 260 dólares, respectivamente. Los nativos del estado suelen asociar
la palabra “inmigrante” con mexicano, pobre e indocumentado.
La cada vez mayor presencia de los latinos es muy notoria en la población es -
colar de algunas localidades donde se han asentado por motivos de trabajo. Los la -
tinos conforman alrededor del 8 o 9 por ciento de la población estatal. En 1995, los
niños latinos constituían solamente el 1.9 por ciento de todos los inscritos en las
escuelas públicas, desde el kínder hasta el grado 12 de high school, y para 2010
eran el 11.4 por ciento (Georgia Department of Education, 2010). En la ciudad de
Gainsville, donde abunda el trabajo para los latinos en las procesadoras de pollo,
los niños latinos eran el 54.4 por ciento de la matrícula escolar en 2010 y el 36.1 por
ciento en todo el condado de Hall donde se ubica Gainsville. En Dalton, donde los
latinos han encontrado empleos en las fábricas de alfombras, sus hijos son el 67
por ciento de la población escolar de la ciudad y el 36.9 por ciento en el condado
circundante.
En el caso de Atlanta, donde el mayor crecimiento ha sido en las zonas subur -
banas y la zona metropolitana abarca varios condados, la situación es un poco di -
ferente. En el sistema escolar de la ciudad, que lo es únicamente de la parte más
antigua y céntrica, hay solamente un 5.5 por ciento de niños latinos en las escue -
las. En los condados de Fulton y Dekalb, a su vez los más antiguos y céntricos de
la ahora muy extensa zona metropolitana, el 11.7 y el 11.3 por ciento, respec tiva -
mente, de la matrícula escolar son latinos. En los condados de Cobb y Gwinnett,
colindantes hacia el noroeste y el noreste, los porcentajes de niños latinos en las
escuelas públicas son 15.8 y 24.8 por ciento, respectivamente. Sin embargo, dada
la segregación residencial de facto que prevalece aquí, como en muchos otros luga -
res del país, hay escuelas en estos condados donde la proporción de niños latinos es
particularmente alta, entre el 59 y el 69 por ciento, por ejemplo, en algunas es cue -
las en el condado de Gwinnett en 2010.
La llegada repentina de decenas o cientos de niños latinos que no hablan inglés
a escuelas donde ninguno de los profesores habla español ha sido bastante proble -
 mática en una región que nunca había tenido que enfrentar una situación como ésta.
Aunque predomina el español, hay decenas de idiomas maternos más entre los
niños que inician la escuela sin saber inglés. En 2009, el 18.8 por ciento de los niños
que viven en el estado tiene por lo menos un progenitor (padre o madre) inmigran-
te; en 1990, la cifra era solamente el 4.9 por ciento (MPI, 2011). Sin embargo, el
hecho de tener padres inmigrantes no significa que los hijos lo sean. Actualmente
el 83 por ciento de los niños que tienen por lo menos un padre inmigrante nacieron
en Estados Unidos y, por lo tanto, son ciudadanos.
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Sentimientos y políticas antiinmigrantes
En la introducción al libro Latino Workers in the Contemporary South, los edito-
res (Murphy et al., 2001) hablan de la historia de intolerancia racial, xenofobia y
pobreza que ha caracterizado a esta región. Señalan que estas características serían
motivo de esperar que nuevos inmigrantes y refugiados enfrentaran problemas al
arraigarse en los estados sureños; sin embargo, afirman que “Después de algunos
años difíciles al principio, durante los cuales mexicanos, asiáticos y otros inmigran -
tes sufrieron intolerancia étnica y racial, los grupos tradicionales de la región (blancos
y negros) han empezado a apreciar y valorar las contribuciones de los recién llega -
dos” (Murphy et al., eds., 2001: 2). Se podría afirmar, tal vez, que la aceptación,
o por lo menos la tolerancia hacia los nuevos inmigrantes latinos y asiáticos existió
hasta cierto punto y hasta determinado momento que es algo difícil de precisar. Lo
cierto es que en años recientes han surgido manifestaciones de xenofobia y dis cri mi -
nación hacia ellos, y en particular hacia los mexicanos y otros latinos.
Originalmente el Ku Klux Klan se formó y floreció en los estados del sur en
la década de 1860, dirigiendo sus ataques principalmente a la población negra,
aunque posteriormente, como hemos dicho, despotricaban también en contra de
los católicos y los judíos. Su visibilidad disminuyó drásticamente después de los
agitados años de los movimientos por los derechos civiles de los negros y las victo rias
alcanzadas en este terreno. Ahora han vuelto a emerger lentamente, vociferando dis -
cursos inflamatorios en contra de los mexicanos, con el pretexto de manifestarse
en contra de la inmigración no autorizada.
En años recientes, pequeños núcleos del KKK se han presentado, con sus togas
blancas y sombreros puntiagudos, en varias localidades de Georgia para despo tri -
car en contra de los inmigrantes mexicanos. Parece que una de las primeras mani -
festaciones de esta nueva etapa en la vida del KKK fue un mitin que realizaron a fines
de octubre de 1998 en Gainsville, donde gran número de inmigrantes encuentran
empleo en las plantas procesadoras de pollo. Un pequeño grupo de diecisiete miem -
bros del Klan se presentó frente al edificio del juzgado municipal (Hall County
Courthouse) para gritar y arengar en contra de los inmigrantes ilegales que les qui -
tan los empleos a los hombres blancos (s.a., 1998). Pero también había grandes
contingentes de quienes protestaban en contra de la presencia del KKK; entre ellos
destaca la participación de grupos afroamericanos encabezados por Hosea Williams,
líder del movimiento por los derechos civiles y colaborador cercano de Martin
Luther King Jr.
Desde la fecha mencionada, y sobre todo en años más recientes, el Klan ha orga -
nizado manifestaciones similares en otras partes del estado, por ejemplo, en la pe -
queña ciudad de Dalton. La llegada de inmigrantes mexicanos a este lugar, donde
se realiza la mayor parte de la producción de alfombras en Estados Unidos, creció
marcadamente durante la década de los noventa, con pocas fricciones aparentes al
principio. Un prominente político y empresario del lugar declaró que “en Dalton
no se ha perdido ni un solo empleo por culpa de los trabajadores inmigran tes y es
gracias a ellos que se han salvadomiles de empleos para los estadunidenses” (Golden,
2002). Sin embargo, con el rápido aumento del número de mexicanos han surgido
otros problemas, como el narcotráfico, de lo cual hablaremos más adelan te, que
han alentado la expresión más abierta de sentimientos antiinmigrantes.
En cuanto a las renovadas actividades del KKK, cabe también mencionar la
manifestación que realizaron en la localidad de Nahunta, en el extremo sur de
Georgia, el 20 de febrero de 2010. El motivo fue la entrada al estado de cuatro
jóvenes latinos que marcharon desde Florida a Washington, D.C., en apoyo a la
DREAM Act.2 Miembros del Klan organizaron un mitin para protestar por la pre -
sencia de estos jóvenes y portaron pancartas con el lema “Stop the Latino invasion
now” (“Paren la invasión latina ahora”). Juan, uno de los jóvenes que organizó la
marcha, escribió en su blog que los del KKK dijeron que “Dios puso a cada raza en sus
respectivos continentes con la intención de que debían quedarse allí” (Rodriguez,
2010). Irónicamente, Juan manifiesta su incredulidad frente a las “intenciones se -
cretas del Klan de reclamar para los pueblos indígenas todas las tierras de América
del Norte y que estén preparando un viaje de retorno a Europa”. Por otra parte, Juan
señala lo importante que fue, para él y sus compañeros, contar en ese momento con
el apoyo de miembros de la National Association for the Advancement of Co lored
People (NAACP, Asociación Nacional para el Avance de la Gente de Color), quie-
nes estuvieron presentes para manifestar su repudio al KKK. 
Lo que más llama la atención de esta anécdota, aunque tal vez no nos deba
sor prender, es la ignorancia de los miembros del KKK con respecto a la historia de
sus propios orígenes, así como de quiénes son los pobladores originales del conti -
nente americano. Sin embargo, es probable que muchos de los prejuicios en contra
de los inmigrantes surjan precisamente de un sinnúmero de ideas falsas con res -
pecto a ellos; en particular, se han propagado muchas contra los mexicanos indo -
cu mentados. Una de las falsedades más generalizadas en Georgia, y también otras
partes del país, es que no pagan impuestos. También se piensa que reciben enor-
mes beneficios sociales del gobierno, lo cual tampoco es cierto.
Además, se preguntan, ¿por qué no vienen legalmente?, como si esto realmen-
te fuera una opción viable para la gran mayoría de los indocumentados. Muchas
personas, al formular esta pregunta, insisten en que no tienen ningún prejuicio en
contra de los inmigrantes y que solamente son los “ilegales” a quienes no pueden to -
lerar porque están infringiendo las leyes del país. Afirman que sus antepasados en -
traron a Estados Unidos “legalmente”, aun cuando lo más probable es que hayan
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2 Una ley para promover el “desarrollo, el apoyo y la educación para extranjeros menores de edad” (De -
velopment, Relief and Education for Alien Minors DREAM Act, cuyas siglas forman la palabra “soñar”
en inglés…); ha sido propuesta en el Congreso federal en varias ocasiones durante la última década pero
en ningún momento ha logrado un número suficiente de votos simultáneamente en ambas cámaras
para ser aprobada como ley. El objetivo principal de esta propuesta es lograr que menores de edad
indocu mentados, que fueron traídos a Estados Unidos por sus padres y que hayan concluido satisfacto-
riamente la enseñanza media (high school) en algún estado, podrían disfrutar de las colegiaturas
aplicables a residentes de ese estado (que son mucho más bajas que las que se aplican a los no res-
identes) para asistir a las universidades estatales y que al concluir sus estudios, o después de algunos
años de ser vi cio militar, si optaran por esa vía, podrían convertirse en residentes legales del país.
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llegado antes de que hubiera leyes y restricciones al respecto. Lo lamentable es que
estas ideas y este tipo de discursos parecen estar cada vez más generalizados en
Georgia, y también en otros estados, a juzgar por el incremento de medidas puni -
tivas aprobadas en años recientes, sobre todo a partir del estallido de la crisis eco -
nómica a finales de 2007.
Es bien sabido que se solicitó y reclutó activamente a mexicanos indocumen -
tados para terminar la construcción de las instalaciones de los Juegos Olímpicos
en Atlanta en 1996 (Amescua, 2006). En otro contexto, Duchon y Murphy (2001: 8)
relatan que cuando el entonces Servicio de Inmigración y Naturalización (INS, por
sus siglas en inglés), y cuyas funciones ahora realiza la Agencia de Inmigración y
Control de Aduanas (Immigration and Customs Enforcement, ICE), hizo una re -
dada durante la cosecha de cebollas (cultivo muy importante para el estado), uno de
los dos senadores federales, el de mayor rango por antigüedad, vino desde Washing -
ton para intervenir a favor de los productores y negociar un acuerdo con el INS para
no interrumpir la cosecha.
No obstante la importancia de los trabajadores indocumentados en varios
ámbitos de la actividad económica, que ofrecen puestos y remuneraciones que por
lo general han sido desdeñados por otros grupos de la población, el cuerpo legisla -
tivo del estado, Georgia Assembly, aprobó en 2006 la Georgia Security and Immi -
gration Compliance Act. Esta ley, que entró en vigor en etapas sucesivas a partir
de 2007, obliga a todas las empresas contratadas y subcontratadas por instancias
gubernamentales estatales, municipales y locales a verificar el estatus migratorio legal
de sus empleados (Hollis, 2006; Business Week, 2006). Las empresas, en general,
no pueden contabilizar como deducibles, para fines del impuesto estatal sobre la
renta, los pagos a trabajadores que no presentan los documentos requeridos. Además,
se impone la retención automática de un impuesto (estatal) del 6 por ciento del sa -
lario de los trabajadores en esta situación. Cualquier persona mayor de dieciocho
años de edad que pretenda utilizar algún servicio público o recibir cualquier bene-
ficio local, es tatal o federal administrado por agencias estatales, tiene que compro-
bar su estadía legal en el país, excepto en el caso de atención médica prena tal y de
emergen cia. La propuesta, originalmente incluida para aplicar un gravamen del 5
por ciento a todas las transferencias de dinero fuera del país por parte de quie nes no
sean ciudadanos de Estados Unidos, no fue aprobada.
Actualmente está bajo consideración, entre varias otras propuestas pendientes,
una nueva ley (HB87) que obligaría a muchos empleadores privados (todos aque -
llos que tengan más de cinco trabajadores) a utilizar una base de datos federal para
verificar el estatus migratorio de sus empleados. Permitiría a la policía local y esta -
tal checar el estatus migratorio de ciertos detenidos. Impondría castigos a quienes,
a sabiendas, transportan o albergan a inmigrantes indocumentados y también para
quienes voluntariamente utilizan documentos falsos para obtener empleo en el es -
tado (Redmon, 2011; Stuart, 2011). Esta controversial propuesta, que fue apro bada
en la Cámara de Representantes del estado, pero, hasta la fecha de entrega de este ensa -
yo, no por el Senado, provocó un álgido debate en muchos sectores. Por un lado, los
políticos del estado alegan que hay que frenar la inmigración no autorizada, pero, por
el otro, no quieren tomar medidas que perjudiquen a los empre sarios o a los produc -
tores agrícolas que dependen de la mano de obra de trabajadores indocumentados
(Bookman, 2011; Tucker, 2011). 
En 2008, Georgia aprobó una ley que explícitamente prohíbe que jóvenes indo -
cumentados tengan el beneficio de pagar colegiaturas reducidas, lo que se aplica
solamente a los residentes del estado, para asistir a las instituciones públicas de
edu cación superior (Adams, 2010). Sólo tres estados más (Arizona, Colorado y Ca ro -
lina del Sur) tienen una ley de este tipo. En cambio, hay diez estados que sí otor-
gan las colegiaturas para residentes a los jóvenes que hayan terminado el high school
allí, independientemente de su estatus migratorio. Los demás estados no tienen
políticas definidas al respecto. Actualmente, por una decisión del Board of Regents
del sistema universitario estatal, en octubre de 2010, sólo se permite el acceso de
los jóvenes indocumentados, independientemente de los montos de la colegia -
tura cobrada, a las escuelas que no aplican criterios académicos para limitar la
matrícula.
De todas las medidas antiinmigrantes que se han implementado en Georgia,
o incluso de las que hayan sido propuestas, tal vez las de mayor impacto negativo
son los acuerdos 287g que existen actualmente en 4 de los 159 condados del es -
tado. Estos acuerdos, entre la agencia federal de la ICE y los condados partici pan -
tes, permite a agentes de la policía local que hayan recibido capacitación especial
para ello, actuar como agentes migratorios federales para detener y deportar a per -
sonas no autorizadas a estar en Estados Unidos (Shahshahani, 2009). El propósito
de esta medida, tal y como se anunció originalmente en 1996, fue combatir los crí -
menes violentos y frenar las actividades de los narcotraficantes y las pandillas. En
la práctica ha servido para deportar a inmigrantes indocumentados, cuyo delito prin -
cipal es manejar sin licencia, y dividir a sus familias. Como el transporte público es
muy limitado en su cobertura y solamente ciudadanos o resi dentes legales pueden
obte ner licencias, muchos inmigrantes indocumentados se ven obligados a manejar
sin licencia para ir a sus trabajos y realizar otras actividades nece sarias. No es casual
que los cuatro condados con acuerdos 287g (Cobb, Hall, Whitfield y Gwinnett) se
encuentran entre los que tienen los números o los porcentajes más altos de lati -
nos, y donde dichos acuerdos fueron establecidos a partir de 2007 en adelante.
¿Por qué hay sentimientos y políticas 
antiinmigrantes en Georgia?
Aunque preguntar sobre el cuándo y el porqué es inevitable, resulta difícil precisar
el momento en que los “pocos” inmigrantes que había en Georgia se convirtieron en
“muchos” o cómo y cuándo estos “muchos” se convirtieron en “demasiados”, según
la percepción de un número significativo de los habitantes del estado. Sin embargo,
hay dos momentos, o más bien, dos sucesos clave, que ayudan a explicar un poco, aun -
que de ninguna manera a justificar, que se manifiesten actualmente sentimien tos
antiinmigrantes, no solamente en Georgia, sino en muchas partes del país. El pri -
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mero son los ataques terroristas del 11 de septiembre de 2001 y el segundo es la
crisis económica que inició a finales del 2007.
Los acontecimientos del 11 de septiembre representan, probablemente, la agre -
sión física, proveniente de una fuente externa, más grave que haya sufrido el país en
su territorio a lo largo de toda su vida independiente. Inmediatamente se desataronma -
nifestaciones de repudio (incluso algunas agresiones físicas) a per sonas de origen árabe
que radican pacíficamente en Estados Unidos y que eviden temente no tu vie ron abso -
lutamente nada que ver con los atentados. De pasada, les tocaron también a algunos
latinos muestras de animadversión, ya sea que por su aspecto físico fueron confundi -
dos con árabes, o simplemente porque fueron percibidos como extranjeros, inde pen -
dientemente de dónde hubieran nacido y cuál sea su estatus en el país. Lo cierto es
que a partir de esa fecha han estado más pre sen tes y han sido más toleradas las expre -
siones de sentimientos antiinmigrantes en varias partes del país.
Algunos años más tarde, y después de más de dos décadas de crecimiento eco -
nómico extraordinario, interrumpido solamente por periodos recesivos breves y
poco profundos, Estados Unidos experimentó la crisis económica más grave y pro -
longada que haya sufrido desde la gran depresión de los años treinta. La tasa de de -
sempleo está en su nivel más alto de los últimos veintisiete años y con pocas pers pec -
ti vas de que baje significativamente en los próximosmeses. Había casi quince millo nes
de desempleados a fines de 2010 y por lo menos cuatro millones de per sonas más en
edad de trabajar que ni siquiera buscan empleo porque están conven cidas de que
no lo van a encontrar. Millones de personas que han perdido sus empleos desde 2007,
también han perdido sus hogares porque esta crisis ha estado relacionada de ma nera
muy particular con la actividad especulativa en la bolsa de valores y el mercado de
bienes raíces.
Parece que en tiempos difíciles siempre se busca a quien culpar. Para muchas
personas resulta más fácil creer que los inmigrantes, y sobre todo los indocu men -
tados, son responsables de que millones de personas hayan perdido sus trabajos en
los últimos tres años, en vez de culpar a los magnates de Wall Street de haber provo -
cado una crisis por sus excesos especulativos. Por lo tanto, les parece mejor deportar
a miles de personas que establecer más regulaciones para las actividades financie -
ras. Casi se da por hecho que la función de los inmigrantes es servir como mano
de obra “desechable” para usar cuando se necesite y expulsar cuando no. Aun en
tiempos de auge, la actitud más generalizada hacia ellos es querer su mano de obra,
pero no reconocerlos a ellos y a sus familiares como personas; querer que trabajen
en sus fábricas, negocios y granjas, pero no que vivan en lugares cercanos a ellos ni
que sus hijos vayan a la escuela con los suyos.
Por los antecedentes racistas de los estados sureños, no es difícil pensar que la
aceptación de los trabajadores latinos, en etapas de expansión económica cuan do
se requería más sumano de obra, se debía en parte precisamente a que son “mo renos”,
pero no “negros”. Hoy día, en Estados Unidos ya no es socialmente aceptable ni “políti -
camente correcto” manifestar, abiertamente, los sentimientos racistas; pero sí es
aceptable manifestar animadversión y rechazo para los inmigran tes “ilegales”, quie -
nes infringen las leyes del país, aunque nunca se señala ni se ataca con la misma
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vehemencia a los empresarios que se benefician de su trabajo. Los indocumentados,
por su vulnerabilidad, son un blanco fácil para las agresiones, frente a las cuales
tienen pocas posibilidades de responder.
Por otra parte, pagan justos por pecadores. Las actividades ilícitas de mexicanos
vinculados al narcotráfico (Golden, 2002; Esquivel, 2009) han convertido a Atlan ta
e incluso a la pequeña ciudad de Dalton en centros importantes para la distri bu ción
de drogas, negocio controlado ahora en buena medida por los cárteles mexicanos.
Por lo tanto, cualquier inmigrante mexicano es percibido ahora no sola mente como
un indocumentado, sino también como un narcotraficante, o por lo menos un nar -
cotraficante en potencia y, por ende, alguien que merece ser repudiado. En coyun -
turas de crisis, momentos de frustración personal, o cuando se perciben ame nazas
de cualquier tipo, la gente suele buscar revertir sus sentimientos negativos contra otros,
y lo hacen generalmente agrediendo a quienes se perciben como más débiles. En este
momento, en Georgia les ha tocado a los migrantes latinos desempeñar ese papel.
Para intentar ahondar un poco más en explicar el porqué de los sentimientos
antiinmigrantes, resulta útil citar lo que señalaManuel Castells respecto de la opi nión
pública estadunidense frente a la guerra en Irak: “las personas tienden a creer lo
que quieren creer” (2009: 229). Es más: “Filtran la información para adap tarla a
sus juicios previos. Son considerablemente más reticentes a aceptar los hechos que
contradicen sus creencias que los que coinciden con ellas” (Castells, 2009: 229-230).
Así sucede con quienes buscan justificar sus actitudes de desprecio hacia ciertos
grupos de inmigrantes y pugnan para la promulgación de leyes más pu nitivas contra
ellos. Hechos como el 11 de septiembre o la crisis económica simplemente exacer -
ban y proveen una salida para su necesidad arraigada de odiar y discriminar a alguien.
Como afirmé al concluir el párrafo anterior, en este momento en Georgia les ha to -
cado a los migrantes latinos jugar ese papel.
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Nosotros [los árabes] somos los nuevos mexicanos y, por
extensión, todos ustedes [los mexicanos] son árabes. 
GUILLERMO GÓMEZ PEÑA
And I thought about how we look just like the Arabs, that in
fact we are the Arabs, and we are the Jews, since we are Mex -
icans, or Mixicans. A mix of this and that, of some any races.
SANDRA CISNEROS
“Godzilla con sombrero de charro”, la cita en el título y de lo cual se hablará un
poco más adelante, proviene de un testimonio-ensayo cuyo autor es el reconocido
y galardonado performancero Guillermo Gómez Peña, un “chicalango” (léase un
híbrido de chicano y chilango, proveniente de la ciudad de México) “in process of
chicanoization” (Gómez Peña, 2008: 325). Mediante un gesto performático aborda
en ese testimonio-ensayo lo que llamaré el imaginario anti(in)migrante estaduni -
dense y en el cual desglosa —al margen del giro irónico y chusco de la imagen en
la cita—, de manera perspicaz y contundente, una visión crítica, pensante y sin -
tiente, en torno a las varias secuelas relacionadas con la xenofobia surgida en Esta -
dos Unidos, sobre todo post-11-s.
A diez años de dicha fecha bien podríamos considerarla como una nueva
frontera histórica surgida en el siglo XXI, a la cual el académico chicano Francisco
Lomelí describe como “el momento en que la historia norteamericana se partió como
las aguas en la Biblia, o como cuando los aztecas se toparon con el águila en me -
dio de Texcoco” (Lomelí, 2008: 385) y José Emilio Pacheco resume a ma nera de
epígrafe: “Un milenio empezó con las Cruzadas. / El otro con dos cifras:/ 9/11” (Pa -
checo, 2008: 477).1
“GODZILLA CON SOMBRERO DE CHARRO”: VISIONES 
TESTIMONIALES Y EL IMAGINARIO ANTI(IN)MIGRANTE*
ESTADUNIDENSE POST-11 DE SEPTIEMBRE
Claire Joysmith** 
* El uso del prefijo “in” entre paréntesis [anti(in)migrante] queda suficientemente aclarado de manera
contextualizada en el artículo, pues en este caso no se trata sólo de migrantes sino de inmigrantes, es
decir, no sólo de mexicanos, etc., que cruzan la frontera, sino de quienes ya viven allá hace varias genera -
cio nes o son primera generación, y ésta es la única manera de especificarlo sin repetir la palabra, lo cual
me parece innecesario. A mi parecer, en los estudios de (in)migración este uso no es tan desconocido.
** Investigadora en el CISAN-UNAM. <elaire@unam.mx>.
1 Joy Harjo, poeta native-American, habla del “magnific field thrown off by grief” en su testimonio-poema
(Harjo, 2008: 344).
En este artículo abordaré algunas visiones de los sentimientos anti(in)mi grantes
vistos desde la óptica de las experiencias personales y colectivas de las chi cani da -
des y latinidades, a través de algunos escritos de carácter testimonial-ensa yístico con
un enfoque particular en el racismo. Entre estas visiones testimoniales destacan las
de Guillermo Gómez Peña, Gloria Anzaldúa, Ariel Dorfman, Catherine Herrera,
Sandra Cisneros, Teresa Carrillo, Eliana Rivero, Demian Pritchard y otros, aun
cuando son muchas más las aportaciones que tratan estos temas en los dos volúme -
nes de los cuales cito, en donde quedan compilados numerosos testi mo nios enviados
por el ciberespacio: One Wound for Another/Una herida por otra. Testimonios de
Latin@s in the U.S. through Cyberspace (11 de septiembre de 2001-11 de marzo de 2002)
y Speaking desde las heridas. Cibertestimonios Transfronterizos/ Transborder (Septem -
ber 11, 2001-March 11, 2006). Ambos volúmenes forman parte de un proyecto de
mayor alcance que continúa en proceso hoy día.2
Cabe aclarar que aun cuando dichos volúmenes no fueron concebidos con la
idea de abordar de manera exclusiva el tema del imaginario racista, la realidad es
que dicho tema resulta intrínseco al documentar cualquier tipo de testimonio,
narrativa o escrito poético surgido de las chicanidades y latinidades estaduni den -
ses, reflejando en la larga y compleja historia de dichas comunidades sus variadas
manifestaciones, ya sea una xenofobia generalizada o la práctica —y más aun
desde el 11-s— normativa y podría decirse sistemática del “perfil racial” (racial
profiling)3 que a menudo abarca también un tipo u otro de clasismo y sexismo.
Cabe aclarar que, en su conjunto, estos textos fueron enviados en respuesta
a preguntas formuladas en las solicitudes de testimonio enviadas por correo elec -
trónico (en octubre de 2001 y septiembre de 2006) con el fin de dar contorno y
especificidad a los objetivos de este ejercicio de documentación ante un momento
de ruptura dolorosa —al cual Gloria Anzaldúa bautiza como “tiempos nepantla”—.4
En los testimonios se retomaron tópicos relacionados con el racismo, la xenofobia
y la subjetividad del migrante e inmigrante sugeridas de algún modo mediante las
preguntas que abordaron cuestiones de raza, etnia, diferencias raciales y cultu ra les,
terrorismo, medios de comunicación, relaciones México-Estados Unidos, la fronte-
ra, tolerancia, compasión, procesos de trauma y sanación, entre otros.5
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2 He elegido sólo algunos textos de ambos volúmenes, los cuales suman un total de casi mil páginas y
unos 160 testimonios.
3 “[…] hoy día política oficial y práctica cotidiana es eufemismo de un racismo ostensible y san cionado
a nivel institucional” (Gómez Peña, 2008: 319).
4 Nepantla, derivado del náhuatl panotla (puente), se traduce al español como “tierra de en medio” y en
inglés como land in-between. Según la nomenclatura utilizada por la escritora y filósofa chicana Gloria
Anzaldúa, es “un espacio psicológico, liminal […], el locus y signo de transición” (Anzaldúa, 2005: 99).
5 En Speaking desde las heridas la pregunta tres quedó plasmada así: “¿Has observado cambios en ti, o
en lo que te rodea, relacionados con cuestiones de raza, clase, género, sexualidad, específicamente como
mexicano, latinoamericano o latinoestadunidense?” La pregunta cuatro solicita comentarios sobre
“las múltiples caras del terrorismo”, “los procesos de trauma y de sanación”, manifestaciones de las dife -
rencias culturales y raciales, tanto en México como en Estados Unidos, el papel de los medios de
comunicación, “tolerancia, compasión, venganza, odio”. La pregunta cinco se refiere a cuestiones rela -
El imaginario anti(in)migrante estadunidense: 
el terrorista como personaje
El filósofo francés Alain Badiou expresa que el término “terrorismo” no debería
usarse fuera de su contexto histórico específico, en vista de que el término “terro -
rista” se aplicó primero a los jacobinos y más adelante en la historia a quienes
resistieron la invasión nazi en Francia. Es decir, este término se asoció a lo que
actualmente consideraríamos parte de la heroicidad de la Resistencia francesa
antinazi.6
Hoy día, el término “terrorista” se usa indiscriminadamente para designar, por
ejemplo, a quien comete crímenes masivos (ejemplos: quienes atentaron contra
las torres gemelas en Nueva York o hicieron explotar bombas en la estación de
Atocha en Madrid). Es decir, no existe un terrorismo, sólo situaciones concretas.
Como lo plantea Badiou, “terrorista” es un término polivalente y propagandístico
desplegado de manera conjunta por gobiernos y medios de comunicación (Mier y
Villegas, 2008: 3).
En la nomenclatura de la “guerra contra el terrorismo”, el sujeto a quien se
etiqueta como “terrorista” va camaleónicamente transformándose con las agendas
políticas del momento, según el imaginario que de ellas se desprenda. En este senti -
do, el personaje del “terrorista” adquiere un rol performático múltiple de acuer do con
el contexto en el que se le nombra y se le asocia como tal, dentro de dicho imaginario.
EnNadie es ilegal, esto mismo lo plantean Justin Akers Chacón y Mike Davis:
De un fogonazo, la tragedia del 11 de septiembre permitió a las fuerzas de extrema
de re cha recuperar la iniciativa contra el progreso de la agenda sobre los derechos de
los inmi grantes. La política de contención de inmigrantes engranaba con el compo -
nente doméstico de la sinuosa “guerra contra el terrorismo”, que de forma vergonzosa
singularizaba, restringía y/o incriminaba la presencia de árabes, árabes-norteame ri -
canos, musulmanes, y otros, perfilándolos como “posibles terroristas”. El fantasma
omnipresente del terrorismo doméstico refractado a través [del imaginario] de las
“hordas invasoras” atravesando las fronteras, creo un maridaje oportunista entre los hal -
cones de la Guerra y los restriccionistas antiinmigrantes (Akers Chacón y Davis, 2006:
289-290).
Es decir, el término “terrorista” queda vinculado por default a un imaginario que
abarca tanto a los árabes y musulmanes, como a las “hordas de bárbaros” que cru zan
la frontera, estigma fácilmente desdoblable y multiplicable en un imaginario en
plena construcción, como lo es el muro a lo largo de la frontera.
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cionadas con la frontera México-Estados Unidos: “¿Cuáles son tus perspectivas a cinco años del 11 de
septiembre de 2001, en cuanto a las relaciones México-EU, migración e inmigración, las restric ciones
en la frontera, el muro, etcétera?”.
6 “Frases como ‘seguridad nacional’ y ‘Ley Patriota’ son términos fascistas que tienen un parecido muy
cercano a la jerga nazi. En alemán, ‘seguridad nacional’ se traduce literalmente al nombre original de
la S.S. nazi” (Gómez Peña, 2008: 319).
Guillermo Gómez Peña alude al imaginario racista estadunidense mediante
estrategias narrativas tales como la dislocación e hiperbolizacion deliberada, todo
enmarcado en un contexto xenófobo y cotidiano, contrapunteando imagen con
sentido de humor —al estilo comic relief— al referirse a una situación que en la
realidad resulta devastadora:
Durante un town meeting sobre temas fronterizos en CNN, conducido por un experto
antiinmigrante de nombre Lou Dobbs, el republicano Michael Macaul explicó: “Des -
pués del 9/11, la frontera es realmente un tema de seguridad nacional. Simplemente
no sabemos quién está entrando a nuestro país”. La implicación de su advertencia era
clara: ¿Cómo podemos diferenciar a un trabajador inmigrante de un terrorista árabe?
¡Guáchenla locos! Godzilla con sombrero de charro podría ser un miembro de Al Qaeda
(Gómez Peña, 2008: 314).
De esta manera, Gómez Peña cuestiona el imaginario anti(in)migrante esta -
du nidense, mediatizado y con tendencias racistas, que refuerza la idea de la fron -
tera como espacio por donde se filtra el dolor, el miedo, la muerte, la inseguridad,
el caos, la otredad amenazante. Por otra parte, ese mismo imaginario trastoca la
frontera como locus que visibiliza y pone de relieve sólo la ilegalidad transgresora
de los personajes, nombrándolos de manera contigua y difuminando otros factores
fundamentales de diferenciación. En el volumen que reúne testimonios mul -
tiétni coculturales post-11-s que lleva por título We Are All Suspects Now. Untold
Stories from Immigrant Communities after 9/11, la vietnamita-estadunidense Tram
Nguyen recuerda la nomenclatura legal que contribuye a establecer el vínculo
terrorista-transgresor-(in)migrante en el imaginario estadunidense:
In national security-speak, there’s a catchall term for undocumented migrants, refu -
gees and asylum seekers, drug and human smugglers, potential terrorists —all those
who cross borders and transgress national boundaries without state authorization. The
term is clandestine transnational actors (Nguyen, 2005: XIV).
Dichos “actores transnacionales clandestinos” quedan colocados, mediati -
zados, en un escenario performático en donde se convierten en suspects, “sospe -
chosos”. Gómez Peña comenta al respecto:
Términos tan cargados como “extranjero ilegal” [ilegal alien], “extranjero” [alien], e
incluso el más represivo, “ilegal”, son ahora sinónimos de traficante, bandido fronte -
rizo, conecte de estupefacientes y pandillero. Las distinciones entre “ilegal” y “legal”
desaparecen con facilidad a los ojos del racista. El rostro moreno de la maldad se
morfea en el rostro de cada “otro” cuando se oprime el botón del miedo (Gómez Peña,
2008: 317).
El sello de transgresión en la frente, los (in)migrantes indocumentados, así como
documentados, son obligados a compartir el estigma de “terrorista potencial”. De
suerte que en este imaginario, lo real, legal e imaginado se trastocan, se perfor -
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matizan. Así surge un protagonista estereotipado, visibilizado por rasgos étnicos y
raciales, objeto del sistemático e institucionalizado perfil racial en los cuales par ti ci -
pan otros rasgos, como clase, nacionalidad, país de origen, nombre/ape llido y len gua.
La escritora y teórica chicana Gloria Anzaldúa, en su testimonio-ensayo vincula este
imaginario con el lenguaje racializado sistemático: “Racialized langua ge leads to
racial profiling, which leads to targeting dark-skin ned, Middle Eastern-looking and
other people of color earmarked as potential terrorists” (Anzaldúa, 2005: 97) Mu chos
de ellos, resulta, de origen mexicano, centroamericano y lati noamericano.
Con ello se va elaborando y reproduciendo una narrativa y un imaginario alar -
mantemente reductivista del terrorista potencial asociado a ciertos fenotipos de tez
morena y ubicados bajo el rubro de ilegal aliens que, al traducirse al español como
“extranjeros ilegales”, se despoja de la consabida connotación de extraterrestre.
Gómez Peña resume lo anterior desglosándolo con su característico sentido
del humor:
Desde el 9/11 el territorio semiótico que abarca la palabra “terrorista” se ha expandido
de manera considerable. Primero se refería estrictamente a los miembros de Al Qaeda
y el Talibán; después, a los “fundamentalistas” musulmanes, eventualmente abarcó a
todos los musulmanes, y luego, por último, a todos los árabes y a quienes parecen árabes.
En el año 2003, un amigo palestino me comentó: “Nosotros [los árabes] somos los
nuevos mexicanos y, por extensión, todos ustedes son árabes”. Y me di cuenta con qué
facilidad se transfieren las mitologías satanizadas del cuerpo moreno de una raza a otra,
de un país a otro (Gómez Peña, 2008: 314).7
Otra óptica desde la cual se percibe el imaginario de las “hordas de bárbaros”,
transgresores de la ley al cruzar la frontera, es la percepción pública mayoritaria
estadunidense de la frontera sur de Estados Unidos (no así, sobra decirlo, la fron -
tera norte con Canadá) como locus de potencial transgresión, “poderosamente
moldeada con la imagen de la frontera que proyectan los políticos, las agencias de
control y los medios”, como apuntan Akers Chacón y Davis; y plantean que este
imaginario se utiliza
en el contexto actual para criminalizar la inmigración desviando la atención de los
temas actuales. Aunque no capturen “terroristas” cruzando la frontera por el desierto
de Arizona, los políticos cultivan el temor permanente de que los terroristas están al
otro lado de la frontera mezclados con las corrientes de emigrantes que pretenden
entrar al país (Akers Chacón y Davis, 2006: 291).
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7 “And I thought about how we look just like the Arabs, that in fact we are the Arabs, and we are the Jews,
since we are Mexicans, or Mix-icans. A mix of this and that, of some any races. And I’ve been pon-
dering this a lot, since when I look in the mirror I look more like Osama Bin Laden than I do Bush.
Osama looks like my tío Nacho. The Afghans look like my brothers. They are my brothers, my broth-
ers with their 1001 Arabian Nights eyebrows and noses. MyfatherwithhisfaceofaMoor” (Cisneros,
2005: 138).
Ante estas “hordas de bárbaros”, el imaginario racializado anti(in)migrante
estadunidense recurre a la justificación en su propia narrativa mediante una “retó-
rica de la victimización”, como apunta Gómez Peña:
La narrativa magistral [Master Narrative] del Departamento de Seguridad Nacional de
Estados Unidos (tal y como fue escrito por los neocons en colaboración con los medios
dominantes) se lee: “Los musulmanes radicales andan tras de ‘nosotros’, los ‘extran -
jeros ilegales’ andan tras de ‘nuestros’ empleos. Nosotros, víctimas de la ira de la his-
toria, somos simplemente unos inocentes espectadores. Nuestro único delito es nuestra
creencia en la libertad y la democracia”. Este despliegue estratégico de la retórica de
la victimización, del heroísmo y el pánico moral claramente justifica tanto el endure-
cimiento de las fronteras como la militarización de nuestras políticas inter nacionales
(Gómez Peña, 2008: 313).8
El imaginario anti(in)migrante subvertido: 
la narrativa de compasión y las latinidades
Si bien un interés del presente ensayo es abordar algunas expresiones concretas
de este imaginario, inventariadas y documentadas en varios de estos testimonios,
el otro lado de la moneda es ofrecer un breve bosquejo de algunas formas en que la
polivocalidad latinoestadunidense presente en la especificidad de estos testi mo nios
aborda actitudes y estrategias desde la subjetividad misma de quienes genealógica -
mente pertenecen a movimientos migratorios hacia Estados Unidos. De manera
muy escueta se plantean aquí algunas de estas actitudes y estrategias a las que re cu -
rren para expresar, desglosar, analizar, reflexionar, enfrentar y buscar vías de resolución
—de maneras pensantes, sintientes, incluso compasivas— a las ma ni festaciones del
imaginario antimigratorio y racista por quienes lo viven de manera cotidiana, sobre
todo post-11-s.
Las chicanidades y latinidades estadunidenses han padecido y enfrentado un
rampante racismo, sobra decirlo, desde mucho antes del 11-s. Décadas, genera -
ciones, de polémica y luchas antirracistas relacionadas con la (in)migración se
han vertido en una narrativa que ha encontrado respuesta en ámbitos culturales,
políticos, de acción social, lingüísticos y literarios. Estos testimonios de algún modo
reflejan esta narrativa vigente y su mutación continua.
En su testimonio Demian Pritchard habla de “racialization” como un proceso
histórico que utiliza una “rhetoric of division”, agregando:
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8 “El migrante es una figura del miedo y del terror, una masa incontrolable que cruza el desierto, toma
los trabajos y las escuelas, exprime a la federación de sus recursos, deforma el idioma, pervierte el
credo norteamericano sobre el que su feudo esta ‘gran nación’ y, además, se manifiesta en números
cada vez mayores en las calles” (Mier y Villegas, 2008: 5). “Fabricando una atmósfera de asedio, donde
los inmigrantes son demonizados en los medios y ridiculizados por los oficiales del gobierno, el movi-
miento antiinmigrantes ha suministrado un desfibrilador ideológico para los políticos que buscan re -
sucitar sus moribundas carreras políticas” (Ackers Chacón y Davis, 2006: 299).
“GODZILLA CON SOMBRERO DE CHARRO” 197
I am sad that while I saw (and see) people coming together as “Americans,” I did not
(and still do not) see enough discussion on race in America […] one of the powerful
lessons that we can learn from 9/11. The lesson of whiteness, whiteness —that is—
as an historical structure of oppression and category of privilege, is that hierarchies are
developed and privilege gained by defining what is “American” against what is “other”
[…] foreign, wild, not to be trusted, above all to be feared (Pritchard, 2005: 241-242).
Gómez Peña retoma esto desde la perspectiva del lenguaje racializado, desa -
fiando las actitudes del imaginario anti(in)migrante racista, y así regresa el debate a
otro territorio en el olvido y pone el dedo en la llaga:
Si se le pone atención al tono y lenguaje del debate sobre la inmigración, uno no pue -
de evitar preguntarse: ¿ha perdido América su compasión (o mejor dicho, la mitología de
la compasión americana) por el desamparado y su tolerancia de la otredad cultural?
¿En qué momento los blancos se dejaron de llamar a sí mismos inmigrantes? E inicial -
mente, ¿no eran ellos también ilegales? (Gómez Peña, 2008: 318).
Gómez Peña analiza el imaginario y ubica el eje migratorio como un asunto de
carácter más amplio y globalizado:
Para mí, el “problema” no es la inmigración sino la histeria de la inmigración. La inmi -
gración es un producto derivado de la globalización y, como tal, es irreversible. Un ter-
cio de la humanidad vive actualmente fuera de su nación, y lejos de su cultura y lengua
maternas. Los Estados-nación de hoy en día son disfuncionales y anacrónicos. Y las
estructuras legales que los contienen no responden a las nuevas complejidades de la épo -
ca (Gómez Peña, 2008: 324). 
Para Gómez Peña, el imaginario anti(in)migrante ha cobrado auge entre cier -
tos sectores del público mediatizado estadunidense que, como él apunta, se lee
como una deshumanizada y deshumanizante ausencia de compasión:9
La histeria de la inmigración siempre sale a relucir en tiempos de crisis. Es parte inte-
gral de la historia racista de Estados Unidos. Pero en esta ocasión es diferente. Lo que
caracteriza este debate sobre la inmigración es una absoluta falta de compasión cuan-
do se habla de inmigrantes sin documentos (Gómez Peña, 2008: 316).10
9 Gómez Peña utiliza este término con toda deliberación. Éste y otros conceptos afines surgen con
gran fre cuencia en estos testimonios. Por dar un ejemplo, en el texto de Anzaldúa aparece nueve
veces a lo largo de las doce páginas de su testimonio.
10 Y continúa: “Los ‘extranjeros’ —es decir, los de piel morena— son ‘criminales’ por el simple hecho
de estar aquí ‘ilegalmente’. Pero la criminalidad que es consecuencia de su ubicación —estar en el lado
equivocado de la frontera entre Estados Unidos y México— se considera ahora sintomática de su
más amplia identidad ‘criminal’. Los tratan como sospechosos de tener vínculos con, o de apoyar a, los
cárteles del crimen internacional y células terroristas” (Gómez Peña, 2008: 316).
Y concluye de manera contundente:
Para mí, la inmigración no es un asunto de legalidad sino un asunto humanitario y
humanístico. Ningún ser humano es “ilegal”, punto. Todos los seres humanos, con o
sin documentos, pertenecen a la especie humana, nuestra especie, y si necesitan nues -
tra ayuda, tenemos la obligación de proporcionársela. A eso se le llama ser humano
[del verbo ser]. Punto. En este contexto, la nacionalidad pasa a segundo plano. Su
dolor es nuestro, así como su destino es nuestro destino (Gómez Peña, 2008: 324).
Al evocar el dolor como referente de una especie de hermandad, y al vincu -
larlo con el destino, Gómez Peña cruza múltiples fronteras semánticas, psicoló -
gicas y emotivas, tocando el corazón mismo de una narrativa de compasión en vías
de creación continua, apelando, habrá que notar, no tanto al pasado, es decir, en
términos historizados (intrínseca a los discursos chicanos y fronterizos), sino al
destino, al futuro que ya está presente.
Y a propósito del dolor, Cristina Rivera Garza, al prologar Speaking desde las
heridas, retoma The Body in Pain de Elaine Scarry y se refiere al dolor como polí -
tica: “El dolor deshace al mundo y, con él, la idea de ese mundo. El dolor, entonces,
es política” (Rivera Garza, 2008: 91). Así se nombra, como ella sostiene, lo que al
nombrarse pierde esencia y fuerza; alude al dolor como ruptura individual y colec -
tiva, privada y política. Y es éste un tema axiomático que siempre queda en el olvido,
perdido entre las cifras numerosas de los estudios referentes a los movimientos
migratorios. El dolor queda recuperado de alguna manera en esta narración de
compasión que se perfila en la gran mayoría de estos testimonios, en donde éste
se convierte en muchas ocasiones en uno de los principales motores del escrito
testimonial. Lo que se quedaría en el sollozo, el llanto, el grito, el silencio, cobra
vida de algún modo, perfilándose así una tentativa “gramática del dolor” (Rivera
Garza, 2008: 91).
Dolor y ruptura como impulsores de creación, esto es, de hecho, axiomático
en la producción literaria y cultural chicana y latinoestadunidense, ya sea por suje -
tos cruzafronteras (in)migrantes, economic refugees (Anzaldúa, 1987), o a cuyos
ancestros se les cruzó el trazo de la frontera de la noche a la mañana, o también como
refugiados políticos, en algunos casos, con lo que son todos partícipes de un modo
u otro de genealogías migratorias, como lo es el pueblo estadunidense.
La narrativa de compasión, entonces, surge como respuesta al imaginario
anti(in)mi grante impulsado por “la narrativa magistral (Master Narrative) del De -
partamento de Seguridad Nacional de Estados Unidos (tal y como fue escrito por
los neocons en colaboración con los medios dominantes)”, como se ha citado del
testimonio-ensayo de Gómez Peña, imaginario construido con intenciones políti cas
específicas. Gloria Anzaldúa responde a dicho imaginario en su testimonio-ensayo
titulado “Let Us Be the Healing of the Wound: The Coyolxauhqui Imperative-La
sombra y el sueño”:
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As I see it, this country’s real battle is with its shadow—its racism, propensity for vio-
lence, rapacity for consuming, neglect of its res pon sibility to global communities and
the environment, and unjust treatment of dissenters and the disenfranchised, espe-
cially people of color (Anzaldúa, 2005: 93).
La “sombra” un tanto jungeana que invoca Anzaldúa se convierte en nomen -
clatura trastocada —en teoría y praxis— que busca y nombra formas que per -
mitan desplazar el consabido binario us vs. them/nosotros vs. ellos11 —instalado
como eje diferenciador en el imaginario antimigratorio estadunidense— mediante
un diferencial con base no en rasgos raciales, etnográficos o de clase, estatus mi -
gra torio, nacionalidad o lengua, sino en su propensión hacia la violencia, el consu -
mismo, la irresponsabilidad, el trato injusto a quienes difieren de la narra tiva
hegemónica estadunidense.
Es así como Anzaldúa disloca el discurso racializado, enfocado en la estereo -
tipación de la otredad transgresora —esa figura performática del (in)migrante
como “terrorista potencial”, sea o no documentado— y recoloca, esta vez en una
narrativa de compasión, a quienes cruzan todo tipo de fronteras y no únicamente
las geopolíticas: a quienes se oponen a la narrativa hegemónica estadunidense, a
quienes también se les estigmatiza por su “diferencia”. La “guerra contra el terro -
ris mo”, plantea Gómez Peña, “es también una guerra contra la diferencia: cultural,
política, religiosa, racial e incluso sexual”.12 Dicho de otra forma, Anzaldúa des pla -
za a quienes quedan estigmatizados/as por ser “diferentes” “a los ojos del racista”
y del imaginario, “esa otredad amenazante”, recolocándolos/las en una especie de
categoría alterna de diferencia: aquellos/as que enfrentan la “sombra” jungeana y
participan en la creación de un “sueño” futuro de convivencia pacífica, sobre el
cual ahonda, y que difiere radicalmente del caduco “sueño americano” (Anzaldúa,
2005: 99-102).
En este sentido Anzaldúa hace un llamado a “abrir los ojos” de forma auto -
crítica, a realizar una interiorización como respuesta a la mirada que proyecta sus
propios miedos al exterior, en la otredad, performatizando figuras migratorias y en
quienes llevan el sello de “diferente”. Ella exhorta: “Abre los ojos, North America,
11 “However, reason and compassion did not prevail with our president, his right wing allies in the media,
and over half of the nation. In the guise of protecting our shores Bush sought to shore up his image
and our national identity…. Hiding behind the rhetoric of ‘good versus evil,’ us versus them, he daily
doled out a racialized language attributing all good to us and complete evil to the terrorists thus forg-
ing a persuasive reactionary nationalistic argument” (Anzaldúa, 2005: 93).
12 “Enfrentémoslo, la guerra contra el terrorismo es también una guerra contra la diferencia: cultural,
política, religiosa, racial e incluso sexual. Y el blanco de esta guerra —los musulmanes, los árabes,
la gente que parece árabe, los inmigrantes latinos y la gente con fuertes acentos y rasgos étnicos—
están siendo agrupados en una sola forma amenazante de otredad. La lista continua para incluir a
los pobres y los sin techo. Los intelectuales disidentes, artistas críticos, científicos con consciencia
social y activistas gay, también se han convertido en el blanco. Los ‘otros’, que son los ‘nuevos bárba -
ros’, se multiplican, amenazando la democracia occidental desde fuera y desde dentro” (Gómez Peña,
2008: 323).
open your eyes, look at your shadow, and listen to your soul […]. When we own our
shadow we allow the breath of healing to enter our lives” (Anzaldúa, 2005: 94, 102). 
Esta mirada interiorizada la ejemplificaría el testimonio de Catherine Herre -
ra, en el cual desglosa su propia complejidad como latinaestadunidense, sinécdoque
(potencial) de las latinidades:
I have had to also see within me “the enemy”, the racist, the hatred, and I believe that
is eventually what the U.S. and its people must confront. […] as a U.S. Latina, I have
seen both sides of the coin, felt both sides of the pain, and perhaps from that, hope
will arise from the ashes […] (Herrera, 2005: 190, 191).13
Su visión testimonial aborda de frente, acepta y expresa sus propias duali dades,
incluso multiplicidades, a partir de un ejercicio consciente de interiorización, en el
cual, en tanto sujeto, retoma el dolor como vivenciado y desdoblado en ella misma.
El testimonio-ensayo de Ariel Dorfman sería tal vez otro ejemplo, entre otros
muchos, de cómo se va perfilando una narrativa de compasión:
I would like to think that a global tragedy such as we are now living might also guide
us towards a new global compassion and identification between peoples that has been
sadly lacking in these months of terror, I hope and pray that in the years to come we can
find ways of globalizing mercy and understanding with as much efficiency and ener-
gy as we have put into the globalization of war and violence (Dorfman, 2008: 252).
En cuanto a la cuestión de pertenencia ante el racismo y el imaginario anti(in) -
mi grante, Eliana Rivero narra: “My daughter is […] getting ‘the look’ […] that
says: Who are you, do you belong here, and are you safe to be around if you don’t
seem to be an Anglo? (Rivero, 2005: 248) Y formula una pregunta puntual: “If we
don’t ‘look American’ what is an American supposed to look like?” (Rivero, 2005:
248) A la cual le sigue otra: “What do we say to the person who looks suspiciously
at us, in airports or in stadiums, that we are Latinos or Latinas and totally unpre-
pared for these confusing times?” (Rivero, 2005: 248). Una de las respuestas, según
puede observarse en estos testimonios, es la elaboración y ampliación de narra tivas
creativas de compasión, tal y como lo propone Anzaldúa:
Changing the thoughts and ideas (the “stories”) we live by and their limiting beliefs (in -
cluding the national narrative of supreme entitlement) will enable us to extend our hand
to others con el corazón con razón en la mano. Individually and collectively we can begin to
share strategies on peaceful co-existence y desparramar [nota: no va en cursivas en el
original] (spread) conocimientos. Each of us can make a difference. By bringing psy-
chological understanding and using spiritual approaches in political acti vism we can stop
the destruction of our moral, compassionate humanity. Empowered, we’ll be motivated
to organize, achieve justice, and begin to heal the world (Anzaldúa, 2005: 101).
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13 “Como latinos, nuestros cuerpos morenos también son territorios ocupados en los que suceden otras
guerras” (Gómez Peña, 2008: 320).
Por otra parte, Teresa Carrrillo escribe en su testimonio:
We have been very critical of the way our country discriminates and excludes Raza immi -
grants and all Latinos, but, at the same time, as Americans, we had been attacked. As
my other comadre put it, our link with the 6000 people killed is our flag. It is a strange
position to find myself in as a Chicana: pulled in by a sense of belonging to this disas-
ter, yet marginalized as a woman of color in normalcy (2005: 125).
De esta manera, Carrillo da otro tipo de respuesta, como sujeto racializado en
la sociedad estadunidense y sujeto que se autodenomina chicana y latinaesta du -
nidense con discurso desarrollado mediante lo vivencial, al elegir, como lo hace su
“comadre”, un objeto-símbolo, simbiosis alterna de unidad/solidaridad, como res-
puesta al violento binario del imaginario racista. Lo hace mediante la creación de
una especie de “bandera-catrina” que reconoce en la muerte un eje de solida ridad
como pertenencia única.
Anzaldúa menciona en su testimonio-ensayo la investigación realizada por
David R. Hawkins en su libro Power vs. Force (2002), en el cual categoriza el com -
portamiento humano con base en frecuencias vibratorias.14 Según lo planteado por
Hawkins, cuando el nivel de frecuencias vibracionales en una escala de 0 a 1000 es
menor a 200, es un indicador de que estos individuos “tend to be powerless and see
themselves as victims” (Hawkins, 2002: 87) y, por otra parte, se inclinan hacia la
polarización, “which in turn creates opposition and division” (Hawkins, 2002: 85).
Lo propuesto aquí se vincula justamente con ese imaginario racista anti(in)mi -
grante que nombra y refrenda a quienes son suspects, “sospechos@s”, convir tién do los
en potenciales víctimas del odio racializado dentro de la sociedad estadunidense.
Mediante la reiteración, estos mismos sujetos se van identificando de manera in -
consciente, dentro de ámbitos públicos que repercuten en lo privado, con ciertas
frecuencias muy bajas que se asocian con shame, vergüenza (20), guilt, culpa (30)
y apathy, apatía (50), e incluso grief, duelo (75), las cuales, indica Hawkins, pueden
explotarse a fin de mantener el control al fomentar actitudes pasivas. Por otra parte,
continúa Hawkins, aunque el nivel vibratorio asociado al fear, miedo (100)15 y anger,
enojo-odio (150), es superior a los anteriores, su propia naturaleza negativa no per mi -
te o muestra pocas posibilidades de poder trascender a frecuencias más altas; más
bien, tiende a revertirse, por especie de gravedad, hacia niveles vibra to rios más bajos.
Desde esta óptica, podría plantearse como hipótesis el que la narrativa de
com pasión, como la he llamado, elaborada por las chicanidades y latinidades y ejem -
plificada en varios de estos testimonios, va mas allá de simplemente una forma de
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14 Hawkins propone las siguientes escalas (del 1 al 1000) de frecuencias vibratorias: shame (20), guilt
(30), apathy (50), grief (75), fear (100), desire (125), anger (150), pride (175), courage (200), neutrality
(250), willingness (310), acceptance (350), reason (400), love (500), joy (540), compassion (600), peace
(600), enlightenment (700-1000).
15 En estos testimonios el concepto de miedo surge, se amplía y se analiza críticamente de manera rei-
terativa en su mayoría.
re sistencia u oposición, sino que constituye una compleja serie de estrategias, en
continua mutabilidad y camaleonicidad, capaces de lograr injerencia a gran escala.
Hawkins las clasificaría mediante sus experimentos científicos en niveles vibrato-
rios en los que establece las categorías relevantes a dichos sujetos y a la na rativa
misma de compasión: pride, orgullo positivo (175), courage, valentía (200),16 neutra-
lity, neutralidad (250), love, amor (500) y compassion, compasión (600) (Hawkins,
2002: 100).
Ante los sentimientos antimigratorios que han alimentado al imaginario me -
diatizado y racista estadunidense, en parte a través de los medios, y que ha co bra -
do auge sobre todo desde el 11-s, la respuesta de las chicanidades y latinidades,
tal y como ha quedado documentado en varios de los testimonios compilados en
estos volúmenes, resaltan en la lectura de varias respuestas que he llamado narra -
tivas de compasión. En estos “tiempos nepantla”, tiempos de entre espacios, tiem -
pos dolidos y fragmentados que Anzaldúa también bautiza como “tiempos de la
Coyolxauhqui”, ella recurre a una imagen que permite semantizar y simbolizar las
complejidades que se llevan en el cuerpo mismo, el dolor de la ruptura y del des -
membramiento (léase de las chicanidades y latinidades en particular, pero no exclu -
sivamente) post-11-s, con la intención de ofrecer una respuesta contundente y
simultáneamente sutil e intrincada: “Coyolxauhqui is my symbol for the necessary
process of dismemberment and fragmentation, of seeing that self or the situations
you’re embroiled in differently. It is also my symbol for reconstruction and refram-
ing, one that allows for putting the pieces together in a new way”.
Se desprende de ello un llamado a remembrar, reconfigurar, recolocar a nivel
individual y colectivo, y a crear una narrativa de compasión: “Let’s have compas -
sion for all those who suffer from violence. Let’s use internal and external conflicts
and wounds to enter [our] soul.” Agregando: “Like Coyolxauhqui, let’s put our dis-
membered psyches and patrias (homelands) together in new constructions” (Anzal -
dúa, 2005: 102), y concluye: “The Coyol xauhqui imperative is an ongoing process
of making and unmaking. There is never any resolution, just the process of healing”
(Anzaldúa, 2005: 100). Podría, entonces, decirse que la narrativa de compasión
es intrínsecamente de continua recreación, sin hegemónico, cómodo y predecible
final (menos aun podría augurarse un final feliz), sino que se va creando y así for-
taleciendo —ya sea por individuos, en comunidades o en colectividades espe -
cíficas— mediante “work that matters” (Anzaldúa, 2005: 102) frente a la historia,
frente al imaginario anti(in)migrante racista estadunidense.
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16 Según Hawkins, es sólo cuando se alcanza el nivel de courage, valentía (200) que “an attainment of
true power occurs”. A este nivel, continúa, nos adentramos en “the zone of exploration, accomplish -
ment, fortitude, and determination” (Hawkins, 2002: 84).
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This is an invasion, not a visit by neighbors 
asking for a cup of sugar. It is a raging invasion 
by illegal immigrants who are pouring unchecked into 
America. It could not be more obvious or more serious. 
GILCHRIST AND CORSI (2006)   
Introduction
It was in a Starbucks coffee shop in the city of La Mesa, California that I met Jim
Gilchrist, president and founder of the Minuteman Project (MMP), for an interview.
With a large cup of coffee in hand, Gilchrist gave me the inside scoop on how he feels
about immigration politics. He believes that the United States is being “invaded by
more than 30 million illegal aliens.” Since Congress and the president “failed” to
enforce immigration laws, he is convinced that this “invasion” represents an “immi -
 nent danger” for U.S. society. In addition to considering “illegal aliens” responsible for
the increase in crime and drug trafficking in the United States, he also thinks that te r -
rorist organizations have already entered the United States by crossing the U.S.-Mex -
 ico border. With an MBA in taxation, Gilchrist blames illegal immigrants for the eco-
nomic deficit. According to his calculations, the U.S. Department of the Treasury
annually spends US$384 billion to carry the cost of illegal foreigners who have and
will become dependent on U.S. taxes (for education, health care, etc.). After 20 years,
these expenditures reach US$8 trillion to US$9 trillion, an amount not surpris-
ingly close to the U.S. deficit, which is approximately US$12 trillion. 
In order to offer an alternative to the “political corruption and dereliction of
duty from the government,” Gilchrist, in collaboration with Chris Simcox, decided to
found the MMP, a civilian border patrol that promotes strict immigration laws and
security enforcement along the U.S.-Mexico border. Their goals are to 1) mo nitor U.S.
borders against the “invasion of illegal aliens”; 2) draw media attention to “the
chaos of illegal immigration and porous borders”; and 3) lobby the U.S. Congress
and policymakers. Gilchrist insists that he is far from being the only one who
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believes immigration poses a threat to national security. He asserts that several
national polls show that 80 percent to 90 percent of Americans share his vision.
Following this logic, he proudly announced that the MMP has recently called those
250 million Americans “honorary members.” In other words, the MMP already has
4 out of 5 Americans in their ranks. Throughout the interview, Gilchrist used
alarming, jingoistic rhetoric to praise the MMP, an organization he believes has
“significantly influenced” the U.S. debate on immigration politics. 
The Minutemen Movement
The MMP is far from being the first group to patrol the U.S.-Mexico border. The
origin of civilian border patrol groups can be traced back to the 1970s with two
local groups: the Hannigans in Arizona (1976) and the Ku Klux Klan Border Watch
in California (1977) (Navarro 2009). In the 1990s and early 2000s, other civilian
border patrol groups were formed, such as the American Border Patrol, Ranch
Rescue, Light up the Border, and Voices of Citizens Together. However, it was only
in 2005, with the foundation of the MMP and another association launched by
Chris Simcox called the Minuteman Civil Defense Corps (MCDC) that the term
Minutemen started being associated with the civilian border patrol movement.1
It was Gilchrist, a Vietnam War veteran, and Simcox, a kindergarten teacher
and editor of the Tombstone Tumbleweed newspaper, who came up with the idea
of creating the MMP. In April 2005, they invited war veterans, ex-Border Patrol
agents and other citizens to serve their country by participating in a month-long
border patrol operation in Arizona. Before the end of the year, Simcox and Gil christ
had divided the organization into two separate entities: the Minuteman Project and
the Minuteman Civil Defense Corps (MCDC). Gilchrist and the MMP have since
lobbied Congress for immigration policy reform, while Simcox and the MCDC have
focused on border actions (Douzet 2009, 4). In 2007, the MMP and the MCDC
had 57 articles around the United States (see Figure 1). Furthermore, according to
the Southern Poverty Law Center, they have inspired many Americans to start their
own civilian border patrol groups, and only in 2005 more than 40 were formed (Mi -
nutemen American Defense, Minutemen Party, San Diego Minutemen, etc.) (Bu -
chanan and Holthouse 2007). These organizations are part of the broader anti-immi-
grant movement, or, as Daniel Tichenor calls it, the cla s sic exclusionist movement.2
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1 The term “Minutemen” has become a powerful symbol of American patriotism. Originally, it referred
to the colonial militia that allowed the colonies to respond rapidly to military threats. In 1775, the
Minu temen fought the British in Lexington and Concord, two famous battles that began the Amer -
ican Revolutionary War.  
2 According to Daniel Tichenor (2002), the actors interested in immigration policy fall into four broad
categories: 1) cosmopolitans; 2) nationalist egalitarians; 3) free-market expansionists; and 4) classic
exclusionists. Classic exclusionists favor restrictions on both immigration admissions and immigrant
rights, especially because of the economic and social burden they impose on the United States.
In addition to the overwhelming amount of attention they have received from
the public, the media, and policy makers, the Minutemen movement garnered in te r -
est in academic circles. It is important to note that most of the literature published
on the Minutemen agrees that they have played a major role in the immigration
de bate in the United States since 2005 (Akers, Chacon, and Davis 2006; Chavez
2008; Dechaine 2009; Doty 2009; Gradsky 2007; Justus 2009; Lyall 2009; Na -
varro 2009; Sheehy 2009; Smith 2007; Yoxall 2006). Doty summarizes this point by
arguing that the Minutemen have become “a powerful symbol and a rallying point
for those who advocate stronger immigration enforcement, especially those who focus
predominantly on border enforcement as a solution to the current immi gration crises”
(Doty 2007, 121). 
Though the phenomenon has been examined using various theoretical ap -
proa ches, there is an important lack of research analyzing the individual. If the
role of the individual were to be thoroughly scrutinized in this context, the impact
of the movement on the immigration debate could be demonstrated to a greater
extent. An approach carrying out an individual level of analysis seems essential, as
several facts question the vast national support that they say they have. Here is an
example of why I believe this: Gilchrist explained that, de s pite the fact that he con-
siders his organization has 250 million honorary members, there are only three main,
“authoritative” members in the Minuteman Project (Gil christ 2009). This observa-
tion coincides with the writings of Navarro, who maintains that Gilchrist and Simcox
control all the actions undertaken by their respective organizations. “Their nation-
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FIGURE 1
STATES WITH AT LEAST ONE MINUTEMEN ARTICLE (MMP AND/OR MCDC)
NOTE: States in light gray have at least one Minutemen article.
MMP= Minutemen Movementin
MCDC= Minutemen Civil Defense Corps.
al boards of directors consisted of a few leaders, which both Simcox and Gilchrist
handpicked. Democracy was absent, meaning that there were never elections held
where the mass membership voted on who would be in the leadership role of
either organization. From the beginning, both militias were ‘personality and not
organization driven’” (2009, 193). Several researchers have re ported internal dis-
ruptions in operations as well as many disputes and differences in opinion with-
in the movement (Doty 2009; Navarro 2009; Justus 2009).
Given this conflict inside the movement, how can we understand the civilian
border patrol movement having an important role in the national immigration de -
bate in the United States since 2005? Or, to put it more broadly, how did the Minu te -
men movement become such an important symbol representing those who endorse
border enforcement and strict immigration laws in the United States? 
This article takes an original stand by focusing on key Minutemen members
and their fundamental role in promoting, developing, and implementing strategies
to influence the immigration debate. The following discussion will also demon-
strate that the civilian border patrol movement, or, more specifically, the Minuteman
Project and the Minuteman Civil Defense Corps, would not have progressed as
much as they have without the determination and the dynamism of their respective
presidents, Gilchrist and Simcox. Before even commenting on what impact the
Minutemen movement has had, it is imperative to understand that the degree of
its impact on the national level is mainly due to the entrepreneurship of Gilchrist
and Simcox. They must be viewed as “security entrepreneurs” in the contemporary
movement of civilian border patrols and in the debate on immigration politics from
2005 to 2010.
The concept of “security entrepreneurs” is based on two theories: “political
entrepreneurs” (Carter and Scott 2006, 2009) and the “securitization process”
(Buzan, Waever, and De Wilde 1998). Often considered experts on undocumented
immigration and border security, the Minutemen presidents can be defined as “se -
curity entrepreneurs,” a term meaning that they are engaged in initiating policy
change or innovation, and in promoting their own security agenda. With their cre-
ativity, strategies, networks, and persuasive speech acts, security entrepreneurs raise
new ideas and frame the debate on a specific issue. As security entrepreneurs, the
Minutemen presidents have two main avenues of influence (that is to say, two main
ways of influencing their audience about the legitimacy of their concerns around
illegal immigration) for achieving their goals: discursive and strategic actions. The
analysis in this article will focus on these avenues of influence in order to high-
light the major role Minutemen presidents have played in the immigration debate.
It will demonstrate that beyond the anti-immigrant symbol the Minutemen move-
ment represents, its strike force depends largely on two members: Gilchrist and
Simcox. The research is based on academic books and articles, Minutemen biog-
raphies, speeches, and websites, as well as on field research conducted in Califor nia
and interviews with members of the MMP, scholars, and activists. This fieldwork has
been conducted in accordance with ethical policies and procedures for research
involving human subjects at the University of Québec at Montréal (UQAM). 
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Discursive Strategy: 
The Securitization of Undocumented Immigrants
Although some journalists and policy makers have discredited civilian border pa -
trolling and dismissed the idea as an insignificant “movement,” one of most impor-
tant avenues of influence for the Minutemen presidents lies in their discursive
strategy. By deliberately framing undocumented immigration and border issues in
security terms, Minutemen presidents helped determine and set the political agen -
da. In other words, they participated in what the Copenhagen School calls the
“securitization process,” a framework used to analyze how an issue becomes secu-
ritized or desecuritized. Buzan, Waever, and De Wilde argue that “securitization is the
move that takes politics beyond the established rules of the game and frames
the issue either as a special kind of politics or as above politics. Securitization can
thus be viewed as a ‘more extreme version of politicization’” (1998, 23). According to
this concept, a securitizing actor uses the language of security (speech acts) to define
a problem not merely in political terms, but rather in security terms in order to
convince a specific audience of a real, existent threat. The Copenhagen School
suggests that for a political issue to become a security one, it must go through the
following 5 steps: 1) designating a referent object to be securitized; 2) subjectively
defining the existence of a threat that jeopardizes the survival of a specific referent
object; 3) authority figures accomplishing the securitization process; 4) taking extra -
ordinary measures in response to an existential threat; and 5) the audience ac -
cepting the new reality (Macleod et al. 2008, 402). It would be an exaggeration to
consider emergency measures taken along the U.S.-Mexico border, such as the con-
struction of the wall, the result of the work of the Minutemen presidents or any other
anti-immigrant organizations. Nevertheless, it is possible to comment on and eval-
uate Gilchrist and Simcox’s level of participation in making undocumented immi-
gration a security issue by studying how they are involved in the five steps of the
securitization process.
Step 1: 
Designating a Referent Object to Be Securitized
According to many political scientists, immigration policies are increasingly viewed
through a security lens (Bigo 1998; Buzan, Weaver, and De Wilde 1998; Doty 1998;
Huysmans 2006). Even supporters of the Copenhagen School researchers argue
that immigration is among the most important issues likely to be perceived as a
threat to societal security. They postulate that the primary referent object to be se -
cured in a context of social insecurity is the identity of a society or a community
(Buzan, Weaver, and De Wilde 1998, 119-140). In the context of U.S. immigration
politics, the referent object to securitize is the American identity, constructed and
defined in opposition to the “other,” namely “illegal aliens,” who pose an existential
threat. It is important to note that since the mid-1980s, undocumented immigration
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has been perceived as a cause for insecurity where American identity is concerned.3
Therefore, the Minutemen presidents did not participate directly in the first step
of the securitization process. They have only continued the work initiated by their
predecessors. As for other anti-immigrant organizations, they have helped maintain
this issue in terms of exception, risk, and confrontation (Bigo 1998, 5). In this con -
text, the discursive actions of the Minutemen presidents must be viewed in rela-
tion to the global rhetoric that construes undocumented immigration as a threat to
American identity. 
Step 2: 
Subjectively Defining the Existence of 
A Threat to the Survival of a Specific Referent Object
The second step is to subjectively define the existence of a threat to the survival
of a specific referent object. Gilchrist and Simcox describe undocumented immi-
gration and border security issues as a threat to societal security in order to influence
the way policy makers think, define, and shape immigration policies. Their speech
acts are aimed at making American citizens believe that undocumented immigra-
tion constitutes a problem harmful to American identity and national sovereignty.
The following paragraphs will focus on how Gilchrist and Simcox show illegal aliens
to be “enemies” and portray the border as a “war zone.” 
CONSTRUCTING THE IMAGE OF ILLEGAL ALIENS
AS THE ENEMY: ILLEGAL ALIENS ALLEGEDLY THE CAUSE
OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC PROBLEMS IN THE UNITED STATES
Gilchrist and Simcox use undocumented immigrants as scapegoats, by holding them
responsible for U.S. social problems, such as those pertaining to employment, health,
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3 The United States has identified undocumented immigration from Mexico and Latin America as a
threat to the American identity since the early 1980s. This is relatively recent, since Mexicans enjoyed
special status for many years. Before 1929, U.S. law allowed Mexicans to cross the border without papers.
After that, Mexicans benefited from the extensive guest worker Bracero Program, which sponsored
4 million Mexicans to work in the United States between 1943 and 1964. However, the end of this
program and the socio-economic context in Mexico (particularly characterized by important popula-
tion growth and the rapid urbanization of society during the 1960s and 1970s) threw many Mexicans
out of work. Many of these unemployed Mexicans decided to work in border towns or to enter the
U.S. without work permits. The problem of undocumented immigration began with the end of the
Bracero Program and gradually increased. Americans began to recognize this issue in the mid-1980s
when the number of undocumented immigrants came to approximately 4 to 5 million. With some
difficulty, the U.S. Congress passed the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) in 1986, granting
amnesty to nearly 3 million undocumented immigrants, while enforcing sanctions on employers who
hired undocumented immigrants and assigning new resources to the Border Patrol.
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and crime. In an essay published at Georgetown University, Gilchrist argues that pro -
active enforcement of immigration laws and border security can have many bene-
fits, such as the “preservation of a long-established American heritage and cul ture,”
“the elimination of traffic gridlock, car pool lanes, or tolls for local highway use,” “a sig-
nificant drop in crime,” “a positive future for the American youth,” and “the elimina-
tion of the thousands of undetected cases of communicable and deadly tuberculosis,
leprosy, and hepatitis hosted by illegal aliens” (2008). The Minu te men pre sidents also
worry about the preservation of the English language: in his essay, Gilchrist states
that, by the year 2030, there could be an attempt to in troduce a bill into Congress
pushing for Spanish to become the United States’ official language (2008, 421).
Gilchrist and Simcox also argue that undocumented immigration harms the
U.S. economy. As explained before, Gilchrist used his expertise in taxation to de m -
onstrate how undocumented immigration leads the United States into a financial
crisis. Simcox goes even further, asserting that militarization of the border would
stimulate the economy: “There’s only one way to stop this. Mobilization! Militarize
the Border! It would create a boom economy” (quoted in Ketcham 2005). 
THE BORDER AS A “WAR ZONE”
The U.S.-Mexico border is often portrayed as a place of danger, chaos, and disor-
der (Payan 2006, 3). The Minutemen presidents’ discursive strategy contributes to
the construction of this image, since their speech acts often rely on war metaphors
to expose the immigration problem: “united army of illegal aliens,” “Minutemen
battle to secure America’s borders,” “chain of command,” “stand my ground,” “Mi n -
utemen are dedicated to protect America against invaders,” “the United States are
under attack,” etc. Simcox could not be clearer about this when he says, “Things
are violent on the border. My God, the border’s a war zone. I don’t get out without
a level 3 bullet-proof vest anywhere near the border” (quoted in Doty 2007, 125).
More specifically, Gilchrist and Simcox try to prove that there is a “war” along the
U.S.-Mexico border by connecting undocumented immigration with terrorism and
crime, describing the growing number of undocumented immigrants with the “inva-
sion” metaphor, and using the symbol of Uncle Sam in their recruitment campaign. 
Firstly, they constantly assert that families and workers are hardly the only
groups of people crossing the border illegally. The group of undocumented immi-
grants apparently also includes criminals, terrorists, murderers, rapists, drug dealers,
and gang members. According to Gilchrist, 10 percent to 20 percent of undocu-
mented immigrants from Mexico are criminals, and another 10 percent will become
criminals after their arrival (Gilchrist and Corsi 2006, xxiv). Apart from being a
danger, these criminals and terrorists are also “natural allies”: Al Qaeda, Hez bollah,
La Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13), Los Zetas, etc. (Dechaine 2009, 55; Gilchrist and
Corsi 2006, 173). Moreover, Gilchrist and Simcox continuously link undocument-
ed immigration with terrorism and drug trafficking to generate a greater sense of
anxiety. Here are two examples: 
Who knows how many Hezbollah or Al Qaeda operatives have bought their way into
the United States across our southern border? (Gilchrist and Corsi 2006, 169)
Because illegal aliens murder 5 000 innocent Americans every year and we take a trillion
dollar hit overall to our economy, illegal immigration rewards us with a 9/11 or worse
every year. (Simcox quoted in Dechaine 2009, 55)
Secondly, Gilchrist and Simcox use certain metaphors and terminology such
as the term “invasion” to emphasize the externality of the threat.4 In his book The
Politics of Insecurity: Fear, Migration and Asylum in the EU, Jef Huysmans explains
that the term “invasion” is a powerful metaphor to securitize increased immigration
without having to explain how it endangers the population (Huysmans 2006, 47-48).
Gilchrist and Simcox followed this method by highlighting the danger of open bor-
ders. In a short essay published at Georgetown University, Gilchrist used the term
“invasion” 15 times. Here are two examples:
At the current rate of invasion, by the year 2025, only 17 years hence, the Minuteman
Project estimates that there will be more illegal aliens occupying U.S. territory than
there will be citizen voters. (Gilchrist 2008, 7)
Annually, the size of the invasion explodes to the equivalent of 208 reinforced army divi-
sions, or about five million persons, entering and occupying U.S. territory. That is larg-
er than all the current U.S. military forces combined: Army, Navy, Air Force, Coast
Guard, Marines, Reservists, and the National Guard. No one knows who these millions
of persons are, where they are, or what their intentions are. (Gilchrist 2008, 6)
Furthermore, Gilchrist fuels fear of a possible invasion of illegal aliens by re -
for mulating the Greek myth of the Trojan horse. Here is how he summarizes this
analogy: 
The fear is that, like the ancient Trojans, we are naively bringing grave danger into our
city walls. The illegal immigrants invading our country will quickly destroy the United
States as a safe, economically sound nation that abides by the rule of law established by
our Founding Fathers. We have allowed into our midst an army of illegal immigrants who
will cause our downfall unless we do something about it now. (Gilchrist 2006, 20)
Simcox also describes the immigration issue using the invasion metaphor. On
the website of  his political action committee (PAC), the MCDC PAC, he posted an
image featuring seven Latinos climbing the security fence. This image is accompa-
nied by a notice board indicating the number of illegal immigrants entering the
United States in “real time.” It is estimated that this figure increases by one immi-
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4 The Minutemen are not the first to use this metaphor; many anti-immigrant organizations have done
so before. Actually, the U.S. News and World Report was the first magazine to use the term “invasion”
in 1977 on its cover to characterize immigration in the United States (Chavez 2001, 221). 
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grant every 45 seconds and today is higher than 15 million (MCDC PAC). According
to Bigo, the use of such alarming statistics amplifies the immigration problem, “ma -
terializes the enemy,” and helps to subjectively define a threat to survival (1998, 4).
By defining the threat with the word “invasion,” the Minutemen presidents are
engaging in an act of securitization. Based on the fear of “the other,” their speech
acts help buttress the idea that border enforcement is necessary to control illegal
immigration and protect American society. This method focuses on demonstrating
the image of a harmonious society being hampered by an external attack (Huys -
mans 2006, 49).
Thirdly, the Minutemen presidents make analogies with past armed conflicts
to demonstrate that there is a “war” on the U.S.-Mexico border. For example, Simcox
used the popular image of Uncle Sam to recruit volunteers. Initially created to get
people to enlist during World War I, this poster has become an icon of the United
States and its government. Simcox decided to adapt it to the Minutemen reality by
making two changes. First, he replaces Uncle Sam’s hat with the blue three-cor-
nered hat of the original eighteenth-century Minutemen movement. Second, he
modifies the original text, “Uncle Sam Wants YOU” for the U.S. Army, to suit the
“border war” idea: “I want YOU - As a Minuteman Volunteer to Secure the U.S. Border.”
By reasserting this popular image, Simcox suggests that the Minutemen have re -
placed Uncle Sam in the protection of the United States. Pointing directly to the
viewer, the new Uncle Sam encourages Americans to join the Minutemen and fight
the “war” against illegal immigration.
The aforementioned speech acts lead to the conclusion that Gilchrist and
Sim cox actively participate in the second step of the securitization process. Their
rhe toric helps define the issue of undocumented immigration as a threat to the se -
curity of American society. To continue in this vein, a researcher might consider other
figures of speech employed by Gilchrist and Simcox, such as those related to health
(illness, infection, cancer, parasites, etc.) and natural disasters (flood, tsunami,
tide, etc.). 
Step 3: 
The Accomplishment of the Securitization Process
The third step is the accomplishment of the securitization process by a group of
people whose authority to secure is recognized by the audience (i.e., the Amer -
ican government or public). For the speech acts to be recognized as legitimate,
Gilchrist and Simcox must be perceived as experts on immigration politics. In other
words, they cannot hope to significantly increase the probability of a political change
without the approval of the audience.
And in order to be perceived as experts, Gilchrist and Simcox refer ad nauseam
to the inaction of the state and policy makers to deal with immigration politics
and border security issues, as shown in the following quote from Gilchrist: 
Securing the border is something the government should be taking care of as a matter
of course. As far as I can figure, President Bush is delusional, lying, or completely
clueless as to the crisis this country is facing. Whatever the situation is, the president
and most members of the U.S. Senate are wrong and, frankly criminally incompetent on
this issue. (Gilchrist and Corsi 2006, xxi)
To demonstrate that they can effectively replace the government, Gilchrist and
Simcox describe the members of their organization as citizens, patriots, pioneers,
activists, and lobbyists who are all dedicated to monitoring the border and curb-
ing illegal immigration. Simcox also claims that the MCDC is a good example of an
organization promoting social justice, by being “one of the most important, socially
responsible, and peaceful movements for justice since the civil rights movement
of the 1960s” (MCDC n.d.). These presidents focus on their patriotism and com-
mitment to the principle of the rule of law in order to be seen as legitimate. 
This technique of denouncing government inaction and promoting the dyna -
mism of the MMP and the MCDC seems to work. According to surveys, the Minu temen
have a good reputation in the United States. For example, a report entitled Amer -
icans’ Immigration Quandary revealed that 55 percent of Americans had already heard
of the Minutemen, and 60 percent supported their actions (Pew 2006, 25). Another
Fox News poll (2006) showed that 46 per cent of Americans consider Minutemen
“concerned citizens,” and that 34 percent describe them as “vigilan tes.” Finally, a
survey conducted by NBC News and The Wall Street Journal (2006) noted that 30
percent of Amer icans wish to see the Minutemen surveillance allowed by the law.
This figure was 50 percent among Republicans. While these surveys do not express
clear agreement among Americans on this issue, we can still conclude that the
Minutemen’s position on illegal immigration has a lot of support.5
Step 4: 
Taking Extraordinary Measures 
In Response to an Existential Threat 
While the Minutemen’s actions are generally accepted, or at least tolerated, the
fourth step reflects the movement’s limits. According to the Copenhagen School
researchers, all extraordinary measures are mainly the responsibility of the state.
Making major decisions such as those pertaining to constructing a border fence,
increasing border patrols, or amending immigration laws must, according to conven -
tion, be made by the U.S. government. Even if the presidents endeavor to take their
own extraordinary measures, they cannot afford to follow through with these ambi -
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5 It is important to note that the audience is not limited to the general public, but also includes poli-
cy makers. I will discuss Gilchrist and Simcox’s political strategy in Washington later in this article,
but I can already mention that several members of the House of Representatives support these pres-
idents and carry their message to the Capitol.
tions. During their border patrol actions, the Minutemen numbered barely more
than 100 in the field. Moreover, the MCDC fence-building project is going slowly,
as it is only 3.2 km long on a more than 3 000 km border (Fan 2008, 712). In other
words, it is impossible for these groups to make a real difference with their limited
civilian and financial resources. While the U.S. Border Patrol, with approximate-
ly 11 000 officers and no less than US$7 billion invested in border se curity in 2006,
has relatively failed to control undocumented immigration (Payan 2006, 56), we
can safely conclude that the Minutemen cannot carry out such an operation. Even
within the state, extraordinary measures remain difficult to achieve. Since 2003,
the U.S. Congress has introduced many bills, but it was not until the Secure Fence
Act of 2006 (HR6061) that the country faced a drastic change in se curity measures.
This act authorizes the construction of 1 100 km of double barriers and the increase
of the number of Border Patrol agents.
Step 5: 
The Audience Accepts the New Reality 
Finally, to complete the securitization process, the audience must accept the new
reality. When the Secure Fence Act was enacted, 46 percent of Americans were in
favor of the security fence (CNN 2006). This statistic increased to 54 percent in
2010 (CNN 2010). This growing apparent desire to secure the U.S.-Mexico bor-
der signifies that the securitization of undocumented immigration is actually
underway. Even though the influx of undocumented immigrants has seen a drastic
decline since 2006 (Passel and Cohn 2010), strict immigration laws such as the
Arizona Sup port Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act (SB1070)
have continued to appear, at least for debate or discussion, even if not ultimately
put into effect. The U.S. seems to tend toward guarding against undocumented
immigration.
By analyzing the five steps of the securization process, it can be concluded that
Gilchrist and Simcox have played major roles in describing undocumented immi-
gration as a threat to American identity. It is important to note that we should not
understand the Minutemen presidents’ influence as if they were the cause of the
securitization of undocumented immigration. However, portraying the border as a
war zone and describing illegal immigration as a social and economic burden for
the United States has certainly helped create an atmosphere that seems to justify
stricter immigration policies. Thus, assuming that there is no single “actor” con-
trolling the securitization process, we can say that Gilchrist and Simcox are two of
the security entrepreneurs who participated to a great extent in it.
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Strategic Actions: Patrolling U.S. Borders, 
Attracting Media Attention, 
And Influencing Political Decisions
The Minutemen presidents’ second avenue of influence is to undertake strategic
actions. Specifically, they participate in the debate on immigration and on border
security by patrolling the U.S. borders, increasing media coverage, and influenc-
ing political decisions. 
PATROLLING U.S. BORDERS
According to Gilchrist and Simcox, the first step in protecting the nation’s sover-
eignty is to immediately deploy the U.S. army to the southern border until a complete
security fence is erected. Once the physical barrier extending from San Diego to
Brownsville is built, 35 000 Border Patrol agents should be deployed, and the ports
and the Canadian border should be secured. Since they believe the federal govern -
ment “has no serious intention of enforcing the borders,” they started their own pa -
trolling actions to prevent the entry of illegal immigrants (Gilchrist and Corsi 2006). 
Their first surveillance operation was organized in April 2005, in Cochise
County, Arizona. Since then, they have patrolled the U.S.-Mexico border as well as
the U.S.-Canada border. The MCDC reported that in 279 days of patrolling, 30 671
illegal immigrants have been seen, 326 rescued, and 13 710 arrested (MCDC n.d.).
These numbers are obviously exaggerated, as the number of volunteers deployed
daily at the border rarely reaches 100. In addition to their daily patrolling activities,
the MMP and the MCDC have organized demonstrations against the employment of
undocumented immigrants in day labor centers in Texas, Arizona, New Mex ico, Ca -
lifornia, Idaho, and Michigan. 
It is important to note that it is almost impossible for these groups to make a
real difference with such limited civilian resources. The Minutemen’s success cannot
be calculated in terms of arrests and border crossings, but in terms of the attention
received. According to Chavez (2008, 25), the Minutemen presidents’ goal is to
produce a “spectacle” that draws public and media attention and influences policy
makers. Gil christ appears to agree, for he says the following:
That first border event was a dog-and-pony show....It was political activism. I organ-
ized it to draw attention to the failure of the government to secure our borders, and it
did that in spades. Patrolling the border is only about 5 or 10 percent of what the Min -
u teman Project is about. The other 90 to 95 percent is driving this issue up through city
councils, mayors, state legislatures, and governors into the halls of Congress to force
change. (quoted in Thomas 2008)
In short, the surveillance operations help draw attention to certain possible
solutions (border enforcement, strict immigration laws, etc.) at the expense of
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others (temporary foreign worker programs, legalization of undocumented immi-
grants, etc.).
ATTRACTING MEDIA ATTENTION
To influence the debate on border security and immigration politics, Simcox and
Gilchrist spread their message using various media such as newspapers, radio, the
Internet, and television. According to Gilchrist, the core Minutemen media strategy
is to build strong collaboration with radio and television hosts who will promote
their ideas (2009). Over the years, Gilchrist and Simcox have developed solid col-
laboration with Lou Dobbs, Glenn Beck, Bill O’Reilly, and local radio hosts like
Roger Hedgecock, Michael Savage, and Mark Edwards (Akers and Davis 2006, 237;
Gilchrist 2009; Navarro 2009, 179). For instance, the Minutemen presidents ap -
peared 18 and 22 times respectively on the program Lou Dobbs Tonight between
March 2005 and March 2007 (Doty 2009, 69). Dobbs has never hidden his support
for the Minutemen organizations. In response to an editorial in The Wall Street Jour -
nal, he said on air, “I just want to be clear to the Journal and to this audience, I sup port
the Minuteman Project and the fine Americans who make it up in all they’ve accom -
plished fully, relentlessly, and proudly” (quoted in Cabrera and Glavac 2010, 692). 
Moreover, the MMP and MCDC are hot topics in the media. From 2005 to 2010,
over 3 900 articles on the Minutemen were published in the United States. As
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the chart indicates, the Minutemen phenomenon was more popular in 2005 and
2006; 75 percent of the articles were published during the movement’s first two
years. Specifically, the month-long border operation in Arizona in April 2005 and
Simcox’s ultimatum for Bush to build a fence at the U.S.-Mexico border (May 2006)
garnered most of the attention. 
INFLUENCING POLITICAL DECISIONS
As important as the patrolling actions and the media strategies can be, the ultimate
goal of Minutemen presidents is policy-related. Gilchrist and Simcox actively pro-
mote and present their ideas to the Immigration Reform Caucus (IRC), finance
political campaigns through their political action committees (PAC), participate
actively in politics —they ran for Congress— and lobby the national legislature.
Gilchrist, Simcox, and the Immigration Reform Caucus
In April, 2005, Gilchrist and Simcox, accompanied by 20 Minutemen volunteers,
formally met with IRC members. In fact, about 10 days after the launch of the border
operation in Arizona in 2005, former IRC Chairman Tom Tancredo (R-Colorado)
said that the MMP was a success and invited Gilchrist and Simcox to Capitol Hill
(Sheehy 2009, 258). The following IRC members congratulated and have publicly
supported the Minutemen political agenda: Tom Tancredo, John T. Doolittle (R-
California), Lamar Smith (R-Texas), Scott Garrett (R-New Jersey), J.D. Hayworth
(R-Arizona), Phil Gingrey (R-Georgia), Virgil Goode (R-Virginia), Walter Jones (R-NC),
Tom Price (R-Georgia), and J. Gresham Barrett (R-South Carolina) (Yoxall 2006,
545-546). Thereafter, Tancredo has collaborated several times with Gilchrist, a
nota ble example being his writing the preface of Gilchrist’s book, Minutemen: The
Battle to Secure America’s Borders. In the preface, he recognizes Gilchrist and
Simcox’s leading roles in the Minutemen movement:
The first Minuteman operation was a tremendous success, and much of that success
was due to the tenacity and vision of Jim Gilchrist and his Minuteman Project partner,
Chris Simcox, publisher of the Tombstone Tumbleweed News paper and founder of the
Minuteman Civil Defense Corps. (Tancredo quoted in Gilchrist and Corsi 2006, xi)
Another IRC member, Charles Norwood (R-Georgia), took a stand in favor of
the Minutemen movement by publishing a report on the first border operation in
Arizona. According to Norwood (2005), the MMP have demonstrated that, with
more manpower deployed at the border, illegal crossings could be reduced signif-
icantly. This report also suggests that auxiliary personnel, such as Minu temen vol-
unteers, should help the Border Patrol, as they can be trained and deployed to the
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border in three days, as opposed to the Border Patrol agents, who take two years
to be trained (20-21).
POLITICAL ACTION COMMITTEES
In order to recruit, endorse, and financially support candidates who promote the Mi n -
utemen political agenda in Congress, Simcox created the Minutemen PAC and
the MCDC PAC, while Gilchrist launched the Minuteman Victory PAC. According
to their websites, these PACs benefited 35 members of Congress and challengers
during the last mid-term elections in 2010. Each PAC had revenue ranging from
US$200 000 to US$720 000 (Open Secrets 2010). Despite these substantial rev-
enues, only 11 percent of contributions has been redirected to candidates, while
admi nistrative costs accounted for most of the expenses. In fact, a third of candidates
received direct funding for a total of US$13 250. Indirect funding (for exam ple,
advertisement and direct mail to support a candidate) ran to US$115 591 and be ne -
fited only two candidates (Open Secrets 2010). These numbers demonstrate that the
Minutemen’s PACs did not significantly support congressional candidates, but again,
these actions have helped to put the Minutemen movement on the map in Congress.  
Minutemen Presidents Run for Congress
Gilchrist and Simcox both actively participated in politics by running for Con -
gress. Gilchrist was the first to adopt this political strategy, running in 2005 on
the American Independent Party ticket in Orange County, California. It was a good
opportunity for Gilchrist, since Christopher Cox (R-California), who had held the
position for 16 years, was the newly appointed Chairman of the Securities and Ex -
change Commission. Aware of the Republican tradition in the 48th Congressional
District, Gilchrist openly said he was taking the opportunity to bring immigration
and border security issues to the public and policy-makers’ attention. He finished
third, with 25 percent of the vote. Despite his defeat, he managed to persuade the
incumbent, John Campbell, to publicly declare that he favored enhancing border
enforcement and that he was against any bill that would allow the creation of tem-
porary foreign worker programs. After the balloting, Gilchrist said, “I had a big smile
on my face…the day after the election. There were four bills dealing with immigra -
tion chaos introduced in Congress that day. Ten weeks before, none of them were
in the works. I have to give myself some credit for that” (quoted in Thomas 2008). 
Five years later, in 2010, Simcox announced his candidacy for John McCain’s
Senate seat. His aim was to challenge McCain (R-Arizona) on border security. He
said, “John McCain has failed miserably in his duty to secure this nation’s borders
and protect the people of Arizona from the escalating violence and lawlessness.
He has fought real efforts over the years at every turn, opting to hold our nation’s
border security hostage to his amnesty schemes” (The Eco no mist 2009). Simcox
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accused McCain of being a “Republican in Name Only” (RINO), a pejorative term
used to discredit Republicans who have more liberal values and principles (Simcox
2010). By mid-February 2010, Simcox had decided to drop the race and endorse
Republican J.D. Hayworth, a candidate who promoted strict border enforcement.
Hayworth is well-known for his anti-immigrant ideology, well summarized in his
book Whatever It Takes: Illegal Immigration, Border Security and the War on Terror
(2006).
LOBBYING CONGRESS
Since the founding of the MMP and the MCDC, many bills legitimatizing civilian border
patrols have been introduced in Congress: the Illegal Immigration Enforcement
and Empowerment Act (SB1823), the Border Security and Modernization Act of
2005 (SB2049), the Protecting America Together Act of 2005 (HR3704), the Border
Protection Corps Act (HR3622), the Homeland Security Volunteerism Enhan ce -
ment Act of 2005 (HR4099), and the State Defense Force Improvement Act of
2005 (HR3401). Although none of them have ever passed, the existence of these
bills shows that Congress has not just been shrugging off the Minutemen pheno m -
enon. Furthermore, the Congressional Research Service has issued two reports on
civilian border patrols. Commissioned by the House Judiciary Committee in 2005,
the first analysis provides a historical overview of the Minutemen movement (Nunez-
Neto 2005). The second sheds light on political and legal issues surrounding civil-
ian border patrols by breaking down the national debate during the 109th Con -
gress (Vina, Blas Nunez-Neto, and Bartlett Weir 2006). Despite these actions, it
remains difficult to identify Gilchrist and Simcox’s direct role in influencing Con -
gress. However, we can say that the fact that this issue is much disputed in Congress
is partly due to their activism. A further study can be conducted to investigate to
what extent they have helped members of Congress to introduce these new bills.
By describing Gilchrist and Simcox’s strategic actions, we can conclude that
even if the Minutemen goal is apparently to monitor the U.S.-Mexico border, they
also have farther-reaching objectives, which are to draw media attention as well
as to shape the political agenda. Obviously, not all their strategic actions are effec-
tive, but Gilchrist and Simcox are the ones who have taken the Minutemen move-
ment to the heights it has reached nationally.
Conclusion
Even if the Minutemen’s rhetoric and actions are hyperbolic, their presidents’ acti v -
ism has been effective insofar as they have succeeded in bringing the issue of
undocumented immigration and border security to the public, the media, and pol-
icymakers’ attention. Furthermore, their alarming rhetoric associating immigration
with a “war,” a “disease,” and an “invasion” has certainly helped create a climate of
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insecurity that justifies stricter immigration policies. It would be inaccurate to claim
that Gilchrist and Simcox are the ones mainly responsible for the securitization
process of undocumented immigration. However, their leading role in the U.S.
anti-immigrant movement has helped promote strict immigration laws and border
enforcement. In conclusion, this research suggests that even though Gilchrist and
Simcox do not directly call the shots on border security, they can be qualified as
“security entrepreneurs” in the anti-immigrant movement. Their persuasive speech
acts, their surveillance operations at the border, their numerous appearances on
television and radio, as well as their lobbying actions in Washington have raised new
ideas and helped shape the political agenda. By focusing on the individual level of
analysis, this research has demonstrated how only two members of the Minutemen
movement have managed to influence the debate and become perceived as ex perts
on immigration and border security issues.
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We must have but one flag. We must also
have but one language. That must be the language
of the Declaration of Independence, of
Washington’s Farewell address, of Lincoln’s
Gettysburg Speech and second inaugural.
THEODORE ROOSEVELT (1917)
I hope very much that I’m the last president 
in American history who can’t speak Spanish.
BILL CLINTON (2000)
But understand this: instead of worrying
about whether immigrants can learn English
–they’ll learn English– you need to make sure your
child can speak Spanish.
BARACK OBAMA (2008)
Language and Identity
Language holds an important place in the theories of nation and nationalism. It is
often considered an important consciousness-raising and nation-building factor. De -
pending on the perspective, it is perceived either as a primordial, mythical founda -
tion of a national culture, or a foundational factor on which —or thanks to which—
the national identity is created. For some, it is the factor that most clearly defines
a nation; for others, it is an instrument used by the elites to build nations and legi -
timize their power. In short, most scholars agree that language plays a vital role in the
process of national consciousness raising and its development, a factor that unites
and integrates different groups within one community. Not surprisingly, it is also
highly important to immigrants and conquered peoples as a crucial instrument for
forming and/or preserving their unique ethnic identity. Since the mother language
reflects a group’s roots, culture, tradition, and distinctive way of seeing the world,
language change is one of the symptoms of assimilation. 
“THIS IS AMERICA — SPEAK ENGLISH.” THE ENGLISH-ONLY
MOVEMENT AND ANTI-IMMIGRANT SENTIMENTS 
IN THE UNITED STATES 
Anna Kaganiec-Kamien´ska* 
* Assistant professor at the Institute for American Studies and Polish Diaspora, Jagiellonian University
Krakow, Poland. a.kaganiec-kamienska@uj.edu.pl.
The English language is merged with American national identity. However, the
Founding Fathers did not grant English the status of an official language; instead
they made what Shirley Brice Heath is widely quoted as calling “a deliberate choice
of policy not to have a policy.” The general U.S. language policy was that of tole r -
ance. English became dominant without actually being declared official because
of the prevalence of Anglo-Saxons among the colonizers and early immigrants and,
thus, as an outcome of historical processes and events.1 It was at the turn of the
twentieth century that the “ideological link” between the American national iden-
tity and proficiency in the English language was established. Several factors contri b -
uted to this merger: vast U.S. territorial acquisitions in the nineteenth century,
which also meant confrontation with foreign-language speakers; mass immigra-
tion from Europe (1880-1920); anti-German sentiments in the U.S. during World
War I; and the Red Scare following the Bolshevik Revolution.  
Contemporary immigration to the United States, predominantly by Latin Amer -
icans (especially Mexicans), makes the issue of U.S. language policy very timely.
A rapidly growing Hispanic/Latino population is sometimes perceived by some,
including distinguished scholars and important politicians, as a threat to Amer -
ican national iden tity. What fuels such sentiments are, for example, the on-going
debate about immigration policy and regulations —Arizona’s harsh April 2010
SB1070 is one of them— border enforcement operations (the “prevention through
deterrence” stra tegy, or the recently approved fence on the U.S.-Mexican border),
as well as other actions and proposals, such as the idea of barring U.S.-born children
of illegal immi grants from automatic U.S. citizenship. 
The English-Only Movement, whose goal is to establish the English language
as the country’s official language, is undoubtedly one of the manifestations of the
strong anti-immigrant —mostly anti-Hispanic— sentiments in the country. Even
though no federal regulations have yet been passed, Official English measures have
been adopted by the majority of the American states. The English-Only Movement
has also focused on the reduction or elimination of language assistance (e.g., bi -
lingual materials and programs), the elimination of bilingual ballots, the promotion
of English only in the workplace, etc. 
This article focuses on how the English-Only Movement stems from, and has
contributed to, anti-immigrant sentiments in the United States in recent decades.
The problem is presented within the broader context of earlier attempts to restrict
foreign-language use.
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1 Today English is the common language in the country (the only language spoken at home by over 80
percent of the population) (U.S. Census Bureau 2000c).
The English Language 
And American Identity, Then…
The fact that the Founding Fathers did not grant English official status may have
been motivated by several factors, as summed up by Terrence G. Wiley: first, “the
dominance of English was self-evident”; second, “the founders respected linguistic
diversity and minority rights”; and third, they did not want to “offend minorities
who had supported the revolutionary cause” (2004, 320). Not mentioning English
in the Constitution could also have been more symbolic, expressing a rejection of
any cultural continuity with the British crown. In fact, as Baron writes, in the 1780s
the Marquis de Chastellux noted that Americans preferred their language to be re -
ferred to as “American” rather than “English” (1990, 42). Despite the fact that after
the revolution, some even suggested that the country choose a different language
(Baron 1990, 42; Shell 1993, 108), English became the most common language in
the colony, and Americans acted as if it were an official language. 
At that time the general language policy was that of tolerance toward other lan -
guages. Many churches and parochial schools operated in other languages, while
in some areas with a high concentration of German speakers, even public schools
operated in German, for example, in Pennsylvania, Ohio, or Wisconsin (Schmid
2001, 19). The first state to authorize bilingual (German-English) teaching was Ohio
in 1839 (Crawford 2001, 20). 
This does not mean, however, that as early as the colonial times the newcomers
were not sometimes perceived as a “cultural threat.” Even though America wel-
comed settlers from different countries from Northern and Western Europe, and
was thus multilingual (Castellanos 1983), some negative, anti-immigrant sentiments
arose. Benjamin Franklin himself openly expressed his concerns about the growing
number of Germans.2 One of the most infamous and widely quoted is in a 1753
letter to Peter Collinson, a member of the British Parliament, where he states,
“Those [Germans] who come hither are generally the most ignorant Stupid Sort
of their Nation” (Franklin 1753). In Observations on the Increase of Mankind (1755)
he also called Germans “Palatine boors,” but, as James Crawford writes, this frag-
ment was later removed from subsequent editions, probably because Franklin must
have felt embarrassed by his own words (quoted in Schmid 2001, 15). 
The concerns about the progress of assimilation of immigrants were particu-
larly loudly voiced at the turn of the twentieth century, in the era of heavy immi-
gration (1880-1920). In that period alone, 23.5 million immigrants arrived in the
United States (Daniels 2004, 5), almost 90 percent from Europe (Daniels 1991, 122).
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to become part of the so-called “Muhlenberg legend,” according to which it was only one vote that
prevented the German language from becoming a national language of the United States. In reality,
as Carol L. Schmid writes, the whole case referred to a petition by a group of Germans from Virginia
asking for some U.S. laws to be published in German as well as in English. In 1795, the House of Repre -
sentatives rejected this proposition by one vote (42-41), probably cast by Frederick August Muhlenberg,
then speaker of the House of Representatives (2001, 17).
The influx was so substantial that in 1890 and 1910, almost 15 percent of the pop-
ulation was foreign-born, the highest rate in U.S. history so far (Daniels 2004, 5).
What is important about this is that, while the majority of immi grants arriving in the
United States up until the 1880s were of Northern and Western Euro pean origin
(Daniels 1991, 122),3 at the turn of the twentieth century a substantial group of the
newcomers came from Southeastern Europe: Italians, Poles, as well as immigrants
from Austria-Hungary, and Russia (Daniels 1991, 122).4 As Charles Jaret puts it,
“This change was seen as more than a mere geographic shift; it was widely accept-
ed that the ‘new’ immigrants from Southern and Eastern Europe differed ‘much
more radically in type from the earlier American residents than did the old immi-
gration, and that in consequence the problem of assimilation has be come much
more difficult’” (1999, 11). Thus, the “new” immigrants were seen, even by some of
the brightest minds of the country, as less educated and skilled, racially inferior,
and generally less desirable than those from Western and Northern Europe.5 Some
official reports supported these positions. Research conducted in 1912 by Henry
Goddard concluded that 83 percent of Jews, 80 percent of Hun garians, 79 percent
of Italians, and 87 percent of Russians recently arrived in the U.S. were “feeble-
minded” (Ricento 1996, 4). Unsurprisingly, these conclusions, as Thomas Ricento
writes, helped establish migration quotas in 1924 (1996). Also, the 1911 Dillingham
Com mission Report suggested that “new” immigrants were not suited to the Amer -
 ican reality (Baron 1990, 134-136).
This big influx of “new” immigrants awoke xenophobic sentiments and spurred
nativist anti-immigrant movements, like Catholic immigrants or Chinese workers
had in earlier periods. For example, at the turn of the twentieth century, the short-
lived American Protective Association (APA) played on the fears of Americans
mainly in the rural Midwest and Pacific Northwest, while in the 1920s, the “new”
anti-Catholic and anti-immigrant Ku Klux Klan had about 4 million members na -
tionally (Beirich 2010b, 8). At the same time, different organizations, for example
Boston’s Immigration Restriction League, some of whose members, as Joe R. Feagin
points out, were also fascinated with eugenics (1997, 23),6 were trying to pass res -
trictive immigration laws.
The broadest Americanization campaign took place in the first two decades
of the twentieth century (Higham 1988). By 1923 as many as 34 states introduced
teaching in English only, in public as well as private schools (Leibowicz 1985,
105-106). Also, some businesses, like Ford Motor Company, started obligatory
English language classes for its workers. Furthermore, some states introduced re gu -
lations restricting other language use and/or limiting the rights of the foreign-born.
For example, New York, among other states, required public school teachers to be
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4 Twenty-two percent in the years from 1861 to 1900, and 44 percent in the 1900-1920 period. 
5 For Roger Daniel’s discussion of the inadequacy of the concepts of “old” and “new” immigration see
Daniels 1991, 183-184.
6 For more on eugenics in the United States, see, for example, Black (2003).
U.S. citizens, while Oregon required English translations of foreign-language news -
papers (Higham 1988). Licensing laws, which banned foreigners from certain jobs,
such as being an attorney, a medical doctor, a surgeon, an engineer, or even a bus
driver, were also a form of discrimination. So was the prohibition in some states (e.g.,
California) of owning agricultural land by those not eligible for citizenship (i.e.,
Asian-born) (Jaret 1999, 17).
The beginning of the twentieth century witnessed the passage of important
immigration and naturalization regulations. In 1906, basic English-language skills
became a requirement for naturalization. In 1917, a literacy test became the main
tool for restricting immigration as a criterion for admitting immigrants to the U.S.
(Daniels 1991, 276-279; Leibowicz 1985, 106-107). The culmination of the Amer -
 icanization campaign was the adoption of a restrictive national quota system in immi -
gration law (1921 and 1924) that sharply reduced immigration from Southern,
Central, and Eastern Europe (immigration from the Western Hemisphere was outside
the quota system). The “new” Europeans, however, were neither the first group to
face hostility, as mentioned before, nor the first to trigger immigration res trictions.
Asians were the first to be barred. In 1882 Congress passed the Chinese Exclu sion
Act, and a few years later Japanese immigration was restricted on the basis of the 1907
“Gentlemen’s Agreement.” The following year President Theodore Roose velt issued an
executive order stopping Asian immigration from Hawaii (Ngai 2003, 114-119).
The Immigration Act of 1917 set up an Asiatic Barred Zone from which no immi -
grants were admitted, and in 1924 all Asian immigration was outlawed.
Language restrictions introduced at the beginning of the twentieth century
thus stemmed from the desire to preserve the American-ness of the United States
and assimilate immigrants. They were also rooted in internal security considera-
tions. After World War I fueled hostile attitudes toward Germans, in different parts
of the United States various attempts were made to eliminate the use of the German
language in public life. In many states, it was forbidden in schools (even German lan -
guage classes were stopped), sermons, and public addresses, while, as Carol L.
Schmid writes, in Iowa and South Dakota, it was even forbidden over telephones.
In some localities, people speaking German on the street could be fined (2001, 36).
Hostility toward Germans would also take the form of physical violence or the
symbolic burning of German books.
In fact, the arguments that newcomers pose a “cultural” or a “political threat”
are, as Jaret points out, two of the common fears that generate anti-immigrant
attitudes and actions (besides considering them a threat to the economic system or
even to the natural environment) (1999, 20). Seeing Germans (and later the Japa -
nese) as disloyal and subversive is only one possible manifestation of these atti-
tudes. This fear may also express itself in perceiving immigrants as unqualified or
unable to understand the principles of democracy. Thus, for example, today Mex -
ican immigrants are accused of not having “good citizenship qualities” and of being
“too apolitical and indifferent,” and hence unwilling to participate in the political
process. They are also accused of having “political interests and values” that are
different from those respected by “real Americans” (Jaret 1999, 23-24).
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Language (and cultural) assimilation was also important in the case of the
colonized and the conquered. A striking example of Americanization through edu-
cation is, clearly enough, the system of boarding schools for Native American chil-
dren (1879-1920), which led to the “cultural disintegration” of Indians (Schmid
2001, 23-25). English also finally became the language of instruction in the South -
west, Louisiana, and Hawaii; however, in Puerto Rico neither English-only nor
bilingual education programs proved effective (Schmid 2001, 25-27, 175-177;
Baron 1990, 166-170),7 and in 1948 Spanish became the language of education
there again (Crawford 2001, 18). “Foreign” languages were also restricted through
various regulations. As for California, for example, although the first state Con -
s titution (1849) guaranteed that state laws also would be published in Spanish, the
new Constitution (1878-1879) was pro-American (Schmid 2001, 28). It gave offi-
cial status to English (dropped in 1966) and abolished publications in Spanish
(Constitutional Convention of the State of California 1879; Crawford 2001, 14-15).
Louisiana was the only territory to become a state (1812) with a non-English-
speaking majority (Crawford 2001, 13). All the other states became states after
the English language and American culture had become dominant. In the South -
west, annexed in 1848, this happened much earlier in California (1850) than in
New Mexico (1912), due to their distinct demographic and economic develop-
ment. While the “Gold Rush” changed California’s ethnic composition immedi-
ately after annexation (Crawford 1992, 51), the immigration of English-speakers to
“Spanish” New Mexico was very slow, and they remained a minority till the begin-
ning of the twentieth century.8 The language issue and Hispanic culture are also
seen as an important obstacle to Puerto Rico becoming a new American state.
Today the island is mainly Spanish-speaking (U.S. Census Bureau 2000b),9 even
though since 1993 both languages are official.
…And Now…Anti-Immigration Sentiments 
And the English-Only Movement
Minority language rights in the United States stem from Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. By the 1980s other federal laws were also adopted to give pro-
tection to non-English speakers. The Bilingual Education Act of 1968 in fact start-
ed bilingual education programs; the 1975 amendment to the Voting Rights Act of
1965 provided for bilingual ballots in specific situations; and the Court Inter pre t -
 ers Act of 1978 provided interpreters in Federal Court. In 1990, a Native American
Languages Act was also passed to maintain and recover languages spoken by the
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speaks Spanish at home (3 million out of 3.8 million).
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Native American population, the natives of Hawaii, and the Pacific Islands. One
of the newest regulations is Executive Order 13166 (“Improving Access to Services
for Persons with Limited English Proficiency”), signed by President Bill Clinton
in 2000 to improve access of limited English proficiency persons (LEP) to federally
conducted and assisted programs and activities. EO 13166 and bilingual education
programs and bilingual ballots are criticized by the advocates of English as an offi-
cial language. While bilingual education programs were virtually ended when Pre s -
ident Bush signed the No Child Left Behind Act of 2002, the other two are still
being challenged.
The current English-Only Movement had its beginning in the early 1980s. By
then, a huge new wave of immigrants (4.5 million in the 1970s, 7.3 million in the
1980s, and 9.1 million in the 1990s [Daniels 2004, 5-6]) caused an explosive rise
in anti-immigrant sentiments.10 Some language restrictions were in fact intro-
duced even before the English-Only Movement started. One of them is the very
restrictive Anti-Bilin gual Ordi nance, adopted in 1980 in Dade County, Florida.
This regulation banned county expenditures on languages other than English, at
the same time changing the 1973 resolution, which made the county officially
“bilingual and bicultural.” All Spanish-language signs and bus schedules were thus
removed and the publication of informational leaflets brought to an end. A 1984
amendment to the ordi nance allowed county spending on public health, emergen-
cies, and tourism (Crawford 1992, 131), before, finally, the ordinance was repealed
in 1993 (Craw ford 2001, 26).
What actually caused the increase of immigration to the United States in the
second half of the twentieth century were the reforms and liberalization of immigra -
tion laws, which also led to an important change in the national origin of newcomers:
the dominant groups now were Latin Americans and Asians.11 The Walter-McCarran
Act of 1952 abolished “all racial and ethnic bars to immigration and naturalization”
and continued a non-quota system for Latin Americans. The Immigration Act of
1965 abolished the national quotas and introduced numerical restrictions for
both hemispheres. It also put a preference on family relations with U.S. citizens.
The closest family members could, therefore, migrate to the U.S. outside the nu -
merical restrictions. Later, other preferences, based on national origin, were also
established. Another important immigration act was the Immigration Reform and
Control Act (IRCA) of 1986, which, on the one hand, introduced some restrictions,
as far as the “unlawful employment of aliens” is concerned, for example, but on
the other hand, granted amnesty to about three million illegal immigrants, who
met all the specified conditions. This amnesty, paradoxically, led to the increase
in the legal immigration of closest family members. It was especially important to
10 For the discussion of the similarities and differences between the anti-immigrant attitudes in the
1880-1920 and 1970-1998, see Jaret (1999).
11 According to the 2000 U.S. Census, the majority of foreign-born are from Latin America (about 52
percent), mainly from Mexico, and from Asia (about 26 percent), mainly China and the Philippines
(Malone et al. 2003, 5). 
the Mex ican group since they comprised 70 percent of the people admitted into the
program (Daniels 2004, passim). 
In fact, increased immigration rates, alongside a high birth rate, contributed
to very fast growth in the number of Hispanics/Latinos. In only two decades
(1980-2000), their absolute numbers and their share in the U.S. population dou-
bled (from 6.4 percent to 12.5 percent, and from 14.6 million to 35.3 million,
res pectively) (Hobbs and Stoops 2002, 78). The fact that in mid-2006 the His -
pa nic/Latino group reached over 14.8 percent of the population (44.3 million) (U.S.
Census Bureau 2007) and is constantly growing enhances the stereotype of all
Latinos as “immigrants.” The advocates of immigration restrictions also empha-
size that for the first time in U.S. history, the majority of immigrants speak the same
language: Spanish. In their opi nion, this is a threat to the future of the English lan -
guage in the United States and even to American identity (Huntington 2004, 256).
In April 1981 Senator Samuel Ichiye Hayakawa, a Canadian immigrant of Ja -
panese origin and a naturalized U.S. citizen, proposed an amendment to the Con -
s titution of the United States, SJ Res. 72, which would establish English as an offi-
cial language of the country. Even though it was not voted by the Congress, it did
become the first proposal that referred to an official status for English.
In 1983 Hayakawa and John Tanton established an organization, U.S. English,
to lobby for the establishment of English as an official language of the United
States. The organization sees several reasons for Official English (U.S. English
n.d.b). First, “Official English promotes unity.” It is argued that the long tradition of
assimilation “has always included the adoption of English as the common means
of communication. Unfortunately, the proliferation of multilingual government
sends the opposite message to non-English speakers: it is not necessary to learn
English because the government will accommodate them in other languages” (U.S.
English n.d.b). Immi grants, as the argument goes, are slower to learn English when
they receive support in their native languages. Moreover, language diversity con -
tri butes to racial and ethnic conflicts. Second, “Official English empowers immi-
grants.…Life without English proficiency in the United States is a life of low-skilled,
low-paying jobs. Studies of Census data show that an immigrant’s income rises
about 30 percent as a result of learning English. Knowledge of English leads to
the realization of the American dream of increased economic opportunity and the
ability to become a more productive member of society, which benefits everyone”
(U.S. English n.d.b). Hence, to succeed in the U.S. you must know English, while
language assis tance, in fact, deprives you of full participation in the society. Third,
“Official English is common sense government.” It would eliminate the need to
spend money on services in different langua ges, which could be spent on English
language classes for the immigrants. U.S. English also emphasizes that giving
English the status of an official language does not mean that other language use
would be absolutely banned. It would be possible in emergency situations, judicial
proceeding as well as foreign-language instruction and the promotion of tourism
[sic!] (U.S. English n.d.b). Regulation, as they write, would not impose a language
on private firms, religious celebrations, or private conversations.
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U.S. English won the support of many prominent Americans. In its Advisory
Board sits, for example, the former governor of California, Arnold Schwarzenegger
(U.S. English n.d.b). As Crawford writes (2001, 5), the organization was also endorsed,
for example, by former-President Richard Nixon, Senator Eugene McCarthy, writer
Saul Bellow, and actors Charlton Heston and Whoopi Goldberg, as well as other
figures, some of whom later withdrew their support. The number of U.S. English
members grew substantially in a few years: from 300 in 1983, to 400 000 in 1990.
In 2000, it claimed 1.4 million members, while in 2009, 400 000 more (Schmidt
2001, 44; U.S. English n.d.b). The survey commissioned by the organization itself
in the 1980s revealed that their members were mostly wealthy, college-educated
men over 60, conservative, of Northern European origin (Crawford 2001, 24).
Apart from U.S. English, some other organizations support giving English an of -
ficial status. One of them is ProEnglish, which had its beginnings in 1994 as an
initiative known as English Language Advocates that was defending Official English
law in Arizona (ProEnglish n.d.). Another organization, English First, founded in 1986
by Larry Pratt, a former Virginia state representative, and the president of Gun Owners
of America, currently has about 150 000 members (English First n.d.). Worth men-
tioning is also the American Ethnic Coalition, founded that same year in Texas by
Lou Zaeske, which aims “to prevent the division of America along language or ethnic
lines” (quoted in Draper and Jimenez 1996, 3). 
Official English opponents do not agree with the arguments of the English-
Only Movement. In their opinion, English is not in danger in the United States,
since even such groups as Hispanics/Latinos, considered very loyal to their mother
tongue, show a tendency to language assimilation. The Spanish language as immi-
grants’ dominant language gives way to English as the dominant language in the
second and subsequent generations, and in many cases it is finally completely
dropped.12 Hispanics/Latinos are simply perfectly aware of the fact that English
proficiency is important for their socioeconomic mobility. Psychologists also point
out that if immigrants are forced to shed their language and culture, it may result
in serious identity problems, especially among children (Padilla et al. 1991, 4). As for
bilingual education, research shows that it is effective, and, what is more, “when bi -
lingual education is implemented in a context that fosters an attitude of additive
bilingualism, then marked changes in school achievement, self-esteem, and inter-
group cooperation are observed” (Padilla et al. 1991, 9). Other arguments against
Official English are for example: it would limit the government’s communication with
those who have limited language skills or do not speak English, including Amer -
ican citizens; it will enhance hostility toward minority groups, especially Asians and
Hispanics/La tinos; and it is inconsistent with American values, violating, basically,
the right to freedom of speech, etc. (Crawford 2006, 1-2).
12 See, for example, Alba and Nee (2003, 217-220); Padilla et al. (1991); Pew Hispanic Center and
Kaiser Family Foundation (2002 and 2004, 16).
The belief that instead of language restrictions the United States needs the
protection of cultural rights led to a proposal for an amendment to the U.S. Con -
s titution (A Cultural Rights Amendment), presented to Congress in 1987. Proposed
by Louisiana Democratic Senator John Breaux and Representative Jimmy Hayes,
it would have granted “the right of the people to preserve, foster, and promote their
respective historic, linguistic, and cultural origins” (quoted in Draper and Jimenez
1996, 3). In clear opposition to Official English also stand state English Plus res-
olutions. Their supporters believe that the retention and the development of a
person’s first language should be encouraged, and bilingual assistance programs
and policies should be strengthened. As the “Statement of Purpose” of the English
Plus Information Clearinghouse (EPIC) reads, “The English Plus concept holds that
the national interest can best be served when all members of our society have full
access to effective opportunities to acquire strong English proficiency plus mastery of
a second or multiple languages” (1987, 152). The first state to approve a non-binding
English Plus resolution was New Mexico in 1989, followed by Oregon and Washing -
ton, and then Rhode Island in 1992. 
Crawford suggests that, the covert agenda of the English-Only Movement is
a “determination to resist racial and cultural diversity in the United States” (2001,
23). In fact, the Southern Poverty Law Center publication The Nativist Lobby (2009)
calls John Tanton, the co-founder of U.S. English, “the most important figure in the
modern American anti-immigrant movement for three decades” (Beirich 2009, 5).
As the report shows, Tanton has been interested in eugenics, linked to racist ideas,
and had contact with the leading white nationalists, as well as Holocaust deniers
and Klan lawyers. Widely discussed in many publications on Official English is
Tanton’s 1986 memorandum “Memo to WITAN IV Attendees,” which leaked out to
the public and left no doubts about what he thought about Hispanics/Latinos. He
wrote, “Will the present majority peaceably hand over its political power to a group
that is simply more fertile?...Can homo contraceptivus compete with homo pro -
genitiva if borders aren’t controlled?” (1986). The leak had some important conse-
quences for Tanton and U.S. English. He himself resigned, while some important
members left the organization truly appalled by his statements (Crawford 2001, 33).
Tanton is also the founder of “the leading organizations of the nativist lobby”
(Beirich 2009, 5). One of them is Federation for American Immigration Reform
(FAIR),13 founded in 1979, which supports restrictive immigration policies and
border control. FAIR is known to have accepted over US$1.2 million support from
the Pioneer Fund, “dedicated to furthering the scientific study of human ability
and diversity” (Pioneer Fund n.d.). FAIR is currently listed as a “hate group” by the
Southern Poverty Law Center. The second organization, the Center for Immi -
gration Studies, is “the nativist lobby’s supposedly ‘inde pendent’ think tank,” pro-
ducing studies on immigration aspects, and which, as Beirich writes, “has never
found any aspect of immigration it likes” (2009, 13). The third organization,
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NumbersUSA, is a grassroots organizing group whose founder, Roy Beck, has
strong links to Tanton (Beirich 2009, 18-21). Tanton also currently sits on the Board
of Directors of ProEnglish.
Recently there has been a substantial rise in the number of anti-immi grant
movements nationwide. An important trigger for the appearance of about 300 si -
milar groups, some more “hard-line” than others was the Minutemen Project border
watch in Arizona (2005) (Beirich 2010a). In May 2010, the Minuteman Project
itself started a SB1070 task force to help the state enforce the regulation. At the
same time, various “hate groups,” to use the Southern Poverty Law Center terminol-
ogy, such as the traditionally white supremacist Council of Con ser vative Citizens,
also became engaged in the immigration problem (Beirich 2010a).
Official English Regulations
Since Hayakawa proposed the aforementioned constitutional amendment in 1981,
several other measures seeking to establish English either as an official language
of the United States or as an official language of the American government have
been introduced in Congress.14 Until the 110th Congress (2007-2008), five of them
passed one house.15 One was the Bill Emerson English Language Empowerment
Act of 1996 (HR123), approved by the House of Representatives, but not voted
in the Senate. Had this regulation been adopted, English would have become the
official language of the U.S. government (and, thus, of federal legislation); it would
also have amended the Voting Rights Act of 1965 to repeal bilingual voting requi re -
ment provisions. Then, in May 2006 an amendment to a proposal of immigration
legislation (S2611), declaring English the national language of the United States,
was passed by the Senate. However, it died at year’s end.
As for state legislation, in 2010, English was an official language of the major-
ity (i.e., 29) of American states, of which Nebraska, Illinois, and Virginia had
adopted Official English laws even before the English-Only Movement started,
while Hawaii has been officially bilingual since 1978. Adopting English as an offi-
cial language of Nebraska in 1920 was a direct consequence of anti-German sen-
timents caused by World War I and the Americanization campaign (Tatalovich 1995,
33-62). In Illinois, the 1969 Official English law was, in fact, an amendment to the
1923 regulation that gave “American” language an official status (and which re -
sulted from, as the sponsor of the 1969 amendment expressed it, “Anglophobia
hysteria” (quoted in Tatalovich 1995, 65-69). Official English in Virginia (1981),
adopted shortly before the organization U.S. English was formed, as Raymond Tata -
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15 Ninety-seventh Congress (1981-1982), S. Amdt. 2019 to S. 2222; 98th Congress (1983-1984), S529;
99th Congress (1985-1986), S. Amdt. 559 to S1200; 104th Congress (1995-1996), HR123; 109th Con -
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lovich writes, was not symbolic: “Opposition to bilingual education was clearly the
motivation behind this statute” (195-200).
By 1990, 14 other states had approved Official English laws: Indiana (1984),
Kentucky (1984), Tennessee (1984), California (1986), Georgia (1986), Arkansas
(1987), Mississippi (1987), North Carolina (1987), North Dakota (1987), South
Carolina (1987), Arizona (1988, though later ruled unconstitutional), Colorado
(1988), Florida (1988), and Alabama (1990). What undoubtedly contributed to the
“second wave” of the Official English campaign were the aforementioned amnesty
programs under the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, on the one
hand, and, on the other, the rise of anti-immigrant sentiments in regions that had
experienced a big influx of immigrants in previous years. This was, for example, the
case in California, where in the 1980s and the 1990s alone several harsh measures
were approved, with an impact on immigrant and minority communities: an Offi -
cial English law,16 a ban on bilingual education, a ban on affirmative action, and
a harsh anti-immigrant law (Proposition 187).17 As a matter of fact, 1994’s Propo -
sition 187 is sometimes pointed out as a regulation that revived the English lan-
guage campaign (e.g., Bender 1996). Montana, New Hampshire, and South Dakota
adopted official English regulations in 1995. They were followed by Wyoming (1996),
Missouri (1998), and Alaska (1998, challenged in court, but later upheld). Utah
followed in 2000, and Iowa in 2002. The third wave started only recently. As Tony
Dokoupil wrote in May 2010, “About 10 additional states have passed ‘official
English’ laws through at least one legislative body since immigration reform broke
down in 2006.” Meanwhile, three states (Arizona for the second time in 2006,
Kansas in 2007, and most recently, Oklahoma in 2010) approved such laws.
Apart from the 29 states, the organization U.S. English also lists Louisiana
(1812) and Massachusetts (1975) as having English as an official language (U.S.
English n.d.a). Yet, Crawford argues that none of them ever officially adopted an
Official English law. Massachusetts is claimed by Official English supporters “on
the basis of a casual (and uninformed) statement by a state court in 1975” (Crawford
n.d.). Louisiana’s first state Constitution (1812) stated that all laws and official
documents would be published in the language “in which the Constitution of the
United States is written” (quoted in Crawford 2001, 13). However, as Crawford
writes, it did not restrict other languages. French was still used in state government
and the state’s second governor did not speak English at all. English as the only
language of teaching was introduced in 1921. In 1974, French was granted protec -
tion by the state Constitution, as a part of its cultural heritage (Baron 1990, 87).
What is interesting, as Jewelle Taylor Gibbs and Teiahsha Bankhead point
out, is that in the states where Official English was adopted by state legislators,
the law is symbolic, while in the states where Official English law was accepted
by state voters (e.g., Arizona, California, Colorado, and Florida), this law is a re flec -
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tion of the real concerns of the inhabitants and their will to preserve the dominant
status of English (Gibbs and Bankhead 2001, 131). 
But why did voters support the idea of giving English official status in the first
place? As already mentioned, it has to do with the current immigration rates as well
as the changes brought by the newcomers to the U.S. communities and towns
(changes in ethnic composition, increased crime rates, etc.) (Crawford 2001, 24-27).
Still, as Carol L. Schmid writes, public support for Official English in polls depends
to a great extent on how the question itself is formulated and who is asked. A more
general idea of giving English an official status, if no information is included about
its possible restrictions and consequences, meets with wider support. It seems to
reflect the strong symbolic meaning of the English language for American national
identity. On the other hand, if the question is more detailed and includes some addi -
tional information about the Official English law and its consequences (e.g., a ban
on other language use by federal institutions, even where English is spoken by a
limited number of people, etc.), support for it is lower. This is why the polls range from
50 percent to almost 90 percent in favor of Official English law (Schmid 2001, 76).
Some states also adopt other regulations, which to some extent restrict other
language use. In 1983, San Francisco voters supported Proposition 0 (on ballots
and voting materials in English only).18 One year later, a similar initiative, Pro -
position 38 (“Voting Materials in English Only”), sponsored by S.I. Hayakawa and
other U.S. English leaders, was supported by the state of California. Cali for nia thus
opposed the 1975 federal amendment to the Voting Rights Act of 1965, which guar-
antees ballots in other languages in specific situations. Still, both pro posi tions were
non-binding because, as Kathryn A. Woolard states, “Federal legislation does not
derive its authority from local voters” (1990, 125).
The supporters of Official English also object to the possibility of taking driv-
ing tests in other languages. Among those states wich in 2009 offered the most
opportunities in this respect were, as quoted here from the U.S. English website:
California (32 languages), Massachusetts (25), Kentucky (23), Connec ticut (21),
and Iowa (21) (2009a). Recently, more states restricted the number of languages
(8) than added new languages to the list (7). At the same time, the number of states
that offer these exams only in English increased. In 2009 this group consisted of
Arizona, Hawaii, Kansas, Maine, New Hampshire, South Dakota, Wyoming, and
Utah (2009b).
Language restrictions have also been adopted at a local level; the aforemen-
tioned Dade County “Anti-Bilingual Ordinance” is one example. U.S. English and
other organizations also report American towns adopting Official English laws. In
this context a border town of El Cenizo, Texas, is worth mentioning. In this small
town of 3 500 inhabitants, in 1999, special status was granted to a language by
the Predominant Language Ordinance. It was, however, not English, but Spanish.
According to 2000 U.S. Census data (2000a), almost 99 percent of the inhabi-
tants of El Cenizo were Hispanics/Latinos, over 42 percent were foreign born, and
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as many as 33.5 percent were not U.S. citizens. What is more, over 90 percent of the
population spoke Spanish at home. These very special characteristics of the town
make its development difficult (Hart 2003, 200-201). The ordinance gave Spanish a
status of a predominant language to incorporate people of limited English language
skills into a broader community. It is, thus, a kind of legislation that focuses on
the real needs of community members (Hart 2003, 200). Many people consider the
Predominant Language Ordinance to be a Spanish-Only law, even though the do c -
ument refers to Spanish as a “predominant,” not an “official” language.19
Final Thoughts
Even though the dominant status of English in the United States does not seem to
be challenged, Official English advocates have continued their efforts. During the
111th session (2009-2010), several projects were presented to Congress that aimed,
for example, to designate English as an official language of the U.S. government or
of the United States, or challenged bilingual voting ballots and Executive Order
13166.20 Meanwhile, on November 2, 2010, Oklahoma voters approved an Official
English measure. Hence, Official English is seen as unifying the nation and es -
sential to social mobility and economic advancement.
An important question needs to be answered, however, as well-known U.S.
sociolinguist Joshua A. Fishman pointed out (1988, 168-169). While the suppor -
ters of Official English/English Only focus on immigrants and the assistance they
may require, the question is why the next generations of Hispanic/Latino immi grants,
who already speak English —and in some cases this is the only language they
speak— remain in the barrios. English proficiency turns out, thus, to be not the only
problem, because it is not the only condition of their social mobility. As Fishman
wrote in 1988, “The Official English/English Only movement may largely represent
the displacement of middle-class Anglo fears and anxieties from the more difficult,
if not intractable, real causes of their fears and anxieties, to mythical and simplistic
and stereotyped scapegoats” (1988, 169). The American middle-class feels inse-
cure and uneasy about immigrants due to the socio-economic changes in the U.S.
(slower economy, the discourse of multiculturalism, next generations having smaller
possibilities of social mobility, etc.). Thus, the deep roots of the English Only
movement lie in the economic, social, and political problems of the United States. At
the same time, it seems to be a safety valve, a way of channeling, to repeat Fish man’s
words, “middle-class Anglo fears and anxieties.”
It has been over 20 years since Fishman formulated these opinions. Since then,
immigration from Latin America, mainly from Mexico, has grown substantially.
The 2000 U.S. Census Bureau data show that almost 18 percent of the U.S. pop-
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ulation uses a language other than English at home, and in most cases they speak
Spanish (2000c), while the 2010 data may be even higher.21 However, as has already
been mentioned, research confirms that even this group undergoes language
assimilation and is aware of its important role in socioeconomic advancement. At
the same time, as a group, Hispanics/Latinos are still below average as far as edu-
cation, wages, or other indicators are concerned.22 Although there is evidence for
some socioeconomic upgrading in the second generation (including in the groups
dominated by traditional labor migrants, e.g., Mexicans), concerns continue to
exist, like, for example, the possible impact of parents’ illegal status on the socioe-
conomic attainment of their U.S.-born children. Studies also find a worrying fact:
the third generation shows “a stagnation in educational attainment relative to the
second generation.” What is more, there has been “the emergence of an opposition-
al culture deriding school achievement among some [Mexican-American school-
children] who are not immigrants” (Alba and Nee 2003, 230-248). Thus, the ques-
tion may be asked: to what extent are the third generation’s stagnation and derisive
attitude toward education a consequence of U.S. society still perceiving His pa -
nics/Latinos as the “others”? Fishman’s question still remains valid.
The language struggle in the United States seems to be more than just an illus -
tration of how important language is in the national identity discourse. Pro moting
“unity,” which is what Official English supporters claim to be doing, is another way
of forcing assimilation. Those who speak an “alien” language and do not speak English
are perceived as not wanting to assimilate, and therefore, as un-Amer ican “strangers.”
And even though most of the Official English measures do not seem to have much
impact on state policies and actions, they do serve one purpose: instead of promoting
“unity,” these measures divide people and make them look at their fellows as “oth-
ers.” The mere fact of declaring English an official language turns ordinary citizens
and public officials into “language vigilantes.” The examples of language vigilantism
(Baron 1990, 20-21; Crawford 2006, 5) show intolerance and harmful resentment
toward language minorities and immigrants. At the same time, denying access to
the mother tongue and imposing English on children may have a very significant
impact on their identity and lead to their marginalization. In fact, the contemporary
language struggle may be seen as a struggle against the “aliens,” a fight to restrict
immigration from culturally (and racially) different regions. Also the fact that the
movement has close ties to immigration restrictionists and anti-immigration orga -
nizations leads many observers to conclude that its agenda is more far-reaching. 
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Bibliography
ADAMS, KAREN L., and DANIEL T. BRINK, eds.
1990 Perspectives on Official English: The Campaign for English as the Official
Language of the USA, Berlin-New York, Mouton de Gruyter.
ALBA, RICHARD, and VICTOR NEE
2003 Remaking the American Mainstream. Assimilation and Contemporary Immi -
gration, Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press.
BARON, DENNIS
1990 The English-Only Question, New Haven, Connecticut, Yale University Press.
BEIRICH, HEIDI
2010a “Essay: The Anti-Immigrant Movement,” Southern Poverty Law Center,
http://www.splcenter.org/get-informed/intelligence-files/ideology/anti
-immigrant/the-anti-immigrant-movement, accessed December 28, 2010.
2010b “The Year in Nativism,” Intelligence Report no. 137, Spring, http://www
.splcenter.org/get-informed/intelligence-report/browse-all-issues/2010/
spring/the-year-in-nativism, accessed December 28, 2010.
2009 The Nativist Lobby. Three Faces of Intolerance, Southern Poverty Law
Center, http://www.splcenter.org/get-informed/publications/the-nativist
-lobby-three-faces-of-intolerance, accessed December 28, 2010.
2007 “The Teflon Nativists. FAIR Marked by Ties to White Supremacy,” Inte l -
ligence Report, Winter, Southern Poverty Law Center, http://www.splcenter
.org/intel/intelreport/article.jsp?aid=846, accessed January 12, 2010.
BENDER, STEVEN W.
1996 “Consumer Protection for Latinos: Overcoming Language Fraud and




2003 War against the Weak: Eugenics and America’s Campaign to Create a Master
Race, Washington D.C., Dialog Press.
CASTELLANOS, DIEGO
1983 “A Polyglot Nation,” in James Crawford, ed., Language Loyalties, Chicago,
The University of Chicago Press, 1992, pp. 13-17.
244 ANNA KAGANIEC-KAMIEN´SKA
“THIS IS AMERICA — SPEAK ENGLISH” 245
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
1879 “Spanish Language Rights in California, Constitutional Debates (1879),”
in James Crawford, ed., Language Loyalties, Chicago, University of Chica go
Press, 1992, pp. 51-58.
CRAWFORD, JAMES
2006 “Official English Legislation: Bad for Civil Rights, Bad for America’s In -
terests, and Even Bad for English,” July 26, American Immigration Lawyers
Association, http://www.ailadownloads.org/advo/Crawford-CrawfordTes
 timony.pdf, accessed January 16, 2010.
2001 At War with Diversity. US Language Policy in an Age of Anxiety, Clevedon,
United Kingdom, Multilingual Matters Ltd.
1992 ed., Language Loyalties, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press.
n.d. “Canards,” Language Policy Web Site & Emporium, http://www.language
policy.net/archives/canards.htm, accessed January 20, 2010.
DADE COUNTY
1980 “Dade County ‘Antibilingual’ Ordinance,” in James Crawford, ed., Lan guage
Loyalties, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1992, p. 131.
DANIELS, ROGER
2004 Guarding the Golden Door. American Immigration Policy and Immigrants
since 1882, New York, Hill and Wang.
2002 Coming to America. A History of Immigration and Ethnicity in American
Life, Princeton, Perrenial.
DOKOUPIL, TONY
2010 “Why ‘English Only’ Will Get the OK in Oklahoma,” Newsweek, May 15,
http://www.newsweek.com/2010/05/15/why-english-only-will-get-the-ok
-in-oklahoma.html, accessed December 7, 2010.
DRAPER, JAMIE B., and MARTHA JIMENEZ
1996 “A Chronology of the Official English Movement,” University of Southern
California, http://www.usc.edu/dept/education/CMMR/PolicyPDF/Offi
cialEnglishDraperJimenez.pdf, accessed November 10, 2009.
ENGLISH FIRST
n.d. http://englishfirst.org/englishfirst/, accessed January 12, 2010.
ENGLISH PLUS INFORMATION CLEARINGHOUSE (EPIC)
1987 “The English Plus Alternative,” in James Crawford, ed., Language Loyal -
ties, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1992, pp. 151-153.
246 ANNA KAGANIEC-KAMIEN´SKA
FEAGIN, JOE R.
1997 “Old Poison in New Bottles,” in Juan F. Perea, ed., Immigrants Out! The New
Nativism and the Anti-immigrant Impulse in the United States, New York,
New York University Press. 
FISHMAN, JOSHUA A.
1988 “The Displaced Anxieties of Anglo-Americans,” in James Crawford, ed.,
Language Loyalties, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1992, 165-170.
FRANKLIN, BENJAMIN
1753 “The German Language in Pennsylvania,” in James Crawford, ed., Lan guage
Loyalties, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1992, pp. 18-19.
GIBBS, JEWELLE TAYLOR, and TEIAHSHA BANKHEAD
2001 Preserving Privilege. California Politics, Propositions, and People of Color,
Westport-London, Praeger.
HART, KENYA
2003 “Defending Against a ‘Death by English.’ English-Only, Spanish-Only, and
a Gringa’s Suggestions for Community Support of Language Rights,” Ber ke -
ley La Raza Law Journal vol. 14, p. 177.
HIGHAM, JOHN
1988 “Crusade for Americanization,” in James Crawford, ed., Language Loyal -
ties, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1992, pp. 72-88.
HOBBS, FRANK, and NICOLE STOOPS
“Demographic Trends in the 20th Century,” Census 2000 Special Reports,
U.S. Census Bureau, November, Washington, D.C., http://www.census
.gov/prod/2002pubs/censr-4.pdf.
HUNTINGTON, SAMUEL
2004 Who Are We? The Challenges to America’s National Identity, New York,
Simon & Schuster. 
JARET, CHARLES
1999 “Troubled by Newcomers: Anti-Immigrant Attitudes and Action during
Two Eras of Mass Immigration to the United States,” Journal of American
Ethnic History vol. 18, no. 3, Spring.
THE LANGUAGE POLICY TASK FORCE
1978 “English and Colonialism in Puerto Rico,” in James Crawford, ed., Lan -
guage Loyalties, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1992, pp. 63-71.
LEIBOWICZ, JOSEPH
1985 “Official English: Another Americanization Campaign?” in James Crawford,
ed., Language Loyalties, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1992,
pp. 101-111.
MALONE, NOLAN, KAARI F. BALUJA, JOSEPH M. COSTANZO, and CYNTHIA J. DAVIS




2003 “Race, Nation, and Citizenship in Late Nineteenth-Century America,
1878-1900,” in Ronald H. Bayor, ed., Race and Ethnicity in America. A
Concise History, New York, Columbia University Press.
PADILLA, AMADO M., KATHRYN J. LINDHOLM, ANDREW CHEN, RICHARD DURÁN,
KENJI HAKUTA, WALLACE LAMBERT, and G. RICHARD TUCKER
1991 “The English-Only Movement. Myths, Reality, and Implications for Psy -
chology,” paper prepared for the American Psychological Association by
the Panel of Experts on English Only Legislation.
PEW HISPANIC CENTER and KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION
2004 “Bilingualism,” Survey Brief, March, http://pewhispanic.org/files/factsheets/
12.pdf, accessed April 18, 2007.
2002 2002 National Survey of Latinos. Summary of Findings, December,
http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/15.pdf, accessed January 16, 2010.
PIONEER FUND
n.d. http://www.pioneerfund.org/, accessed January 12, 2010.
PROENGLISH
n.d. http://www.proenglish.org/main/gen-info.htm, accessed January 12, 2010.
RAMIREZ, ROBERTO R.
2004 We the People: Hispanics in the United States, Census 2000 Special Re -
ports, December, U.S. Census Bureau, http://www.census.gov/prod/
2004pubs/censr-18.pdf, accessed January 16, 2010.
RICENTO, THOMAS
1996 “A Brief History of Language Restrictionism in the United States,”
University of Southern California, http://www.usc.edu/dept/education/
CMMR/PolicyPDF/OfficialEnglishRicento.pdf, accessed January 12,
2010.
“THIS IS AMERICA — SPEAK ENGLISH” 247
ROOSEVELT, THEODORE
1917 “One Flag, One Language,” in James Crawford, ed., Language Loyalties,
Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1992, pp. 84-85.
SCHMID, CAROL L.
2001 The Politics of Language. Conflict, Identity, and Cultural Pluralism in Com -
parative Perspective, New York, Oxford University Press.
SHELL, MARC
1993 “Babel in America; or, The Politics of Language Diversity in the United
States,” Critical Inquiry vol. 20, no. 1, Autumn.
TANTON, JOHN
1986 “Memo to WITAN IV Attendees from John Tanton,” Southern Poverty Law
Center, Intelligence Report, Summer 2002, http://www.splcenter.org/
intel/intelreport/article.jsp?sid=125, accessed January 12, 2010.
TATALOVICH, RAYMOND
1995 Nativism Reborn? The Official English Language Movement and the Amer -
ican States, Lexington, The University Press of Kentucky.
U.S. Census Bureau
2007 “Minority Population Tops 100 Million,” U.S. Census Bureau News, May
17, http://www.census.gov/newsroom/releases/archives/population/cb07
-70.html, accessed January 12, 2010.
2000a “Profile of General Demographic Characteristics: Geographic area: El
Cenizo city, Texas,” http://censtats.census.gov/data/TX/1604822905.pdf,
accessed January 16, 2010.
2000b “Profile of General Demographic Characteristics: 2000. Geographic Area:
Puerto Rico,” http://censtats.census.gov/data/PR/04072.pdf, accessed
November 10, 2009.
2000c “Profile of Selected Social Characteristics: 2000, Geographic area: United
States,” http://censtats.census.gov/data/US/01000.pdf, accessed January
16, 2010.
U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS
1972 “Language Rights and New Mexico Statehood,” in James Crawford, ed.,
Language Loyalties, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1992, pp. 58-63.
U.S. ENGLISH
2009a “Fact Sheets: Languages Used for Driver’s License Exams,” November,
http://www.us-english.org/view/305, accessed January 16, 2010.
248 ANNA KAGANIEC-KAMIEN´SKA
2009b “U.S. English Study Highlights Multilingualism in Driver’s License
Exams,” June 2, http://www.us-english.org/view/668, accessed January 12,
2010.
n.d.a “States with Official English Laws,” http://www.usenglish.org/view/13.
n.d.b “Why Is Official English Necessary?” http://www.usenglish.org/view/10,
accessed January 12, 2010.
WILEY, TERRENCE G.
2004 “Language Planning, Language Policy and the English-Only Movement,”
in Edward Fenegan and John R. Rickford, eds., Language in the USA. Themes
for the Twenty-first Century, New York, Cambridge University Press,
pp. 319-338.
WOOLARD, KATHRYN A.
1990 “Voting Rights, Liberal Voters and the Official English Movement: An
Analysis of Campaign Rhetoric in San Francisco’s Proposition ‘0,’” in Karen
L. Adams, Daniel T. Brink, eds., Perspectives on Official English: the Cam -
paign for English as the Official Language of the USA, Berlin-New York,
Mouton de Gruyter.
“THIS IS AMERICA — SPEAK ENGLISH” 249

Introducción
Este trabajo tiene como propósito sistematizar y analizar el conjunto de percepcio -
nes y actitudes que la sociedad mexicana asume —expresa o indirectamente— hacia
la población extranjera inmigrante. En un primer segmento, nos remitimos al mo -
mento histórico a partir del cual creemos que se ubica la génesis de los sentimien tos
de aversión o simpatía hacia los extranjeros. Intentamos dilucidarlos a partir de pro -
nun ciamientos oficiales y mecanismos legislativos elaborados durante este pe rio do
que, en nuestra opinión, sentaron las bases de un discurso antiinmigrante, parale la -
mente con el nacimiento del Estado mexicano, pero también, y a la vez, de pos turas
xenofílicas que dieron pie a tratos desiguales y discriminatorios. 
En un segundo momento, resaltamos la importancia de las actitudes y prác ti -
cas adoptadas en tiempos recientes por diversos sectores de la sociedad mexica -
na hacia la población inmigrante. Con ello intentamos destacar el trato social que se
da a los inmigrantes en nuestro país en distintos espacios sociales. En este sentido,
se mencionan experiencias concretas en las que dichas actitudes afloran, como es
el caso de las migraciones laborales, consideradas en el imaginario —al igual que en
muchos otros contextos— como amenazantes para los trabajadores nativos. Se
intentará documentar estas actitudes con datos proporcionados por la Primera En -
cuesta Nacional sobre Discriminación en México,1 para llevar a cabo un examen más
completo y actualizado del tema.
Finalmente, en un tercer momento, se reflexionará, con base en lo expuesto,
en torno a la coherencia de las exigencias respecto del trato que reciben nuestros
connacionales durante su experiencia migratoria en Estados Unidos, a la luz del
trato que se suele brindar a los inmigrantes y transmigrantes en nuestro territorio. 
XENOFOBIA Y DISCRIMINACIÓN EN MÉXICO
Manuel Ángel Castillo*
Germán G. Guerra**
* Profesor-investigador del Centro de Estudios Demográficos, Urbanos y Ambientales, El Colegio de
México. <castillo@colmex.mx>.
** Investigador asociado, Centro de Investigación en Sistemas de Salud del Instituto Nacional de Salud
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1 Al momento de la elaboración de este documento (invierno de 2010) estaba en marcha el proce-
samiento de resultados preliminares de la Encuesta Nacional sobre Discriminación en México 2010
(Enadis 2010) del Consejo Nacional para Prevenir la Discriminación (Conapred). Los resultados
generales fueron publicados en abril de 2011. 
Debido a esta asincronía, el presente trabajo tuvo como únicos insumos los resultados de la en cues -
ta realizada en 2005 por la misma institución. Algunas de las preguntas utilizadas en dicha encuesta
Xenofobia y xenofilia 
como procesos de diferenciación
LOS EXTRANJEROS DURANTE
EL MÉXICO INDEPENDIENTE Y LA REFORMA
Cabe plantear que el origen de los sentimientos de aversión-simpatía en México
hacia poblaciones procedentes de ultramar se remonta a las restricciones impues -
tas por la Corona para la residencia de los extranjeros desembarcados en el virrei -
nato novohispano. Estas restricciones respondían a una lógica del colonialismo
imperial español, que deseaba mantener alejados de los territorios conquistados a po -
bladores de otras metrópolis, con la intención de salvaguardar el dominio social y
político de la Corona. Los mecanismos ejercidos para el acceso de poblaciones ex -
tranjeras a la Nueva España estaban claramente delimitados por derechos de suelo,
sangre y maritales, con lo cual se prohibía prácticamente la entrada de población
proveniente de otros países europeos a México. Aunado a esto, los conflictos inter -
nos entre indios, castas, peninsulares y criollos expresaron el extrañamiento y recelo
social que se profesaban los distintos grupos de una sociedad rígida y estamental,
acostumbrada a diferenciarse tanto por sus orígenes sociales como territoriales,
hecho que terminó por arraigar, en los distintos integrantes de la población nativa,
la reserva hacia cualquier grupo social externo. 
Con el advenimiento del México independiente y antes de la Reforma, la magra
e incipiente entrada de población extranjera fue un hecho histórico. En 1820, se
aceptó la admisión de extranjeros en México —no sin ciertas trabas, basadas en per -
cepciones ideológicas sobre las distintas nacionalidades— y fue hasta la Reforma
cuando se retiraron de jure todos los impedimentos en razón de nacionalidad para su
admisión al país. Esto no era fortuito, pues se esperaba también en México el éxodo
masivo europeo que recibieron Estados Unidos y Argentina, cosa que no sucedió
(González Navarro, 1993, I: 21-24; Salazar, 1996: 54). A partir de ese momento es
posible ubicar el surgimiento del sentimiento xenofílico hacia la población euro pea,
el cual se reflejaría posteriormente en distintos aspectos y procesos en la vida de la
sociedad mexicana.
En 1821, el México independiente sumaba una población de casi ocho millo -
nes de habitantes, desigualmente repartidos en cuatro millones y medio de kiló -
metros cuadrados. La nueva nación requería de una definición clara de fronteras
y la población que éstas contendrían. Ante la incertidumbre que implicaba la eman -
cipación española, el continuo expansionismo estadunidense y el secular conflicto
entre castas y mestizaje, así como los sentimientos antihispanos y antiextranjeros
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no aparecieron en la Enadis 2010, por lo que no es posible hacer una comparación directa que
informe sobre el cambio de actitudes hacia la población extranjera en México durante el periodo trans -
currido entre ambos levantamientos. No obstante, se mencionarán algunos resultados de preguntas
similares de la Enadis 2010, que complementarán a los que se exponen, a fin de comparar indirecta -
mente tanto los resultados de ambas encuestas como los cambios en las actitudes mencionadas.     
imperantes en facciones de la incipiente clase política y sectores de la sociedad mexi -
cana, el panorama mostraba una compleja perspectiva sobre la población extranjera,
la cual oscilaba entre la franca apertura y el añejo recelo. Así, para la Comisión de
Relaciones Exteriores, instaurada en 1821: “La población extranjera no era sólo un
aumento cuantitativo sino cualitativo, porque trasladaba los conocimientos indus -
triales de sus países de origen […] atraer extranjeros ilustrados, laboriosos y de
buenas costumbres es atraer talentos y riqueza; pero atraer extranjeros viciosos es
atraer inmoralidad” (González Navarro, 1993, I: 42).
Los antecedentes mencionados dejan entrever elementos discriminatorios en -
vueltos en requisitos de una política de poblamiento que se iría modificando en sus
restricciones, a la par de cambios ideológicos, políticos y sociales que experimen -
taría el Estado mexicano a lo largo de los siglos subsecuentes. Estos cambios se
mate rializarían en discursos, ora expansionistas, ora restrictivos, pronunciados por
los grupos políticos de la época (conservadores y liberales), matizados con una diver -
sidad de tonalidades que oscilaban entre el restriccionismo, la xenofobia y el nati -
vismo (Verea, 2003: 66-71; Palma, 2006: 52). La proliferación de estas ideas en torno
a la población extranjera marcarían el sino de las décadas por venir frente a la pro -
blemática de poblamiento que el incipiente Estado mexicano enfrentaría.
Asimismo, de forma paralela y a nivel cotidiano, surgirían en diversos grupos
sociales mexicanos sentimientos de aversión y simpatía, diferenciados en función
de características —reales o imaginarias—, atribuidas a los distintos grupos que
conformarían la población extranjera en México como reacción a su presencia. 
LA POBLACIÓN EXTRANJERA EN LAS LEGISLACIONES
Y POLÍTICAS MIGRATORIAS DEL SIGLO XX
Políticas y legislaciones basadas en el nacionalismo revolucionario
A partir de la Reforma, la formalización de la recepción de población extranjera sin
distingo de raza ni nacionalidad, basada en principios liberales, no estuvo exen-
ta de ciertas prácticas discrecionales, como la discriminación en razón de la
profe sión de la religión católica, que operaban fácticamente desde décadas anterio-
res con los intentos de poblamiento en Texas y California. 
A principios del siglo XX, en 1908, se promulgó la primera ley en materia de
regulación de entrada de flujos de población extranjera en los puertos y fronteras.2
Esta ley restringía el acceso no sólo por cuestiones sanitarias, sino sociales —como
la ocupación en la prostitución, crimen, vagancia y militancia anarquista— y físicas.
Dichas restricciones prevalecieron en legislaciones promulgadas a lo largo de ese
siglo y fungieron como un modelo que, explotando las ideas preconcebidas en torno
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buque japonés anclado en Manzanillo.
a ciertos grupos y nacionalidades de la población extranjera, determinaría el acceso
o prohibición a los inmigrantes (González Navarro, 1993, I: 35; Palma, 2006: 62;
Yankelevich y Chenillo, 2009: 180).
El periodo revolucionario trajo a colación uno de los aspectos ideológicos que
permiten comprender las relaciones de México con el mundo externo: el nacio -
nalismo. Bajo esta lente, es posible observar el comportamiento paradigmático que
ha tenido la sociedad mexicana con la población extranjera, el cual se refleja en
diversas acciones emprendidas hacia ésta. 
Como efecto de un exaltado nacionalismo que encumbraba las ideas del mes -
tizaje cultural y la riqueza territorial a manos de toda la población mexicana, se
impu sieron limitaciones políticas y de propiedad, que previamente habían goza -
do los extranjeros en México en el periodo de auge económico del porfiriato, de
modo que la máxima “México para los mexicanos”, a la vez cotidiana e institucio -
nal, se escuchaba reiteradamente (Palma, 2006: 56-58; Gil, 2010: 133; Meyer,
2010: 16-18). Sin embargo, los capitales extranjeros resultaron indispensables para
la reactivación económica del periodo posrevolucionario, por lo que sólo algunos
grupos de ex tran jeros resultaron afectados por la xenofobia revolucionaria, en es -
pecial chinos,3 espa ñoles y estadunidenses (Salazar, 1996: 35; Yankelevich y Che -
nillo, 2009: 181). En última instancia, esto da la pauta para argumentar que el
nacionalismo deja ver cierto grado de ajuste y flexibilización de su discurso en fun -
ción del papel que la población extranjera tiene —o se cree que tiene— en los asun-
tos nacionales y el con texto internacional, como se verá más adelante en el episodio
del exilio español. 
El gobierno de Obregón se enfrentó al problema de la repatriación de gran-
des contingentes de nacionales provenientes de Estados Unidos, propiciado por
la cri sis económica durante la posguerra. Esto tendría como resonancia políti-
ca, en materia de migración, la regulación de la entrada de flujos de población
extran jera, en aras de la protección de los intereses laborales nacionales. En 1926 se
pro mulgó la nueva Ley de Migración, que hacía patente, de manera oficial, la pro-
tección de los trabajadores mexicanos, toda vez que prohibía la entrada de extranje-
ros cuando exis tiera escasez de empleo. Esta ley tuvo muchos problemas en su
operación: en pri mer lugar, nunca fue reglamentada, lo que propició prácticas dis-
crecionales en materia de control de la población extranjera “que definió normas y
criterios a través de acuerdos y circulares confidenciales” (Yankelevich y Chenillo,
2009: 185). De las disposiciones emanadas de esta ley, dos resultan de particular
importancia: la limi tación de acceso a extranjeros, según sus actividades econó-
micas, y la restricción de razas reticentes al mestizaje, por considerarse científica-
mente degeneradas. En la instrumentación de la segunda disposición persistía la
confusión entre nacio nalidad y raza, con lo que resultaba fácil imputar actividades
comerciales perjudi ciales a ciertos grupos de extranjeros, en el contexto de una eco -
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3 El caso de los contingentes chinos “llegó a extremos vergonzantes, pues […] incluso ocurrieron matan -
zas con características de masacres en el contexto de las luchas revolucionarias” (Chu, 1992; Castillo,
2010: 550; Hu-Dehart, 1997).
nomía deprimida. De este modo, además de la población negra, se restringía el acce-
so a los gitanos, turcos, sirios y árabes, debido a su éxito en actividades comerciales
de menudeo (Salazar, 1996: 43-45; Ota, 1997). En segundo lugar, problemas de
índole burocrática (esca sez de presupuesto y personal) entorpecían la labor que la
ley destinaba al Servicio Nacional de Migración, lo cual favoreció la consolidación
de las prácticas discre cionales basadas en la confidencialidad, común denomina-
dor de la política migra toria de este periodo. 
El elemento racial, que en última instancia se revestiría de argumentos cien -
tíficos y proteccionistas para la economía nacional, permitió no sólo restringir, sino
facilitar la aceptación de razas-nacionalidades que inyectarían “savia nueva en nues tra
raza aborigen decadente” (Yankelevich y Chenillo, 2009: 195). Sobre estas na cio na -
lidades se destacaban, además de su capacidad de asimilación, sus contri bu cio nes
en la prosperidad nacional mediante actividades industriales. Como consecuencia, a
principios de los años treinta, la Secretaría de Gobernación imponía prohibicio-
nes a virtualmente toda población que no fuera europea occidental, norteameri-
cana y latinoamericana.
Lo anterior no puede sino mirarse como un paradójico comportamiento de las po -
líticas mexicanas hacia la población extranjera. El deseo febril de poblamiento
por contingentes extranjeros se vio secularmente limitado por varios flancos: en el
aspecto material —y muy a pesar del discurso decimonónico que encumbraba las
riquezas naturales del país (González Navarro, 1993: I; Salazar, 1996: 54; Palma,
2006: 54-55)— los proyectos colonizadores fracasaron debido al poco interés que
despertaba en la población extranjera agrícola el territorio mexicano. En el aspec -
to institucional, un abandonado aparato burocrático trajo a colación la débil orga -
nización de las autoridades migratorias por cumplir el control fronterizo y portuario
que se les exigía. Finalmente, en el aspecto ideológico, las disposiciones confiden -
ciales basadas en un discurso nacionalista conllevaron a restringir la entrada a una
ya de por sí limitada admisión de población extranjera en nuestro territorio.
EL ASILO ESPAÑOL REPUBLICANO Y SU CONTEXTO
La tradición de asilo y refugio, que cuenta con casi dos siglos de antigüedad en Mé -
xico, merece examinarse bajo el más emblemático de los casos conocidos en su his -
toria: el exilio español. Se trata de un episodio sui géneris, cronológicamente acotado
(1939-1947), que puso en relieve la capacidad del Estado mexicano de atender y re -
ci bir a una población española cuyo perfil sociodemográfico distaba mucho del que
tradicionalmente había recibido en migraciones pasadas. En efecto, se trató de una
inmigración que huía de la guerra civil, cuya alta profesionalización marcó una di -
ferencia de las inmigraciones económicas anteriores, lo cual facilitó su inserción
en el sector terciario de la economía mexicana, principalmente en las actividades
educativas, intelectuales y artísticas (Gil, 2010: 149-153, Ímaz, 1995: 47). 
Asimismo, en un contexto internacional específico caracterizado por la per se -
cución a los partidos comunistas por parte de los regímenes fascistas, y la sim patía
XENOFOBIA Y DISCRIMINACIÓN EN MÉXICO 255
del gobierno mexicano hacia políticas progresistas de carácter socialista, es po si ble
entender el refugio español en México como una de “las expresiones cons tructivas
del nacionalismo revolucionario” (Meyer, 2010: 19), cuyo peso cualitativo supera en
sus consecuencias, al cuantitativo. Si bien el número de refugiados reci bidos por Mé -
xico fue modesto —alrededor de veinte mil frente a los casi doscientos mil recibidos
por Francia (Gil, 2010: 149)—, este hecho le granjeó una autoimagen como país de
aceptación y brazos abiertos a la población extranjera en contextos de persecución
política.
Al pensar en este episodio, consolidado en el imaginario como la era de oro
de la apertura y la tradición mexicana del asilo, no hay que perder de vista la con -
tinuidad de elementos raciales (moderados con el título de población extranjera
“culturalmente asimilable”) y de protección laboral (impulso a industrias nacio na -
les) que continuaron operando paralelamente en los hechos.4 Asimismo, algunas
consecuencias del capítulo de la expropiación petrolera pueden leerse como una
muestra negativa del nacionalismo que décadas atrás había restringido las liberta -
des extranjeras, y que se volvía a manifestar a la par del asilo republicano. En efecto,
este episodio orilló a alemanes, ingleses y estadunidenses, principales nacionalida -
des empleadas en la industria petrolera, minera y eléctrica de México, a natura li -
zarse para no perder sus propiedades (Salazar, 1996: 39). Estas medidas, empero,
permitieron a personas de otras nacionalidades, cuyas actividades se concentraban
en el comercio y las pequeñas y medianas industrias, como las españolas, france sas
y libanesas, continuar expandiéndose y diversificando sus ocupaciones hasta con -
servar el día de hoy sus inversiones. 
LA POBLACIÓN EXTRANJERA DESDE LA LEY GENERAL
DE POBLACIÓN Y LAS LEGISLACIONES ACTUALES
En 1936 se aprobó la Ley General de Población, la cual disponía de la elaboración
de tablas diferenciales de población extranjera que darían a conocer el número
máximo de personas que se aceptarían en territorio nacional. En los periodos más
restrictivos, sólo se llegó a aceptar no más de cien extranjeros al año de todos los
países no procedentes de América y España. Estas cuotas estuvieron vigentes hasta
1946, pero durante toda la década que operaron, las preferencias de admisión fue -
ron las mismas: “sexo masculino, soltero, menor de veinticinco años, hablar el idio-
ma oficial y ser susceptibles de asimilarse a la vida cultural del país” (Yankelevich
y Chenillo, 2009: 217).
Durante la segunda guerra mundial, los criterios no fueron mucho más flexi -
bles en su aplicación que como se venían dando, pero hubo mayores restricciones
para la población europea en general (a excepción de la española, como ya se se -
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4 A la recepción de veinte mil españoles refugiados, así como de algunos alemanes antifascistas, se le
contrapone el rechazo de otros refugiados (judíos europeos, la mayoría) que solicitaron reiteradamen-
te el asilo político sin tener éxito (Salazar, 1996: 40). 
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ñaló). Ya avanzados los años cincuenta y durante las décadas subsiguientes, la cues -
tión de los migrantes se insertó en la discusión del crecimiento poblacional del
país y su dinámica demográfica, en relación con las condiciones de desarrollo eco -
nómico y social. Un reflejo de esto se manifestó en la Ley General de Población
de 1974 —vigente hasta la fecha y varias veces reformada—, la cual proponía
dimensionar las medidas de admisión de población extranjera a los contextos cul -
turales, políticos y sociales del país.
En la práctica, esta ley ha dado amplia cabida a la continuación de políticas
específicas y coyunturales legadas de las prácticas del pasado aquí expuestas,5 en
las que la constante es la discrecionalidad en su aplicación. Asimismo, en el as -
pecto formal, la ley muestra una visible obsolescencia respecto de la complejidad
migratoria actual —México como país de origen, destino, tránsito y retorno de mi -
grantes— que se manifiesta en la prevalencia de criterios migratorios aplicables en
decenios pasados en cuanto a las autoridades responsables del control migratorio
y la gestión de mecanismos para ello (Castillo, 2010: 574; Rodríguez, 2010: 129).
Sin embargo, es posible señalar que ha habido algunos avances, sobre todo en lo que
respecta a la despenalización de la migración indocumentada y la incorporación de
la categoría migratoria de refugiado, entre otras.6 Estos progresos y reformas, empero,
no habrían sido concretadas de no ser por la sinergia entre distintos grupos de la
sociedad civil organizada y organizaciones internacionales que las impulsaron.7
FILIAS Y FOBIAS: MANIFESTACIONES
EN LA VIDA COTIDIANA EN MÉXICO
Con base en lo hasta aquí señalado, resulta evidente que la restricción para la
admisión de contingentes extranjeros se ha basado ciertamente en una política dis -
5 Para una descripción detallada de la instrumentación, implementación y consecuencias de la aplica ción
de estas prácticas en tiempos recientes, principalmente en la frontera sur de México, véase Grupo
Guatemala-México: Migración y Desarrollo (2008; 2009).
6 Para una recapitulación de las declaraciones y tratados que el Estado mexicano ha ratificado (sobre
todo en el tema de los refugiados y asilados) y que han tenido como consecuencia cambios en esta ley
y su reglamento, véase Castillo y Venet (2010: 195-226). La reciente aprobación y entrada en vigencia
de la Ley de Refugiados y Protección Complementaria en enero de 2011 (DOF, 2011) es muestra de
avance para la adecuación de las leyes en la realidad migratoria del país.
7 Asimismo, los esfuerzos actuales han cobrado forma en la Ley de Migración aprobada en mayo de 2011.
Se trata de un ordenamiento que tiene el acierto de tomar una perspectiva de protección y procuración
de derechos humanos a los inmigrantes en el país, a la vez que carece de un dimensionamiento del fenó-
meno migratorio res pecto de la emigración mexicana y la transmigración de contingentes de todo el
mundo, así como de un mayor énfasis en los mecanismos de procuración de derechos humanos y
acce so a la justicia. Estas observaciones se extraen del Foro de opinión sobre iniciativa de Ley de
Migración, realizado los días 26 y 27 de enero de 2011 en El Colegio de México, convocado por el
Grupo Guatemala-México: Migración y Desarrollo, el Instituto de Estudios y Divulgación sobre Mi -
gración, la Sociedad Mexi cana de Demografía y el Centro de Estudios Demográficos, Urbanos y
Ambientales de El Colegio de México. 
crecional que, utilizando la fachada de la protección laboral —y reciente mente,
la de la seguridad nacional— ha encubierto prejuicios étnicos y raciales, así como
un exacerbado nacionalismo con los cuales se discrimina a la población extran jera.
Bajo la operación de prácticas discrecionales en el trato al migrante, se atribuyen
a éste características, vicios y virtudes, que en última instancia harían de seable su per -
manencia y tolerancia en la vida cotidiana del mexicano, diferencián dose así filias
y fobias hacia ciertas nacionalidades y grupos de extranjeros. Ante esto, supo nemos
que el correlato de una “disminución notable de los rasgos de xenofobia alguna vez
experimentados […] se daría en el marco de una política oficial que des cali fica cual -
quier expresión o práctica discriminatoria en razón de origen, grupo étnico o nacio-
nalidad” (Castillo, 2010: 570). Esta política involucra ría en su ela bo ración a actores
de la sociedad civil y política, en concordancia y com promiso para hacer de México
un espacio de solidaridad y de apertura a los flujos de migran tes, consecuente con
el contexto mundial contemporáneo y su com pleja realidad migratoria.
Según lo expuesto, algunas de las manifestaciones más claras de la xenofobia
o xenofilia se dan en la convivencia cotidiana con los extranjeros —particular -
mente en el ámbito laboral— y es posible que permanezcan vigentes hasta el día de
hoy. En el siguiente apartado, intentaremos dilucidar este supuesto, a partir del exa -
men de los datos que arroja la Primera Encuesta Nacional sobre Discriminación
en México, 2005.
Percepciones sociales y xenofobia: 
opiniones en torno al extranjero en México
Se ha delineado el clima no precisamente favorable a la población extranjera en
México, así como el valor cualitativo sobre el cuantitativo que tienen las inmigra -
ciones extranjeras en México, debido a su capacidad de visibilizar las actitudes,
percepciones y autopercepciones que tiene la sociedad mexicana respecto de los
extranjeros (Castillo, 2010: 549; Yankelevich y Chenillo, 2009: 178; Verea, 2003:
13-19). Es válido preguntarse de qué modo se hacen objetivos los sentimientos de
xenofobia y xenofilia que profesa la sociedad mexicana a las poblaciones extranje-
ras. La historia provee algunos elementos acerca de cómo vivían o cómo se les per -
mitía vivir a los extranjeros en México8 en su relación cotidiana con los mexicanos.
Asi mismo, una manera de objetivar la xenofobia se ha dado en los calificativos atri -
bui dos a los extranjeros en distintos contextos históricos, de tal modo que un explo -
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8 Como ejemplo —conforme señala Salazar (1996: 45)—, es posible suponer mejores niveles de vida
a partir de los indicadores de propiedad, según nacionalidad en información censal de 1930 y 1940.
Los europeos y estadunidenses solían ser dueños de predios urbanos y rurales en mayores proporcio -
nes que los latinoamericanos, como los guatemaltecos, que cuando declaraban tener propiedades, éstas
solían ser rurales. Para las migraciones asiáticas, los provenientes de Medio Oriente solían poseer algu -
na propiedad en zonas urbanas, mientras que los chinos, a pesar de su importancia numérica, con taban
con menos propiedades. En todo caso, este indicador permite suponer el ascenso económico de cier-
tos grupos de migrantes respecto de otros. 
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tador de la clase obrera bien podría estar representado por un estadunidense o un
español, a la vez que un chino o un guatemalteco serían oportunistas que ocupaban
fuentes de trabajo pertenecientes a los mexicanos (Ota, 1997). 
Estos procesos tienen su correlato en la autosegregación y aislamiento que
sufrieron los pocos contingentes poblacionales que decidieron permanecer en terri -
torio nacional, sobre todo en los puertos y espacios urbanos (Salazar, 1996: 44-45),
y sirven de ejemplo para imaginar las atribuciones que la sociedad mexicana hace a
los extranjeros en el contexto migratorio, a la vez que presentan el reto de infor mar, de
manera más precisa, las actitudes xenófobas y xenofílicas existentes en la actualidad.
El uso de encuestas de opinión en la migración se discute en el ámbito acadé mico,
debido en parte a que, según sus críticos, estos instrumentos no tienen la capaci -
dad de poner en evidencia las diversas manifestaciones xenófobas o racistas según
los distintos grupos sociales que conforman los países receptores. Asi mis mo, se
piensa que las limitaciones de las encuestas realizadas en países receptores de inmi-
grantes radican en que sólo se ciñen a describir el cambio de los niveles de xenofobia
respecto de años anteriores, lo cual está sujeto a eventualidades y co yun tu ras, o a com-
parar las percepciones con países vecinos (Izquierdo, 1996: 153). Por su parte, quienes
defienden el uso de encuestas sobre migración argumentan la impor tancia de cap-
tar la opinión pública para la evaluación de políticas migra torias de integración,
como en el caso de Estados Unidos y Europa (The German Marshall Fund of the
United States y Fundación BBVA, 2010), o a llenar espacios de información necesaria
ante la escasez o poca rigurosidad de datos en materia de política exterior, basadas
en opinión pública, como sucede en la región latinoame ricana (CIDE, 2010).
Teniendo en cuenta ambos argumentos, hemos optado por explorar la infor -
mación disponible en la Primera Encuesta Nacional sobre Discriminación en Mé -
xico, 20059 con la finalidad de aproximarnos a las actitudes y percepciones hacia
los migrantes en la sociedad mexicana, sin soslayar las implicaciones en la polí -
tica migratoria del país. Aunque no es el objetivo principal de este trabajo, la explo -
ra ción de dicho instrumento nos permitirá, por ende, detectar y mencionar alguna
de sus fortalezas y debilidades para la realización de diagnósticos sobre la xenofo bia
y el trato a los extranjeros en el país. 
IMAGINARIOS DE CONVIVENCIA CON EXTRANJEROS
Por imaginarios de convivencia entendemos situaciones hipotéticas de trato coti -
diano con extranjeros y el modo en que se desenvolverían las interacciones en dichos
9 Encuesta de representatividad nacional realizada por la Secretaría de Desarrollo Social (Sedesol) y
el Consejo Nacional para Prevenir la Discriminación (Conapred), cuyas preguntas se basan en opi -
niones sobre la discriminación hacia grupos considerados vulnerables. Siendo conscientes de las limi -
taciones que tiene este tipo de encuestas, decidimos tomarla como fuente de datos para analizar e
interpretar la situación de los extranjeros en México, a la luz de las opiniones que los mexicanos tienen
de aquéllos, en relación con otros grupos vulnerables. 
espacios. La encuesta centra muchas de sus preguntas en este tipo de situaciones,
las cuales permiten aproximarse a las opiniones de los nacionales respecto de los
extranjeros.
A primera vista, se pensaría que no se percibe mucha incomodidad en los mexi ca -
nos por convivir con extranjeros. En efecto, sólo 1 por ciento de los encuestados de cla -
ran no querer tener como vecinos a extranjeros. Esta baja proporción se corresponde
con una preferencia mayor a convivir con extranjeros que con otros grupos (gráfica 1).
No obstante, cuando se les pregunta abiertamente si estarían dispuestos a per -
mitir que en su casa viviera un centroamericano,10 más de una tercera parte (39.8 por
ciento) dijo que no lo aceptaría (gráfica 2), proporción similar a la de personas con
sida (39.1 por ciento), personas con ideas diferentes (33.6 por ciento) y personas
de otra religión (31.4 por ciento). Esta situación brinda una muestra de la impor -
tancia del hecho de provenir de una región o de un país específico para gozar de
aceptación o rechazo por parte de los mexicanos.
Otra manera de aproximarse a las percepciones sobre la convivencia con ex -
tranjeros se encuentra en la intención que tendría la persona en organizarse con otras
ante el hipotético escenario de que un grupo indígena deseara establecerse cerca
de la comunidad donde reside la persona11 (gráfica 3).
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Drogadictos
Alcohólicos
Personas con carácter inestable
Personas prostitutas
Homosexuales
Gente que ande mucho en la política
Alguien con antecedentes penales
Personas infectadas de sida
Parientes cercanos
Personas de otra religión























¿QUIÉNES NO QUISIERA TENER COMO VECINOS DE SU CASA?
REPÚBLICA MEXICANA
FUENTE: Elaboración propia con datos de la Primera Encuesta Nacional sobre Discriminación, 2005.
Sedesol.
10 Se eligió esta pregunta porque el reactivo en la encuesta no pregunta acerca de extranjeros. La
Enadis 2010 sí especifica la pregunta respecto de extranjeros y el 26.6 por ciento declaró no estar dis -
puesto a aceptarlos en su vivienda (Conapred 2011), lo cual puede indicar una menor disposición
a aceptar personas de origen centroamericano.
11 Pregunta 94 de la encuesta.












¿ESTARÍA DISPUESTO A PERMITIR QUE EN SU CASA VIVIERAN CENTROAMERICANOS?
REPÚBLICA MEXICANA













¿ESTARÍA DISPUESTO A ORGANIZARSE CON OTRAS PERSONAS
PARA SOLICITAR QUE NO DEJEN VIVIR AHÍ A UN GRUPO DE INDÍGENAS
QUE SE QUIEREN ESTABLECER CERCA DE SU COMUNIDAD?
REPÚBLICA MEXICANA
FUENTE: Elaboración propia con datos de la Primera Encuesta Nacional sobre Discriminación, 2005.
Sedesol.
Se aprecia que casi uno de cada tres mexicanos estaría dispuesto a organizar -
se para impedir el establecimiento de grupos étnicos en su comunidad, lo cual se
interpretaría como una reticencia, de importantes proporciones, para aceptar la con -
vivencia con grupos de personas diferentes. 
Tomando en cuenta estos resultados y comparándolos con otras percepcio -
nes, es posible identificar una ambigüedad en las actitudes hacia los extranjeros.
En efecto, cuando se indaga sobre si consideran que los extranjeros, en función de
otros grupos, están desprotegidos, sólo el 1 por ciento así lo piensa. Pero cuando se
trata de tener una convivencia más cercana con ellos, la disposición no es la misma.
A pesar de que la encuesta tiene limitaciones, es posible interpretar esta situa ción
como una actitud ambivalente hacia los extranjeros, heredada del tratamiento his -
tórico que se les ha dado en el país, así como del desconocimiento de su situa ción
o poca convivencia que se ha tenido con ellos, lo cual lleva a preguntarse sobre las
percepciones que los mexicanos tienen en torno a las necesidades de los ex tran jeros
en México.
IMAGINARIOS DE NECESIDADES
Y DERECHOS DE LOS EXTRANJEROS
Cabe suponer cierta empatía hacia los extranjeros en México, a partir de la per -
cep ción que se tiene sobre si éstos tienen razón para sentirse discriminados. En efec-
to, casi la mitad de los mexicanos piensa que hay razones para que los extran jeros
se sientan discriminados (gráfica 4);12 sin embargo, se detecta una dificultad para
identificar en qué aspectos lo son. De este modo, cuando se indaga sobre el prin cipal
derecho que se les vulnera, dos de cada tres mexicanos declaran no saber cuál es y
sólo el 4.4 por ciento opina que es su derecho a trabajar. 
En el mismo sentido, al preguntar sobre las necesidades más importantes por
resolver en los extranjeros, se detecta un desconocimiento de cuál sería (64 por cien -
to); el 9 por ciento declara que el trabajo debería ser la necesidad más importan-
te a satisfacer y el 2.2 por ciento opina que es el apoyo a los inmigrantes.13
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12 Alrededor de la misma proporción alcanza la opinión en torno a los jóvenes (52.8 por ciento) y los
no católicos (50.7 por ciento). 
13 Ésta es una de las opciones de respuesta que ofrece la encuesta para esta pregunta, la cual conside -
ramos que es muy vaga, pues no permite conocer más a fondo cómo se entiende el apoyo a los inmi-
grantes. La Enadis 2010 indica que sólo uno de cada diez mexicanos cree que “se respetan mucho”
los derechos de los centroamericanos. El 30 por ciento piensa que “no se respetan”, otro 30 por ciento
opina que “se respetan poco” y sólo uno de cada cuatro piensa que “se respeta algo”. Al preguntar a
los inmigrantes qué tan de acuerdo están en que “no se respetan sus derechos”, el 23 por ciento está
de acuerdo, el 24 por ciento en desacuerdo y el 36.5 por ciento no están ni de acuerdo ni en desa -
cuerdo. Este dato podría indicar un miedo o reticencia entre ellos a externar su opinión sincera sobre
el respeto de sus derechos cuando es un organismo de gobierno el que lleva a cabo la encuesta. Además
de lo anterior, al preguntar a los inmigrantes qué tan de acuerdo están en que la sociedad no ayuda
a los migrantes porque no conoce sus problemas, el 44 por ciento de ellos están de acuerdo (cálculos
propios con base en Enadis 2010). 
Lo anterior indicaría una falta de sensibilización a las necesidades de los ex -
tranjeros, lo cual es, hasta cierto punto, entendible, ya que, como se expuso antes,
México no se ha caracterizado por ser un destino importante en materia de atrac -
ción de población extranjera. No obstante el desconocimiento o ignorancia de los
derechos que se vulnera a los extranjeros o las necesidades más importantes por
resolverles, puede significar también una empatía débil que facilitaría la reproduc -
ción de estereotipos y actitudes xenófobas bajo condiciones propicias (contextos
políticos, sociales, económicos, etcétera).
Líneas atrás se mencionó la importancia del tema laboral en relación con los
extranjeros en México; una relevancia doble, pues, por un lado, el trabajo desem -
peñado por los extranjeros en México constituye una instancia para analizar el im pac -
to socioeconómico de la actividad económica extranjera en el país. Por otro lado,
dicha relación permite aproximarse a las ideas y percepciones que subyacen en el
imaginario mexicano respecto del extranjero en el mercado laboral nacional. 
MIGRACIONES LABORALES EN MÉXICO
México no se ha caracterizado por atraer migraciones laborales extranjeras. Esto
es comprensible si se consideran las medidas predominantemente restrictivas de
las que ya se ha hablado. La falta de estudios específicos de las inserciones y tra -
yectorias laborales de los inmigrantes en México se dificulta principalmente por la










¿USTED CREE QUE LOS EXTRANJEROS QUE VIVEN EN MÉXICO
TIENEN RAZÓN PARA SENTIRSE DISCRIMINADOS?
REPÚBLICA MEXICANA
FUENTE: Elaboración propia con datos de la Primera Encuesta Nacional sobre Discriminación, 2005.
Sedesol.
deficiencia y escasez de registros, lo cual conlleva la carencia del conocimiento sis -
te mático y confiable sobre la trayectoria, según el estatus migratorio de los extran -
jeros: inmigrantes, inmigrados y naturalizados (Castillo, 2010: 559). 
Sin embargo, el estudio de caso profundamente tratado de la única migración la -
boral extranjera históricamente establecida, representa el de los inmigrantes gua-
temaltecos que laboran en cultivos de temporal —café principalmente— en la región
del Soconusco en Chiapas (Castillo, 2000; Castillo y Ángeles, 2000; Ángeles, 2010).
Desde la década de los cincuenta, este movimiento ha dado indi cios de su aporte
al desarrollo económico y social del país. Este flujo se enmarca, al igual que la mayo-
ría de las migraciones laborales en otros países, en la lógica de la necesidad de mano
de obra en actividades económicas de temporada en el ámbito rural, y en momentos de
expansión de inversión en el ámbito urbano, como el caso de la construcción.
A lo largo del tiempo destaca el papel marginal que el Estado mexicano ha
tenido en las resoluciones y necesidades de atención de estos flujos, adoptando sólo
algunas medidas aisladas en materia de salud y educación, documentación, sistemas
de protección y previsión social, etc. La regulación de los mecanismos de contrata -
ción de los trabajadores por parte de los empleadores se ha dado por intermedia rios
que han actuado como elementos facilitadores para ese trámite. Estos mecanismos
y programas se caracterizan por su discontinuidad en el tiempo, lo cual es propi cia -
do por el cese de vigencia de acuerdos y reformas legales. El involucramiento de
las autoridades laborales ha sido reducido —si no es que ha estado defi nitiva mente
ausente—, lo cual sugiere una falta de conciencia respecto de la escala inter na cional
del movimiento, el cual requiere de un tratamiento coordinado entre dis tintos ni -
veles de gobierno y órdenes jurídicos.
En las décadas recientes, el advenimiento de la terciarización de la economía
mexicana ha impactado de forma importante los flujos de migración laboral en la
región. Esto ha propiciado cambios en los flujos, tanto en su composición socio -
demográfica, como en el ámbito de la ocupación laboral. De este modo, ciudades
como Tapachula y Chetumal han absorbido contingentes en los sectores de servi -
cios y de la construcción. Esto, a su vez, ha incidido en la “expansión del perfil de
los trabajadores al incorporar de manera franca la participación de mujeres en
nichos laborales específicos” (Castillo, 2010: 562), lo cual ha implicado una indi -
vidualización de las mujeres como migrantes y ya no como acompañantes, papel
que se les asignaba en el marco de las migraciones agrícolas. 
Todo lo anterior apunta a la necesidad de un involucramiento mayor por parte
de las autoridades competentes, manifiesto en la vinculación de las instancias que
atienden a este histórico flujo migratorio, cada vez más complejo, que da muestras
de contribuir al desarrollo regional mediante la diversificación y adaptabilidad a los
mercados laborales que los reciben. No obstante, dimensionar la problemática la -
boral de los inmigrantes en México no es competencia exclusiva de las autoridades
involucradas. Las opiniones por parte de la población mexicana en torno a la situa -
ción laboral de los inmigrantes en México contienen información esencial sobre
las dificultades que ellos atraviesan cotidianamente a la luz de las percepciones
de los mexicanos. 
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IMAGINARIOS DE LOS EXTRANJEROS Y EL ENTORNO LABORAL
Las percepciones de la población mexicana en torno a este asunto dejan ver la ne -
cesidad de una sensibilización y conocimiento de la situación de los inmigrantes que
laboran en el territorio nacional, lo cual se manifiesta en sus opiniones: al igual
que en los casos previos, la percepción sobre la vulnerabilidad laboral de los ex tran -
jeros, en función de otros grupos, es baja; sólo el 1.95 por ciento de los mexicanos
opina que los extranjeros constituyen el grupo que más dificultades tiene en obtener
un empleo. Esta percepción se complementa al cuestionar sobre qué grupo de per -
sonas nunca admitiría en un trabajo (gráfica 5).
Casi uno de cada cinco mexicanos (17.1 por ciento) no contrataría a un ex -
tranjero en su trabajo. Esta proporción representa, junto con los enfermos de sida,
el grupo a quienes los mexicanos dan menor preferencia para contratar, sólo supe-
rada por quienes ya tienen trabajo. Así, la percepción poco compartida sobre los ex -
tran jeros como grupo vulnerable en el mercado laboral, representada por la baja
pro porción de mexicanos que así lo considera, se refuerza por una escasa disposición
a contratarlos. 
XENOFOBIA Y DISCRIMINACIÓN EN MÉXICO 265













¿A QUIÉN USTED JAMÁS CONTRATARÍA?
REPÚBLICA MEXICANA
* Incluye a personas que ya cumplieron condenas, discapacitados, no enfermos de sida, mujeres casa das,
personas menores de 25 años, hombres, personas no homosexuales, personas no católicas, no indíge-
nas, no discapacitados, personas menores de 60 años, personas sin antecedentes penales, personas
entre 25 y 40 años, indígenas, desempleados, madres solteras, mujeres, mexicanos y personas católicas.
FUENTE: Elaboración propia con datos de la Primera Encuesta Nacional sobre Discriminación, 2005.
Sedesol.
Del mismo modo, esta opinión, que refleja sentimientos xenófobos en el ámbito
laboral, no ajenos a lo que la historia mexicana señala, se refuerza en las per cep ciones
respecto de quién debería ayudar a los extranjeros a conseguir un trabajo (gráfica 6).
Así, cerca de la mitad de los mexicanos coinciden en que es tarea del gobierno la
gestión de colocación en empleos a los extranjeros en México; mientras que la otra
mitad se divide entre los que piensan que le corresponde a sus amigos e insti tuciones
(16.5 por ciento), a nadie (14.1 por ciento), a sus familiares (6.4 por ciento), a otros
(3.8 por ciento) o a todos (3.5 por ciento). Asimismo destaca que el 5.7 por ciento
declara desconocer a quién le correspondería esta tarea.14 Esto se interpreta ría como
una fuerte disposición entre los mexicanos a no querer tratar con ex tran jeros en el
ámbito laboral, manifestada tanto en una negación de la solidaridad hacia aquéllos,
como en una desvinculación de colaboración o ayuda en la procuración de trabajo,
sustituida por medios que no le competen directamente al mexicano (go bierno o las
propias redes del extranjero).
Con base en todo lo anterior, es posible argumentar que en la sociedad me -
xi cana existe (y ha existido) una actitud xenofóbica latente que se manifiesta en



















¿QUIÉN CREE QUE DEBERÍA AYUDARLE A UN EXTRANJERO A CONSEGUIR TRABAJO?
REPÚBLICA MEXICANA
FUENTE: Elaboración propia con datos de la Primera Encuesta Nacional sobre Discriminación, 2005.
Sedesol.
14 Datos de la Enadis 2010 indican que cerca de la mitad de los mexicanos (43 por ciento) cree que el
gobierno debería crear más empleos para aquellos que vienen a trabajar desde otros países, mientras
que el 25 por ciento prefiere que se controle la migración con medidas gubernamentales para estos
flujos (cálculos propios con base en Enadis 2010).
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las per cepciones en torno a los extranjeros en el mercado laboral. Asimismo, dichas
percepciones pueden traducirse y filtrarse (en la práctica) en acciones específicas
que dificultan la inserción laboral de los extranjeros en México, como regulaciones
cambiantes según periodos políticos o prácticas discrecionales de contratación. 
Hasta donde nos es posible observar, la situación de los extranjeros y su rela -
ción con el mercado laboral mexicano se caracterizan por una doble problemática:
por un lado, la discontinua atención por parte de las instituciones y autoridades
com petentes para atender a los inmigrantes en el mercado laboral mexicano, me -
diante políticas laborales adecuadas a la dimensión del fenómeno; por el otro, la
latente xenofobia por parte de la población mexicana, traducida en actitudes de es -
casa em patía y solidaridad hacia los extranjeros en busca de trabajo o que se encuen -
tran tra bajando en México. Esto nos lleva a reflexionar sobre la calidad moral que se
tiene para exigir un trato digno (basado en los derechos humanos) a los conna cio -
nales en Estados Unidos, en contrapartida con el trato y actitudes que se practican
hacia los migrantes en nuestro territorio.
El principio de los derechos humanos 
en la política migratoria interna y externa en México
Los recientes avances en el ámbito jurídico respecto del tema migratorio toman un
cariz cada vez más orientado en favor de los derechos humanos. Esto se ha materia -
lizado en la derogación de artículos de la Ley General de Población que penali zaban
la migración indocumentada, así como en la entrada en vigor de la Ley de Refu -
giados y Protección Complementaria en enero de 2011. Paralelamente, el gobierno
de México se ha dado a la tarea de defender los derechos de los emigrantes mexi -
canos en territorio estadunidense, con base en principios que deberían ser aplicables
también a los inmigrantes en territorio nacional. 
De este modo se han instrumentado diversos mecanismos para la verificación
de la protección de derechos humanos tanto en la frontera norte, como para los
inmigrantes en México, por parte de la Comisión Nacional de Derechos Huma nos
(CNDH) y de la sociedad civil organizada (Foro Migraciones, 1999; 2002; Sin Fron -
teras, 2009). Sin embargo, en el ámbito social, las condiciones que obstaculizan la
procuración de derechos humanos de los migrantes y transmigrantes se materia -
lizan en abusos por parte de las autoridades o actores privados coludidos con éstas
para lucrar con la vulnerabilidad de estos flujos. En el peor de los escenarios, esta in -
defensión, falta de procuración de derechos humanos y escasa vigencia de políticas
públicas destinadas a estos grupos, se observan como consecuencia en las atro -
cidades recientemente experimentadas por indocumentados y transmigrantes que
abandonan su país en busca de mejores oportunidades: extorsiones, secuestros y ase -
sinatos (CNDH, 1993; 1995; 1996; 2005; 2009; Sin Fronteras, 2009).
En el ámbito internacional, la observancia de derechos humanos ha estado obs -
taculizada por la progresiva adopción de criterios de seguridad, a raíz de los sucesos
ocurridos en Nueva York y Washington en septiembre de 2001. En las repercusio nes
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para México, esto ha significado el tránsito de un paradigma de control y verifica ción
de flujos migratorios, de por sí deficiente, a otro de seguridad nacional, en aras de la
prevención de ataques terroristas en Estados Unidos, cuyos posibles per petradores
transitarían por los países considerados como áreas de influencia por dicha nación. 
Actualmente, las prácticas que diferenciaban acciones para la seguridad pú -
blica y la seguridad nacional se han desdibujado, y el contexto de combate al crimen
organizado, expresado en el tráfico de armas, narcóticos y personas, ha agudizado la
criminalización del inmigrante, principalmente el indocumentado, en territorio na -
cional (Castillo, 2005; 2010).
Lo anterior presenta un desequilibrio de acciones respecto de lo que se quiere
y exige para los emigrantes mexicanos y lo que se plantea en materia de protec-
ción de los inmigrantes en nuestro territorio. Aunado a esto, los esfuerzos recientes
por articular acciones que sienten las bases para una política integral de Estado,
ba sada en principios de derechos humanos, han sido limitados tanto por accio-
nes políticas, como por la interrupción de gestiones por institucionalizarlos a causa
de la conclusión de los periodos de gobierno, como lo muestra el caso de la formula -
ción del documento México frente al fenómeno migratorio o los foros convocados
por el Instituto Nacional de Migración (INM) para la formulación de una política
espe cífica para la frontera sur (INM, 2005). Pero no sólo cuestiones de índole polí -
tica han propiciado un tortuoso y lento proceso de institucionalización de una
políti ca migratoria adecuada a la complejidad del fenómeno migratorio. Las juris -
dic ciones no acotadas y cambiantes de las instituciones y autoridades involucradas
en el tema migratorio, así como la descoordinación entre sí y la eficiencia limitada
para llevar a buen término sus funciones, traslucen que el tema migratorio rebasa la
capa cidad institucional que existe para manejarlo.
En suma, resulta imperante el compromiso por la continuidad de los esfuerzos
desempeñados por varios sectores de la sociedad mexicana, si esperamos que la
política integral en materia migratoria sea una realidad en el futuro. Con esto, no
sólo se adquiriría la calidad moral para exigir un trato digno a los mexicanos que
emigran a Estados Unidos, sino que se procuraría el trato digno y humano que todo
migrante “nacional o extranjero” merece tener.
Conclusiones
En este trabajo intentamos aproximarnos a los sentimientos de aversión y empatía
hacia la población extranjera en México, a partir de periodos específicos de la his -
toria del México moderno y contemporáneo. Consideramos la xenofobia y la xeno -
filia como procesos de diferenciación que se explican mediante mecanismos de
regulación de la admisión, presencia y desarrollo de actividades de la población ex -
tranjera en territorio nacional, basados en diversas legislaciones y decretos, cuyo
común denominador ha sido su laxa reglamentación, la cual ha dado pie a una im -
plementación discrecional, no siempre favorable a sus intereses, ni respetuosa de sus
derechos, ni congruente con principios fundamentales consagrados en la legisla-
ción interna y en los instrumentos de derecho internacional que el Estado mexicano
ha signado. 
En efecto, durante casi dos siglos, la política de control de población extranjera
en México se basó en prejuicios étnicos y nacionalistas, pero encubierta en argu -
mentos de protección al trabajador mexicano y, más recientemente, de seguridad
nacional. De ese modo, ha sido discriminatoria respecto de poblaciones proce -
dentes de latitudes geográficas consideradas perjudiciales para el bienestar del
trabajador mexicano.
Sin embargo, la preferencia por ciertas nacionalidades y el desprecio de otras
no han sido estáticos a lo largo del tiempo. En épocas de nacionalismo exacer bado,
como en la época de la expropiación petrolera, destaca la franca aversión por po bla -
ciones que en otros momentos se habían considerado benignas para el mes tizaje
nacional, como la europea y la estadunidense. Esto ejemplifica la ambigüe dad con
que la población mexicana en su conjunto percibe a los extranjeros en este país, lo
cual refleja la histórica reserva que los grupos étnicos en México han experimen tado
entre sí desde la época colonial. Al mismo tiempo, estos cambios resuenan en cada
nueva promulgación de ley o reforma que versa sobre el tema de la población
extran jera o migrante en México.
Asimismo, consideramos que las percepciones y opiniones cotidianas de los
mexicanos respecto de los extranjeros influirían en las acciones emprendidas hacia
éstos. Sin menospreciar los valiosos ejemplos solidarios de los que ha dado muestra
la sociedad mexicana hacia algunos grupos de extranjeros en distintas etapas de la
historia, es posible aseverar, con base en los resultados de la Primera Encuesta Na -
cional sobre Discriminación en México, que existe poca sensibilidad o conocimien-
to de la experiencia de los extranjeros en México, lo cual se observa en actitudes
negativas y falta de solidaridad en escenarios hipotéticos de interacción con ellos.
Estas actitudes se vincularían con la escasa relación que históricamente se ha esta -
blecido con poblaciones inmigrantes, así como con las actitudes antiinmigrantes
mostradas hacia los trabajadores extranjeros en diversos momentos de la historia,
principalmente en los de recesión económica. Suponemos que dichas actitudes, en
todo caso producto de la ignorancia, son peligrosas; actitudes que servirían de base
para otro tipo de acciones, cuando las condiciones sean propicias, mediante la ali -
mentación de discursos nacionalistas o de seguridad nacional.
Tomando en cuenta las actitudes xenófobas latentes y la discrecionalidad en
la aplicación de las leyes, así como el débil andamiaje institucional para la pro tec -
ción de los migrantes, la discusión de la necesidad de una política integral de Estado
se antoja más necesaria que nunca, así como los esfuerzos para concretarla desde
los distintos ámbitos de la sociedad mexicana en su conjunto. Sólo así será posi-
ble hablar de avances positivos en las actitudes mexicanas en las que ya no habrá
lugar para filias ni fobias, sino respeto de las personas por el simple hecho de serlo.
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Historical and Contemporary Trends
INTRODUCTION
Changes in immigration patterns and policy tend to invoke significant public reac tion,
ranging from “reluctant acceptance” to “outright rejection” (Ceobanu and Escan -
dell 2010, 311). It is imperative to understand these attitudes for several reasons. For
one, politicians respond to the expressed preferences of the voting public. People’s
attitudes may also indicate how members of the receiving society treat immigrants in
everyday interactions (Esses, Dovidio, and Hodson 2002, 70). More positive feel-
ings toward immigration on a societal level probably result in more positive behavior
toward immigration in everyday encounters and vice-versa. Attitudes toward immi -
gration and immigrants also contribute to the construction of national identity and
belief systems about which persons or groups constitute accepted and valued mem bers
of a society. Seeing one’s country as a “nation of immi grants,” for example, may fos-
ter more positive attitudes toward newcomers (Esses, Dovidio, and Hodson 2002,
71). Given the recent increase in the breadth of comparable cross-national data, much
of the recent work in the field of anti-immigration and immigrant studies (known as
ATII research) (Ceobanu and Es can dell 2010, 310) focuses on explaining cross-
national differences in public opinion about immigrants.
In these cross-national comparisons, Canada emerges with some of the most
positive public attitudes toward immigration. In a cross-national study of 22 coun-
tries using data from the ISSP National Identity Module (ISSP-NI), Mayda (2006)
finds that Canada ranks first in terms of the public’s positive association between
immigration and both the economy and society’s overall “openness.” In other words,
Canadians, more than citizens of other countries, feel that immigrants make a po s -
itive contribution to Canada’s culture and economy. Canadians are also the most
likely to believe that immigration levels should be increased. In a question gauging
the strength of attitudes on increasing immigration levels, Canada ranks second
only to Ireland (Mayda 2006, 527). These findings are echoed by recent Canadian
research. Although characterized by negative attitudes in the 1980s, public senti-
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ment has grown increasingly positive over time (Wilkes, Guppy, and Farris 2008, 312).
This trend is related to the pervasiveness of multiculturalism discourses, as well as
a more positive economic environment and a government that has actively worked
to promote the view that immigration is good for the economy (Wilkes and Corri -
gall-Brown 2010, 16).
This article considers Canada’s early history of outright anti-immigrant policy
and attitudes, how these changed over time, and their implications for the present.
In what follows, we consider policy on and attitudes toward immigration in Ca n -
ada, highlighting three major historical periods: Canada’s period of openly racist
immigration policy (pre-1962), the post-war period in which the policy of official mul -
ticulturalism developed (1946-1988), and contemporary attitudes and ideas about
immigration, particularly following several episodes of moral panic since 1999. We
argue that the positive attitudes toward immigration and immigrants in Canada
are a product of a long history. This stems from a concerted official policy by succes -
sive governments since the late 1960s, and especially the 1980s, to promote immi -
gration as essential to the nation and to national identity.
Early History (pre-1962)
Canada has a long history of anti-immigrant sentiment. The first prime minister,
Sir John A. MacDonald (1878-1891), envisioned it as a white man’s country. This
“White Canada” nation-building project was to be accomplished first through the
subjugation of indigenous peoples and expropriation of their land, and subsequen t -
ly, through a number of policies encouraging white settlement. Immigration by the
“sons and daughters of the British Empire,” Anglo-Saxon British and Americans,
was encouraged while racialized migrants were barred from entry (Dua 2007, 446;
Gabriel and Abu-Laban 2002, 38). Other immigrants were allowed in according
to a “descending order of ethnic preference” that depended on the changing eco-
nomic conditions. Least desired were Asians, Jews, and blacks, tolerated only when
holed up in lumber camps deep in the forest or farming the more marginal areas
of the western wheat frontier (Abella and Troper 1991, 5). Canada’s immigration
his tory remains deeply scarred by its early treatment of the Chinese and South Asians,
its rejection of Holocaust refugees, and the internment of the Japanese during
World War II.
Canadian fear and exclusion of “Oriental immigration” was the earliest and
most pronounced, carrying well into the twentieth century (Miki 2004, 19). Early
Chinese migration to Canada began in the mid-nineteenth century when Chinese
pioneers followed the Gold Rush up the Fraser River, establishing Canada’s first
Chinatown in Victoria in 1858 (Ng 1999, 10). Other migrants from southern Chi na
joined them and, gradually, small Chinese communities appeared along the Fraser
River and on Vancouver Island. Chinese laborers were recruited in large num bers for
the construction of the Canadian Pacific Railroad (CPR) from 1881-1885, during which
time 17 000 Chinese migrants landed in British Columbia. While many returned to
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China, by 1884 British Columbia’s Chinese population numbered 10 000 (Ng 1999,
10). Despite their foundational role in linking eastern and western Canada through
the railroad (another of Canada’s nation-building projects), the increasing Chinese
presence was seen as a threat to “White Canada,” the “po pular bar-room cry” of
the era (Yu 2009, 1015). A Royal Commission warned of the “ill effects of Chinese
immigration,” and every effort was made to contain and discourage their presence
once work on the CPR was complete (Li 2008, 128). In 1885, a “head tax” of Can$50
was imposed on all Chinese immigrants entering Canada (Kobayashi and Jackson
1994, 38). It was justified on the grounds that Chinese immigrants were “morally
depraved” and could threaten the moral fiber of white Ca nadian society (Dua 2007,
453). It also stipulated that there could only be one Chinese immigrant for “every
fifty tons of a ship’s weight” (Anderson 1991, 58). Male Chinese workers were not
allowed to bring their wives and families, a measure taken to discourage permanent
residency. The initial tax proved ineffective, and by 1901, it was raised to Can$100,
and by 1904 to Can$500 (James 2004, 889). 
As Canada worked —unsuccessfully— to prevent Chinese migration, South
Asian and Japanese migration to Canada were also increasing. A period of econo m -
ic decline coupled with an increasing number of “Orientals” spread fear of “Yellow
peril” through Vancouver. It was believed that Asian migrants intended to take jobs
from “white workers” and “take control first of BC [British Columbia] and eventually
the nation” (Miki 2004, 20). By 1907, the Asiatic Exclusion League had formed in Van -
couver. Representing a wide swath of Vancouver society, the league was entrusted
with protecting British Columbia from the harmful influx of Japa nese, Chinese,
and Indian migrants. The anti-Asian hysteria culminated in Sep tember of that year,
when a parade organized by the league to protest the Asian presence turned into a
riot (Johnston 1989, 4). Thousands of people, many of them European immigrants,
marched on Chinatown and Japantown. This violence was symptomatic of growing
anti-immigrant sentiment in Canada. By 1923, Chinese immigration was banned
entirely by the Chinese Immigration Act, and would not be reinstated until 1947. 
Anti-Indian sentiment, although bound up similarly in ideas of morality and
Asiatic “invasion,” necessitated a different strategy. Like the Chinese migrants, ef -
forts were made to contain South Asian settlement. These newcomers were hustled
off boats and into jobs in farming and contracting in the interior of British Colum bia.
Indians in the city of Vancouver were harassed and often forced to live in buildings
outside the urban center, with no electricity or running water (Johnston 1989, 3).
Because they were British subjects, however, they could not be excluded outright
by Canadian government policy. Japan had entered into a gentleman’s agreement
with Canada, consenting to limit Japanese migration to 400 persons per year. A
similar arrangement could not be reached with British India because the colonial gov -
ernment feared that limiting Indians’ ability to move throughout the Empire would
strengthen Indian nationalism —“What kind of an empire was it that did not allow
free movement of its subject people?” (Johnston 1989, 4). It was in the interests
of both British India and Canada to “disguise” the limitations on the migration of
Indians. This was done through the Continuous Journey Order in Council in 1908.
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The order stipulated that all immigrants entering Canada must have come via
direct “passage” from their home country. It was then arranged privately with steam -
ship companies to stop providing “continuous passages” between India and Ca n -
 ada and to limit the number of sailings (Johnston 1989, 5). The Canadian Paci fic
Railway (CPR) operated the only direct trip from India to Canada and simply stop ped
providing this service to Indians. This policy effectively allowed for a diplomatic clos-
ing of the doors to Canada to all Indian migrants. 
Famously, Gurdit Singh challenged Continuous Journey in 1914. Chartering
a steamship himself, named the Komagata Maru, he brought 376 Indians to Ca n -
ada (Dua 2007, 461). They were refused landing in Vancouver, however, on the
grounds that the ship had sailed from Japan, and not directly from India. The ship
sat in Vancouver’s harbor for six weeks while the issue was debated and Vancouver’s
South Asian community worked to appeal the government’s decision. The case was
dismissed on the grounds that not all the passengers had Can$200, a rule estab-
lished by a previous Order in Council. In the six years that followed, only one South
Asian migrant gained entry into Canada (Miki 2004, 14). 
Canada’s anti-Jewish history has also been well documented by Abella and
Troper (1991). The official Canadian position on Jewish refugees fleeing Nazism
during World War II was that “none is too many.” The nearly 1 000 Jewish refugees
aboard the German ocean-liner St. Louis were denied entry to Canada, forcing their
return to Europe, and leading eventually to many of their deaths. As the situation
in Europe worsened, in 1941, Canadian immigration officer William R. Little main -
tained that it was in the best “interest of Canada to prevent Jewish people from
coming to Canada” for fear of being over-run by an “exodus of European refugees
from the Far East” (Abella and Troper 1991, 79). The Canadian Immigration Branch
enforced this position stridently despite the wide array of actors who fervently worked
on behalf of the Jews, such as the World Jewish Congress (WJC), the Federation of
Polish Jewry, the Jewish Immigrant Aid Society, and the Canadian ambassador
to France, George Vanier. 
The internment of the Japanese during World War II also reinforced the white
vision of Canada, albeit through a discourse of national security (Kobayashi 1992, 1;
Dhamoon and Abu-Laban 2009, 165). The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in De -
cember 1941 precipitated the arrest of 26 Japanese men in Canada, along with the
closure of Japanese newspapers and government seizure of Japanese fishing boats
(Dhamoon and Abu-Laban 2009, 170). By 1942, the Canadian government, under
the leadership of Mackenzie King, called for the “mass uprooting of all people of
Japanese ancestry living in the ‘protected zone,’” an area stretching along the west
coast of British Columbia and 160 kilometers inland (Miki 2004, 2). Twenty-three
thousand Japanese living in Canada, most of whom had been born there or were
naturalized, were rounded up and interned as “enemy aliens,” taken to camps in the
interior of British Columbia, Alberta, Manitoba, and Ontario. Following the war,
every effort was made by the government to prevent Japanese Canadians from re-
building their lives, failing to return their property and dispersing them across the
country (Kobayashi 1992, 2). The term “Jap,” a “linguistic residue of the war,” along
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with the memory of the internment, has had a profound impact on Japanese-Ca -
na dian identity (Miki 2004, 14). The government denied any wrongdoing until the
Redress Settlement of 1988.
Many of these statutes remained on the books until 1962.
The Post-War Period (1946-1988)
The current low levels of anti-immigrant sentiment in Canada can be traced to a
series of broader processes beginning in the 1940s. British identity among Cana -
dians had begun to wane in the wake of WWII (Hawkins 1988, 80). The weakened
attachment to the “mother country” raised questions about defining a separate Cana -
dian identity and citizenship, and particularly how they would differ from the United
States. In 1946, the Canadian Citizenship Act formally established the con ditions
for Canadian citizenship (Canadians had previously been considered British sub-
jects). Shortly thereafter, the Department of Citizenship and Immigration was
created (1949), shifting the focus of immigration policy from migration within the
British Empire, to migration to Canada (Hawkins 1988, 95). 
As ties to Britain weakened, a general international movement supporting hu -
man rights, civil rights, and humanitarianism gained strength. The horrific conse-
quences of ignoring refugees in the Holocaust were widely known; the phrase “Never
Again” became a worldwide motto. The year 1960 was designated by the United
Nations as “World Refugee Year,” leading Canada to admit 6 000 refugees. To the south,
the U.S. civil rights movement was gaining steam, as were protests against the war
in Vietnam. The political, social, and cultural climate of the 1960s came to emphasize
the concept of the “global village” (Knowles 2007, 269), and the concept of a “rights-
based society” began to take hold in Canada and the United States. In Canada,
the trend to liberalism culminated in the creation of the Bill of Rights in 1960 by
Prime Minister John Diefenbaker. 
Diefenbaker and the Progressive Conservatives were elected in 1957 on the
platform of increasing Canada’s population to 40 million. Diefenbaker appointed
the first female cabinet minister, Ellen Fairclough. She was intended to serve as
a “caretaker minister” because Diefenbaker did not envision drastic changes to the
portfolio. But this would soon change. A large number of Southern Italian immi-
grants had begun arriving to Canada in the late 1950s and early 1960s through
family sponsorship. These Southern Italian immigrants, who were poor, generally
unskilled, and considered racially undesirable, occupied a disproportionate percen t -
age of Italy’s quota. Family sponsorship, or chain migration, magnified this trend
over time, leaving little room for the more desired Northern Italians, who were more
skilled and considered more Western European. To remedy this situation, the Pro -
gressive Conservatives (PCs) created Bill 310 in 1959, which would limit the num -
ber of “sponsorable” relatives to “immediate family members” only for “Egypt, Europe,
North America, Latin America, Lebanon, Turkey, and Israel” (Knowles 2007, 181).
By the end of the 1950s, however, there were significant urban concentrations of
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Southern Italians (Kelley and Trebilcock 2000, 142), and they wielded consider-
able influence over the political representatives in their ridings, mainly held by
Liberal members of Parliament. Surprisingly strong opposition from the ethnic
lobby and the Liberals momentarily forced the PCs to abandon Bill 310 (Knowles
2007, 181). Interestingly, the PC goal of “prioritizing” sponsored relatives stem-
ming from the Italian question led to Canada becoming the first country to aban-
don its “white immigration policy.” In 1962, Fairclough introduced a policy based
on three immigration categories: sponsored, nominated relatives, and independent
immigrants (Knowles 2007, 187). 
The Liberals ousted the PCs in 1963, under the leadership of Lester B. Pearson.
They continued the project of re-tuning Canada’s immigration policy to have more
control over the economic/skill characteristics of the people entering the country,
creating the Department of Manpower and Immigration in 1966. The new depart -
ment was created under the assumption that “immigration policy must be adminis -
tered in the interests of the country and of the immigrants themselves in a context that
takes into account the entire position of employment, training, and placement in
Canada (Pearson 1966, quoted in Knowles 2007, 192). Immigration became linked
to the labor market and changing economic conditions. The deputy minister of this
department, Tom Kent, created Canada’s famous immigration Point System in 1967,
with the goal of creating a way to evaluate immigrant applications based on their
skills objectively, efficiently, and uniformly (Knowles 2007, 195). The Point System
functions by awarding set numbers of points to potential immigrants for various
characteristics: skill, age, language ability, education level, etc. The pass mark was
50/100 points —it is now 67/100. The system was revisited in 1976, when points
became allocated for “nominated relatives” (Hawkins 1988, 32). The point system
is intended to foster “long-term…economic growth,” as then-Canadian Mi nister of
Manpower and Immigration Jean Marchand said in 1966 (Schachar 2006, 171). It
was the world’s first “talent for citizenship,” or merit-based immigrant selection stra t -
egy arrangement (Schachar 2006, 164).
While modifications in selection policy changed the nature of immigration to
Canada, official multiculturalism has been instrumental in creating a Canada that
values immigration and immigrants. In addition to the processes that contributed to
the creation of the Point System, several other factors were crucial to the adoption
of the multiculturalism policy. For one, the so-called “ethnic lobby” had grown. A par -
ticularly strong Ukrainian community began to press for formal recognition of their
cultural contribution to Canadian society (Lupul 2005; Lalande 2006, 48). Se cond,
the move toward multiculturalism (as opposed to biculturalism) cannot be sepa rated
from the tension between Canada’s Francophone national minority, Quebec, and
the majority Anglophone culture (Wood and Gilbert 2005, 682). How to reconcile these
“two solitudes,” and avoid Quebec separation from Canada, was a central pro blem
on Trudeau’s agenda. Trudeau believed that a policy of bicultu ralism (the recognition
of two founding peoples, English and French) would prove fatal to Canadian unity.
Official multiculturalism was adopted in 1971. Its early aim was to recognize
the important role of cultural groups in Canada (Hiebert and Ley 2003, 17) and
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to encourage immigrants to “visibly and proudly express their ethnic identity”
(Banting and Kymlicka 2010, 49). Diversity became “reinterpreted…as a defining
ingredient of Canadian identity” (Hiebert and Ley 2003, 12). In the 1980s multi -
culturalism shifted from a policy supporting the expression of cultural identity, to
a policy geared toward equity (Kobayashi 1993, 205). Overall, multiculturalism
continues to denote a commitment to four principles: “the recognition and accom -
modation of cultural diversity; removing barriers to full participation; promoting
interchange between groups; and promoting the acquisition of official languages”
(Banting and Kymlicka 2010, 50). Multiculturalism was given statutory standing
by the Canadian Multiculturalism Act of 1988 and “renewed” in 1997 (Banting and
Kymlicka 2010, 50). 
Multiculturalism operates on many levels. At one level, the Multiculturalism
Directorate is an official government body housed in the Department of Citizen -
ship and Immigration. It provides a small amount of funding and programming for
multicultural activities. At a broader level, multiculturalism also represents a “gov-
ernment-wide commitment” to a set of goals and guiding principles intended to
guide the policies and activities of federal government bodies. The directorate over -
sees these goals (Banting and Kymlicka 2010, 50). Multiculturalism has also been
implemented variously by provincial and municipal governments, as well as by the
private sector. Furthermore, on a societal level, multiculturalism signifies a demo-
graphic reality about the changing composition of society through immigration. As
Banting and Kymlicka argue, 
In this sense, multiculturalism policies have permeated Canadian public life, with rip-
ple effects far removed from their original home in one branch of the federal govern-
ment. The 1971 federal statement on multiculturalism has initiated a long march
through institutions at all levels of Canadian society. (2010, 52)
Given the multi-faceted and multi-scalar nature of the concept of multicul-
turalism in Canada, the term has taken on a rather “ambiguous” connotation for
the Canadian public (Banting and Kymlicka 2010, 51). People are cognizant that the
official policy exists and that the make-up of society is changing around them, but
are unclear about what this actually means for their everyday lives. Despite this
uncertainty, public and political opposition have been relatively muted in Canada
compared to European countries that have also adopted multicultural policies
(i.e., the Netherlands, Britain, and Germany). While public debate over multicul -
turalism in Canada has always existed, the only significant political attempt to dis-
mantle the official policy came from the —since dissolved— Reform Party in the
early 1990s. In contrast, there has been a marked “retreat” from multiculturalism
by European countries in the last decade, coupled with the rise of right-wing anti-
immigrant policies (Joppke 2004, 238). Most recently, German Chancellor Angela
Merkel declared Germany’s attempt at multiculturalism had “utterly failed” (Wente
2010).
The Contemporary Period (1999-Present Day)
Canada has come a long way since the 1940s. Attitudes have become much more
positive. Efforts have been made to address the wrongdoings of the past through
official government apologies for the Chinese Head Tax in 2006 and for the Ko -
magata Maru steamship incident in 2008. Nevertheless, the overall positive Cana -
dian attitudes toward immigration have been punctuated by a series of moral panics
that seem to be the cause of a periodic abandonment of support for multiculturalism,
immigration, and humanitarianism.
Although there is a longstanding debate about the origins of moral panics —spe -
cifically whether such crises are imposed by elites (Hall et al. 1978, 41), driven
by the media or other interest groups (Cohen 1972, 7), or begin with a pre-existing
“social anxiety” at the grassroots level (Goode and Ben-Yehuda 1994, 25)— they
represent a mixture of the three (see Hier and Greenberg 2002). Several periods of
significant immigration-related moral panic have taken place in recent years.
MORAL PANICS: CHINESE AND TAMIL “BOAT PEOPLE”
On July 21, 1999, following rumors of a “ghost ship” appearing off the Queen Char -
lotte Islands on British Columbia’s northwestern coastline, the Royal Canadian
Mounted Police (RCMP) stopped a Chinese fishing boat carrying 123 mostly undo cu -
mented Chinese migrants. Initially, very little was known about where they had
come from, where they were headed, and why they had come. Despite these un cer -
tainties, the media rushed to portray the event as an “invasion” of “illegal aliens,” rep-
resenting the migrants as “boat people,” “human cargo,” and “detainees,” and raising
the alarm about their potential as a public health risk and criminal activity (drug traf -
ficking and organized crime) (Hier and Greenberg 2002, 501). In media images,
the migrants appeared as “unkempt criminals,” escorted in handcuffs by police to
detention centers (Hier and Greenberg 2002, 493). 
Over the next few months, three more boats carrying Chinese migrants would
arrive in British Columbia. By September 11, 1999, 599 migrants had arrived in all.
With each successive arrival, the outcry grew. Groups of citizens could be seen
gathering at key BC ports. It appeared that Canadian sovereignty was “in crisis”
(Hier and Greenberg 2002, 493). The perceived inability of Canadian officials to
stop the boats was taken as a sign that Canada needed to take a stronger stance on
refugees and that “decisive intervention” was needed (Hier and Greenberg 2002,
490). Canadian newspapers began publishing polls of their readers’ opinions on
what should be done with the refugees. According to one poll, conducted by the
Times Colonist, 98 percent of respondents believed that “migrants should be returned
immediately.” As Hier and Greenberg explain, although the poll was “dubiously”
conducted, similar results were echoed by several of the countries’ national news-
papers like the National Post and the Toronto Sun. A number of editorials began
appearing echoing this sentiment. Canadian Alliance member Betty Granger
282 YOLANDE POTTIE-SHERMAN AND RIMA WILKES 
ANTI-IMMIGRANT SENTIMENT IN CANADA 283
resigned after accidentally referring to the incident as an “Asian invasion” (Hier
and Greenberg 2002, 497). Town hall meetings and radio phone-in shows also
emphasized this message.
The event was used as a platform for a wider discussion about who could be
considered a “Canadian.” The media had tapped into a still deeply rooted “uncer-
tainty and fear” about Chinese migration in Canada that had existed since the
nineteenth century. This longstanding hostility was compounded by increased
migration in the lead-up to and following the handover of British Hong Kong to
China. This new cohort of migrants was “upwardly mobile,” wealthy, and was rap-
idly changing both the financial and physical landscape of Vancouver (Hier and
Greenberg 2002, 494; Mitchell 2004, 163; Ley 2008, 183, and 2010, 126). In
particular, the new influx challenged a “deeply entrenched nostalgia for tradition
and heritage, cultural-aesthetic values and political habits” (Hier and Greenberg
2002, 494). 
There have been several similar cases since then. On August 12, 2010, 490
Tamil refugees arrived on Vancouver Island aboard the MV Sun Sea. The Cana -
dian response to this event has been strikingly similar to that of the Chinese boat
people 10 years earlier. In the same way, the effectiveness of Canada’s immigration
and refugee policy has been called into question. Like in 1999, similar concerns
have been raised as to the potential health risks posed by refugee claimants (in this
case, tuberculosis). Key policy officials, for example Public Safety Minister Vic
Toews, have sounded warning bells that the Sun Sea is a “test boat,” foreshadowing
a situation that may spiral out of control (Chase 2010). The event was also an issue
of concern in the 2010 Toronto mayoral election, given the city’s large Tamil pop-
ulation, particularly after then-candidate and now Mayor Rob Ford stated, “We
can’t even deal with the 2.5 million people in this city. I think it’s more important to
take care of the people now before we start bringing in more” (Cohn 2010). The
figure of the “queue jumper” and their “abuse of Canada’s generosity” (Gunter 2010)
have figured prominently in editorials and online newspaper comment sections.
Despite the similarities, there are some important differences between the two
cases. First, many of the Tamil refugee claimants are likely “genuine refugees,”
whereas the Chinese were largely economic migrants. Second, much of the con-
troversy surrounding the Tamil case relates to the refugees’ potential relationship
to the terrorist activities of the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka. In the last 10 years, the dis -
courses of securitization and terrorism have infiltrated Canadian policy and pu b -
lic thinking, in a way that did not exist in 1999. An Angus Reid Global Monitor
public opinion poll is cited regularly in Canada’s national newspapers, reporting
that, “Almost half of Canadians would deport Tamils.” In Ontario, where outcry over
the Tamil case has been the strongest, Angus Reid reports that 55 percent would
send Tamil refugees home even if their cases were found to be “legitimate and there
is no discernible link between the migrants and the terrorists” (Cohn 2010). 
The recent crisis was compounded in early October 2010 when nine Moro c -
can stowaways were discovered aboard the Mediterranean Shipping Company’s
Lugano when it docked in Montreal (Chung 2010). The chain of events has opened
up a series of debates about immigration, refugee policy, religious diversity, and
multiculturalism. Angus Reid now reports that nearly half of Canadians (46 per-
cent) feel that immigrants are “having a negative impact” on Canada (Abraham 2010).
Refugee advocacy groups across the country have been actively trying to combat
this reaction.
Conclusion
Recent cross-national comparisons show that Canadians have some of the most
positive attitudes toward immigration and immigrants and comparatively low lev-
els of anti-immigrant sentiment (Mayda 2006, 526). This article has situated these
findings within the historical development of multiculturalism in Canada. In par-
ticular, the relatively positive levels stem from official policy support for the Ca -
n adian project of multiculturalism, which, in spite of its equivocality, has filtered
through to many levels of society. Canada today is strikingly different from the Can -
ada that promoted openly racist attitudes and policies in the late nineteenth and
first half of the twentieth century.
Still, despite the relatively positive attitudes toward immigrants and immigra -
tion, Canada’s long history of anti-immigrant sentiment should not be overlooked,
nor should Canada be complacent about the contemporary situation. For nearly
100 years after Confederation, Canada had an explicitly “white” policy of immi-
gration that actively excluded and racialized migrants who were not from the pre-
ferred white and Western European countries. This policy included a “head tax”
and eventually an outright ban on Chinese migration in the early twentieth century.
Strategies, such as the Continuous Journey Order, limited the numbers of South
Asians entering the country. During World War II, Canada refused Jewish refu gees
entry and interned Japanese Canadians as enemies of the state. This white immi-
gration policy was “on the books” until 1962, making Canada’s current relatively po s -
itive attitudes toward immigrants all the more striking. Nor is the contem porary
period immune from anti-immigrant sentiment. Amplified by the media and elites,
an undercurrent of anti-immigrant sentiment surfaces periodically in the form of
moral panics about Canada’s inability to patrol its borders against unwanted mi -
grants and in discourses about national security and radicalization. These attitudes
reflect and influence policy decisions, and reveal deeper constructions of national
identity and belonging, as well as the extent to which immigrants are welcomed
into Canadian society. 
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Canada, which has traditionally welcomed immigrants, has remained strongly pro-
immi gration. This is reflected in policies mandating comparatively high immigra-
tion levels and in the fact that public opinion generally supports it. Clearly this makes
the country an exception to prevailing attitudes about this issue across most in dus -
trial nations, attitudes that have received much attention, particularly in the United
Kingdom, the United States, France, and the Netherlands. This “Canadian exceptio n -
alism” on immigration is reflected in cross-national comparisons of public opinion,
most recently by the German Marshall Fund (2010, 7), which also indicated that
Canadians were more likely to see immigration as an opportunity than as a problem.
What accounts for the generally quite positive Canadian approach to this issue? Why
have anti-immigrant views such as have been seen in other countries not become
more prominent in Canada? Are there indications that Canadian attitudes might turn
in a more negative direction in the future? To address these questions, this chapter
examines available Canadian public opinion data, including a recent national opinion
survey, to attempt to clarify the social roots of popular support for high immigra tion
levels in Canada.
Canadian immigration levels, strong throughout the nation’s history, have been
particularly high for the past 20 years, when Canada has received about 250 000
permanent immigrants annually, representing between 0.7 and 0.8 percent of the
total population. As a result of relatively high immigration, the Canadian po pulation
has a substantially greater foreign-born component compared to the United States
and most European countries (United Nations 2006). Much of this immigra tion has
been concentrated in the major cities of Toronto, Montreal, and Van couver, and in
the recent period, Toronto alone has received nearly100 000 new immigrants each
year, making it one of the world’s most immigrant-intensive large cities.
In this context of high immigration, it is particularly remarkable that there has
been such widespread acceptance of and support for it in Canada, with relatively
little of the acrimonious debate seen elsewhere. Public opinion polls show that almost
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without exception, for the last several decades, a majority of the Canadian popu-
lation has either supported immigration levels or has even wanted them increased.
In most countries, the reverse is true: there is less immigration, and a majority still
wants reductions. Most telling, there is rarely any debate on immigration during
Canadian election campaigns. Canadian federal political parties today all espouse
pro-immigration policies; the public rarely asks them to defend their policies. The
word “immigration” is seldom even mentioned in the nationally-televised leaders’
debates. In the debate preceding the recent May 2011 election, a question on immi -
gration and multiculturalism was posed by a voter, and each of the four prime mi n -
isterial candidates responded with a pro-immigration position.
There are immigration critics in Canada, but in the Canadian context, even the
critics can turn out to be actually pro-immigration by international standards. For
example, in his book Who Gets In: What’s Wrong with Canada’s Immigration Pro -
gram - and How to Fix It (2002), Daniel Stoffman proposed that immigration in
Canada be reduced to about 175 000 per year. On a per capita basis, this reduced level
of would be higher than that advocated by supporters of immigration in other coun -
tries. Implementing Stoffman’s proposal would still leave Canada as one of the
industrial world’s leading pro-immigration countries. 
The issues articulated in the debate over Canadian immigration policy include
both economic and socio-cultural dimensions. On the economic side, proponents
of immigration have argued that it is a great economic benefit to Canada, boosting
development and stimulating employment, as well as increasing tax revenues and
contributing to the public welfare. They also argue that immigrants are needed to
offset population aging. Opponents argue that its economic benefits are exagger-
ated, and that immigrants depress wages levels, undercutting the position of many
native-born workers. They also suggest that immigrants tend to rely on welfare and
become a burden to the country. 
Immigration also raises social and cultural issues, and here the debate focuses on
the challenges posed by increased cultural diversity, and the impact of racism and ra -
cial discrimination. Proponents of immigration argue that as a multicultural country
Canada benefits from increased diversity, and that its identity is strengthened by
further immigration. Opponents argue that immigrants often bring cultural stan-
dards that are incompatible with Canadian traditions, and that immigrant groups
tend to isolate themselves in enclaves, detracting from Canadian unity. The most
visible debates have been in Quebec, and led to the appointment of a commission
to examine what constitutes “reasonable accommodation” of cultural differences
(Bouchard and Taylor 2008). 
To gain further insight into Canadian attitudes, the present chapter examines
trends and patterns in attitudes about immigration in Canada, based on public
opinion data. I use published time series on support for immigration, which show
that Canadian support for immigration has been substantial over a number of years,
and remains so today. I also draw upon a recent national survey conducted by the
Environics Institute in November 2010 (N=2020) to explore the popular views in
greater depth.
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The analysis provides insight into both economic and socio-cultural views and
perceptions of immigration, and their relationship to broader characteristics of the
Canadian population. Two viewpoints, belief in the economic benefits of immigra tion
and pride in the policy of multiculturalism, are both quite widespread and im -
portant in boosting strong support for immigration in Canada. On the econo mic
side, fears that immigrants pose an economic threat do exist, but the belief that im -
migration helps with the economy, reflecting a basic economic optimism, is clearly
more widespread. On the socio-cultural side, many Canadians express concern that
too many immigrants, perhaps particularly Muslims but other groups as well, are
not adopting Canadian values. They want immigrants to blend into the society, and not
to become isolated in enclaves. However, a majority of Canadians also sup ports the
policy of multiculturalism, and expresses considerable pride in multicul tu ralism as
part of the Canadian identity. This has the effect of moderating concerns about immi -
grant integration, and as a result, support for multiculturalism is associated with
support for immigration policy. This support is underpinned by attach ment to a variety
of related “socially progressive” positions such as gun control, access to abortion, and
gay rights; all of these seem to be associated with support for high levels of immigra -
tion. More conservative undercurrents seem to threaten the prevailing consensus on
immigration, but on many issues they are a minority.
These elements of public opinion have interesting implications for the political
dynamics of immigration policy. Immigration supporters are predominant in all po -
litical parties; however, the Conservative Party has attracted significantly more of
the anti-immigrant vote. Yet, in power, the Conservatives have maintained a high-
immigration policy. The Conservatives under Mulroney supported the previous Li b -
eral policies of immigration and multiculturalism. The current Harper government
approach is somewhat different: to adjust immigrant selection to display concern
with the economic contribution of immigration, while also attempting to underscore
the need for cultural assimilation, yet at the same time avoiding outright abandon -
ment of multiculturalism. 
Trends in Canadian Attitudes to Immigration
A review of public opinion polls conducted in Canada over recent years and de c -
ades clearly shows strong support for high immigration levels. In most years be -
tween 1975 and 2005, Gallup Canada has asked nationally representative samples
of Canadians the following question: “If it were your job to plan an immigration
policy for Canada at this time, would you be inclined to increase immigration, de -
crease immigration, or keep the number of immigrants at about the current level?”
In every year but one, 1982, a recession year, the majority of the population has
res ponded that they would support either keeping the number of immigrants at the
current level, or increasing immigration (see Chart 1). In fact the highest level of sup -
port was found in the most recent year in the series, 2005. And the positive trend
continued to 2010, according to polls between 2004 and 2010 by EKOS Research
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Associates (2010, 4), based on responses to a similar question. In 2004, the pro-
portion agreeing with current levels or higher was 63 percent compared to 31 per-
cent who thought there were too many immigrants. In 2010, the proportion agree-
ing with current levels or higher was 67 percent, compared to 23 percent who
thought there were too many immigrants.
A somewhat different question has been asked by Environics Canada over the
period 1977 to 2010 (see Chart 2). It puts the issue in a more negative way, asking,
“Do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree
with the following statement: Overall there is too much immigration to Canada.”
From the late 1970s to the early 1990s, majorities agreed, either strongly or at least
somewhat, presumably indicating negative attitudes to immigration. However, since
the mid-1990s, respondents have begun to disagree more strongly with the statement,
and since 2000 clear majorities have disagreed. The most recent poll, in 2010, showed
a slight upward trend in agreement that there is too much immigration, but still a
clear majority disagreed that there were too many immigrants.
For the period since the mid-1990s, the sources all show majority support for
immigration, which is remarkable since this period registered the highest immi-
gration levels. During the first part of the period since 1975, however, the sources
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CHART 1
CANADIAN PUBLIC OPINION ON IMMIGRATION LEVELS
“If it were your job to plan an immigration policy for Canada at this time, would you be
inclined to increase immigration, decrease immigration, or keep the number of immigrants
at about the current level?”
SOURCE: Gallup Canada (2001).
seem to show somewhat conflicting trends. The Gallup and EKOS polls show ma -
jority support over three decades, while the Environics polls show majority support
mainly during the most recent decade or decade and a half. The discrepancy may
be related to the different wording of the questions in the two sets of polls. The Gallup
and EKOS polls present respondents with a neutral choice be tween va rious options,
whereas the Environics polls requests agreement with a negative opinion that there
is “too much” immigration. To some extent, a “positive response bias” might be at
work in the Environics interviews. Positive response bias refers to the tendency of some
survey respondents to agree with any statement offered by an interviewer, as a sim-
ple gesture of politeness rather than an expression of a genuine opinion. If such a
source of bias is discounted, it might be suggested that over the past three decades,
actual Canadian attitudes toward immigration have been more positive than the
Environics poll data indicate. However, this would not explain why the Environics polls
showed more significant change over time than appears in the Gallup-EKOS series.
In any case, there is agreement among the polls that Ca nadians have been generally
positive on immigration over the past decade, a period during which immigration
stayed at quite high levels.
Some analysts in the media have suggested there has been a turn away from
support for immigration. This has been based on the very recent downturn shown
in Environics polls. However, the more complete data reviewed above show clearly
that any recent negative trends are relatively small and have not overturned the ma -
jority support for high immigration levels. One particular point sometimes made by
critics of immigration is that in Canadian public opinion, the proportion supporting
reduced immigration is larger than the proportion supporting increased immi gra -
tion (this was noted by Collacott [2002, 39], and also emphasized on the website
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CHART 2
CANADIAN PUBLIC AGREEMENT THAT THERE IS TOO MUCH IMMIGRATION
SOURCE: Environics Institute (2010).
of the Centre for Immigration Policy Reform [n.d.] in attempting to argue that
Canadians’ support for high levels of immigration is what they call a “myth”). How -
ever, in analyzing public opinion on any policy, it is clearly inappropriate to focus
only on those who want change and ignore the segment of the population that sup -
ports the policy as it is, particularly when this proportion is as large —roughly 50
to 60 percent— as it is in the case of immigration policy in Canada. In fact, there
can be no doubt that those who want to reduce immigration levels are a minority in
Canada, and have been for some time.
Analysis of Support for Immigration: 
Environics National Survey, November 2010
The most recent survey in the Environics series examined above includes many
questions about immigrants and multiculturalism and may be scrutinized in more
detail to find social patterns underlying support for high levels of immigration in
Canada. As noted above, the survey question on immigration policy had a negative
bias; respondents were asked for agreement or disagreement that “Overall, there is
too much immigration in Canada,” and 58.2 percent disagreed, 26.7 percent strongly
so. These views are taken as support for Canada’s immigration policy. Another 41.3
percent agreed there was too much immigration, 19.5 percent strongly so. These are
the opponents. The survey also tapped a series of attitudes and perceptions speci -
fically related to immigration and also broader social and economic perspectives
on Canadian life, as well as a standard series of demographic variables. The first
column in Table 1 presents correlations between support for immigration on the
one hand, and each of these various demographic variables, economic viewpoints,
and social viewpoints. In the case of variables representing region, employment sta-
tus, and birthplace, they are dummy variables, with omitted categories of Ontario
(as a region), full-time employment, and Canadian birthplace, respectively. Sub -
sequent columns present a series of regression models with selected groups of
variables entered. These various analyses enable us to examine how the variables are
related to each other in the processes underlying support for the present policy of
high immigration levels in Canada.
Reviewing the demographic categories, it is clear that support for immigra-
tion to Canada is quite widely distributed across the country. In Table 1, the first
column indicates zero-order correlations between support for immigration and va r -
ious social categories and variables. There is majority support not only across Onta -
rio (51.5 percent), but also in Quebec (59.8 percent), Alberta (53.0 percent), and
British Columbia (54.5 percent), as well as in the Prairie and Eastern regions. None
of the correlation coefficients for region or urban area are statistically significant
at the 0.05 level; support is somewhat higher in Quebec and in Eastern Canada.
The data also show that majorities favor immigration in the major cities with very
high immigration (the figures are Toronto, 60.2 percent; Montreal, 62.6 percent;
and Vancouver, 56.4 percent), and in the smaller cities and towns with fewer than
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one million inhabitants. Ethnicity and language have only minor if any correlation
to support for immigration. As might be inferred from strong support for immigra -
tion in Quebec, support among Francophone Canadians is, if anything, higher than
among Anglophones. And there is majority support for immigration both among
immigrants themselves and among the Canadian-born; immigrants differ little re -
gardless of whether they are born in Europe or the U.S., or outside Europe and the
U.S., and would be more often recent immigrants and visible minorities. Based
on these patterns, it would be expected that the most important determinants of
attitudes about immigration would be issues of national rather than local or imme -
diate personal concern.
The most important personal characteristic related to support for immigration
is high educational levels. Highly educated Canadians tend to favor immigration. Of
those who completed university, 69.3 percent supported current levels, and only
30.8 percent did not express support. Of those who had a high school education
or less, a majority (57.1 percent) felt there was too much immigration, and only
43.0 percent supported current levels. Persons with high income also favor immi-
gration; however the regression result (model 1, standardized betas with all demo-
graphic variables in the equation) shows that the effect of income is entirely relat-
ed to educational level. Net of education and other demographics, the coefficient
for the effect of income on support for immigration is close to zero. When edu-
cation is controlled, persons living in the regions of eastern Canada, Quebec, and
the Prairies are seen to be more supportive of immigration. Younger Canadians
also support it more strongly, a pattern partly explained by their higher educatio n al
levels.
Those employed full-time are much more supportive of immigration, partic-
ularly compared to the unemployed. Among the latter, 57.0 percent felt there is too
much immigration, compared to only 37.4 percent of those employed full-time.
Students and the self-employed were more supportive of immigration. Retirees are
less supportive of immigration, associated with the fact they are older rather than
with retirement in itself. Men are more likely than women to support immigration;
the regression result in model 1 shows this has little to do with employment status.
Overall, immigration is most strongly supported by the highly educated, and
also by men, the young, and those employed full-time. Support is distributed widely
across the country, and in both urban and rural areas, but, relative to demographics,
is more pronounced in Eastern Canada, Quebec, and the Prairies. Ethnic and lin-



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Viewpoints Supportive of High Immigration Levels
THE ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF IMMIGRATION
Canadians tend to see immigration as an economic opportunity for the country.
Most (82.0 percent according to the Focus Canada 2010 survey) agree that it has
a positive impact on the economy. Relatively few (25.0 per cent) think immigrants
“take away jobs” from other Canadians. The first of these perceptions relates to the
broader impact, and the second to the potential impact on individuals who might
be displaced. The data show that these two beliefs are related to each other (r = 0.35),
and both are important sources of support for Canada’s immigration policy; together,
they account for a third of variations in attitudes (ß = 0.28 for positive economic
impact; ß = -0.42 for taking jobs away from others; R2 = 0.32; see Model 2).
The perception that immigration has a positive economic impact is common
to all major regions of Canada, both English and French Canada, including the
most prosperous regions that receive a lot of immigrants, like Ontario, Quebec,
and British Columbia, and those less prosperous such as Atlantic Canada, where
unemployment is relatively high and immigrants are sought as a way of stimulating
the economy and creating employment. Although perceptions of a positive eco-
nomic impact are less pervasive among the unemployed, according to the Focus
Canada survey, even they have a generally positive view. Among the un employed,
68 percent see immigration as having a positive effect on the economy, and only 36 per -
cent agree that immigrants take jobs from other Canadians.
Whether immigration does in fact benefit the economy, or at least the size of
the benefit, is a matter of debate among economists, including Canadian econo-
mists. Many economists in the U.S. believe that the benefits tend to be small,
although the specifics are debated. The same views apply also to Canada, accord-
ing to a frequently-cited report by the Economic Council of Canada (1991). On the
other hand, a more recent and up-to-date analysis by Dungan, Gunderson, and Fang
(2010) provides a more optimistic analysis. 
Whatever the analysis among economists, Canada’s general public adheres to
the positive side of this issue, and has done so over a considerable period of time.
There may be several reasons for this. One is that the government management
of the program has emphasized economic objectives, and has done so consistent-
ly over many years. Canada’s so-called “points system” for selecting immigrants on
the basis of education, work experience, language knowledge, and other indicators
of employability and labor market value, has served to create an image of the immi -
grant as a valuable economic asset to the country. Over time, the emphasis on the
selection of highly-educated immigrants has increased, translating into a consid-
erably degree of employment success. Positive employment outcomes in turn lead to
perceptions that immigration has a positive economic impact, with minimal social
costs or impact on expenditures required to maintain the welfare state. As well,
the children of these highly educated immigrants from China, India, and other Asian
countries, and from Latin America and the Caribbean, have in turn become high-
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ly educated and have attained employment success. Although recent cohorts of
immigrants have struggled, overall their education and human capital assets have
played an important role in fostering successful integration into society.
The government’s ability to manage immigration successfully to enhance eco-
nomic benefits is undoubtedly aided by Canadian geography. Its geographic iso-
lation from all countries other than the United States has limited illegal immigra-
tion and made legal immigration more attractive. Geographic isolation has been
important in sustaining the political perception of Canadian immigration as being
controlled in the national interest. And the strong negative reactions to the arrival
of small numbers of illegal immigrants from Asian in boats off the coast of British
Columbia give a clear indication that public opinion could turn negative if larger
numbers of illegal or non-status immigrants were entering the country.
Behind these perceptions of immigration are more general views about the
general direction of the Canadian economy, and whether one’s own position has
been improving or not. These perceptions also appear to create positive views of
immigration (see Table 1, Model 3). Those who feel confident about the national
economy, and those who see their personal “standard of living” as having improved
over the past decade, are more frequently found among supporters of immigration
(r = 0.11 and 0.13, respectively, column 1 of Table 1). The multivariate analysis
(Model 4) shows that this effect is mainly or even entirely because these optimis -
tic views foster the idea that immigration is having a positive impact. By the same
token, those who are not doing well and think the economy is off track may be less
inclined to think immigration has a favorable impact. (Model 5 includes demo-
graphic variables; the basic patterns remain the same.)
The economic impact of immigration is also related to the welfare state, since,
if immigrants contribute to boosting the economy, they would also be expected to
pay taxes and help bolster publicly-funded programs. We might therefore expect
to find supporters of the welfare state taking a more positive view of immigration.
This expectation is in fact confirmed by the fact that those who view taxes as
important for maintaining the Canadian quality of life —the survey question
mentioned health care, education, and roads as representative tax-funded ameni-
ties— are more likely to support immigration (r = 0.17). This also implies that
opponents of the welfare state oppose immigration, possibly on the ground that
immigrants may be likely to exploit the welfare system and add to an already un -
wanted burden. In either case, the overall perception of immigrants’ economic sta-
tus might be the key. In fact, the multivariate analysis (Models 4 and 5) indicates
that the fact that supporters of the welfare state actually have more positive views
of the economic impact of immigration is what makes them more supportive of it.
The same is true of those who have a more positive view of economic conditions
in Canada generally: they are more likely to support immigration because they
believe in its positive benefits. Once these effects are taken into account, the more
general economic viewpoints have much less weight. 
The significance of economic factors in the support for immigration in Ca nada
suggests that an economic downturn might undermine that support. However, in
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the recent past, economic recessions in Canada have not produced a backlash
against immigration. It is interesting to consider how the belief in its economic
be nefits may have been affected by the Mulroney government’s decision in the
early 1990s to maintain high levels of immigration during a severe recession. Tra -
ditionally, immigration levels in Canada had been moderated during recession
years, in deference to a belief that immigrants would be less welcome when jobs are
scarce. However, during the recession of the early 1990s, which was particularly
severe in Canada, the decision was made to keep levels more or less unchanged
to maintain program stability. As it happened, there was no backlash, and, in fact,
as we have seen, the perception that immigrants take jobs from other Canadians
actually faded during this period.
PRIDE IN MULTICULTURALISM
Canadians’ views on the social and cultural side of immigration also affect their
attitudes about immigration policy. First, support for multiculturalism appears to
be a strong force supporting high immigration levels in Canada. Canadians support
the national multiculturalism policy and regard it as a key feature of the national
identity; the Focus Canada data show that this reinforces support for immigration.
The correlation analysis in Table 1 (column 1) shows the positive relation be -
tween support for multiculturalism and support for immigration (r = 0.26). Since
it was first announced in 1971, Canadians have come to see multiculturalism as
a positive feature of the Canadian identity. Most polls show majority approval of
multiculturalism (for an analysis of data over several decades, see Dasko [2005]).
A recent Angus Reid poll (2010) also showed that 55 percent of respondents re -
garded multiculturalism as having been good for Canada, while 30 percent believe
it has been bad. Fully 85 percent of Focus Canada respondents felt that multicul -
turalism was very or somewhat important to the national identity, and when they
pointed to important national symbols, multiculturalism was in the top group,
after health care, the flag, and the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, but ahead of
hockey, bilingualism, and the RCMP. And in the survey, those who felt multicul-
turalism was important to national identity were much more likely to support high
immigration levels. Of those who felt that multiculturalism is “very important” to
national identity (a clear majority), 67.7 percent disagreed that there was too much
immigration, compared to 49.6 percent among the smaller group who thought it was
“somewhat important,” and only 41.8 percent among the even smaller group (11.8
percent) who thought it was unimportant. 
Multiculturalism policy could create a more positive view of immigration for
several reasons. The most obvious is that it encourages the view that immigration
creates positive cultural as well as economic benefits. A second, possibly related,
reason is that multiculturalism may lead to a perception that if minority groups
retain their culture, this does not necessarily mean they do not share or are not
adopting Canadian cultural values. In fact, one of the tenets of multiculturalism
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and cultural pluralism generally is that integration into society and cultural reten-
tion are not opposed to one another and are expected to occur at the same time.
A third reason why multiculturalism may encourage a positive view of immigra-
tion is that its prevalence in Canada may actually enhance social inclusion for cul-
tural minorities, smoothing their integration and supporting both socio-cultural
and economic benefits. And fourth, the simple fact of asserting multiculturalism
as a national policy may create a perception that immigration is an essential fea-
ture of Canadian tradition, which should be upheld as a point of national pride.
In this way, multiculturalism may serve as a kind of public relations campaign sup -
portive of immigration.
Despite support for multiculturalism, it is also clear that Canadians want immi -
grants to blend into the mainstream. They are concerned that many immigrants
are not adopting Canadian values and worry about the implications. In the Focus
Canada survey, respondents were asked whether or not they agreed that “ethnic
groups should try as much as possible to blend into Canadian society and not form
a separate community.”  Nationally, an overwhelming 80 percent agreed with this
statement, 51.3 percent “strongly.”  The percentages were even higher in Quebec
(90.4 percent), but they were also strong in the rest of Canada (76.6 percent).
The expectation that immigrants should “blend” into society does not neces-
sarily imply an expectation for complete conformity to mainstream culture. Most
Canadians do feel more comfortable if immigrants make the effort to become part
of the mainstream society, and there are strong concerns that immigrants are not
doing so. Majorities of Canadians (nearly 70 percent) agree that “there are too many
immigrants coming into this country who are not adopting Canadian values,” and
over 40 percent “strongly agree.”
Both the preference that immigrants should blend in, and the belief that they
may not be doing so, tend to be associated with less enthusiasm for immigration
(in Table 2, r = 0.22 for disagreeing that blending is important, and r = 0.45 for
disagreeing that too many immigrants are not adopting Canadian values). These
are quite strong effects, and the fact that majorities actually agree with these
statements indicates that desire for immigrant blending and the concern that they
are not blending are very important factors in qualifying support for immigration in
Canada. Racial difference also matters to some Canadians, who object to immi -
gration as a result (r = 0.31), but only a small group expressed this concern in the
interviews. More are concerned that many refugee claims may not be valid, and
this, too, is associated with less support for immigration (r = 0.39). 
Concerns about questions of immigrant integration are clearly expressed in
the Focus Canada survey specifically regarding Muslims. The survey asked, “Do you
think most Muslims coming to our country today want to adopt Canadian cus-
toms and way of life or do you think they want to be distinct from the larger Ca -
nadian society?” Most respondents felt they “want to be distinct” (55.3 percent),
while only 27.9 percent thought they wanted to adopt Canadian customs; 3.3 per-
cent thought they wanted to do both, and 13.4 percent expressed no opinion. Another
question asked about the ban on wearing head scarves by Muslim women in public
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places, including schools, and respondents were about equally divided on whether
it was a good or bad idea. There was perhaps a slightly greater proportion who
thought it was a good idea (47.6 percent), compared to 43.9 percent who thought
it was a bad idea. Generally, concern about the cultural integration of immigrants
does not vary markedly by region; however, the controversy regarding Muslims has
been particularly notable in the case of Quebec, and this is reflected in the Focus
Canada survey interviews. In Quebec, 60.4 percent think Muslims want to be dis -
tinct from the larger Canadian society, compared to 53.7 percent in the rest of
Canada. And in Quebec, 66 percent think banning head scarves worn by Muslim
women in public places is a good idea, compared to 41.5 percent in the rest of
Canada.
It should be remembered that an emphasis in public opinion on “blending”
and the integration of immigrants is far from new. Although it is possible that
these concerns may have intensified in recent years, with the increased attention
to Muslims in particular, similar views have been found in many public opinion
surveys throughout the period since the 1970s when multiculturalism policy was
put in place. For example, a poll conducted by Decima Research just over two de c -
ades ago, in 1989, showed substantial majorities of Canadians supporting the idea
of immigrant “blending.” Respondents were asked, “What do you think is better for
Canada, for new immigrants to be encouraged to maintain their distinct culture
and ways, or to change their distinct culture and ways to blend into the larger so -
ciety?” Only 34 percent of Canadians at the time favored the maintenance of “dis -
tinct cultures and ways.” Comparison with a parallel poll conducted in the United
States at the same time showed that this preference for blending was actually
more prevalent in Canada than in the United States (Reitz and Breton 1994, 27-28).
And even earlier, a national survey conducted in 1976 (Berry, Kalin, and Taylor
1977), when most immigrants were of European background, showed that although
most Canadians accepted cultural retention by minorities, the emphasis was on
cultural practices that did not affect mainstream society significantly. So, from the
1970s to the present time, Canadians have definitely favored the idea of immi-
grants becoming an integral part of mainstream society.
The two viewpoints —support for multiculturalism and support for immigrant
“blending”— are different and not necessarily contradictory. Certainly in principle,
they are not inconsistent, since multiculturalism in Canada was always intended
to accomplish the goal of integration of minorities into the mainstream. Never -
theless, the issue has caused confusion. A National Post story on the November
2010 Angus Reid poll reported that more than half (54 percent) thought Canada
should be a “melting pot” rather than a “mosaic” (Selley 2010). The article suggest-
ed that the public had repudiated multiculturalism, despite the fact (as cited above)
that the same poll found a majority (55 percent) thinking multiculturalism was
good for Canada, compared to only 30 percent who thought it was bad. To its author,
it seemed that Canadians were confused and had “no idea” what multiculturalism
actually is.
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In interpreting such poll results, care should be taken to consider the actual
meaning of the questions asked of respondents. First, the questions do not pro-
vide respondents with a definition of either multiculturalism or terms such as
“melting pot,” “mosaic,” “blending,” or “separate communities.” So, they are free to
attribute any meaning to any of them. Second, and more significantly, when ques-
tions present respondents with a binary choice between opposites such as “melt-
ing pot” vs. “mosaic,” or “blending” vs. “separate communities,” supporters of multi -
culturalism may have difficulty. In fact, multiculturalism is intended to overcome
precisely this binary choice; it offers the potential for both integration and main-
taining one’s culture. So, faced with what might be viewed as a philosophically
inappropriate request to choose between them, many come down on the side of
blending. But this response choice does not necessarily imply a demand for com-
plete immigrant assimilation or a repudiation of multiculturalism (though of course
for some it may mean that). And third, the desire for immigrant “blending” refers
to the outcomes people would like to see; support for multiculturalism influences
the criteria people may bring to the assessment of whether immigrant integration is
working. The criteria may be less exacting for supporters of multiculturalism than
for others. In short, support for multiculturalism may be quite consistent with an
emphasis on blending, if the latter is understood to include a degree of minority
cultural maintenance. What is clear is that Canadians support both multicultur-
alism and a pattern of immigrant integration into mainstream society.
The multivariate analysis helps clarify how these viewpoints affect support
for immigration. It suggests that one way multiculturalism impacts is that it trans-
lates into a more open or flexible standard for assessing immigrant integration.
This leads to immigrants more often being seen as meeting that standard. The
impact of a positive view of multiculturalism on public expectations and percep-
tions of immigrant cultural conformity is clearly evident in the multivariate analy-
sis (see Table 1, Models 6 and 7). The coefficient for importance attached to mul-
ticulturalism and the one representing the expectation that immigrants need not
blend into society are both reduced and virtually eliminated when the perception
of how well immigrants are adopting Canadian values is introduced into the analy-
sis. The importance attached to multiculturalism appears to moderate the impact
of the desire for blending and concerns about whether it is occurring. 
Actually, in addition to multiculturalism, a number of other broader social
values are related to support for immigration. Many of these involve what is some-
times called “social progressivism,” including support for the ban on capital pun-
ishment, gun control legislation, same-sex marriage, and access to abortion. All of
these items are associated with support for immigration. By the same token, the
so-called “social conservatives,” who hold opposite views on these topics, and also
share a perception that crime rates are increasing, tend to oppose immigration and
to think too many immigrants are coming into the country. The multivariate analy-
sis suggests that these items reflect a general discomfort with diversity in society
and seem to be associated with a desire for conformity, which includes cultural
conformity by immigrants. The effect of these cultural values items is significantly
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reduced when perceptions and expectations regarding cultural conformity are
included in the analysis (Models 8 and 9).
Canadian pride in multiculturalism is also to some extent reinforced by its
role in defining Canadian identity vis-à-vis the United States. The Canadian dis-
course on multiculturalism frequently underscores a presumed contrast between
Canadian multiculturalism and the American melting pot. Multiculturalism is
viewed as one concrete manifestation of a greater Canadian tolerance for diversity
and openness to cultural inclusion, unlike the United States’ supposedly traditio n -
al emphasis on assimilation and cultural conformity as patriotic duties. The jux-
taposition of the American melting pot and the Canadian cultural mosaic is one of the
most frequently invoked symbols of Canadian distinctiveness, along with hockey and
a few others such as universal health insurance and gun control. In the Focus
Canada survey, it is no surprise to find that 89.9 percent of respondents state that
in comparing Canada and the U.S., Canada “maintains a better quality of life for
its citizens.” Only 3.6 percent preferred the U.S., with another 1.7 percent saying
there is no difference. What is worth noting is that, of those who state that multi cul -
turalism is “very important” to the national identity, the proportion of respondents
who prefer Canada is 95.4 percent; whereas, of those who feel that multiculturalism
is not at all important, the figure drops to 83.1 percent. As determinants of support
for immigration in Canada, both multiculturalism and pride in Canada’s quality of
life are significant.
The multivariate analysis suggests the following causal sequence. Persons with
stronger expectations for immigrants to blend into society are applying a more res -
trictive standard and, as a result, are more likely to view immigrants as falling short.
They therefore conclude that immigration is creating problems and more often
favor reductions in immigration levels. In this context, one possible effect of sup-
port for multiculturalism is to relax expectations for immigrants’ cultural confor -
mity. Supporters of multiculturalism thus apply less restrictive standards to immi-
grants in terms of cultural conformity, and immigrants are therefore more often
perceived as meeting those standards. Immigration is thus seen as contributing to
a more unified society, and this leads to support for higher immigration levels. In
this way, popular support for multiculturalism translates into increased support for
immigration, even in a society in which the predominant view is an expectation
for immigrants to blend in and become part of the mainstream society.
Concerns about so-called “bogus” refugee claims constitute one quite con-
troversial element in Canadian immigration. This topic appears in the news reg-
ularly, and the analysis here indicates that the validity of refugee claims is a sig-
nificant issue for those who feel Canada has too much immigration (r = 0.39, first
column in Table 1). The multivariate analysis (Model 10) shows that this matter
is nearly as significant as immigrants’ not adopting Canadian values and has a sig-
nificant net effect on support for immigration. Put differently, a favorable view of
refugee claims may be seen as one on the list of socially progressive views held by
those who favor immigration. The analysis shows it is a fundamental issue related
to support for immigration policy.
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Political Parties and Canadian Immigration Policy
Although all major Canadian  political parties have pro-immigration policies, one
organization, the Conservative Party of Canada, is generally perceived to be the most
reluctant to support immigration, and the least supportive of multiculturalism. Under
Brian Mulroney (1984-1993), the Conservatives maintained high immigration
numbers, and introduced legislation in support of multiculturalism and also employ -
 ment equity. However, after the Conservative defeat in 1993, they merged with the
Reform Party, which had been seen as representing social conservatism and reluc-
tance to support immigration; and Stephen Harper (2006-present) has in fact made
significant changes to immigration policy, and emphasized cultural adaptation of
immigrants more than multiculturalism. Therefore, it is of interest to examine some
of these issues in terms of political party support in Canada.
The data show that Conservative supporters are significantly less likely to
support immigration than supporters of other major parties (ß=-0.09, with Liberal
Party support as the reference category). The New Democrats and Bloc Québé c -
ois are relatively strong supporters of immigration (ß= 0.06 and 0.04, respectively).
The data also suggest some of the reasons for this, related to social and economic
viewpoints as analyzed above. Demographic variations, linked to educa tion, region,
or employment status, are not major explanatory variables. How ever, although eco -
nomic perspectives on immigration are important in explaining attitudes about it,
Conservative Party supporters’ positions appear to be related to their social views.
They are less enthusiastic about multiculturalism, and express stronger views that
immigrants should blend into society. They more often worry that immigrants are
not adopting Canadian values. The multivariate analysis shows that these variables
explain the greater opposition of Conservative Party supporters to immigration
policies.2
Conclusions and Discussion
Canadian public opinion supports immigration for two main reasons: confidence
in its positive economic benefits and pride in multiculturalism as a socially progres -
sive policy. Immigration continues to be an important nation-building strategy for
Canada. Immigrants are seen in fairly pragmatic terms as major building blocks for
the future, keeping the country prosperous and enabling its expansion. This seems
to contrast not only with countries in Europe, which are latecomers to immigration
and may see it either as unwelcome, or at best as a way to fill specific needs arising
from time to time, but also with the United States, which is also a traditional coun -
try of immigration but is a superpower that no longer sees itself as needing immi-
grants to grow and reach its destiny. Immigration issues in Canada are often dis-
cussed in terms of multiculturalism, and the analysis here confirms that support
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2 The author would be happy to provide this analysis to anyone who requests it.
for multiculturalism is indeed a major factor boosting the country’s immigration
program. Support for multiculturalism does not mean that Canadians do not want
immigrants to blend in or become part of a national “melting pot,” although this
conclusion is often drawn in both media and academic discussion of immigration.
Even among supporters of multiculturalism, there is a desire for immigrants to be -
come part of mainstream society; this is part of the meaning and purpose of multi -
culturalism in Canada, as a strategy encouraging the incorporation of immigrants.
Multiculturalism in Canada fosters support for immigration by encouraging a more
open or tolerant view of the process of immigrant integration.
These views of immigration are rooted in more basic opinions and outlooks
prevalent in Canada. On the economic side, Canadians tend to take an optimistic
and expansionist view of their economic future, both at the national level and in
terms of their own personal situations. This optimism is a basic feature of their
positive opinion of immigration. On the social and cultural side, Canadian multi-
culturalism is related to other socially progressive viewpoints that tend to prevail
in the country. Canada was one of the first countries to recognize gay marriage; and
its laws on abortion, gun control, and capital punishment distinguish it from those
of its more socially conservative southern neighbor. Many Canadians are proud of
this distinction, and national pride plays into support for multiculturalism as well.
The result is that the country’s expansionist immigration program has become part
of the mix of progressive public policies that for many are linked to the Canadian
identity and what it means to be Canadian.
These findings raise the question of what factors might tend to undermine
po pular support for immigration in Canada in the future. The primary importance
of the economic agenda, and the fact that it carries so much weight in both English
and French Canada and across many social groups, suggests that expansionist
immigration will probably be part of Canada’s policy for some time to come. It seems
likely that major economic changes would be necessary to upset this pattern, such
as, for example, a very prolonged recession, or a much more visible sign of im mi -
grants experiencing economic difficulty and requiring attention and possibly sig-
nificant public expenditures. The fact that immigrants’ employment situation has
become more difficult might seem a possible source of such a changing view of the
economics of immigration. This does not appear to have happened, and the evidence
based on experience during recessions, including the most recent recession as well as
the one in the early 1990s, suggests that belief in immigration as an oppor tunity is
quite resilient and not vulnerable to rapid change. The issues of culture and multi-
culturalism are important but perhaps somewhat less critical. Major develop ments in
terms of social conflict or breakdown in immigrant minority communities might have
the effect of eroding the confidence that multicuturalism helps foster Canadian
unity, and this could affect attitudes toward immigration.
Predictions of a weakening of Canadian support for immigration and multi-
cuturalism have often been wrong. Such forecasts have figured prominently in the
media several times over the past two decades. One was on the publication of Neil
Bissoondath’s book The Selling of Illusions: The Cult of Multiculturalism in Canada
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in 1994. Another was in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, and
yet another when the plot by a group of Muslim youth to bomb Parliament Hill
was uncovered. None of these have had the predicted effect. In fact, Canadians
have been relatively unconcerned about terrorism, compared to people in other
countries. However, a more important reason may be that the economic agenda
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Dos documentales, producidos por la compañía independiente White Pines Pic -
tures, así como una miniserie de televisión, Human Cargo (2004), abordan la inmi -
gración a Canadá.1 Desde una perspectiva que pretende tanto ser objetiva como
presentar la paradójica situación de los inmigrantes ilegales en Canadá, los resul -
tados de estas series se alejan de lo convencional, en tanto que procuran no estereo -
tipar (como lo hizo el cine fronterizo hollywoodense durante décadas) y, sin embar -
go, en ocasiones contienen grietas en la narrativa, por las cuales se filtran tanto el
sentimiento antiinmigrante como la tendencia al perfil racial. Este artículo estu -
diará los resultados, involuntariamente ambiguos, en estas producciones.
La “guerra” contra los migrantes: 
un espectáculo que genera buen rating
A partir de los sucesos del 11 de septiembre, el tema de la seguridad ha implicado
una refronterización de Estados Unidos; así, las fronteras en Norteamérica han
adquirido tal importancia que han generado estas producciones documentales
para televisión con temas que habían pertenecido casi exclusivamente al ámbito
cinematográfico; en un inicio se habían constreñido a programas especiales, pero,
debido al atractivo de los temas, se han desarrollado, por diversos caminos, hasta
con vertirse en series. En éstas, las fronteras se representan como regiones estra -
tégicas para las relaciones bilaterales, ya sea México-Estados Unidos, ya Estados
Unidos-Canadá. Pero también como la barrera que impedirá que sustancias y per-
sonas indeseables las franqueen y se internen en territorio estadunidense.
A pesar de que este artículo versa sobre la producción televisiva canadiense
para la emisora pública angloparlante (Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, CBC),
me ha parecido pertinente —como proemio— hacer mención a un par de pro -
ducciones estadunidenses para National Geographic, una cadena de televisión de
paga que se difunde a nivel mundial, por dos motivos: el primero es, precisamente,
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la diferencia de niveles de audiencia que éstos alcanzan en relación con las pro -
ducciones canadienses, tanto en número de espectadores como de extensión geo -
gráfica; el segundo es que, a pesar del tono pseudocientífico del canal y de sus
miras de aparente difusión de la cultura, o mejor dicho de la diversidad de las cul -
turas mundiales, el tono de estas series de programas es escandaloso y conduce a
la creación de estereotipos negativos respecto de los mexicanos que allí aparecen.
Frontera, zona de guerra (Border Wars) se estrenó en Estados Unidos el 10 de
enero de 2010 y tuvo el nivel de audiencia más alto para el debut de un programa.
En México y el resto de América Latina su emisión inició el 3 de febrero de ese
mismo año.
Basta el título para darnos una idea de cómo estos documentales de una hora
retratan las fronteras norteamericanas, básicamente la que existe entre México y
Estados Unidos. Más aún, las imágenes en la página de esta serie señalan al ene -
migo y cómo debe combatírsele.
El programa documenta la actividad cotidiana de los agentes estadunidenses
de Aduanas y Protección Fronteriza, sobre todo en el sur de su país, combatiendo el
tráfico de drogas, la migración ilegal y, en ocasiones, el terrorismo. Las situaciones se
presentan de tal modo que aparecen ante el espectador como amenazas inminen -
tes a la seguridad de Estados Unidos.
En vista de que es necesario destruir al “enemigo”, las patrullas están equipa -
das con cámaras de última generación y sistemas de monitoreo controlados por
personal altamente especializado. Vigilan todas las entradas por agua y por aire, pero
sobre todo por tierra. Estas últimas representan las vías más transitadas y, por
tanto, las más filmadas.
Desde la comodidad de sus salas, los espectadores observan a los oficiales que
patrullan la zona o caminan por el desierto de Altar, con aparatos que registran el
calor corporal, en busca de “ilegales”, sosteniendo tiroteos, desmantelando camio -
netas en busca de drogas, deteniendo sospechosos en los aeropuertos o inspec -
cionando la correspondencia para encontrar cualquier clase de contrabando en
los sobres.
Los títulos de cada episodio son directos y duros (“Night-shift Preview”, “Desert
Sweep”, “The Human Stash”, “Midnight Runners”, “Human Assets”, “Explosive
Search”, “Drugs Bust”, “The Big Fence”, “Road Sweep”) y se relacionan con el conte -
nido de cada uno de éstos, el cual se construye con base en breves escenas de
acción, de manera estereotípica o maniquea, en la que los agentes son los héroes,
y los villanos, generalmente de origen mexicano, son todos calificados como crimi -
nales, y a todos se les trata de la misma forma, ya sea porque trafican drogas, ya por-
que intenten cruzar la frontera para conseguir un empleo que les permita enviar
dinero a casa. Es decir, en esta serie la ilegalidad equivale a criminalidad, por lo
que ser inmigrante implica, en el discurso narrativo, lo mismo que ser narcotra fi -
cante o un posible terrorista.
Así pues, en varios episodios, el tema principal es la cacería; en otros, el foco
se centra en los inmigrantes; en algunos más, la actividad de mayor importancia es
la investigación (en relación con documentos falsos o para descubrir contrabando
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y lavado de dinero); algunos pocos tratan sobre el terrorismo y muchos más sobre
el narcotráfico; pero todos desde el punto de vista de cuán necesario es defenderse
de las amenazas o ataques a la seguridad nacional.
Desde esta perspectiva, resulta legítimo preguntarnos si de verdad esto es un
producto de la televisión cultural. Para los espectadores mexicanos, es difícil ver
cómo nuestros(as) compatriotas son cazados como si se tratara de animales; cómo,
por su simple apariencia (es decir, pertenecer a cierta raza o parecer de determi -
nada nacionalidad) y por hablar español, se les acusa de todo tipo de delitos, mientras
el equipo de filmación documenta y atestigua la brutalidad a la que se les some-
te en nombre de la seguridad, convirtiéndonos a nosotros, también, en testigos (¿o
cómplices?).
Por tratarse de una serie documental, todos los sucesos que presenciamos han
ocurrido en un contexto real en las fronteras México-Estados Unidos o Estados
Unidos-Canadá, y se consideraría que se trata de la filmación de algo verdadero;
sin embargo, resulta de una verdad sesgada, pues, como ya se dijo, aunque se hable
de las fronteras, lo que se subraya es, básicamente, lo que ocurre en el sur de Esta dos
Unidos, con “personajes” que en su mayoría son mexicanos y que intentan atentar
contra las leyes estadunidenses. En caso de equivocación por parte de los agentes de
la Patrulla Fronteriza, nunca aparece cómo se remediaría ésta. Tampoco se men cio -
nan los intercambios positivos que suceden en esta inmensa zona geográfica. Mucho
menos de lo que ocurre al norte.
En opinión del crítico Julián Gorodischer, lo que la televisión antropológica
ha producido en este caso es un relato paranoico: “la TV antropológica acompaña
el rediseño planetario deviniendo menos en testigo de los sucesos naturales del
amplio mundo que en un militante a favor de una causa nacional: órgano de una
política exterior que [...] cierra filas con otros grupos noticiosos como la CNN y la
Fox News” (Gorodischer, 2010).
Más allá de que el contenido del programa sea perturbador, debido a que apli -
ca el perfil racial para la construcción de sus personajes (los mexicanos inmigran tes
ilegales, polleros o narcotraficantes), lo es más aún que en su página de Internet
exista un juego interactivo en el que el usuario puede convertirse en agente de la
Patrulla Fronteriza y cazar indocumentados, o leer los alborozados comentarios
posi tivos del público que no sólo apoya la tarea de “defensa” que los agentes llevan
a cabo en el sur de su frontera, sino también la construcción del muro entre estos
dos países.
El éxito del rating se ratifica porque en NatGeo TV ahora se exhibe, para -
lelamente a la segunda temporada de Border Wars, una nueva serie, exclusivamen -
te dedicada al segmento sur de la frontera y significativamente llamada Shadow
Wolves: Border Warriors, Patrulla Fronteriza: prohibido pasar.
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El 11 de septiembre y el cambio de perspectiva 
en los documentales de White Pines
El Consejo Canadiense para los Refugiados (CCR) publicó (2005) un comunica-
do en el que expresaba la preocupación de que las medidas relacionadas con la
seguridad nacional se han tomado de manera que han violado los derechos de los
refugiados y de los inmigrantes; de que, tanto en la práctica como en el ámbito de
la ley, exista discriminación; que en la prosecución de una agenda de seguridad ha
surgido una brecha entre los derechos de quienes son ciudadanos y quienes no lo son;
señalan que el hecho de que, para combatir el terrorismo, se apliquen leyes de inmi -
gración y no penales, implica que existen dos parámetros, puesto que las leyes de
inmigración no pueden imponerse a los ciudadanos de un país y, por tanto, son dis-
criminatorias, sobre todo porque las medidas tomadas respecto de la seguridad
imponen, a quienes no son ciudadanos, penas que implican hasta la deportación
(potencialmente la tortura) por actos o asociaciones que serían legales para los
ciudadanos; los juicios de inmigración, asegura el documento, niegan los derechos
primordiales de quienes no son ciudadanos, como el derecho a un juicio justo, a la
libertad y a no ser torturado.
El documento teme que, en pos de la búsqueda de cierta seguridad, al discri -
 minar a determinados grupos étnicos o religiosos,2 se viole la Carta Canadiense
de Derechos y Libertades (Department of Justice, 1982), que otorga (entre otras) las
libertades religiosa, de conciencia y de asociación, así como los derechos, entre otros,
de movilidad, de no ser detenido o cateado arbitrariamente, de tener un juicio
justo y expedito.
Como se mencionó antes, desde el 9 de septiembre de 2001, la frontera entre
Canadá y Estados Unidos se ha transformado más que durante todo el siglo XX,3
debido a los comentarios negativos sobre la porosidad de esta zona común, otrora
considerada la más larga y menos vigilada del mundo. Los medios atestiguan estos
cambios y ello es obvio en la transformación gradual del tono de los programas para
la CBC4 de las productoras White Pines5 y Force Four Entertainment.
El 9 de marzo de 1997, Invisible Nation: Policing the Underground (1997), se
transmitió a nivel nacional en Canadá, seguido de la participación telefónica del
público durante una hora. Se trata de un texto extraordinario, puesto que se plantea,
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2 Habla en la página 2 específicamente de musulmanes y árabes.
3 Ésta es la tesis en que se basa el excelente y detallado análisis de esta zona realizado por Konrad y
Nicol (2008).
4 Me parece importante señalar aquí que, salvo los que estoy llevando a cabo en el proyecto “Instruc -
ciones para vivir en el limbo”, no existen estudios académicos sobre esta serie de documentales para
la televisión canadiense; en el caso de las series de ficción, hay reseñas y tan sólo un artículo sobre
Human Cargo, del que hablaré posteriormente. En contraste, además de las reseñas sobre las series
de Natgeo TV, existen blogs, diarios de producción y muchos otros recursos accesibles en la red para
su investigación.
5 Y del mismo equipo de realizadores, Peter Raymont y la ya desaparecida Lindalee Tracey, como direc -
tores y productores.
con un tono sumamente crítico, el asunto de la inmigración ilegal en la ciudad de
Toronto, desde el punto de vista de los oficiales de inmigración y de los inmigran -
tes; pero, además, tomando en cuenta que el problema tiene implicaciones tanto
legales, como en la compleja vida cotidiana de los actores.
La secuencia de créditos nos sitúa en la tónica de la película; sobre una pan -
talla azul, escucharemos una llamada telefónica en la que un ciudadano reporta inmi -
grantes ilegales; inmediatamente después, una toma panorámica del lago Ontario
congelado y la icónica Torre CN nos dan el referente geográfico de Toronto. La se -
cuencia se cierra con la voz femenina en off de la narradora que nos guiará a lo largo
del documental, explicando lo que es la nación invisible.
De ahí en adelante, toda la información que recibamos por parte de esta na -
rradora será en un tono poético y dará la palabra a un “nosotros” colectivo que,
cons truido con base en el discurso, deberá leerse como “los canadienses”. Tam -
bién será nuestra guía en el descubrimiento del sistema que impide que indi vi -
duos indesea bles se queden a vivir en Canadá. La construcción de este “nosotros”
interpela al es pec tador y lo compromete para que responda a las situaciones plan -
tea das por el docu mental y vividas por personajes que son seres humanos actuantes
en la realidad.
De inmediato se nos presentará el hilo conductor de la trama. Desde dentro de
una patrulla, presenciamos la conversación entre dos oficiales de migración que
deben arrestar a una familia rusa que tiene tres niñas y un niño. La narradora aclara
que ellos no han creado la política de inmigración, sino que tan sólo deben imple -
mentarla. Aprenderemos, pues, que los protagonistas son parte de un grupo piloto
de 36 investigadores de migración del área de Toronto, uno de los cuales es un hom -
bre blanco que trabajó con la Policía Montada y otro que es un inmigrante de Guyana,
quien en su país fue maestro, pero que lleva diez años en su nuevo oficio.
El espectador será testigo de la ambigüedad que existe en la tarea de los oficia -
les, quienes saben que los individuos comunes e inofensivos serán los deportados
(porque no saben esconderse tan eficazmente como los delincuentes) y, en ocasio -
nes, tendrán que utilizar contra ellos medidas violentas, tratarlos como si fueran
criminales y, aunque no creen que lo sean, deben arrestarlos de cualquier forma.
Veamos varios ejemplos de cómo se nos presenta tal complejidad.
Mientras la cámara realiza un travelling entre filas de archiveros y la imagen
nos deja saber que la burocracia convierte a los seres humanos en mera estadística,
la voz en off recalca que, en la sede de la aplicación de la ley, las vidas ilegales se
res guardan en archivos y los juicios de conciencia se inician; la metáfora visual
señala la deshumanización del proceso burocrático, mientras que el texto verba li -
zado subraya que justicia no es un sinónimo de equidad.
Aprenderemos también que, a finales de los años noventa, cada semana se re -
cibían alrededor de trescientas denuncias telefónicas de inmigrantes ilegales; aun -
que el oficial blanco piensa que los avisos son útiles, el de Guyana siente que: “es
como si nos llamaran para que recogiéramos la basura”, y está consciente de que los
seres humanos han sido migrantes perpetuos y eso es lo que da su configuración
actual al mundo. Por lo que el documental transluce, las denuncias se relacionan
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con ciudadanos que llevan a cabo perfiles raciales y desconfían de determinadas
personas por cómo se ven, es decir, porque son diferentes a ellos.
Con un dolly sobre rieles del tren, la voz en off narra partes de la historia de
Canadá, basada en la migración, sobreponiendo fotografías antiguas en sepia o blan -
co y negro de los inmigrantes que construyeron esa misma vía férrea, pero también
de los que trabajaban los campos o de los más jóvenes que acudían a las escuelas. La
nostalgia provocada por las fotos se interrumpe con imágenes en movimiento de
hombres y mujeres de diversos orígenes étnicos, clases sociales, oficios y profesiones
en el mismo rincón de la ciudad, como una afirmación —por parte de los docu -
mentalistas— en favor de la multiplicidad como componente vital de Toronto. La
narradora, nostálgica, crítica, poética, comenta: “Viven, se esconden, se ven como
nosotros, tal vez son nosotros, nuestros ancestros inmigrantes que continúan su
viaje a casa, o tal vez no son como nosotros, para nada”.
El documental recurre a la técnica del collage en varias ocasiones, mezclando
imágenes contemporáneas en movimiento, tomas de personas de distintas razas y
edades caminando por las calles, mientras que la narradora sentencia que las fron -
teras no pueden detener la fuerza de la esperanza. El efecto, en ocasiones, se logra
también con el collage de las fotografías antiguas, complementado por un texto
que le recuerda al espectador los orígenes de la multiplicidad: “vinimos como soña -
dores e imaginamos una nación”. Estos montajes, por supuesto, simbolizan el mo -
saico canadiense, ilustrado con seres humanos reales, con los que el espectador
pueda identificarse.
El documental señala que el proceso de refronterización en Canadá se da con
base en las necesidades de seguridad de Estados Unidos. La voz en off explica que
la guerra estadunidense contra el crimen envía criminales al norte y Canadá queda
a merced de la geografía, de modo que se convierte en un buen escondite, debido a
que la frontera está abierta. Para ilustrar este argumento, el documental muestra,
entonces, a otro equipo de oficiales a la caza de verdaderos criminales: narcotra -
ficantes, pedófilos, asaltantes a mano armada u hombres estafadores. “Somos una
nación compasiva y deberíamos estar orgullosos de ello [...]. Sin embargo, debería
haber un mayor escrutinio de todos los que quieran entrar al país para que nadie
se pueda colar”. Estos delincuentes que cruzan la frontera ilegalmente abusan de la
hospitalidad canadiense. Así, los espectadores atestiguan no sólo las persecucio nes,
sino también los cateos, en busca de papeles, en el cuerpo de personas que apa ren -
 temente son sospechosas. Cabe señalar que en este documental aún no se habla
de la sospecha como regla ante cualquier persona de esta nacionalidad o aquella
raza, como sí sucederá en textos posteriores al 11 de septiembre.
La voz en off afirma que “la ley debe aplicarse con imparcialidad”, porque, como
el video nos permite ver, hay una distancia enorme entre arrestar criminales y
arrestar familias que inmigraron por motivos de mejora económica y que están dis -
puestas a trabajar y a vivir conforme a las leyes canadienses.
El tono del documental desea concientizar al espectador de que la ilegalidad de
un inmigrante no necesariamente equivale a la criminalización de éste; y a lo largo
de su exposición modula las diferencias entre las personas que migran, sus motivos
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y la invisibilidad a la que su condición los obliga. Por ello, cuando se trata el tema de
las redadas en las fábricas, la narradora las considera un mal necesario, dado el incre -
mento de la contratación de inmigrantes ilegales en aquéllas. “Se dise minan rápida -
mente en nuestra economía, trabajando horas largas y baratas, tal como lo hicimos
nosotros cuando recién llegamos aquí”, afirma incómoda la voz en off, mientras es -
cuchamos también a los oficiales de inmigración cuestionarse sobre si se trata de
una situación justa. La imparcialidad no siempre resulta fácil. Los oficiales de inmi -
gración tienen conciencia de la difícil situación de las personas a las que arrestan. 
En estas escenas, los inmigrantes son retratados como víctimas de los emplea -
dores que se aprovechan de su situación, en tanto que no pueden exigir que sus
derechos laborales se cumplan ni pueden quejarse cuando ocurren estas viola cio -
nes. “Nos echamos sus sueños en el bolsillo, indulgentes de nuestra avaricia; ¿qué
los protege de nosotros?”, se pregunta una vez más la narradora.
En una situación ambigua, los productores del documental optan por una vi -
sión crítica que permite que el espectador cuestione los resultados de una política
de migración que se endurece y que crea un clima empático con los inmigrantes,
aunque sean ilegales. En este momento de la diégesis, el documental ha logrado
su meta: hacernos saber que los inmigrantes sin papeles no son criminales y que
los oficiales conscientes tienen una labor muy compleja.
El caso de José y Lucy, al presentarnos un caso particular con personas que tie -
nen nombre, apellido, lengua, nacionalidad e historia de vida, da cuerpo a los expe -
dientes que vimos en los archivos, mientras escuchamos su relato en español. El
hecho de que no existan subtítulos en inglés es otro más de los esfuerzos del docu -
mental por hacer una declaración de principios. Se nos presenta a José de es pal das,
mientras trapea un pasillo. La metáfora visual nos dice que José no puede mostrar
el rostro porque no tiene papeles. La pareja uruguaya tiene tres hijos y espera el
cuarto; son parte de quienes llegan a Canadá ya sea porque son pobres, ya “porque
tienen miedo y esperan, en silencio, que suceda un milagro”. Tuvieron que dejar su
país porque José era policía y alguien que quería vengarse de él lo andaba buscan -
do para matarlo. Lucy estaba haciendo el internado de medicina. En Canadá, ambos
trabajaban en servicios de limpieza. Su subempleo es calificado por la narradora
como parte de los “crímenes de la esperanza”.
Cuando arrestan a José y lo llevan a un centro de detención, la opinión de Lucy
es que probablemente existe una discriminación en contra de los inmigrantes,
que es inmerecida, porque ellos trabajan hasta por la mínima cosa que tienen. En
el ámbito de lo visual, el documental enfatiza el desaliento de estos inmigrantes
empobrecidos con metáforas claras: el pasillo que José trapeaba se oscurece y él
desaparece ante nuestros ojos.
La historia continúa en su desesperanza. A pesar de que las fianzas son caras,
la familia consigue pagar la de José, pero la deportación es aún posible. El caso de
José es al que el CCR se refería cuando afirma que algunos inmigrantes ilegales son
enviados a situaciones que ponen en peligro sus vidas. Y en ese momento la escena
se vuelve dolorosamente irónica: la toma es en cámara subjetiva, desde un colum -
pio en un hermoso y verde parque, mientras una niña canta “O Canada”. José habla
sobre el futuro de sus hijos, que han sido criados como canadienses, pero que, por
no haber nacido en el país, son ilegales. En la siguiente toma, la familia camina ale -
jándose de la cámara fija, mientras la narradora reflexiona: “vivir invisible mente, ima-
gina el peso del silencio”, mientras se desvanecen ante nuestra mirada. Lo último que
sabremos de ellos es que Lucy, que no goza del derecho a tener asis tencia médica,
ha parido: “Aquí hay ya esperanza, un niño que es canadiense”.
Pero el final del programa es incierto y, me atrevería a decir, no muy opti mis -
ta, puesto que el invierno ha regresado a cerrar el círculo al otro lado del lago. La
narradora concluye que, como el invierno, la nación invisible es gris: “divide nues -
tros corazones, ¿los echamos o les permitimos quedarse en la sombra?” ¿Sería
posible que, en algún momento, los inmigrantes se volvieran visibles sin que fuera
peligroso para ellos? Este documental no da ninguna respuesta. 
En The Undefended Border (2002) encontramos ya un cambio notable que
responde, por supuesto, al contexto político y de seguridad. El título, por ejemplo,
es una suerte de ironía en relación con el contenido del documental, mucho más
largo que su predecesor y con una estructura distinta. Se trata, en este caso, de
una serie de tres capítulos de una hora cada uno, escrita por Tracey y dirigida por
Raymont. Ahora la focalización radica totalmente en los oficiales de migración. Se
ha perdido, de alguna forma, el aliento crítico que daba la perspectiva de los dos
puntos de vista en Invisible Nation.
La estructura de los tres episodios que conforman esta miniserie es la misma:
cada uno se enfoca en una parte específica del trabajo de los oficiales de migración
y las escenas de acción se complementan con indicios de las vidas de los perso na -
jes, las cuales van de sus opiniones acerca de los entrenamientos sobre el multicul -
turalismo y la multiplicidad a sus actividades cotidianas y sus muy atentas y educadas
actitudes profesionales. Durante estas escenas, a veces aparecen subtítulos que
explican algunos procedimientos o que nos proporcionan información estadística
acerca de los inmigrantes ilegales, las solicitudes de refugio, las redadas y otros temas
pertinentes. Los subtítulos son una manera de eliminar el matiz de autoridad que
ten dría una voz en off que proveyera tales informaciones; sin embar go, el prólogo
que se repite en los tres episodios tiene un narrador que habla de la intensidad de
la mi gración en nuestros días y que nos lanza dos preguntas retóricas: “¿A quién que -
re mos aquí?, ¿a quién queremos mantener fuera?”.
Equívocamente, pues esto no coincide con el contenido de los episodios, la
presentación está editada de tal forma que da la impresión de violencia y emoción,
e inmediatamente nos hace pensar en los dramas policiacos de ficción.
Cabe mencionar, también, que en todos los capítulos, al menos uno de los ofi -
ciales de migración, señala que su familia emigró de manera legal a Canadá. Esto
indudablemente está incluido para hacer que el espectador tenga en mente que se
trata de un grupo de trabajo en el que el racismo resulta algo impensable, de una
institución que pertenece a un país que favorece la migración, al punto en que los
mismos inmigrantes se sienten orgullosos de trabajar para dicho país. Sin embargo,
Marian van der Zon (2000) observa que en Canadá el mito de la ilegalidad enfrenta
a los ciudadanos, “respetuosos de las leyes” que provienen de la misma etnia y que mi -
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graron “legalmente”, con los “otros”, los “deshonestos”, los que pretenden darle la
vuelta a los procesos de migración. El documental, entonces, presenta a estos dos
tipos de migrantes y, por tanto, construye la otredad desde la perspectiva de los guar -
dianes de la ley que vigilan para que ésta se cumpla.
El primer episodio de la miniserie se llama “Toughening the Border” y sus pro -
tagonistas son los encargados de revisar la documentación a la llegada de los extran -
jeros; estos guardias piensan que, en pro de la seguridad de Canadá, deben impedir
la entrada de quien no es conveniente para el país y, por tanto, el endurecimiento
de la indefensa frontera canadiense es indispensable. Las expresiones que utilizan
resultan muy significativas, en tanto que, por ejemplo, mantenerse alerta parece
sinónimo de sospechar o no tener confianza. 
El otro, el extranjero, por tanto, es un sujeto poco confiable. Es interesante
que, en los monitores que los oficiales consultan, podamos ver una lista de sujetos
buscados por terrorismo, todos de religión islámica, y que, también, veamos mu -
jeres con velos atravesando las aduanas. La aparición de estas imágenes, una tras otra,
después del discurso de la sospecha, deja en la mente del espectador la sinonimia
que se presenta entre musulmán y sospechoso. Reem Bahdi (2003) explica de qué
manera ha afectado a los musulmanes y árabes la práctica de realizar perfiles ra cia -
les en la lucha contra el terrorismo. 
Para los oficiales de inmigración en los puertos de entrada a Canadá, el entre -
namiento es importante, pero también lo es la primera impresión. Según Bahdi
(2003: 295-296), el perfil racial implica separar a una parte de la población de un
segmento mayor, con base en criterios específicos relacionados con el peligro y
que someten al subgrupo a un escrutinio mayor con el propósito de prevenir actos
de violencia, crimen o alguna actividad indeseable. Y, con base en la importancia de
la primera impresión, resulta imposible para el espectador no advertir determinado
sesgo o tendencia: se desconfía de la gente que proviene de ciertas áreas geográ fi -
cas y se asocia la pertenencia a la raza blanca o a determinada clase social (más alta,
por supuesto) con la “inocencia”. En el documental presenciamos el caso de una
oficial que interroga a dos mujeres: una tercermundista y otra de Europa orien tal.
Ingenua y abiertamente clasista, la oficial declara que esta última resultaba más con -
fiable porque sabía cómo llenar los papeles y cómo responder a las preguntas que
ella le formulaba.6
Los agentes que dan testimonio señalan que después del 11 de septiembre
es necesario que mantengan los ojos muy abiertos para separar a los buenos de los
malos; la línea en la que habitan no es sólo la frontera que defienden, sino también
la simbólica, la que separa a las personas que viven obedeciendo la ley de las que
6 En su tesis, Van der Zon (2000) hace un puntual análisis de la cobertura de los medios en el inci -
dente de las lanchas con 590 migrantes de la provincia de Fujian, en China, que llegaron a las costas de
Columbia Británica en el verano de 1999, y contrasta su representación con la de los 4 374 refu -
giados kosovares en la primavera de ese mismo año. El proceso de racialización en el caso de los chinos
hace que pasen de ser víctimas a delincuentes; mientras que al considerar que la raza blanca es el cen-
tro, los kosovares no sufrieron de categorización como parte de la otredad.
no lo hacen. Por tanto, su obligación es mantener a salvo a Canadá, libre de terro -
ristas, pero con la frontera abierta.
El segundo episodio de la miniserie se denomina “Immigration Task Force” y
documenta al grupo homónimo, conformado por agentes de migración y oficiales de
la Real Policía Montada, grupo creado en 1994 para atrapar criminales que están
ilegalmente en Canadá. Cuando un ciudadano canadiense realiza una denuncia
telefónica anónima, la fuerza actúa como respuesta a esa llamada. Según uno de los
oficiales entrevistados, las denuncias se basan, tal como se permite que los espec -
tadores concluyan, en sospechas que se derivan ya sea de la raza o de la nacionali -
dad. “Mucha gente saca conclusiones”; es decir, mucha gente realiza perfiles ra ciales;
o mejor dicho, existe el racismo en contra de los inmigrantes. Una vez que se ha
transpuesto la entrada al país, alrededor de cien mil migrantes ilegales —se infor -
ma en el documental— permanecen en el área de Toronto y hay que atraparlos.
El último de los tres capítulos, “End of the Line”, versa sobre la deportación, la
parte final del proceso que se lleva a cabo en pos de la defensa de la frontera y en
busca de la seguridad nacional. En este episodio, los agentes trabajan organizando
redadas en fábricas, por ejemplo, para detener trabajadores ilegales, quienes, para -
dójicamente, como una de ellos explica, llevan a cabo labores que nadie más quiere
hacer. A diferencia de lo que sucede en Invisible Nation, aunque la paradoja se se -
ñala, no se habla de los derechos laborales violados, por ejemplo. Los agentes tam -
bién buscan criminales de guerra. Situar una actividad junto a la otra le da a la
migración ilegal el estatus de crimen y, por tanto, no desautoriza el punto de vista
de los ciudadanos que hacen las denuncias telefónicas. Conforme el relato avanza,
nos enteramos de que muchos de los buscados son algunos de los veinticinco mil
llamados refugiados fallidos, personas que solicitaron la ciudadanía como refugia -
dos y, cuan do les fue negada, simplemente decidieron quedarse. El documental, al
constatar la cifra, sin dar un punto de vista, señala el “peligro” que implica la facilidad
con la cual se puede pedir asilo en Canadá.
En vista de que cualquiera que afirme que su vida estará en peligro en su país
de origen no puede ser deportado, algunos lo hacen y esperan que su caso se revise
en una corte especial, lo cual toma años, por lo que una de las oficiales de la corte
que fueron entrevistadas opina que el Acta de Inmigración debería modificarse,
pues otorga demasiados derechos a todos los residentes. Aunque el documental no
respalda este punto de vista, tampoco presenta otro que se le oponga. Así que pre -
senciamos detenciones justas e injustas; personajes que se resignan porque ya
lo esperaban, pero que explican que preferirían quedarse, en la mayoría de los casos,
para tener un mejor nivel de vida. Este último episodio muestra cómo culminan
las expulsiones “afortunadas” de Canadá. Concluye con un muy elocuente epílogo
de una agente, migrante escocesa ella misma, con lo cual el documental una vez
más da autoridad a los migrantes legales y deja sin voz a los otros, los ilegales. Lo que
la oficial desea no es impedir que la gente siga llegando, sino tener más control sobre
quien llega.
La agenda en este documental de White Pines después del 11 de septiembre
podría ser la del mal necesario: en algunos casos, el endurecimiento puede parecer
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contrario a un punto de vista humanitario de la migración, pero es necesario debido
a que la gente utiliza documentos falsos, miente, comete actos criminales y abusa
de las peticiones de refugio.
Como es posible advertir en la factura de los dos documentales realizados por
el mismo equipo de producción, la afirmación de que el 11 de septiembre modifi-
có más la zona fronteriza que todo el desarrollo histórico del siglo XX queda en evi -
dencia. También el hecho de que el perfil racial se ha vuelto una práctica cotidia -
na en las aduanas y puertos de entrada y que, tal como lo señala el Consejo Na cional
Antirracismo de Canadá (NARCC, 2007), este país ha esgrimido razones de segu -
ridad nacional para deportar personas que podrían sufrir tortura en sus países de ori -
gen, o cómo los gobiernos provinciales “siguen implantando medidas regresi vas,
recortes e implementan políticas injustas o inadecuadas que tienen un impacto
en detrimento de comunidades racializadas o de inmigrantes” (NARCC, 2007: 7).
Una serie de ficción y su ambigua lectura
El 4 de enero de 2004 se transmitió el primero de seis episodios de la miniserie
Human Cargo, filmada en Columbia Británica y Sudáfrica. En el único artículo aca -
démico que se ha escrito sobre la serie, McAllister (2008: 325-342) la incluye en
un género que ella ha denominado como “el drama de complicidad geopolí ti ca”.
Me interesa seguir de cerca el inteligente análisis de esta autora, pues me servirá
para probar que también aquí cabe una lectura ambigua en relación con el perfil
racial.
Según McAllister (2008: 312-313), la serie traza las maneras en que la inver -
sión global y la corrupción política conectan los destinos de individuos en el tercer
y el primer mundos, mientras critica el papel de Canadá en la crisis mundial de los
refugiados, con base en la tradición canadiense de los docudramas, que dramati -
zan situaciones basadas en hechos reales.
Son seis historias las que se entrelazan para formar la trama de la serie. La de
Nina Wade, política conservadora de derecha que pierde una elección intermedia
en Columbia Británica y que, al culpar a los inmigrantes de su derrota, como cas -
tigo recibe un puesto en la Junta de Refugiados, para mandarla al olvido. La de
Helen Wade, la joven bisexual hija de Nina, que se enfrenta a sus puntos de vista
reaccionarios y parte de Canadá para trabajar en una ONG en un campo de refugia dos
en Burundi, donde, por exceso de buena voluntad, causa la muerte de varios niños
por haberles dado maíz de mala calidad y la de su propio amante (de quien queda
embarazada), por querer enfrentarse a las milicias tutsis. 
Otra historia es la de Jerry Fischer, abogado especialista en inmigración, que
trabaja defendiendo peticiones de refugio, y que en algún punto de la historia se
ve obligado a optar entre su ejercicio profesional y su familia. 
La de Moses Buntu, profesor hutu de primaria que sufre la persecución cuan-
do estalla en su aldea la guerra civil entre los hutus y los tutsis y que, al ser captura -
do por las milicias tutsis, se ve obligado a trabajar como esclavo en una mina de
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propiedad canadiense, donde éstas son una suerte de guardias blancas, y logra huir
para pedir asilo en Canadá.7 La de su hermana, Odette Kaba, casada con un tutsi,
quien es arrastrada a un campo de refugiados, donde su bebita muere por el maíz
contaminado y su hijo mayor se convierte en un pequeño asesino reclutado por las
milicias tutsis. 
Por último, la historia de Naila Zalmi, inmigrante ilegal afgana que, en la prime -
ra escena de la miniserie, llega a Canadá como única superviviente en la caja de un
tráiler (donde además de ella hay cuatro niños hondureños y su cuñado muertos),
en busca de su marido, otro inmigrante ilegal.
Editada para tener un ritmo veloz, adecuado a las series de suspenso político,
la presentación de los personajes nos indica que la migración a Canadá es el hilo
de la acción principal en la trama. El marcador geográfico contextual en que se lee
“Canada Welcomes You! Super-natural British Columbia” nos lo indica. Así pues,
se abre la puerta a la ambigüedad.
McAllister señala que los hilos de la acción a los que se les da mayor peso na -
rrativo son los de Nina y Moses, quienes culminarán en su encuentro en la Junta
de Refugiados, con Jerry como abogado de éste, y se enfoca en ellos para probar que
la serie subvierte las convenciones de blanco=bueno, otro=malo, y que su efec ti -
vidad se basa en hechos controversiales de confrontación racial que han su cedido
en Columbia Británica.
Sin embargo, le toma sólo un párrafo despachar la parte correspondiente a la
historia de Naila Zalmi y Youssef su esposo, la cual abre la puerta a la ambigüe-
dad del perfil racial, la discriminación y el racismo que la serie critica.
Scot Wortley (2006) se pregunta si el público percibe la existencia de la aplica -
ción del perfil racial y si será posible eliminarlo. No parece ser así. En la actuali dad,
como ya se señaló anteriormente (Badhi, 2003; NARCC, 2007; CCR, 2005; 2006), el
grupo más discriminado es el de los musulmanes y los árabes. En Human Cargo,
Naila es sospechosa porque es una inmigrante ilegal, porque es la única supervivien -
te de una carga humana, porque es musulmana, porque le miente a la autori dad, por -
que guarda secretos. El abogado Jerry Fischer es el único que, indebidamente, cree
en ella. Un indicio de que la desconfianza es acertada es que, en un cobertizo lleno
de inmigrantes ilegales explotados por algún patrón canadiense anónimo, esconde un
disco. Si el espectador ha olvidado este detalle, pensará, inge nuamente como el abo -
gado, que de verdad se trata únicamente de una mujer que busca a un marido que
tuvo que huir de su país por causas desconocidas y de la cual se piensa mal solamen -
te por su nacionalidad, religión y raza. Craso error. La trama nos descubre que las
sospechas eran acertadas. Cuando la mujer al fin halla a su esposo, el espectador des -
cubre que está asociado con un grupo fanático que piensa destruir Canadá y ella no
sólo es el vehículo para entregar los planes a los terroristas, sino también la causa tan -
gencial por la que el abogado, quien la auxilia para cruzar por un cuerpo de agua hacia
Estados Unidos, es asesinado.
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7 Una vez que se le otorga el asilo, el subempleo en el que vive es otro signo más de que las políticas
del Estado canadiense no garantizan los derechos ni de los inmigrantes legales (Galabuzi, 2005).
Marian van der Zon (2000: cap. 3) señala que, en el proceso de racializar al otro,
criminalizándolo, se perpetúan narrativas que yo asociaría con la creación de este -
reotipos en la ficción. La autora afirma que los mitos nacionales canadienses nie -
gan que el racismo existe y que, con base en la seguridad de su pureza e inocencia,
eliminan la culpa que el racismo les produce. La raza —concluye— se convierte
en algo separado de ellos; el problema no radica en la “blancura”, sino en cómo se
considera al “otro”.
Entonces, es paradójico que una serie que pretende estudiar de manera seria,
crítica, no convencional y desprejuiciada (y que en varios niveles lo logra) el racis -
mo, el sentimiento antiinmigrante, caiga, de manera ingenua y casi pura, precisa -
mente en lo que condena.
Como bien señala McAllister (2008: 324), el final abierto en pos del holo -
causto musulmán es reaccionario. La ambigüedad permea entonces el resultado y
nos hace dudar de las ONG, las juntas de refugiados, la objetividad de los juicios
y la inexistencia del perfil racial.
Un mínimo epílogo
Con un dejo de humor, el documentalista y productor de la serie The Border—para
un análisis más detallado de esta serie, véase Martínez-Zalce (2011)—, Peter Ray -
mont, dijo que no hay tal cosa como una mala reseña (Vlessing, 2010), aunque
ésta llegue demasiado tarde,8 en referencia a los cables de Wikileaks,9 en los que
un funcionario estadunidense se quejaba de que la CBC utilizaba tensiones entre
Canadá y Estados Unidos, relacionadas con las políticas fronterizas, y las confron -
taciones con el Departamento de Seguridad Nacional, para subrayar las diferen -
cias entre los canadienses y los estadunidenses, a expensas de estereotipar a estos
últimos.
Resulta irónica la lectura unidimensional del diplómatico, puesto que en esta
serie de la productora White Pines hay deslices similares a los que se advierten
tanto en The Undefended Border, como en Human Cargo, los cuales perpetúan la
idea de que los musulmanes son sospechosos o culpables de lo que los perfiladores
raciales les han achacado. 
La producción de estereotipos en la narrativa comunica que determinados sec -
tores de la población, entre los casos aquí estudiados el grupo de los inmigran tes ile -
gales, constituyen una amenaza; paralelamente, Badhi (2003: 312) señala que el
perfil racial permite que quienes toman las decisiones en los gobiernos enfo quen su
tiempo y sus recursos en un segmento específico de la población que les parece más
riesgoso que otro; después del 11 de septiembre, árabes y musulmanes caben en
este segmento. Sin embargo, cabría preguntarse por qué, sabiendo que el te rro ris -
ta era un hombre blanco, después de los atentados de 1995 en la ciudad de Okla -
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8 Después de tres temporadas, la serie fue cancelada en 2010.
9 Éstos se incluyen en el apartado de las fuentes del presente artículo.
homa, en los que hubo 169 muertos, no se produjo un discurso acerca de los blan -
cos buenos y los blancos malos, sino que se le consideró un individuo daña do, por
lo que sus actos nunca se pensaron como representativos de todo un grupo racial.
Decir que este tipo de sutilezas parecen estar lejos de las interpretaciones de
quien redactó los comunicados que aparecieron en Wikileaks, podría no sorpren -
dernos; que documentalistas y guionistas —que obviamente no son conservado -
res— las pierdan de vista, involuntariamente, resulta, eso sí, preocupante.
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The first decade of the twenty-first century, particularly since 9/11, has been marked
by popular demands for more and more restrictive immigration policies across the
globe. Recent events such as the deportation of undocumented migrants in France,
the new 2010 Arizona immigration law, as well as swelling popular support for
draconian immigration policies proposed by diverse political constituencies such
as the Tea Partiers in the U.S. are all emblematic of this conservative turn. While
multiple concerns may be fueling the rising ambivalence toward immigration, one
important source of anxiety across these different contexts is the percep tion that mi -
grants pose a financial burden to the state. Concerns about the type, extent, and
timing of state-provided social services for immigrants —if any— re flect deep ide-
ological divides in many countries. On the one hand, opponents of welfare programs
that include immigrants as beneficiaries claim that these programs not only attract
immigrants (the “magnet hypothesis”), but also create a “culture of dependency” and
are an unsustainable strain on the state (Bauer and Zimmerman 2002; Borjas 2002;
Brucker et al. 2001). In contrast, others recognize the importance migrants have
on host societies’ economies and the future sustainability of the welfare system (Cor -
nelius, Tsuda, Martin, et al. 2004; Facchini and Mayda 2007). This variation among
institutional environments calls for the investigation of the relationship between the
welfare state and practices associated with entitle ment, exclusion, and overall polit-
ical and social membership (Geddes 2003, 152).
In this article, I engage with the scholarly debates concerning the problem-
atic relationship between the state and democratic institutions, as well as inter-
national migration through the lens of welfare state regimes (see Bloemraad 2006;
Bloemraad, Korteweg, and Yurdakul 2008; Bommes and Morawska 2005; Brettell
and Hollifield 2000; Castles 2007; Castles and Miller 2003; Cornelius et al. 2004;
Cornelius and Rosenblum 2005; Freeman 2007; Geddes 2003; Givens 2007;
Hollifield 2000 and 2007; Messina 2002 and 2007; Messina and Lahav 2005). In
particular, I examine whether individuals’ perceptions of the sustainability and
viability of the welfare state system can be predicted by the impact immigrants
are perceived to have on the economy and welfare system: what has been com-
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monly referred to as “welfare chauvinism” (Freeman 2009). Welfare chauvinism is
defined as resentment of immigrants who are perceived to take natives’ jobs, cause
unemployment, and are overall seen to benefit from more than contribute toward
the welfare state system (Crepaz and Damron 2009). If indeed there is a relationship,
this raises the question of whether the welfare state can intervene and reduce pro -
tectionism, anti-immigrant sentiment, and overall levels of prejudice. Do exten-
sive, universal versus targeted means-tested welfare provisions schemes have the
capacity to reduce protectionism? The investigation of whether countries with
highly developed corporatist welfare state programs (such as Sweden and the Nether -
lands) are more, less, or just as likely to express protectionism than countries with
more restricted welfare policies, where an ethos of individual res ponsibility pre-
vails (such as Britain), can shed light on the relationship between immigration and
the future of the European social policy model. Central to my analysis is the ex plo -
ration of whether rich institutional environments (e.g., the policies, programs, and
legislation enacted by the welfare state) are key contextual predictors in assessing
the relationship between different forms of threats to and perceptions of the wel-
fare state. If so, institutional and political environments set the stage for specific
inter-group relationships to take place, and, as such, variabi lity across institutional
environments will necessarily produce differences in public opinion about immigra -
tion. At the same time, within countries, it is not clear whether groups who benefit
differently from welfare state programs (such as the unemployed, the disabled, the
elderly, etc.) are more or less likely to express approval of protectionism. Thus, build-
ing upon the work of Freeman (2009) and Crepaz and Damron (2009), the analysis
herein provides empirical evidence for whether countries with more advanced and
universal social protection systems not only avoid stigma tiza tion and social cate-
gorization, but are also more likely to foster social cohesiveness and actually help
socially integrate immigrants into host societies. The findings are particularly rel-
evant in light of a recent study by Koopmans that suggests a very different picture:
one in which labor market participation of migrants is lower in countries with more
robust welfare state systems. In the Netherlands and Sweden, countries that have
embraced multicultural integration policies, migrants’ participation in the labor mar-
ket is lower compared to Austria, Germany and Switzer land which traditionally “chose
to retain high barriers to migrants becoming full citizens and made residency right
dependent on performance in the labor market and the absence of a criminal record”
(2010, 20). Koopmans further shows that in countries with a limited welfare state
such as the UK, immigrants are better off in terms of labor participation (2010, 21).
This article approaches these questions from two angles. First, the relation-
ship between people’s perceptions of the welfare state and threats to it is assessed at
the individual level. Thus, classic individual-level theories and controls are evalu-
ated as they are tied to different forms of prejudice and protectionism (Quillian
1995). For example, I examine whether individuals’ socioeconomic characteristics
shape their perceptions of the welfare state. What are the public responses to the
coverage, sustainability, and future of the social protection system as host societies
become more multiethnic? 
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Secondly, institutional factors are tested vis-à-vis other contextual effects
(such as a country’s economic conditions) that may be associated with processes
regarding the development of welfare state policies and their relationship to per-
ceptions of immigrants. Welfare states are defined as “powerful institutional forces
embodying ideas and practices associated with inclusion, exclusion, membership,
belonging, entitlement, and identity” (Geddes 2003, 152). The approach used
assumes that individuals’ public perceptions are expected to vary across countries
depending on institutional characteristics, more specifically the type of welfare state
regimes each country has. Esping-Andersen (1990) argues that institutional struc -
tures have historically resulted from class- and ethnic-based social movements
leading to forms of collective action and solidarity whose outcome is specific insti -
tutio nal welfare regimes. Institutional arrangements that arise from these class-based
social movements will lead to solidarity (and social capital) and ultimately affect
the ways migrants become incorporated into the host society. 
By introducing the institutional dimension, the relationship between percep-
tions of economic and political threats posed by immigrants and perceptions of the
welfare state can be better captured as a result of the existence or lack of a robust wel-
fare state system. From this perspective, types of welfare regimes (and the poli cies
aimed at regulating social inequalities) may intervene in shaping public attitudes
toward immigration. Thus, expenditure levels for social protection systems will help
explain the interaction between perceptions of welfare state policies and the emer -
gence of new forms of immigrant threat. Overall, the question guiding this analy-
sis focuses on whether a relationship between micro-level predictors of protec-
tionism and perceptions of the future of the welfare state are mediated or not by the
development of welfare state policies. 
Immigration and Welfare State Regimes
There is growing literature in the United States and Europe that examines the use
of welfare benefits by migrants (see, for example, Bauer and Zimmerman 2002;
Bean and Van Hook 1998; Borjas 2002; Freeman 2009). In this literature, one of
the key tenets is that as host societies become more ethnically heterogeneous, both
levels of support for welfare programs (Freeman 2009) and levels of generalized
social trust/social capital decrease (Putnam 2007). Since liberal demo cracies have
the responsibility to provide social rights and benefits to their populations, includ-
ing immigrants (Soysal 1994), the available institutional framework shapes the
relationship between immigration and trust in institutions (Crepaz 2008; Crepaz
and Damron 2009). The existing literature thus demonstrates that immigration
and ethnic heterogeneity often become an obstacle for the development of robust
welfare systems (Alesina and La Ferrara 2002; Alesina and Glaeser 2004; Bay and
Pedersen 2006). 
Empirical research in the European context has been limited to Northern
European countries and has focused mainly on addressing migrants’ total partici-
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pation in the system and the assessment of the overall economic burden immi-
gration poses on specific welfare programs (Pedersen 2000). Bay and Pedersen,
for example, examined the relationship between views on unconditional income
redistribution policies and ethnic heterogeneity in Norway. They found that many
initial supporters of an unconditional basic income policy changed positions
when told it would include non-citizens living in Norway (2006, 432). Along these
lines, Koopmans (2010, 8) argues that immigrants’ incentives for developing lan-
guage proficiency and improving human capital are lower in these societies and as
such they are characterized by a culture of dependency. From this perspective, robust
welfare state systems supposedly become a magnet (pull factor) as immigrants
tend to gravitate to countries with relatively good protection systems (Borjas 2002).
Over time, concerns also arise that continued immigration flows will endanger the
very financial existence of the welfare state system (Borjas 2002). Overall, this eco -
 nomic argument can be summarized as follows: countries with higher social inequa lity
are more attractive to skilled immigrants, whereas countries with generous welfare
states are more attractive to unskilled immigrants resulting in what Koopmans would
characterize as a “negative selection” process (2010). 
With the exception of a few studies (Alesina and Glaeser 2004; Crepaz and
Damron 2009; Facchini and Mayda 2007; Koopmans 2010), cross-national empi r -
ical research examining perceptions of welfare state systems and immigration is
scarce. Some work has focused on examining differences between the perceptions
of the poor in European countries and the United States (Alesina and Glaeser
2004). In a study examining the relationship between welfare determinants and
individual attitudes in Europe, Facchini and Mayda (2007) show that attitudes
among high income individuals toward unskilled immigrants are more negatively
affected by unskilled immigration only if taxes are raised to maintain per capita
accessibility to benefits. In contrast, individuals at the bottom of the income distri -
bution suffer more with unskilled immigration if taxes are kept constant and the
adjustment is carried out through a reduction in per capita transfers. Based on this
evidence, I ex pect differences between perceptions of immigration (unskilled
and/or skilled) among individuals at the lower versus higher brackets of the income
distribution.
In a recent comparative study, Crepaz and Damron further confirm that
extensive welfare states vis-à-vis residual welfare states are in a better position to
absorb immigrants and reduce overall levels of welfare chauvinism (2009, 456).
Implicit in these findings is the assumption that an understanding of individuals’
opinions about welfare warrants an understanding of their perceptions of those
more likely to become welfare recipients. Building upon this past work, I argue that
bridging the gap in the social science scholarship focused on immigration and wel -
fare states requires a comparative framework to study cross-country differences in
the institutional determinants that explain individual attitudes about immigration
and immigration policies. Before setting out several hypotheses, a cha racteri za tion of
the different types of welfare state regimes is in order.
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TYPES OF WELFARE STATE REGIMES
Across Europe, different institutional and organizational structures reflect the array
of social policy models regarding migrants’ social rights (Cornelius et al. 2004; Soysal
1994; Esping-Andersen 1990; Sainsbury 2006). Within the social sciences, numer-
ous scholars have proposed different typologies of welfare state regimes (see Arts
and Gelissen [2002] for an extensive literature review on this topic). Although not
addressing how different regimes deal with immigration per se and notwithstanding
some negative criticism, Esping-Andersen’s 1990 seminal work has provided a useful
typology, identifying three types of welfare state regimes: liberal, con servative-cor po -
ratist, and social democratic. Castles and Mitchell identified four types: liberal, con -
servative, non-right hegemony, and radical (1993). Other scholars have further clus-
tered countries by different types based on entitlements (Arts and Gelissen 2002). 
With regard to immigration and welfare state regimes, Sainsbury (2006) esta b -
lishes a three-pronged classification: 1) the liberal inclusive model (e.g., the United
States) characterized by bestowing citizenship on the basis of birthplace criteria
(ius solis); 2) the conservative model based on exclusionary rights (e.g., Germany)
derived from lineage (ius sanguinis); and 3) a social democratic inclusive model,
based on residence rights (ius domicile). Another classification of welfare state
regimes is specifically tied to international migration. Soysal (1994) provides a clas -
sification of European countries based on incorporation regimes. She distinguishes
between corporatist, liberal, and statist. Examples of these models are Sweden
and the Netherlands for the centralized collectivist corporatist model, Britain and
Switzerland for the individualist liberal-decentralized model, France for the state-
centered incorporation regimen, and Germany representing a model between the
statist and corporatist. A central tenet in Soysal’s classification is the variation across
countries in terms of migrants’ capacity to formally create advocacy groups that
seek formal political representation in the host society. Swedish civil society, for
example, directly supports numerous ethnic migrant organizations coupled with a
comprehensive funding scheme aimed at strengthening “migrant’s self-organization
and increasing contact and cooperation between migrants and Swedish institu-
tions” (1994, 91). While a similar institutional environment is found in the Nether -
 lands, a more limited funding scheme is provided in Britain and Switzerland. In
contrast, France does not directly support collective ethnic identity and organizing,
while in Germany, funding for organizations is available, but is channeled through
the local government (as opposed to the national centralized scheme in Sweden
and the Netherlands). Also worth noting is the fact that funds oriented to the
preservation of a migrant’s original culture, political activities, and representation, as
well as political adaptation (such as services to migrants), are more abundant in
social democratic regimes compared to the other models.
Soysal also notes that the corporatist model is characterized by the function
of corporate groups, such as faith-based organizations and occupational associa-
tions, which play key roles in incorporating new immigrants. Under this model,
immigrants obtain their social rights through these corporate groups. Hence, it is
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centrally organized and collectively oriented (1994). The liberal model does not
have a centralized administration or formal collective groups that play a role in
incorporation. Rather, the labor market is the main instrument of incorporation.
Even though a central authority determines the basic rules and process of incor-
poration, that authority does not play a significant role; instead, individual action
is the main source of incorporation, with help from private associations or local
groups. The statist model is opposed to the liberal model, as the state is seen as the
administrative unit that organizes incorporation, and the model does not have an
intermediary structure (and so, it is distanced from the corporatist model). As these
classifications are helpful for examining the relationship between immigration and
institutions, some scholars have questioned their theoretical and construct appli-
cability (Freeman 2006). In the analysis proposed here, I use public so cial benefit
expenditures as a percentage of GDP as an approximation of program matic prefer-
ences of different welfare states and move away from case-specific analysis in
attempting to validate these typologies. Before I undertake the empirical analysis,
I discuss the main theoretical influences informing the hypotheses.
From Threat to Perceptions of the Welfare State
One key proposition informing this study is that perceptions of the welfare state
are tied to dynamics of ethnic competition and conflict (Freeman 2009). I con-
ceptualize perceived immigrant threat as the belief that immigrants negatively
affect the well-being of the dominant group and this belief has an impact on indi-
viduals’ attitudes toward redistribution and the welfare state. The threat dimension
is also conceptualized as being strongly correlated to anti-foreign exclusionism and
discriminatory policy attitudes (Escandell and Ceobanu 2009; Pettigrew 2000).
Thus, perceived threat as well as cultural and symbolic threats shape host socie-
ty members’ attitudes toward immigrants’ modes of incorporation and their access
to benefits (Fetzer 2000a, 2000b; Quillian 1995). Multi-ethnic societies are thus
more likely to exhibit a lack of altruism toward others, especially if the welfare
beneficiaries are perceived as physically and socially different and are ultimately
seen as threatening collective well-being. 
A second theoretical influence comes from studies examining how more or less
expansive and universal welfare state regimes influence the relationship between per -
ceptions of threat and perceptions of the welfare state system (Crepaz 2008). The
scholars argue that protectionism, chauvinism, and pessimistic views of the fu ture of
the welfare state develop as a result of strong in-group identification. The lack of trust
and inter-group solidarity toward other groups (perceived as being less worthy and “un -
deserving” of state benefits) may also influence exclusionary attitudes toward re dis -
tribution (see also Van Oorschot 2008). Crepaz and Damron, for example, frame this
process in terms of prejudice and reliance on social categorizations that starkly
differentiates “us” from “them” (2009, 445). These social categorizations foster psy-
chological processes such that “real” threat, conflict, eco nomic competition, or even
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prior contact/experience with that particular group is not necessary to spark prej-
udice (Sears et al. 2000). Thus, limited welfare state regimes characterized by
means-tested policies, unintentionally single out “the needy,” ultimately creating
stigmatization that can lead to exclusionism. In contrast, more universal expansive and
inclusive welfare states foster solidarity across different racial, social, and class
groups who participate and benefit from the same state benefits. While social cat-
egorization stresses the important role that threats play in creating feelings of protec -
tionism and chauvinism with regard to social po licies, the benefits of universal wel-
fare states is framed as fostering trust and solidarity across groups. 
A third theoretical influence emanates from the public opinion literature on
immigration that puts the embedded nature of micro-level predictors in larger con -
textual frameworks center stage. Contextual factors may include the effects of ethnic
composition (e.g., minority group size) and economic infrastructure (e.g., eco-
nomic inequality), as well as their roles in shaping the relationships between clas-
sic individual predictors and anti-immigrant sentiment (Ceobanu and Escan dell
2008; Escandell and Ceobanu 2009; Quillian 1995; Kunovich 2002; Semyonov, Re -
bec ca, and Gorodzeisky 2006). In such scholarship, the inclusion of macro-structu ral
factors makes possible new ways of explaining variations in attitudes. Researchers
were able to test an array of propositions about the embedded nature of public re -
s ponses toward immigrants and immigration policies while controlling for individual-
level attributes. Studies have shown, for example, that liberal-democratic traditions
constitute a key contextual predictor for the emergence of new forms of anti-im mi -
 grant sentiment (Ceobanu and Escandell 2008; Coenders and Scheepers 2003;
Hello, Scheepers, and Gijsberts 2002), permissiveness of immi gration policies (Hjerm
2007), or the degree of religious heterogeneity (Hello, Scheepers, and Gijsberts
2002). I add to this contextual approach the ways micro-level predictors are embed -
ded within perceptions of welfare state regimes.
With the above theoretical trajectories in mind, I argue that more empirical
attention has to be given to group threat perceptions and their effect on percep-
tions of welfare systems (as mechanisms of redistribution). This is especially rel-
evant since contextual measures, such as ethnic diversity, may be playing a key role in
the development of these views. Building upon this, two very distinct propositions
can be formulated: 1) group threat is a powerful mechanism to explain individuals’
views about the future of the welfare state, and, 2) contextual measures such as
ethnic diversity, economic conditions, and size of the welfare state are mediating
factors explaining the relationship between group threat and perceptions of the
welfare state. Thus, I hypothesize the following:
H1: Immigrant group threat explains increased pessimistic views about the
future, extent of coverage, and sustainability of the welfare system.
H2: Pessimism about the future of the welfare state is lower in countries with
less ethnic heterogeneity.
H3: Pessimism about the future of the welfare state is lower in countries with
more robust welfare state systems.
Data and Measurements
Data for this study come from the 2009 Eurobarometer 71.3 (European Com mis -
sion 2009). The pooled dataset is comprised of 30 333 individuals. For the analy-
sis, I use 24 European Union member states: Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece,
Spain, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Austria, Por -
tugal, Sweden, Great Britain, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Li th -
uania, Malta, Poland, Slo vakia, and Cyprus. 
The analysis uses one dependent variable, tapping an index of perceptions of
welfare (0-1), combining five questions: “At the moment, when you think of the
future of your pension, would you say that you are…? Very confident, somewhat
confident, not very confident, and not at all confident”; “For each of the follow-
ing, please tell me whether you think it applies to the social welfare system of your
country: a) provides enough coverage; b) could serve as a model for other countries.”
These same questions were asked about the future: “Let’s think now about what
the [insert NATIONALITY] social welfare system will be in 2030” (see Table 1). Results
yielded a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.67 for the dependent variable.
Two key independent variables are operationalized to measure perceptions of
group threat: 1) a dichotomous measure based on respondents’ agreement with
the statement, “We need immigrants to work in certain sectors of the economy,”
where 1 refers to disagreement and 0 agreement (see Table 1). The key indepen -
dent variable measuring group perceptions is operationalized as a dichotomous
variable based on each respondent’s opinion of the statement, “The presence of
people from other ethnic groups increases unemployment in [our country].”  For this
second measure, to ensure that both variables are coded in the same direction,
1 refers to agreement and 0 refers to disagreement. Moreover, the former measure
captures the individual’s attitudes toward immigrants in Europe, and the latter
taps an overall measure of prejudice toward ethnic groups. The analysis uses three
additional individual-level variables regarding labor force status (“employed,” “un -
employed” (reference category), “students,” “retired” and “never in the labor force”).
Control variables were used, such as “political stance” (1-7 scale), whether the re -
s pondent lives in a rural area, and several socio-demographic variables such as “age”
and “sex”; respondent age upon completion of education was also transformed as
a dummy measure where 1 was “college educated,” and 0, “no college education.”  
Aside from the individual-level variables, the analysis uses a series of macro-
level measures to assess countries’ institutional environment, based on the official
national statistics offered by the Eurostat. The direct measure for the welfare state
regime is the total “social protection benefits” expenditure (as a percentage of the
GDP). This measure includes health care, pensions, unemployment, and other social
transfers. Regardless of whether migrants have access to these benefits or not, which
varies across countries, the goal is to assess the overall size of the welfare state re -
gimes in European Union countries. Two additional macro-level measures are
included in the analysis: the first seeks to tap ethnic heterogeneity and immigrant
composition of EU countries by using a proxy, the percentage of citizens from
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TABLE 1 
QUESTION WORDING AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
FOR THE INDIVIDUAL LEVEL VARIABLES
Variable Description Mean S.D.
Welfare state Mean index of the following four items:a .57 .23
confidence For the following please tell me whether 
you think it applies to the (NATIONALITY):
Provides enough coverage
Could serve as a model for other countries
Let’s now think about what the 
(NATIONALITY) social welfare system 
will be in 2030. In your opinion:
Provides enough coverage
Could serve as a model for other countries
At the moment, when you think of 
the future of your pension, would you say   
that you are…? 
(1) Very confident, somewhat confident, not  
very confident, (0) not at all confident
Perceived group We need immigrants to work in certain 
size sectors of  the economya .48 —
The presence of people from ethnic groups 
increases unemployment in 
(OUR COUNTRY) a .58 —
Political stance In political matters, people talk of 
“the left” and “the right.” How would you 
place your views scale on this scale (1-7)? 5.43 2.29
Unemployed Labor force status: unemployedb .09
Students Labor force status: studentsb .08
Retired Labor force status: retiredb .28
Never in work force Labor force status: never in labor forceb .07
Employed Labor force status: employedb .47
Rural Would you say you live in a rural area? .37
Education How old were you when you stopped .27
full-time education?b   (=1)
Gender Respondent’s sex is maleb .45 —
Age Respondent’s age (years) 47.42 18.22
Marital status Could you give me the letter 
which corresponds .54
best to your own current situation?
NOTES: a Measured as follows: Agreement to disagreement. b Dichotomous variable (yes or no).
SOURCE: Eurobarometer 2009.
non-EU countries; the second is the aggregate-level control to capture disparities
among countries and reflect economic circumstances measured through the per
capital gross domestic product (“economic condition”).
MODEL
Using hierarchical modeling, the analysis estimates several models of perceptions
about the future of the welfare state as being determined by micro- and macro-
level variables. Table 2 reports the results of these models for the dependent variable
used. In Table 2, Model 1 and 5, I test for the random intercept effects without
any predictors at the macro level. This can be written mathematically as 
(1)
where Yij is the response of an individual i (i = 1, 2,…, nj) in the jth (j = 1, 2,…, J)
country on the dependent variable perceptions of the welfare state; Xqij (q = 1,
2,…, 13) is a level-1 predicting variable q for case i in unit j; betas are level-1 coef-
ficients (b0j the intercept andbqj is a vector of slopes); and rij is a level-1 residual. 
In Table 2, Models 4 and 5 include several parameters at the macro level, and
enable a testing of hypothesis 2 and 3. Mathematically, the model can be written
as follows:
(2)
whereb0j is the intercept estimated in equation (1); W0sj (s = 1, 2,…, 5) is a level-
2 predicting variable or interaction term;g00 is a level-2 intercept;g0s is the vector of
slopes for the estimated level-2 predicting variables; and u0j is a level-2 random
effect. Table 3 introduces hypothesis 3 and tests for the cross-level interactions,
expressed mathematically as
(3)
whereb1j is a vector of slopes estimated in equation (1) corresponding to the
three level-1 variables measuring perceptions of the welfare state; W1mj is a level-2
predicting variable (the direct and indirect measure for the institutional environ-
ment and other macro level controls);g10 is a level-2 intercept;g1m is a vector of
Yij = !0 j + !qj
q=1
13
! *Xqij + rij ,
!0 j = " 00 + " 0s
s=1
3
! *W0sj + u0 j ,
!1 j = " 10 + " 1m
m=1
3




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































level-2 slopes; and u1j is a level-2 random effect. The overall equation for all the
cross-level interactions can be expressed as follows:
(4)
wherebqj (q = 2,…, 10) is a vector of slopes estimated in equation (1) correspon -
ding to the level-1 control variables; W1j is the level-2 predicting variable;gq0 is a
vector of level-2 intercepts;gq1 is a vector of level-2 slopes; and uqj is a level-2 ran-
dom effect.
Results
Prior to estimating the multilevel models, bivariate analyses in Charts 1 to 3 assess the
association between the mean attitudinal confidence level about the future of
the welfare state and the three key macro-level measures in the 24 EU countries
analyzed. Some clear patterns emerge in these charts. For example, Chart 1 repre -
sents the bivariate relationship between per capita GDP and the mean level of con-
fidence about sustainability and coverage and the future of the welfare state. 
!qj = " q0 + " q1
q=2
13





























CONFIDENCE IN THE FUTURE OF THE WELFARE STATE BY GDP PER CAPITA
KEY: Belgium (BE), France (FR), Austria (AT), Italy (IT), Poland (PL), Czech Republic (CZ), Cyprus (CY),
Portugal (PT), Denmark (DK), Latvia (LV), Germany (GE), Lithuania (LT), Estonia (EE), Luxembourg
(LU), Slovakia (SK), Ireland (IE), Hungary (HU), Finland (FI), Greece (GR), Sweden (SE), Spain (ES),
Netherlands (NL), United Kingdom (UK)
SOURCE: European Commission (2009).
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First, the dependent measure shows great variability when it comes to assessing
confidence in the future of the system. As expected, there is a positive association
be tween per capita GDP and confidence in the future of the system. Especially rel-
evant is the confirmation that Northern European countries such as Denmark,
Finland, the Netherlands, and Austria are clustered together with the highest mean
confidence levels about the system. Also relevant in Chart 1 is the fact that Eastern
European countries, for the most part, are clustered together at the bottom in terms
of confidence levels. Luxemburg stands alone as it has the highest per capita GDP, but
remains close to the median level of confidence toward the welfare state. Inte r -
estingly, France and Ireland show relatively low levels of confidence in the future
of the welfare system as compared to other countries with higher GDP levels.
A less clear pattern of association is presented in Chart 2, which displays the
relationship between the percentage of non-EU citizens and mean confidence
levels concerning the future of the welfare state. As the measure is just a proxy of
ethnic heterogeneity, it is hard to discern a specific trend; however, three Northern
European countries (Finland, Denmark, and the Netherlands) show a relatively
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Percentage of citizens of non-EU countries, 2008
CHART 2 
CONFIDENCE IN THE FUTURE OF THE WELFARE STATE
BY PERCENTAGE OF CITIZENS FROM NON-EU COUNTRIES
KEY: Belgium (BE), France (FR), Austria (AT), Italy (IT), Poland (PL), Czech Republic (CZ), Cyprus (CY),
Portugal (PT), Denmark (DK), Latvia (LV), Germany (GE), Lithuania (LT), Estonia (EE), Luxembourg
(LU), Slovakia (SK), Ireland (IE), Hungary (HU), Finland (FI), Greece (GR), Sweden (SE), Spain (ES),
Netherlands (NL), United Kingdom (UK)
SOURCE: European Commission (2009).
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of the welfare state. Along opposite lines, the UK, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Spain,
and Greece show relatively higher levels of ethnic heterogeneity coupled with
more skepticism about the future of the welfare system. The Eastern Euro pean
countries (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Lithuania, and Slovakia) contradict the for-
mal expectation, as these countries show the lowest levels of ethnic heterogeneity and
among the lowest in confidence in the future of the welfare system. Two outliers are
Estonia and Latvia, with high levels of non-EU-member citizens, par ticularly a large
Russian minority, residing there. Overall, ethnic heterogeneity seems to be associ-
ated with lower confidence levels about the future sustainability of the welfare state.
Chart 3 further illustrates the privileged position of northern European coun -
tries, as it displays the association between social protection benefit expenditures
as a percentage of GDP and overall levels of confidence in the welfare state system.
Sweden, Denmark, the Netherlands, Finland, and Austria are clustered together
in the top left corner of the graph since they score high on both measures. There is
a positive linear association between these two measures. Overall, investments in so -
cial protection benefits seem to translate into higher mean levels of confidence in
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CHART 3
CONFIDENCE IN THE FUTURE OF THE WELFARE STATE
BY SOCIAL PROTECTION BENEFITS (AS % OF GDP)
KEY: Belgium (BE), France (FR), Austria (AT), Italy (IT), Poland (PL), Czech Republic (CZ), Cyprus (CY),
Portugal (PT), Denmark (DK), Latvia (LV), Germany (GE), Lithuania (LT), Estonia (EE), Luxembourg
(LU), Slovakia (SK), Ireland (IE), Hungary (HU), Finland (FI), Greece (GR), Sweden (SE), Spain (ES),
Netherlands (NL), United Kingdom (UK)
SOURCE: Eurostat (n. d.).
tional tests to assess the direction of the causal relationship. To accomplish this
and determine whether these contextual measures are predictors of perceptions of
the welfare state, a series of hierarchical models are presented below. 
I tested hypotheses 1 to 3 for the effects of key independent variables at the
micro and macro level on mean confidence levels regarding the future of the wel-
fare state. Model 1 in Table 2 shows the random intercept model of key controls
—all the predictors at level 1 are allowed to vary at the intercept level. The effects
show that older, highly educated, married people as well as males are more confi dent
about the future of the welfare system than other social groups. Especially relevant is
the fact that compared to the unemployed, all the groups measuring different
objective economic positions in the labor market reported higher mean levels of
the dependent variable. In Model 2, I introduced a key control, political stance,
which interestingly did not yield statistically significant results. Thus, political con -
servatism does not seem to play a key role in predicting confidence levels regarding
the system.
In Model 3, I introduced the two key predictors of group threat. The results
are revealing, since both variables are statistically significant in predicting a change in
the dependent variable (p< .000). The first predictor has a positive effect, as those
who agree with the statement “we need migrants for certain sectors of our economy”
express higher confidence levels about the future of the system. The effect is neg-
ative (as expected) when respondents agree with the statement “the presence of
people from other ethnic groups increases unemployment.” This variable further
demonstrates the robust effects of the group threat measures. Higher perceptions
of immigrant threat seem to lower the confidence in the overall future of the sys-
tem. These findings confirm hypothesis 1. Model 3 shows that with all the micro-
level variables introduced in the model, the amount of explainable variance in the
dependent variable between countries is 13 percent.
In Models 4 and 5, I introduce the three contextual measures at the random
intercept level. In Model 4, results show that countries with higher GDP levels dis-
play statistically significant higher mean levels of confidence in the system and
reiterate the findings of the bivariate analysis in Chart 1. Similarly, the ethnic het-
erogeneity effect is also statistically significant in predicting lower mean confi-
dence levels regarding the future of the welfare state. These findings confirm
hypothesis 2, which supports the literature exploring the embedded nature of atti-
tudinal models. Model 5 adds the contextual institutional measure of expendi-
tures on social protection benefits (as a percentage of GDP) which did not yield
significant results in explaining the dependent variable (hypothesis 3). This effect,
however, is key for estimating the cross-level interaction effects approximated in
Model 6. This final model also assesses hypothesis 3 regarding whether group threat
perceptions are more or less salient in more or less robust welfare state regimes.
In Model 6, the random slope model displays the effects of group threat. These
effects are measured as interacting with the size of the welfare state (the contex-
tual measure of social protection benefits expenditure). The results show that
group threat (in terms of ethnic minorities affecting unemployment) is a stronger
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effect in reducing welfare state confidence levels in countries with robust welfare
state systems. The overall estimated levels of confidence seem to be higher for indi -
viduals who do not experience group threat (especially in countries with robust
welfare systems). In contrast, the effects of group threat in reducing confidence in the
welfare state are also stronger among people living in a country with a robust wel-
fare system. After introducing the macro-level variables, the overall amount of
explainable variance in the dependent variable between countries is 60 percent. 
Conclusion and Discussion
This article examines the hypothesis that confidence in the welfare system is
affected by individuals’ perceptions of the economic threat immigrants pose. The
results confirm that both measures used to assess perceptions of threat (immigrants
are needed in certain economic sectors and the perception that ethnic minorities
cause unemployment) are strong predictors of confidence levels in the future of the
welfare state. The data show that as societies become more multiethnic and plural,
individuals become more ambivalent about the future of the welfare state. Is wel-
fare chauvinism behind these perceptions? The conclusion of these findings seems to
corroborate that welfare chauvinism underllies these perceptions since pessimism
about the future of the system is greatly explained by the group threat factor. The
conclusion of these findings is important theoretically because it confirms that per -
ceptions of the welfare state and ethnic competition and conflict are interrelated.
From this analysis, I infer that protectionism is associated with pessimism about the
future in terms of coverage, pensions, and expenditures levels, while openness is
associated with optimism about these dimensions of the system. 
In addition to the group threat effect, the findings are theoretically relevant,
as they demonstrate the embedded nature of public opinion processes. Chart 4,
shows the effects of the cross-level interactions analysis reported in Model 6 in
Table 3. As societies become more ethnically diverse, the trend suggests more
skepticism about the future of the system. This not only confirms the group threat
hypothesis but also how the visibility of minorities triggers not necessarily “realis-
tic” perceptions of their impact on the host society. More alarmingly, the findings
suggest that as societies develop more robust welfare systems, perceptions of threat
seem to play a greater role in decreasing confidence in the system. This finding
partially confirms the conservative turn in Finland’s recent elections. Since the
results support the idea that predicted mean confidence levels toward the system
are higher in countries with robust welfare state systems, a reverse pattern occurs
among those who are more intolerant. In other words, intolerant individuals, or
those who perceive immigrants as posing a threat, are more likely to live in a country
with a robust welfare system.
The results further confirm an additional model (not reported in Table 2 due
to space constraints) that shows that the unemployed (compared to other occupa -
tional groups), and thus those who are more vulnerable, exhibit lower confidence
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levels about the future of the system in countries with robust welfare state systems.
These results seem to contradict Crepaz and Damron’s 2009 findings regarding
the leveling effects of expansive welfare systems. Rather, the results explained
here suggest that threat, one of the key predictors of the dependent variable, is more
salient in countries with robust welfare systems.   
Overall, these results go in the direction of previous research by Bay and
Pedersen (2006) in Norway based on inter-group solidarity. Ethnic competition
changes views about redistribution and confidence in the system. Moreover, the
results partially confirm that the unemployed are more vulnerable and express more
uncertainty in countries with a strong welfare state system, compared to employed
individuals in a country with low levels of social benefits expenditure. The results
thus seem to corroborate that in social democratic and corporatist countries, while the
predicted level of confidence in the welfare state is higher, among vulnerable pop-
ulations (e.g. the unemployed), the effects of individuals’ perceptions of threat are
more salient.
The existence of generous state and local resources and networks of support
for migrants may trigger negative feelings among the most economically vulnera-
ble in host societies. Investing in strong local and national services not only for
immigrant populations (such as universal programs to help settlement, language
classes, access to health care, etc.), but also for the native born through multicultur-
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to the multiple constituencies within the nation-state, the implementation of gov-
ernmental programs can lay the groundwork for greater social adaptation. From
the perspective of public opinion, the findings in this article corroborate that anti-
immigrant sentiment is lower in Western European countries compared to the
former Soviet bloc. Investing in strong social protection systems seems to be a good
way to reduce this gap.
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The conflation of immigration with terrorism in public political discourse across
post-September 11 Europe has challenged national governments to reconcile the
contradictions embedded within what hitherto had been a coherent policy equi-
librium. For most of the post-WWII period, this equilibrium was comprised of three
discrete dimensions: 1) economic: securing an adequate supply of foreign labor;
2) societal: successfully incorporating immigrants into the host societies; and 3) ex -
ternal safety: safeguarding national territorial borders. Indeed, until September 11,
Europe’s political elites could more or less assume that state decisions taken along
one of the aforementioned policy dimensions did not circumscribe decisions made
along others. However, with the inclusion of immigration in a new “security con-
tinuum” (Aradau 2001), the veracity of this premise is challenged. Specifically,
the balance of scholarly opinion has shifted from the view that Europeans are ill
informed about and/or largely deferential to the preferences of political elites on
immigration-related questions toward the conclusion that policy makers current-
ly forge immigration and immigrant policy in a super-heated political environment
within which their policy options are severely circumscribed by an attentive and
predominantly illiberal public (Bigo 2002; Karyotis 2007, 11).
Against the backdrop of this claim, this article poses and addresses two related
questions. First, has European public opinion become more illiberal on immigration-
related questions since September 11? Is it significantly less receptive to new immi -
gra tion and/or less accommodating toward settled immigrants than previously (Jennings
2005; Noelle-Neumann 2002, 95)? Second, does the opinion survey record de mon -
 s trate that European publics feel less economically, socially, and physically secure?
Have immigration-related issues become more “securitized” post-September 11?    
To address these questions, this article will go far back in the respective na tio n -
al public opinion records, paying special attention to the patterns of public atti-
tudes in Britain, France, and Spain. Why emphasize these countries? Moreover, why
conflate the aforementioned European experiences with the 9/11 U.S. tragedy? I offer
two justifications. First, the trauma of September 11, 2001, serves as a useful
proxy for the 1995 terrorist incidents in France, the July 2005 London bombings,
and the March 11, 2004, Madrid train attack. In each of these European coun-
tries a major terrorist event linked to immigration (however tangentially and/or
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rhetorically) either preceeded or followed September 11. In so doing, it potentially
prepared the groundwork for the experience of terrorism in these countries to be in -
terpreted —albeit retrospectively in the French case— by the public through the lens
of the U.S. experience. Specifically, it is often hypothesized that, for Euro peans,
September 11 has reinforced, although to varying degrees, the appropriateness of
viewing immigration-related issues through the prism of security (Guild 2003,
336; Soledad Saux 2007, 62). Second, because the events of September 11 and
their links to immigration carry a meaning for the British, French, and Spanish
publics that few other European publics can be expected to appreciate (Collyer
2006), we can reasonably assume that if public opinion on immigration-related issues
did not become more illiberal or more securitized for these publics, it is highly un -
likely that they did so among other Europeans.
Attitudes toward Immigration in Historical Perspective
On the basis of the evidence in the public opinion record, it is fair to conclude that
few policy areas have aroused greater apprehension and negativity among Western
Europeans during the past half century than immigration (Lahav 2004, 1176).
This is not to suggest that the public has always and everywhere been overtly hos-
tile to immigrants. Rather, it is simply to underscore that in contrast to other major
policy issues, public opinion is unusually consensual and negative on immigra-
tion-related matters. Since mass immigration began after WWII, relatively few
Europeans have supported it, and fewer still have embraced the social changes
that permanent mass immigrant settlement have visited upon the immigration-
receiving societies (Schain 2008a, 9).  
EARLY AND CONTINUING APPREHENSION
To be sure, post-WWII migration to Western Europe commenced under relatively
favorable economic, social, and political circumstances (Messina 2007, 52). The
first wave of labor migrants generally flowed against the backdrop of widespread
economic prosperity and popular and elite expectations that most migrants would
eventually return “home,” thus engendering the so-called “myth of return.” Partly
because of this myth, the original foreign workers were fairly well tolerated. 
The context in which the second wave of predominantly family migrants un -
folded was very different. By the mid-1970s the postwar economic boom had run
its course. Economic stagflation, high unemployment, and painful structural eco-
nomic adjustment converged to erode the generally permissive political and social
environment in which, for the most part, the first wave of foreign workers had been
received. Although economic conditions in Western Europe were better by the start
of the third wave of migration during the late 1980s, the end of the decade and the
beginning of the 1990s unfortunately coincided with a period of structural eco-
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nomic adjustment and persistently high unemployment. Compounding these dif-
ficulties were the lingering political aftershocks from the first two waves of immi-
gration. Indeed, by the time the third wave was peaking during the early 1990s,
Western European mass publics were not at all disposed to embrace it, despite
the positive economic contributions that immigrant workers continued to make
(Kuijsten 1997, 209-228).  
Even during its comparatively benign phase, however, public concern about the
fallout from mass immigrant settlement was evident across the major host countries.
In Britain, where the public opinion record is especially extensive, immigration-
related issues emerged during the 1950s as one of the most the most politically
charged areas of public policy. To illustrate: by the 1960s and 1970s more than 80 per-
cent of the public felt that too many immigrants had been admitted; moreover, in
1968, more than 25 percent identified “immigrants” as the most urgent problem
facing Britain (Messina 1989, 12-13). Indeed, so strongly did the British public resent
immigration during the late 1960s and early 1970s that a majority (56 percent) on
average agreed that immigrants should be encouraged to repatriate (Studlar 1974, 377).
Even during the late 1970s, i.e., after tens of thousands of migrants were already
long settled, 49 percent of Britons expressed the opinion that the government should
financially assist immigrants who were willing to return to their “country of origin”
(Gallup 1980, 310). Particularly ominous for long-term immigrant-native relations
were the results of seven opinion surveys conducted between 1959 and 1972, in which
on average, a plurality of respondents (42 percent) said that relations between “white
people and colored people” were “getting worse,” and 84 percent reported a “color
problem” in their district (Studlar 1974, 374). 
The British public’s dissatisfaction with mass immigration and permanent
immigrant settlement persisted throughout the early 1980s. In July 1981, a near
majority of the public (49 percent) expressed the view that Britain’s political parties
were not saying enough about immigration (Hastings and Hastings 1983, 386). In
the same month “immigrants/colored persons” were cited as “very serious social pro b -
 lems” by 56 percent of respondents, outranking other social problems including
drunkenness, pornography, heavy smoking, gambling, prostitution, and homosexuality
(Hastings and Hastings 1983, 438). A further 38 percent of respondents endorsed
repatriating immigrants as a solution to Britain’s “racial problems” (Hastings and
Hastings 1983, 444). From 1978 through 1990, either a plurality or a majority of
the public disapproved of the government’s handling of immigration in every pub-
lic opinion survey but one (King 2001, 179-180).         
How typical was the British public’s reception of early post-WWII immigration?
Although the opinion record elsewhere is less extensive, the evidence suggests
that the British experience was not unusual. In Germany, for example, 55 percent
of what researchers considered the attentive public in 1956 opposed allowing
Italian workers into the country (Noelle and Neumann 1967, 359). In 1964, a
plurality of respondents (36 percent) felt that foreign workers were a “serious
problem,” judging them to be “always after the girls” (42 percent), “loud” (39 per-
cent), “not very clean” (30 percent), and “often violent” (27 percent) (Noelle and
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Neumann 1967, 360-61). In 1975, 83 percent of Germans concurred that “foreign
workers will become a serious problem for us in the future” (Noelle-Neumann
1981, 288). Three years later, 73 percent of the public ranked the issue of foreign
workers as either “important” or “very important” (Gallup 1980, 277). Moreover,
either a majority or plurality of respondents in 1980 and 1984 endorsed the res pec -
tive statements that guest workers “should adjust their lifestyle to the German
lifestyle” (66/56 percent), “be sent home when jobs are tight” (53/41 percent), and be
barred from participating in all political activity (57/47 percent) (Hoskin 1991, 71).  
The German public’s continuing unease with post-WWII immigration and its
social fallout is perhaps best reflected in the results of two 1980s opinion surveys.
In the first (1980) half of all respondents agreed that “in the next year or two” ten-
sions between foreign workers and Germany would escalate (Noelle-Neumann
1981, 494). A second (1986) revealed that although most Germans (61 percent)
recognized the economy needed foreign workers, a supermajority (70 percent) never -
theless advocated that their numbers be reduced (Hoskin 1991, 72).         
If anything, the aversion to early post-WWII immigration was greater among
the French public. Half of all respondents surveyed in 1947 (Watson 1952, 20)
objected to the presence of Spanish, North African, and Italian immigrants in
France, and a near majority (47 percent) opposed the “idea” of immigration (Mauco
1950, 21). Four years later only half of all French respondents judged that settled
foreigners were “rendering services to the country” (Girard 1971, 834). Against this
backdrop of negativity toward mass immigration, a majority of the French public
in 1947, 1949, and 1965 —that is, at the very height of foreign worker contribu-
tions to the postwar French economy— opposed allowing a “certain number” of
foreigners to enter and settle in France (Girard 1971, 861).  
The French public’s apprehension about immigration and immigrants was fueled
by a fear that foreigners, particularly North Africans, black Africans, and Turks,
would not assimilate into French society. In a 1971 opinion survey, for example,
only 56 percent of respondents considered that foreigners in France would grad-
ually become French, while 35 percent expressed the belief that they would always
be different (Girard 1971, 840). Moreover, despite the fact that in 1971 less than
a quarter of respondents (23 percent) indicated that their particular neighborhood
was directly affected by immigrant settlement (Girard et al. 1974, 1021), a near-
majority (49 percent) agreed that the then-existing ratio of one foreigner for every
13 French people was “too high” (Girard et al. 1974, 1022). 
In comparison to the British and French, the reaction of the Spanish public
to mass migration to Spain during its take-off phase in the early 1990s was relaxed
and their reception of immigrants relatively tolerant. In contrast to most other
Europeans during this period, only a minority (25 percent) of Spaniards during this
period believed there were “too many” immigrants in their country (European
 Commission 1991, A35). Indeed, immigration barely registered on the Spanish
public’s issue agenda through the late 1990s; moreover, even at the start of the
current decade less than 10 percent of the public identified immigration as one of
Spain’s three major problems (Table 4).  
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Nevertheless, against this generally positive backdrop were several worrying
signs. First, beginning in 1992 and continuing throughout the decade, a majority
of Spaniards thought that the entry of immigrants from the less developed coun-
tries should be restricted (Díez Nicolás and Ramírez Lafita 2001, 159). Second,
in 2000 a supermajority of Spaniards (83 percent) endorsed the view that there
were either “too many” or “many” persons of other nationalities residing in the
country (Díez Nicolás and Ramírez Lafita 2001, 121). Third, most Spaniards felt
that immigration levels would only increase: almost 80 percent predicted that the
number of foreign immigrants would rise within five years (Centro de Inves tiga -
ciones Sociológicas 1999), a higher percentage than those foreseeing an increase
in the overall consumption of alcohol (55 percent) and illegal drugs (50 percent),
and nearly the same percentage of respondents as those who anticipated a rise in
the number of couples living together outside of marriage (81 percent). Finally, in
1996 and 2000 more survey respondents than not felt that migrants were being
received with “contempt,” “aggressiveness,” “distrust,” and “indifference,” rather
than with “friendliness” (Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas 1996-2008). 
PUBLIC OPINION BEFORE SEPTEMBER 11
Although public attitudes toward immigration and immigrants fluctuated some-
what in response to changing economic, social, and political conditions during the
late 1980s and into the 1990s (Coenders and Scheepers 2008; Kessler and Freeman
2005), they nevertheless remained mostly negative (Green-Pedersen and Krogstrup
2008). A large plurality of Europeans (46 percent) in 1988 endorsed the view that
the presence of non-European Community citizens in their country was a “bad thing,”
including either a plurality or majority of citizens in three of the six major Euro pean
immigration destination countries: Belgium, Denmark, and Germany (European Com -
mission 1988, 64). In France, a majority of respondents (58 percent) in 1984 concurred
with the statement that the proportion of immigrants in the population was too
large and an equal number (57 percent) in 1989 were “personally concerned” about
immigration (Lynch and Simon 2003, 164). In the Netherlands, a plurality (45 per -
cent) of persons surveyed in 1986 endorsed the prescription that all legal immi-
grants should be encouraged to repatriate (Moors, Van Dam, and Esveldt 1999). In
Italy, a plurality of respondents in 1987 (49 percent) and 1989 (43 percent) perceived
either “only” or “mainly” disadvantages to immigration; moreover, a majority (57/51 per-
cent) wanted immigration to be restricted (Bonifazi 1992, 32-33). 
With some exceptions, European public attitudes about immigrants and immi -
gration did not improve much during the 1990s (Semyonov and Raijman 2006).
As previously, a large majority (74 percent) of Britons perceived the future United
Kingdom either as a “multi-racial society with tensions” or one where “groups live
separately but in tension,” although in contrast to the 1959-1972 period, only a
minority (27 percent) of the public perceived that British race relations were “get-
ting worse” (Hastings and Hastings 1998, 463-464). In France, when asked to
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choose between either “integrating” immigrants or having them “depart,” a major-
ity of respondents chose the latter option in three surveys between 1990 and 1992
(TNS Sofres 2002). A majority of the French also endorsed offering “working
immigrants” financial incentives to return to their respective countries of origin
(Lynch and Simon 2003, 166). In the Netherlands, the 45 percent of respondents
advocating that all immigrants be repatriated in 1986 swelled to 48 percent in
1990 and 51 percent in 1994 (Moors, Van Dam, and Esveldt 1999). By 1998,
even larger majorities disagreed that “Muslims have a lot to offer Dutch culture”
(55 percent) while concurring that Western European and Muslim “ways of life
are irreconcilable” (53 percent) (Sniderman and Hagendoorn 2007, 23). In Ger -
many in 1991, a majority of respondents endorsed the statement that most politi-
cians worry “too much” about foreigners and “not enough about Germans” (Legge,
Jr. 1996, 520). In Italy, a robust majority (63 percent) agreed with the statement
that foreigners who had lived in Italy “for quite some time should eventually return to
their own country” (Bonifazi 1992, 32). 
During the 1990s, Europeans as a whole continued to hold the opinion that
there were “too many immigrants” in their country, although the percentage of res -
pondents endorsing this view either declined or stayed constant in 8 out of 13
countries surveyed in both 1991 and 1997 (Table 1). Interestingly, Britain, France, and
Spain were among the countries where the percentages declined. Un doubtedly
fueling the public’s aversion to immigrant numbers during the decade was its un -
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TABLE 1
VIEW THAT THERE ARE “TOO MANY” IMMIGRANTS, 1988-2000 (%)
Country 1988 1991 1992 1993 1994 1997 2000
Austria — — — — — 49.6 30.5
Belgium 42.9 56.6 53.0 53.7 57.1 59.5 54.5
Denmark 35.5 42.7 45.9 42.8 40.5 46.1 33.8
Finland — — — — — 10.4 17.3
France         44.6 55.8 51.5 55.6 55.1 46.1 42.0
Germany 48.1 54.9 55.0 59.5 40.1 51.8 43.2
Greece 19.1 28.6 45.1 57.4 63.9 71.0 58.3
Ireland 7.3 12.1 11.3 7.9 8.0 19.0 33.3
Italy 33.7 63.0 65.0 64.3 45.9 52.6 42.6
Luxembourg 30.0 20.3 32.1 20.6 23.0 32.8 23.3
Netherlands 30.0 44.1 48.7 47.3 47.2 39.6 41.3
Portugal 13.9 18.2 27.6 25.1 30.2 28.1 30.9
Spain 17.4 24.6 23.4 25.2 26.5 20.4 22.6
Sweden — — — — — 37.8 27.6
UK 44.5 54.1 50.1 50.2 42.4 42.3 44.1
EC/EU 37.4 50.5 50.0 51.6 43.5 44.5 39.9
SOURCE: Kessler and Freeman (2005, 831).
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easiness about the presence within their society of large numbers of persons of color
and, increasingly, different religious traditions. As reflected in Table 2, a substan-
tial percentage of Europeans continued to find the “presence of people of another
race disturbing” during the 1990s, an especially pervasive sentiment among Belgians,
Danes, and the French. Given this, it is not surprising that a fifth of European
Union citizens in 2000 endorsed the view that “foreigners should be sent back to
their country of origin” (Thalhammer et al. 2001).                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
Public Opinion after September 11
Did the events associated with September 11 transform public attitudes toward
immigration and immigrants? Did public opinion become more negative? As might
have been expected, European opinions about immigration and immigrants did
not improve after September 11 (Pew Research Center 2007, 28). Nevertheless, as
we will see below, it was not significantly transformed by the trauma of September 11;
nor did it radically change in Britain, France, and Spain as a consequence of these
countries’ respective domestic tragedies (Fetzer and Soper 2003, 256). Although
immigration-related issues became more salient after September 11, public attitudes
largely continued along the trajectories established years and, in some cases, de c -
ades earlier.   
TABLE 2
AGREE THAT THE “PRESENCE OF PEOPLE OF ANOTHER RACE
[IS] DISTURBING,” 1993-2000 (%)
% Foreign-
EB 39 EB 48 EB 53 Average Average Born Pop. Rank
Country 1993 1997 2000 Percent Rank 2000 Foreign Pop.
Belgium 21.6 22.3 26.7 23.5 1 8.4 3
Denmark 19.3 24 23.1 22.1 2 4.8 6
France 23.4 13.0 23.1 19.8 3 5.6 4
Austria — 22.2 13.8 18.0 4 9.3 1
Germany 15.2 13.7 16.8 15.2 5 8.9 2
Italy 12.8 13.9 14.2 13.6 6 2.4 10
Britain 13.6 12.0 13.5 13.0 7 4.0 8
Ireland 8.6 8.6 19 12.1 8 3.3 9
Sweden — 8.8 11.7 10.3 9 5.4 5
Netherlands 7.9 11.8 9.7 9.8 10 4.2 7
Finland 11.0 7.2 10.2 9.5 11 1.8 13
Portugal 8.3 5.4 11.5 8.4 12 2.1 12
Spain 10.7 6.4 5.6 7.6 13 2.2 11
Correlation between average rank and percent foreign rank = 0.75
SOURCE: European Commission (1993, 1998, and 2000).
More Salient?
Although it is reasonable to presume that European publics would perceive immi-
gration as more salient after September 11, according to at least one yardstick, this
does not seem to be so universally. As Table 3 demonstrates, the percentage of res -
pondents identifying immigration as a priority for either European or national public
policy actually declined in more EU countries than it increased between 2000 and
2003. Immigration also failed to become more salient in 6 of 15 member-state coun -
tries and in the EU as a whole between 1997 and 2003, a pattern which largely con -
tinues through to the present. Indeed, only 32 percent of EU citizens in 2008 expressed
the view that immigration should be made a priority during the 2009 European elec -
tion campaign, thus firmly esta blishing it as a second-order issue compared with
unemployment (47 percent), economic growth (45 percent), inflation (41 percent),
and crime (37 percent) (European Commission 2008b, 30).     
As might have been expected, immigration increased in salience among Britons
and Spaniards between 2000 and 2006, a period which conveniently brackets opinion
prior to September 11 and after the 2004 train bombings in Spain and the July 2005
terrorist events in Britain. However, inexplicably, its salience declined in France:
indeed, by 2004, the salience of immigration for French citizens (8 percent) was among
the lowest within the EU and only half the EU average. More over, after increasing as
a driver of vote choice in French national elections between 1984 and 1997, the immi -
gration issue diminished in importance in 2002 and 2004 (Schain 2008b, 127).
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TABLE 3
SALIENCE OF IMMIGRATION AS A POLICY ISSUE AMONG EUROPEANS, 
1997-2008 (%)
Trend Trend Trend 
Country 1997 2000 2003 2000-2003 2004 2006 2008 2004-2008 1997-2008
Austria 23 17 10 - 10 17 14 + -
Belgium 11 14 16 + 18 16 17 - +
Britain 18 20 32 + 41 32 35 - +
Denmark 15 13 25 + 23 27 18 - +
Finland 5 9 5 - 5 5 7 + +
France 15 13 11 - 8 11 7 - -
Germany 25 22 5 - 8 8 6 - -
Greece 2 16 6 - 6 3 4 - +
Ireland 6 9 10 + 12 11 5 - -
Italy 12 17 13 - 12 15 7 - -
Luxembourg 8 10 10 N 17 12 10 - +
Netherlands 8 16 8 - 16 16 18 + +
Portugal 2 3 2 - 2 3 2 N N
Spain 4 6 17 + 20 33 18 - +
Sweden 5 6 10 + 11 7 12 + +
EU 15 15 16 13 - 16 17 (11) - -
SOURCE: European Commission (1998, 2000, 2003, 2004, 2006, and 2008a).
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The extent to which immigration-related issues became more salient in Britain
after September 11 is clear in the data represented in Chart 1. As it indicates, immi -
gration-related issues generally fell below the threshold of greatest import during
the 1980s and 1990s; only in 2001 did they consistently rank among the most im por -
tant. Since 2001, however, their salience has soared, increasing more than twofold.
Indeed, 30 percent or more of respondents viewed them as among the most salient
in 37 different monthly surveys between September 2001 and December 2007.
By contrast, before September 2001, immigration failed to achieve this threshold
of salience in any month during the previous 27 years (Ipsos MORI 1974-2009).                
On the surface, the trajectory of Spanish public opinion was somewhat sim-
ilar to the British. As we observed earlier, until this decade immigration barely reg-
istered on the Spanish public’s issue agenda; less than 10 percent of the public
identified it as one of Spain’s three major problems (Table 4). After the March 11,
2004, bombings, however, the number of Spanish respondents identifying immi-
gration as a major problem rose to 28 percent.
This said, three facts lend perspective to the state of contemporary Spanish
public opinion on immigration. First, by 2007 public concern had fallen back to
what it had been at the beginning of the decade (that is, before rising again in
2008). Second, although a large minority of the Spanish public perceived immi-
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SOURCE: Ipsos MORI (1974-2009).
“personally.” Finally, at no point either before or after September 11 did the salience
of immigration for the Spanish public ascend to the heights recorded in post-
September 11 Britain.
More Illiberal?
Because immigration is a multi-faceted phenomenon and problems of immigration
control and immigrant incorporation are often conflated in public, political discourse,
any longitudinal analysis of the trajectory of public opinion must be approached
cautiously. However, because we are less concerned in this essay with measuring
social tolerance or prejudice toward established immigrants (Coenders and Scheepers
2008) than we are with the question of whether or not public opinion has become
more securitized, the aforementioned problem is somewhat less severe. 
Did the events of September 11 alter the center of gravity of public opinion?
Are Europeans less tolerant of immigration and immigrants post-9/ 11? In Britain
the opinion survey evidence suggests not. As the data in Table 5 reveals, the res -
ponse of Britons to the question of whether not there are “too many immigrants” has
remained relatively constant over recent years: robust majorities agreed with this
statement both before and after September 11; indeed, the distribution of respon -
ses to one survey in 2007 was strikingly similar to what it was both in 1989 and
2000. A different longitudinal opinion survey (Simon and Sikich 2007, 957), which
posed the question of whether immigration should be reduced, increased, or remain
the same, also discovered that the British public’s views were fairly constant pre-
and post-September 11 (in 1995 and 2003, respectively). Indeed, compared to the
1960s, when more than four in five persons felt that too many immigrants had
been admitted into Britain (Messina 1989, 12), contemporary British public atti-
tudes toward immigration in the post-September 11 period seem positively relaxed
and tolerant.
Evidence of greater continuity than discontinuity in British opinion after July
2005, Britain’s September 11 moment, is contained in Table 6. When asked to
choose among five statements about immigration policy, large majorities pre-
dictably preferred the option of making immigration laws “tougher.” Yet, the size
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TABLE 4
MIGRATION TO SPAIN: ONE OF THREE MAJOR PROBLEMS, 1998-2008 (%)
1998 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
For Spain 2.5 9.9 9.3 12.0 13.9 17.8 28.0 17.3 10.1 23.7
Personally 2.4 3.4 3.6 4.9 5.1 7.7 8.1 12.2 8.7 7.9
SOURCE: Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (1996-2008).
of this majority varied little over time and was actually slightly smaller in 2003
than it was in 2006 and 2007. Fairly constant, too, were the percentage of respon-
dents advocating that “immigration should be stopped altogether.” Somewhat sur-
prisingly given the negative environment for immigration purportedly generated
by terrorism, this minority opinion never exceeded more than 13 percent between
2003 and 2007.                    
As Table 7 reveals, more focused public attitudes on immigration from the
Middle East and North Africa did not significantly change in the wake of the
2005 London bombings either. Although the percentage of respondents affirming
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TABLE 5
“THERE ARE TOO MANY IMMIGRANTS” IN BRITAIN, 1989-2007 (%)
Total Agree Total Disagree Neither/Nor* Don’t Know
1989 63 18 18 1
1994 64 33 — 3
1997 61 35 — 4
1999 55 33 — 13
2000 66 17 13 3
2001 54 31 10 5
2007 68 22 8 2
* 1994-1999 data from surveys using self-completed questionnaires with no “neither/ nor” option and,
except in 1999, no “don’t know” option. 
SOURCE: Ipsos MORI (2007a).
TABLE 6
BRITISH ATTITUDES ON IMMIGRATION POLICY, 2003-2007 (%)
Change
2003 2005 2006 2007 2003-2007
Laws on immigration should:
Be abolished, so anyone can come 2 2 1 2 0
live in Britain.
Be relaxed. 4 8 5 5 +1
Remain as they are. 12 19 17 13 +1
Be much tougher. 67 58 63 64 -3
Immigration should be 
stopped altogether: 13 11 12 12 -1
Don’t know 3 2 2 3 0
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immigration from the aforementioned region as a “good thing” declined between
2005 and 2007, a majority of the British public nevertheless remained positive. More -
over, the minority concluding that Middle Eastern and North African immigration
was a “bad thing” actually decreased between 2002 and 2007.   
Although attitudes toward settled immigrants have shifted somewhat in France
since the 1990s, similarly to Britain, they have not done so in the expected, illiberal
direction. As Table 8 indicates, the percentage of French respondents preferring
immigrants “to depart” decreased in the interval prior to and after the 1995 bomb-
ings (1992-1998) and again between 1998 and 2002. Indeed, fewer respondents
preferred that settled immigrants leave France in 2002 (38 percent) than in 1998
(47 percent). On the other side of the coin, the percentage of the public preferring
that immigrants “integrate” into French society increased between 1992 and 1998
(41 to 47 percent) and again between 1998 and 2002 (47 to 53 percent).
These results do not, of course, suggest a liberal turn in public attitudes. The
more recent majority advocating the integration of immigrants into French society
says nothing about the motivations underlying that preference or the preferred means
by which immigrants should integrate (e.g., through forced assimilation or volun-
tary incorporation). This said, the fact that many more respondents chose the option
of immigrant integration over repatriation in 2002 dispels the notion that the ter-
rorist events of either 1995 or 2001 caused French public opinion to become espe -
cially illiberal. Indeed, it is particulary revealing that the public opinion majorities
favoring repatriating immigrants (1991 and 1992) were recorded before and not after
the domestic terrorist bombings in 1995.
French attitudes toward immigration from the Middle East as well as North
Africa have not become more illiberal as a consequence of September 11. Indeed,
if anything, the French public became more tolerant of immigration from the region
over time. As Table 7 indicates, the majority perceiving this particular immi gra -
tion stream to be a “bad thing” in 2002 became an equivalent majority endorsing
TABLE 8
FRENCH ATTITUDES TOWARD SETTLED IMMIGRANTS, 1989-2002 
Wish for Immigrants to: 







SOURCE: TNS Sofres (2002).
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it as a “good thing” in 2007. This result generally echoes the findings of a 2007 opin-
ion survey (PRNewswire 2007) in which a majority of the French public (54 percent)
con curred with the suggestion that immigration “helps” the country, a sentiment
also shared by either a plurality or majority of Italians (51 percent), Germans (48
percent), and Spaniards (53 percent).   
In contrast to the public in Britain and France, Spaniards have become more
negative toward Middle Eastern and North African immigration (Table 7), albeit
over a shorter interval. From two-thirds who concurred that immigration from the
region was a “good thing” in 2005, popular feeling deteriorated to the point that a
plurality (45 percent) viewed it as a bad thing in 2007. This said, the erosion of
Spanish public support for Middle Eastern and North African immigration is not
likely to be a direct reaction to the 2004 Madrid train bombings, since the latter
postdated the former result by three years. Moreover, as Table 7 demonstrates, even
in 2007 Spaniards were far less negative about immigration from the Middle East
and North Africa than either Germans or Italians, neither of whom has yet directly
experienced a September 11 moment.
Discussion
What can be concluded about this public opinion survey evidence? First, although
immigration-related issues have become more politically salient in some countries
since September 11 across most of Western Europe, including in France and Spain,
they are and have been historically second-order concerns: that is, they fall below
the threshold of political significance routinely exceeded by economic and other
issues. After increasing as a motive for vote choice in French elections between 1984
and 1997, for example, immigration declined in importance in 2002 and 2004.
Moreover, immigration-related issues played only a negligible role in the 2005 British
general election (Economist 2005). 
Second, there has generally been greater continuity than discontinuity in pu b -
 lic opinion on immigration-related issues. Put simply, European publics have always
been wary of mass immigration and immigrant settlement. The post-1995 incidents
of domestic terrorism as well as the U.S. experience of September 11 do not seem
to have influenced European public opinion to become more illiberal toward new
immigration or immigrants. This counterintuitive conclusion holds true even with
regard to Middle Eastern and North African migration.
How can these counterintuitive results be explained? Yankelovich (1993) argues
that “public opinion develops slowly over a long period —at least 10 years for a
complex issue.” In doing so, he claims that it winds through seven stages, the last
of which results in citizens endorsing a course of action, accepting its costs and
trade-offs, and living with the consequences. Immigration, it could be reasonably
assumed, is just such a complex and multifaceted issue. If so, September 11 prob-
ably had relatively little impact on the trajectory of public opinion because the most
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into most Europeans’ thinking, particularly among publics within the traditional
immigration-receiving countries. Indeed, McLaren has astutely observed that po p -
ular “fears related to the religion and culture of new immigrants were apparent in
Europe before the attacks of September 11, July 7, and the Madrid train attack
of 2004” (2008, 15). 
Evidence supporting this hypothesis is presented in Tables 9 and 10. As the data
demonstrate, not only were immigrants perceived negatively by many Europeans
before 2001, but the former were already established as objects of general inse-
curity (Table 10) and viewed by a substantial minority of Europeans as specifically
threatening to national culture/identity, employment, and public safety (Table 10).
In short, issues pertaining to mass immigrant settlement were already “securitized” for
many Europeans before September 11.
Much like the evidence reported in previous tables, the data in Table 9 reveal
that whatever the level of public concern about immigrants prior to 2001, the tra-
jectory of opinion did not significantly change after September 11. Indeed, of the
five Western European countries represented, only in Spain did public perceptions of
immigrants as threatening along all three security dimensions significantly spike
upward from 1999 to 2005; in France and Italy it receded.
In light of the aforementioned results, public opinion does not seem to be
more securitized after September 11 than before. As a consequence, and all else
being equal, the historically expansive bias of state immigration and immigrant
policy is likely to continue as long as political elites in Europe view immigration to
be in their country’s best interest (Messina 2007, 224-245).
TABLE 10
MINORITY GROUPS AS A CAUSE OF INSECURITY, 2000 (%)
Country Tend to Agree Tend to Disagree Don’t Know
Greece 77 19 3
Denmark 60 33 7
Belgium 56 35 9
France 51 41 8
Germany 46 34 19
Norway (2002) 45 41 14
Netherlands 45 44 11
Austria 44 39 17
Ireland 42 43 14
EU 42 47 15
Luxembourg 40 47 13
Italy 38 46 16
Spain 34 56 11
United Kingdom 32 48 20
Finland 32 61 8
Sweden 24 66 10
SOURCE: Statistics Norway (2002).  
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The idea that France is the striking illustration of what multiculturalism is not
(Jennings  2000), or that, to the contrary, the Netherlands and Britain have epit-
omized a European version of multiculturalism (Hentzinger 2003) has been held
as self-evident wisdom by scholars, journalists, politicians, and ordinary citizens at
least since the 1980s. Who would challenge the existence of contradictions among
French republican assimilation, British race relations, or Dutch pillarization? Such
differences have been stylized into national models. For a long time, these models
have sparked strong interest in international social science literature. Models were
used to account for national idiomatic integration policies, the structure of public
discourses, processes of immigrants’ socio-economic and socio-cultural incor poration,
and the reaction of European societies to immigration, race, ethnicity, and so forth
(for a recent illustration, see Fetzer and Soper 2005). 
Since the beginning of the twenty-first century, however, these traditional
models began to go into crisis. The British and Dutch versions of multiculturalism
were publicly declared failures, and French republicanism was portrayed as going
through a profound crisis, mainly after the 2005 riots (Fassin and Fassin 2006).
In the wake of these new discourses, Islam was dramatized as a challenge to lib-
eral democracy and national identity; integration and citizenship were framed as
institutional and symbolic sites of a cultural conflict —if not a clash of civiliza-
tions— and immigrants as the main agents of the crisis. While they attempted to
explain this crisis, scholars who had been confident until then in the existence of
stylized models of citizenship became embarrassed. How could the “crisis of models”
that burst through in the 2000s be explained with the classical notion of “models” that
had been so useful to them before? 
Scholars tried to overcome this embarrassment, pointing to different possible
explanations. Some speculated about the possible convergence among Western
European countries’ integration policies, and the crisis of models was conceived of as
the indicator of a retreat from classical versions of multiculturalism and republica nism
in favor of coercive integration coupled with anti-discrimination measures (Joppke
2007; Wallace Goodman 2010). Others pointed to the lack of flexibility, adapta-
tion, or pragmatism of traditional conceptions of citizenship, at a time of increasing
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socio-cultural and religious diversity; models were much too path-dependent to adapt
easily to new problems, and produced “pathologies” in public discourses and policies
(Amiraux 2010; Guiraudon 2006; Favell 1998). Finally, some scholars presented
the uniqueness of Islam as the main agent of the crisis; that is, classical approaches
to citizenship and integration were not appropriate anymore in the face of such an
unprecedented challenge (Koopmans et al. 2005; Koopmans and Statham 2005). 
I contend that these analyses help us make sense of the European anti-Islam
and anti-immigrant politics that took the form of a “multicultural backlash” in the
decade from 2000 to 2010 (Vertovec and Wessendorf 2009). I argue that these
new discourses are not merely a political puzzle that scholars must address but an
epistemological challenge that calls for a critical reappraisal of notions long
held as appropriate and relevant in the scholarship, such as “national models of
integration.”
This is what I propose we do in this article, by answering the following ques-
tion: Can “models of integration” help us explain the scenario of their crisis that
seems to weigh so heavily in the explanations of new anti-immigrant and anti-Islam
public discourses? My answer is that this is not the case, because the notion of
models is strongly biased and ill-founded. Models are a preconceived notion rather
than a genuine analytical framework, which scholars cannot use without their
research paying considerable costs. However, one should not throw the baby out
with the bathwater and discard models entirely. Instead, we can think about them
in a way that is more useful for the social sciences.
The Crisis of National Models of Integration: 
A New Stage of Anti-Immigrant Discourses
On October 16, 2010, German Chancellor Angela Merkel stated that “the approach
[to building] a multicultural [society] and to liv[ing] side-by-side and enjoy[ing]
each other... has failed, utterly failed” (Die Welt 2010). Only a few months later, on
February 5, 2011, the newly elected British Prime Minister David Cameron chal-
lenged the United Kingdom’s multicultural integration policies, and connected
multiculturalism to radical Islamism. He declared, “Instead of ignoring this ex tre mist
ideology, we —as governments and societies— have got to confront it. Instead of
encouraging people to live apart, we need a clear sense of shared national identity,
open to everyone” (Wright and Taylor 2011). Eventually, the president of the French
Republic, Nicolas Sarkozy, asked during a February 10, 2011, TV talk show what
he thought about the question of immigrant integration, answered, “Yes, multicul -
turalism is a failure. In all our democracies, we have paid too much attention to the
identity of the [immigrants] who arrived in France, and not enough to the identity of
the country” (Libération 2011). 
It would, of course, be hazardous to assign to “multiculturalism” any consis-
tent definition that would encompass the differences among the national contexts
of reference in these discourses. However, these anti-multicultural contentions
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participate in a new framing of integration issues in the public and political debates,
most salient since the 2000s.
This framing superimposes several repertoires. It focuses strictly on Islam as
the main challenge to citizenship and the values of liberalism. The issue is heavily cul-
turalized, and socio-economic dimensions disappear from the dominant frames
about the “problems of integration.” Gender and sexual equality are major instru-
mental references in these debates about the incommensurability of Islam and
Western liberal citizenship. 
Another aspect is that extreme right-wing parties do not monopolize these stra -
tegic discourses about Islam and Muslims. Of course, they have a massive im pact
on the definition of the agenda in countries like the Netherlands or France. Populist
movements and public figures such as Pim Fortuyn and Geert Wilders have played
key roles in the emergence of anti-multicultural discourses since 2002. However,
the debate started a decade before, initiated by the liberal leader Fritz Bolkenstein
as early as 1991, and was visible in discussions among Social-De mo crats. The pu b -
lication of an article by Paul Scheffer in 2000 on “the multicultural tragedy” and
the 2002 murder of Theo Van Gogh sparked a new debate, in which the Dutch mul -
ticultural integration model that had supposedly been implemented in the 1980s
was accused of being the main reason for the “tragedy.” 
The situation in France in the present decade is another cause for concern.
A March 2011 poll forecast that Marine Le Pen, the president of the French
extreme right-wing National Front party, could be in first place in the first round of
the 2012 presidential elections, with 23 percent of the votes, compared to 21 per-
cent for Nicolas Sarkozy and 21 percent for the leader of the Socialist Party (Le
Monde 2011). This is a direct outcome of the politics of French secularism, Islam,
and immigra tion since 2002, which accelerated after the 2007 presidential elec-
tion and the creation of a Ministry of Immigration, Integration, and National Iden tity.
In a July 2010 public speech in Grenoble, Nicolas Sarkozy (2010) stated that
the French re publican model was failing because of “30 years of uncontrolled
immigration.”
How can we analyze this situation? As mentioned above, the literature has been
increasingly concerned with this so-called “crisis of integration” connected to a
“crisis of identities.” In turn, this identity crisis has been framed as a problem of
the competition between, on the one hand, national conceptions of citizenship
and, on the other hand, collective identity claims made by migrants in general and
“Muslims” in particular (Joppke 2009; Koopmans et al. 2005). And countries like
France, Germany, Britain, or the Netherlands have been held up as laboratories
of this “crisis” by scholars committed to demonstrating the comparative advan-
tages of the various “national models” they identified in each national context:
that is, republicanism for France (Favell 1998), ethno-nationalism for Germany
(Brubaker 1992), and multiculturalism for the Netherlands or Britain (Koopmans
et al. 2005; Koopmans and Statham 2005; Sniderman and Hagendoorn 2007).
Underlying the crisis of traditional models of citizenship, some authors have argued
about a convergence of national self-conceptions of citizenship and a retreat from
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multiculturalism (Joppke 2004, 2007). Others, on the contrary, argue that these
national models are strongly path-dependent (Schain, 2008) and that France
remains a powerful illustration of what multiculturalism is not, while in countries
like Britain or the Netherlands, multiculturalism remains something indisputably
un-French (see Jennings 2000). 
What this scholarship shares in common is the idea that “national integration
models” would be a useful framework for the comparative study of citizenship.
From this perspective, nothing could be understood about immigrants and mi -
norities in France outside a narrative that identifies republicanism as the French
model, or British “race relations” and the Dutch “multiculturalism” as national mod-
els for Britain and the Netherlands.
Instead of these understandings, I think the real cause for concern that soci-
ologists, historians, or political scientists should be aware of is less about this “crisis
of national models” that attracts so much attention in the literature, than the ina -
bility of this literature to provide us with a viable definition of these models as
analytical frameworks. In other words, the scholarly notions of a British and Dutch
multiculturalism —and, for similar reasons, of a French republicanism— are pro b -
lematic because they are also used by other non-scholarly agents, who have
structured the public and political debates along the idea of models and their crises.
My point here is that models are not simply a neutral tool social scientists use when
they work on immigrant integration. They are also part of the public and political
discourses about immigrant integration, and an argument in the new public dis-
courses against immigration and Islam. It is thus difficult to use an analytical frame -
work that participates actively in the construction of the puzzling reality it propo -
ses to analyze. This leads us to confront the notion of models and assess its virtues
and drawbacks. 
Key Problems with Models
A national model of integration and citizenship is usually defined as a public phi-
losophy (Schain 2008), a policy paradigm (Favell 1998; Guiraudon 2006), an insti -
tutional and discursive opportunity structure (Koopmans et al. 2005), or a nation-
al cultural idiom (Brubaker 1992). All these concepts attempt to show how social
reality is structured by pre-existing ideas about a nation’s self-understanding (Sabatier
and Jenkins-Smith 1993; Hall 1993; Müller 2005; Goffman 1974; Skocpol 1985).1
Within this perspective, France is conceived as an assimilationist country (as
opposed to multiculturalist countries like Britain or the Netherlands), whose na -
tional identity is based on a universalistic public philosophy (as opposed to an
ethno-cultural national identity, as in the case in Germany). In turn, because France
is a republican country, its notion of the Republic is seen as all-encompassing: the
Republic organizes the separation between public and private realms (through a
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strict color-blind approach to ethnicity and race), between the state and the church
(the philosophy of French secularism, laïcité), and it underpins the specifically
French “political, open definition” of citizenship and immigrant incorporation through
nationality (for a summary of all these interrelated dimensions of the French
model, see Schnapper 1994a). By contrast, in Britain and the Netherlands, diffe r -
ent idealistic structures are viewed as enabling people to mobilize on the basis of
ethnic or racial identities, while integration policies aim at promoting group-based
identities instead of a common citizenship (Sniderman and Hagendoorn 2007;
Koopmans and Statham 2005; Koopmans et al. 2005; Joppke 2009). 
This perspective on integration models emphasizes first that agency and col-
lective interests are marginal dimensions of institutional arrangements (in the field of
education or health, for example) and the structure of public debates (Brubaker
1992, 13-16; Bleich 2003). Instead, normative and idealistic “frames,” “structures,”
“idioms,” or “paradigms” are seen as being the primary and main driving force of
policies and practices related to identity, citizenship, immigration, religious diver-
sity, and so on. Social actors, from politicians to veiled Muslim women, are portrayed
as simply inheriting these ideas, using and adapting to them. In turn, a public speech
on immigrants or a woman’s decision to wear the hijab are also brought down to
a single cause, namely the power of French republicanism or British and Dutch
multiculturalism to drive individual behavior, social movements, institutional
arrangements, and policies (Koopmans et al. 2005; Favell 1998; Schnapper 1994b). 
When it comes to explaining precisely how this causal relation works and where
these models come from, however, the literature is unclear. Assumptions about
the aprioristic existence of a French republic, which supposedly started on July 14,
1789, and ended on October 11, 2010, with the prohibition of the niqab, are com-
mon, as are assumptions about the Dutch and British multicultural models. But
a convincing explanation for the origins of these models and why they are empha-
sized in public discourse and policy is never offered. The notion of a national model
is held as self-evident. It provides an account of a social world with no agency but
a top-down elite-driven structure (see Mathieu 2002), with no real historicity —no
substantial difference is seen between France’s republican identity in 1789, under
the Third Republic, or today— but a strong path dependency —French republicanism
and British and Dutch multiculturalism cannot easily be replaced by other con-
ceptions— and in which ideas have paramount power. It gives no detailed account
of where these ideas get their power from, or the processes and mechanisms through
which they shape social reality and are accepted and used by social actors in dif-
ferent contexts. In other words, in order to accept the relevance of the notion of na -
tional models, one also has to accept as a given the pre-existence of national public
philosophies with sufficient influence to shape a whole society.
Another problem is that the notion of a model of integration and citizenship
used by scholars is borrowed from the discourse of a variety of stakeholders in po -
litical, media, and academic spheres. Analytical ideal types of French republican-
ism or British and Dutch multiculturalism are akin to political stereotypes, com-
monly held in public and political debates in each country. When sociologists,
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political scientists, historians, or philosophers discuss republican or multicultural
models, they are not writing about anything different from what politicians and jour-
nalists talk and write about, even if scholars —sometimes— discuss the models in
a different way. The notion of model used by scholars is heteronomous: academ-
ic discussions on models are pervaded by normative, political, and moral interests
that stem from ideological debates in the public arena in which scholars also take part
(Bowen 2007; Scholten 2009; Essed and Nimako 2006; Bertossi and Duyvendak
2009). The problem here is the extent to which scholarly notions of integration
models reflect and are influenced by public debates, which in turn are structured by
dominant and elite-shaped frames. Often, scholarly writings presented as analyzing
social and political phenomena are heavily normative. This normative dimension is
strikingly obvious in the literature that has addressed the issue of a possible “crisis”
of national integration models in Europe since the begin ning of the 2000s (Vertovec
and Wessendorf 2009). Research on the integration of immigrants in Europe has
turned into discussions about the success or failure of traditional integration poli-
cies on the one hand, and on the other, about the legitimacy of ethnic minorities’
claims, particularly those made by Muslims (Joppke 2007, 2009; Koopmans and
Statham 2005; Klausen 2005). By the same token, these debates have reinforced
questions about Muslims’ loyalty and incorporation —“Are they with us or against
us?”— and the relevance of a category (“Muslims”) that is used in and is the subject
of political debates. 
Finally, the notion of an integration and citizenship model has a totalizing ten -
dency: it tends to bundle together social, institutional, and political facets of cit-
izenship and the integration of migrants, treating these different aspects as a “cul-
tural totality” (Foucault 1969, 25), even when scholarly discussions of models are
nuanced. For instance, scholars commonly point to the contradictions, inconsis-
tencies, and limits of the republican model in France or of multiculturalism in the
Netherlands and Britain. What is usually assumed, however, and not questioned,
is that France has a republication model or that the Netherlands has represented
the ideal type of a European form of institutional and normative multiculturalism.
This common acceptance of a French republican or a Dutch multicultural model
in the social science literature hinders our understanding of diversity and inte-
gration in two ways. 
First, discussions of racial, ethnic, or religious discrimination, or the integration
problems of a variety of immigrant groups in a country tend to be limited to con -
siderations of the comparative advantages and disadvantages of the different mod-
els. The research questions thus become: Does French republicanism produce
more or less discrimination than Dutch and British multiculturalism? Does the
former integrate immigrants better than the latter (Koopmans et al. 2005; Favell
1998; Schain 2008; Brubaker 1992)?
The precise meanings of the republican and multicultural models are often
forgotten in such discussions. Of course, republicanism and multiculturalism refer
to clear normative systems in the writings of political philosophers (Laborde 2010;
Pettit 1997; Guérard de Latour 2010). But it is far from certain that these systems
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provide manageable and relevant frameworks of analysis for social and political
scientists looking at institutions and social interactions in different national con-
texts. As mentioned above, the assumption that models are an independent variable
that can account for the socio-cultural and socio-economic integration of immi -
grants and minority groups leaves partially unanswered the question of how nor-
mative systems are translated into a complex institutional and social reality, and
how they affect policies and the functioning of institutions such as schools, hos-
pitals, the military, or the labor market. Of particular concern is the reification of the
models, even when they are addressed within a frame analysis perspective inspired by
Goffman (1974) (for a formulation of the reification issue, see Mathieu [2002]; for
an illustration of the problem, Passy and Guigni [2005]). The ideological or symbol-
ic dimensions of the incorporation of migrants or minority groups are reified into
models, which serve, for certain scholars, as legitimate substitutes for in-depth
research and analysis of empirical reality.
Secondly, this tendency affects the selection of and the analytical importance
placed on various indicators that scholars use to understand differences among
national contexts. It is not uncommon for scholars to derive their indicators from
their a priori and reified notion in order to prove that these very models exist. For
example, Muslim chaplaincies in prisons or in the military have been presented as
proof of multiculturalism in the Netherlands (e.g., Koopmans and Statham 2005, 156).
However, such institutional roles are perceived as either irrelevant or “pathological”
within the French context since it is difficult to argue that Muslim chaplains in
the French armed forces or prisons prove that France is a multicultural country
(on the notion of “pathologies” in national philosophies of citizenship, see Favell
[1998]; on ethnicity in the French military and prisons, Bertossi and Wihtol de
Wenden [2007]; Beckford, Joly, and Khosrokhavar [2005]). 
This example not only raises the “one-country-one-indicator” issue in com-
parative research, but also shows that other possible independent variables can be
lost in the analysis through the use of preconceived national models. The fact is
that the shift from conscription to an all-volunteer military (i.e., the specific insti-
tutional logic) has played a more important role in the implementation of Muslim
chaplaincies in the French military than the general conception of French citizen -
ship. Finally, this example also demonstrates the tendency of models to strikingly
limit the predictive potential usually attributed to them: the French color-blind
model of citizenship cannot predict the institutionalization of cultural accommo-
dation in a public institution like the military (for a similar argument about poli-
cies, see Wallace Goodman [2010]). 
In the end, the question concerning national models is empirical: when scholars
go into the field to conduct research, how can they make sense of the behavior
and attitudes of people who justify their actions using notions like the “republic,”
“secularism,” “integration,” “multiculturalism,” “pillarization,” “ethnicity,” “Islam,” or
“race”? I argue that, taken as a comprehensive analytical framework and indepen -
dent variable, models of integration are not much use in answering this question, for
all the reasons mentioned above. 
In the next two sections, I propose to look at these key reasons in context.
That is, I suggest that we need to observe how the notion of models has been used in
recent discussions about the incorporation of immigrants and minority groups
in Western European countries. Interestingly enough, these discussions have in -
creasingly focused on a so-called “crisis” or “failure” of traditional integration models
in France, Britain, and the Netherlands.
French Scholarly Politics of Republicanism: 
Debating the Model or Modeling the Debate?
The current debate about republicanism among French scholars has highlighted
the political power of the contradictions between the republican ideal of color-
blind equality, supposedly at the source of the French integration policies, and the
actual discrimination suffered by immigrants and their offspring, and their stigma -
tization in public and political debates as members of racial and ethnic groups (De
Rudder et al. 2000; Fassin and Fassin 2006). One key topic of these debates has
concerned the use of “ethnic categories” to assess the level of racial and ethnic dis -
crimination (Sabbagh and Peer 2008). The dilemma hinges on considering these
categories as a breach of the traditional color-blind republican approach to citi-
zenship —the French state does not formally recognize ethnic or racial groups—
or, conversely, considering the color-blind approach an impediment to an in-depth
understanding of the extent and nature of discrimination against French minori-
ty group members, a discrimination that contradicts the principle of republican
equality (Martiniello and Simon 2005; Simon 2003). This discussion of ethnic
categories has not been limited to the question of the state’s use of ethnic cate-
gories in the national census. It has focused on the legitimacy of their use by social
scientists researching integration in France; this is a burning issue in France,
which has nothing to do with the legitimate questions involved in scientific dis-
course and everything to do with the ideological nature of public debates (Simon
and Amiraux 2006).
This debate over the use of ethnic categories reveals two mutually exclusive
conceptions of the French model. For those against using ethnic categories, the
immense value of French republicanism is that it emancipates individuals through
its specific universalistic program, despite actual discrimination. By refusing any
reference to ethnicity in research on integration and citizenship, many authors call
for preserving this fundamental value (Schnapper 1994a, 1994b). They criticize
fellow scholars for using ethnic and racial categories in their research, sometimes
accusing them of “creating” ethnic groups in France (Pierrot 1998, 235). Those
in favor of adopting ethnic categories argue that the color-blindness of the French
model impedes efforts to improve the status of ethnic and racial minority group
members and reduce the discrimination they suffer, and that this model must be
corrected in order to restore its initial value, upholding the motto of “liberty, equa l -
ity, fraternity” (Weil 2005; Laborde 2010; Guérard de Latour 2010).
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Regardless of the way in which French scholars approach the question of eth-
nic categories, they do share a similar conception of the value of republicanism:
that is, republicanism is the model France has inherited from her political tradi-
tion, and it stands, compared to other models, as the best ideological and policy
framework to incorporate migrants and minority groups into French society. The
existence of a singular French model remains undisputed. Scholars who criticize
the contradictions and costs of republicanism nonetheless continue to accept or
assume what I would call an imagined normative republic, characterized by abstract
universalism, individual equality, and state neutrality in matters of religion. The
French model, in other words, is at once a product of wishful thinking, a norma-
tive position, and an analytical framework. 
Finally, such debates concern not only French academics or students. They
have an impact of their own on the international literature for various reasons:
French scholars’ work is read outside of France; French scholars are often the first
interviewees that foreign —junior as well as senior— researchers meet in their initial
days of research in France; and French scholars are also involved in writing public
or policy-oriented documents (Scholten 2009) or articles in newspapers that often
end up on the desks of international academics and are used in analyzing the
French situation. This circulation of French debates outside the boundaries of the
republic contributes to reinforcing the belief in the existence of the French model,
in the form of wishful thinking, a normative stand, or a useful analytical framework
that helps explain the idiomatic approach used in France when it comes to mi -
grants and minority groups.
More generally, what this example of French scholarly debates shows is that
we cannot break with a discourse that turns unique national characteristics into
a normative and explicative model simply by pointing out its contradictions. Quite
the opposite. By discussing the model, we end up —reluctantly?— confirming its
existence even if the discussion of its principles is nuanced. Debating republicanism
does not explain what the republican model is. This leaves the field researcher
without a specific answer to our initial question: Does a national integration and
citizenship model exist that explains observed reality?
Debates on the European “Multicultural Backlash”: 
A New Normative Turn 
Since the beginning of the 2000s, the question of models has taken a specific turn
in public debates in Western Europe, reinforcing their normative power in the
academic literature. The difference between multiculturalism and republicanism,
a difference long considered a major element in citizenship policies, is less sharp
than it used to be (Joppke 2007). A “backlash” seems to have emerged against multi -
culturalism in the Netherlands and Britain (for a critique of backlash arguments,
see Vertovec and Wessendorf [2009]). Some authors, arguing against the conception
of strongly path-dependent models, have addressed this multicultural backlash by
describing a convergence of national self-conceptions of citizenship, and a retreat
from multiculturalism in favor of a new “civic integration” approach (Joppke 2004,
2007; Wallace Goodman 2010). 
A pivotal notion of the convergence hypothesis is multiculturalism’s failure to
integrate Muslims. For example, Christian Joppke emphasizes the “puzzling dis-
junction between an apparently ill-adapted and dissatisfied Muslim minority and
a rather accommodative state policy” in Britain (2009, 455), and concludes that
“the most deceptive and pernicious [wrong things to expect from the state] perhaps
are ‘respect and recognition’” (2009, 470). Interestingly, authors who emphasize
the path-dependent dimension of national models seem to share this view when
it comes to criticizing multiculturalism as a form of “segregationism” (Koopmans
et al. 2005, 11). In their comparison of Muslim collective claims in Britain and
the Netherlands, Ruud Koopmans and Paul Statham emphasize the singularity of
Muslim groups. They argue that, in contrast to other groups, “Muslims based in
the Netherlands dare to demand new group exceptions in a dynamic way” (2005,
155) in the public arena and that “claims made by certain ethnic minority groups
are less easy to satisfy because they bring into question the very essence of liber-
al values” (2005, 140).
This discussion on the limits of multiculturalism in Britain and the Netherlands
calls for two comments. First, the argument of a multicultural backlash appears mere-
ly as a stylized replication of political discourses. This argument is similar to the new
politics of anti-multiculturalism that has emerged in Britain and the Netherlands
since the beginning of the 2000s. In 2004, Trevor Phillips, then-pre sident of the
British Commission for Racial Equality, explained that “multicul turalism is a solu-
tion of the past….It implies separation” (Times 2004). The statement had a strong
echo within the heated debate on the future of British multiculturalism that had
begun few years before (Parekh 2000; Barry 2001) in Britain and in other Euro -
pean countries. In the Netherlands, Paul Scheffer’ article on “The Multicultural
Tragedy” (2000) generated considerable public discussion about the failure of the
Dutch multicultural model, and, among other things, provided legitimacy to radical
critiques of Dutch immigrant integration policies (see, among others, Duyvendak
and Scholten [2009]).
Second, spurred by this new debate, scholars have become engrossed in the
attempt to understand the much-announced crisis of the Dutch and British mod-
els, and the reasons for the failure of multiculturalism. Regardless of the way they
look at the multicultural backlash (from a convergence or a path-dependency per-
spective), many authors use national multicultural integration models as an inde-
pendent variable for explaining the multicultural crisis. In doing so, they strengthen
the notion’s normative dimension, which is increasingly connected to the predo m -
inant political and public debates on the issue. It also reinforces the apparently
obvious existence of a causal relationship between national models, policy devel-
opments, and collective mobilizations in a national context, without clarifying def-
initions of the models, or assessing their power to make sense of empirical reality.
This has given rise to a striking paradox: never have we taken for granted so indis-
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putably the analytical usefulness of these models than since we started discussing
their crisis, failure, or end. 
The Elusiveness of Models
Despite the problems with models that I have mentioned, the fact is that the notion
of national models can still be useful for the comparative study of immigrant inte-
gration on the condition that what scholars construct as national frameworks re -
flects empirical reality, including instances where the constructs are an official
version of this reality. In other words, in order to conduct a debate on the heuristic
values of republicanism or multiculturalism as models of a given country, we ought
to be able to extract a sufficiently stable definition of French republicanism or of
multiculturalism in the Netherlands or Britain as normative value systems to be
able to use the models as explanatory tools. 
However, the normative consistency of national integration models becomes
difficult to grasp when we look back at the last three decades of politics and pub-
lic policies of integration in the Netherlands, Britain, and France. Indeed, the de -
bates on republicanism and multiculturalism seem to act as a fig leaf hiding the
widely varied and contradictory framings of integration and citizenship issues in
each country.
In the Netherlands, the idea of a multicultural model has had a complex tra-
jectory.2 The integration of migrants was not a public issue until the late 1970s,
when the guest worker program ended and it became clear that migrants were
there to stay. A “minority policy” was developed in the late 1970s and early 1980s,
close to the idea of Dutch multiculturalism described by Koopmans (2005) and
Joppke (2007). Even though the minority policy was the reflection of a pragmat-
ic approach rather than the political and institutional expression of “normative
multiculturalism,” it was nonetheless based on the idea that, in order to optimize
migrants’ socioeconomic integration, the country needed to promote their socio-
cultural identities. 
This minority policy, however, lasted less than a decade. Starting in the early
1990s, Dutch integration policies were reformulated to focus on the participation
of immigrants and their children in the labor market and on individual equality against
the backdrop of a crisis of the welfare state. The categories allochtoon (those with
at least one parent born abroad) and autochtoon (those born to Dutch-born parents)
were adopted to distinguish non-Western migrants from the native Dutch. This was
also a time when concerns about Islam as generating integration problems became a
central political issue and were taken up by the liberal parliamentary leader Frits
Bolkestein from 1991 onward. In the early twenty-first century, integration poli-
cies changed, with the advent of an assimilationist approach that ended up mak-
ANTI-IMMIGRANT POLITICS 389
2 The following paragraphs on the Dutch case are directly inspired by Duyvendak and Scholten (2009).
ing the previous concept of Dutch multiculturalism a model of the past, and an
anti-model in the present. 
This account of variations in Dutch integration policies challenges the per-
ception that multiculturalism has been an unequivocal model in the Netherlands,
a question sharply debated by Dutch scholars nowadays. Thus, the significant issue
is not which normative type of multiculturalism could have produced the “Dutch
model,” but rather understanding why, despite repeated reversals in the way
Dutch policies and integration politics were publicly conceptualized, the Nether -
lands is said to have a multicultural model, although that “model” was applied
for barely a decade and was actually abandoned 20 years ago (Duyvendak and
Scholten 2009).
Finding a multicultural model in Britain is no easy task either. The very idea
of a stylized public philosophy of integration is even more difficult to grasp than in
the Netherlands. The reason is that British policymakers and collective minority actors
have mostly opted for a pragmatic approach to integration, rather than for a sophis-
ticated normative model like in France (Joly 2007; Garbaye 2005; com pare Favell
1998). In this context, the work done today by the most influential British scholars
on this issue may in fact be seen as an attempt to move away from this traditional
pragmatic approach and to promote a public normative conception of multicul-
turalism (i.e., Modood 2005; Parekh 2000). 
In any case, before what is currently referred to as a multicultural model, po l -
icies of assimilation were the norm in Britain. It was only in the 1960s that pub-
lic debates focused on the dilemma of a liberal citizenship fraught with racial dis-
crimination (Rose and Deakin 1969). The new Commonwealth migrants from the
Caribbean, India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh, who dominated the migrant flow to
Britain in the 1950s and early 1960s, were then British citizens on arrival. This had a
direct impact on how public debates about immigration were framed. The public
issue of integration was framed by two objectives, namely the fight against discri m -
ination and the promotion of good relations among the various groups in Britain
(Bleich 2003). The categories used to define these groups were racial in the begin -
ning, with ethnicity becoming more important in the 1980s. Since the late 1990s,
these categories have been reformulated in the country, and religion is now a cen-
tral one. In 2001, the census included a question about religious identity for the
first time. Interfaith dialogue is now a significant tool of public interventions on
questions of integration, and one of the major topics of debate is the demand by
Muslim groups for the recognition of religious categories in anti-discrimination
legislation. In summary, the British “multicultural crisis” is only a discursive strategy
that serves as a proxy for a new wave of changes in the frameworks defining pub-
lic debates and public interventions on integration.
Finally, a comparable analysis can be done regarding the republican model in
France. Ever since the question of immigrant minorities’ integration emerged on
the political agenda in the mid-1980s, there have been at least four normative con -
ceptualizations of the French model. Each of these sees integration and the corres -
ponding public response in a specific way that clashes with the three others (Bertossi
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2009):  the groups labeled as “immigrants” are never defined in the same way;3
the origin of the challenge posed to the republican concept of common belonging
is never perceived as being the same; behind the constant call for “tradition” and
the “principles of the Republic” (Feldblum 1999), the public response is always
different and always clashes with the historical republican foundation.
A first “normative republic” conception held sway in the mid-1980s with the
end of the myth of the return of immigrants to their countries of origin: immi-
grants had become part of French society (see Sayad 1999). At the same time, the
National Front, France’s extreme right-wing party, began to take on weight in the
public debate, achieving its first electoral successes in local (1983), European (1984),
and national (1986) elections. The public issue of the integration of immigrant
minorities was defined in terms of loyalty (the Français de papiers or “identity-card-
citizens”), allegiance (the issue of mandatory military service for individuals with dual
nationalities) (Bertossi 2001), and, soon thereafter, religion (with the first headscarf
affair in 1989) (Kepel 1987). After several attempts, the Law of 1993 set new con-
ditions for access to citizenship, requiring a manifestation de volonté (an explicit
request) and thereby eliminating the century-old tradition of automatic access to cit-
izenship for those born in France (Weil 2002).
This first conceptualization of the republican model was replaced at the end
of the 1990s by a new normative program based on the “French invention of dis-
crimination” (Fassin 2002), which drastically changed the integration debate. The
notion of formal equality (having French citizenship) became secondary to a sub-
stantive definition of equality (having French citizenship and not being discrimi-
nated against) (Conseil d’État 1997). The issue was no longer one of foreigners
wanting to become French citizens, but of French citizens needing to be provided
with equal opportunities by French society and institutions.
Soon afterwards, the public conceptualization of republican principles evolved
toward a third normative republic that denounced the anti-discriminatory element as
a “purely moral approach” unsuitable for confronting “a stream of converging indices
reflected in various forms of identity-related movements and tensions” (Haut Conseil
à l’Intégration 2006, 17). In the early 2000s, the secular republic appeared as the new
yardstick in the integration debate. However, far from being defined in the terms
of the 1905 law, the founding law on laïcité, secularism became a moral framework
that defined identity and was linked to new debates on gender equality, sexuality,
and the “deviance” of immigrant family structures (e.g., accusations of polygamy and
machismo or concerns about overcrowded households in immigrant neighborhoods).
The public response to this evolution is summed up in the Law of March 15, 2004,
which disallowed “conspicuous religious signs” in public schools and imposed the
posting of a “secularism charter” in the hallways of public buildings, namely hos-
pitals (Haut Conseil à l’Intégration 2007).
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3 The term “immigrant” is used in public discourse and debates in France to refer to people who are
not immigrants at all, but French-born children and grandchildren of immigrants.
It seems to me that a fourth normative republic is in the making. Behind the
conspicuous secular dimension of the current debate about banning the burka in
public places, which affects fewer than 2 000 women, something else appears to
mark a new stage in the republican framework. Current debates about integration,
and in particular the integration of Muslim groups, are no longer enclosed with-
in the limits of abstract universalism, but are part of a “civilizational program,”
which Nicholas Sarkozy explicitly described in a November 12, 2009, speech on
integration and French national identity. Sarkozy’s remarks heralded the return of
a notion that had been explicitly abandoned by the republican integration model
since the 1980s: assimilation is now supported by the notion of “immaterial public
order” (meaning that sociocultural integration is a matter of public order and se -
curity) (Conseil d’État 2010). 
This discussion of the four notions of the republic raises a key question: Which
conceptualization are we using when we discuss the republican model? Is it the
republic of nationality, anti-discrimination, secularism, or the republic of moral
assimilation and public order? These four frameworks lead to different and mutually
contradictory diagnoses of existing social problems, and give rise to different nor-
mative programs.
This brief comparison of the Netherlands, Britain, and France shows the lim-
its of the idea of an unequivocal integration model prevailing in each country. It
also repositions the “crisis of models” discourse beyond a before-and-after percep -
tion of a glorious past that has given way to the current decline. This reposition-
ing allows us to rid ourselves of the idea of normative blocks being put to the test
of multicultural and Muslim claims or nationalist reaction since the early twenty-
first century. These highly stylized national models, as we often imagine them, have
never existed, not because of the contradictions or the gap between their precepts
and observable reality, but for the simple reason that they were never institution-
alized or internalized on the basis of stable, univocal, and coherent normative systems
over the last 30 years.
Finding the Models: Five Working Propositions
So, we come back to my original question: Do national models provide either a partial
or a complete explanation of reality as empirically observed by field researchers?
What can national integration models teach us about the practices of those who
speak about the French Republic, multiculturalism, integration, and ethnicity? It
is not enough to show, as I have done, the problems with concepts like national inte-
gration models. The fact that these models are not institutionally consistent, nor-
matively coherent, culturally defined, or historically stable does not mean that they
are simply figments of the imagination of researchers engaged in ideological debates
on immigrants’ integration.
Models are not an illusion created by public or political debates. This is the
most important element of my argument: when trying to address issues such as
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the integration of migrants and citizenship in a context of diversity, we are con-
fronted with a wide range of social actors (including scholars) who believe in the
existence of these models and use them to justify strategic choices and their own
practices.
It is not enough to conclude that national models do not exist, because the
reality scholars observe is, in fact, saturated with “modelized” thoughts and “mod-
elizing” practices. The subjects of our research (social actors) believe in the exis-
tence of a French model built on principles inherited from the French Revolution
or in the existence of a Dutch and a British multiculturalism. Models are dis-
cussed everywhere: in working-class pubs, hospital hallways, at the desks of fam-
ily allowance organizations, in police stations, in school staff rooms, in union or
NGO meetings, in the reader commentary sections of newspaper websites, in sum-
mits of European ministers of the interior, to name just a few.
It is therefore wrong to say that national models of integration should not be
taken seriously because many people do take these models very seriously. The model
concepts are used, imagined, negotiated, affirmed, contested, and challenged by
different types of people. Models should not be studied as if they exist in a stable
and consistent normative, cultural, historical, and institutional context. It is critical
to be aware of the diverse uses of models and the negotiations, discussions —and
misunderstandings— in which they play a role. The cognitive turn in the social
science literature on ethnicity, which conceptualizes “ethnicity, race, and nation as
perspectives on the world rather than entities in the world” (Brubaker et al. 2004, 31),
is therefore a promising perspective for repositioning the notion of national inte-
gration models (see also Weber 1991, 58-59; Schütz 1982). This perspective helps
avoid a positivist approach that often reduces questions about national models to
questions about “how institutions think” (Douglas 1986) and how members of a
society are configured in idealistic structures and shaped by societal institutions.
The perspective helps place social actors’ agency front and center, removing it
from behind the screen of official and formal narratives of nations’ cultural self-
understandings.  
Models are not the a priori resource for action or an ex ante normative frame-
work through which actors give shape to their strategies. Instead, these strategies
give shape to varying, polysemic, and contradictory models. Models do not impose
on social actors ready-made ways for deciding what to do and how to do it. A wide
range of social actors contribute to the construction of national models through the
definition of agendas, specific problematization of issues at stake, the understanding
of situations, categorization of social groups, and moral entrepreneurship (Becker
1963), to which they attribute substantial content (e.g., a normative value system,
a matrix of justification, typified categories within the sense of a social hierarchy,
a moral judgment) (Boltanski and Thévenot 1991; Lamont 2002; Bowen 2009).
If we take models as cognition, involving more than merely the policymaking
community and telling much more than a mere univocal official narrative about
how nations define their self-identity, we no longer conceive of them as an inde-
pendent but as a dependent variable. This way, we can avoid two major drawbacks:
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we can free ourselves from a totalizing and non-reflexive use of models (i.e., repu b -
licanism or multiculturalism as fully explaining citizenship in France, the Nether -
lands, and Britain) and steer clear of overly dismissive conceptions of models (i.e.,
they count for nothing at all). In other words, French republicanism, British and
Dutch multiculturalism, or other national stylized conceptions of citizenship can-
not be held up as objective entities. They cannot be turned into the explanatory
framework for the differences that exist among national contexts. Rather, they
work as what I call “cognitive vanishing-points.” These points are used as struc-
tures of reference in various contexts to frame the questions of identity, of com-
mon belonging, and of inclusion and exclusion. However, this framing activity is
not monopolized by one social group (policymakers or national elites) and does
not produce univocal, coherent, and homogeneous normative entities. Five inter-
related working propositions about national models summarize the argument I
have laid out here:
• Far from being homogeneous blocks, national models are constantly con-
tradicted by social, political, and institutional practices. Contradictions are
part of these models and can represent exogenous divergences —the pre-
cepts of a model are contradicted by public policies in certain sectors— or
endogenous divergences —contradictory principles may be claimed in the
name of the same model.
• Models are not stable and allow varying problematizations across time. To
speak of republicanism as the French model or multiculturalism in Britain
or the Netherlands leaves much to be said about the stark differences that
characterize public discussions on the integration of migrants and the project
of equality and inclusion of diversity within the existing national context.
• Models are not an a priori normative matrix but an a posteriori problemati-
zation. French universalism, Dutch tolerance, or British racial equality are
not the starting point but the temporary outcome of public discussions. Models
are the result of chaotic negotiations on the meaning of “the integra tion
problem” and its solution. Debates about models are aimed at imposing a
dominant framework, which is never given before the discussion reaches a
very provisional stage. To speak of republicanism, multiculturalism, and the
crisis of European national models is part of the attempt to impose a dom-
inant frame in public discussion.
• Models are not absolute but polysemic expressions. Thus, they offer a stra -
tegic ambiguity (Eisenberg 1984; Leitch and Davenport 2007) that makes
them easily manipulated by different actors who seek different outcomes
from the discussion. If scholars refer in their analyses to French republi-
canism or Dutch and British multiculturalism, so do journalists, politicians,
immigrant associations, and other actors. However, the content that each
attaches to these or other similar concepts (secularism, pillarization, state
neutrality, integration, etc.) is very often different. They may seem to be dis -
cussing the same issues, but behind the seeming linguistic stability of these
394 CHRISTOPHE BERTOSSI
ANTI-IMMIGRANT POLITICS 395
concepts, people attribute widely different, even opposite, normative con-
notations to the models. What do assertions such as “France is republican,”
“republican principles require the banning of the burka,” or “because France
is republican, we cannot use ethnic statistics” have in common? Each use
of the word “republic” has different implications (a political regime with a
constitution, a moral judgment about religious freedom, a statement about the
consequence of an ideology for research). The closely-knit interrelationship
among these different dimensions cannot be taken as a given —are they
really part of a consistent and integrated single scheme?— but must be ex -
plained (how each belongs to different schemes and affects the others). Not
only are contradictions an inherent feature of models (the first proposition), but
the model-constructing process involves a variety of “spheres of justice” or
“worlds of justification” (Walzer 1983; Boltanski and Thévenot 1991; Bowen
2009; Schütz 1982). The possible discrepancy between one sphere and
another may lead to misunderstandings by concerned actors, which, in turn,
reinforces the contradictions I already mentioned. For instance, the principle
of gender equality may be used to try to liberate those viewed as being op -
pressed (for example, women wearing the niqab and seen as dominated by
husbands or brothers) and, at the same time, deprive these same women of
their status as citizens (by refusing them access to nationality because they
wear the niqab). In the Netherlands, tolerance (toward same sex couples, for
instance) may be used as a basis for intolerant discourse (against Muslim pop-
ulations, for example).
• While they lack any stable normative content, models represent a performa -
tive practice (Austin 1962). This type of practice produces additional meaning
in routine social relations between actors who share a belief in a normatively
consistent and coherent social and political world but attribute very different
meanings to this fact (proposition 4). Behind the various uses, contradictory
practices, disagreements regarding future action, disputes on the normative
approach of what the integration of migrants ought to be, or on citizenship
in a context of cultural, religious, ethnic or racial diversity, actors in fact dis-
cuss the contradictions, drifting, and limitations of the models without ever
doubting their existence. These discussions routinize the idea that France
is undeniably republican or that Britain and the Netherlands are multicul-
tural, the effects of which are real, including the institutionalization of the
narrative. This performative effect should not only be explored in the realm
of official institutions and policies, but also in the cognitive construction of
social reality, in which all the segments that make up a society participate. 
Conclusion
My aim in this article has not been to propose a new theory of the notion of na -
tional integration models. Instead, I have argued that models of integration are an
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inappropriate tool for the comparative study of integration inasmuch as the objec-
tive of that research is to assess the success or failure of a national approach to
integrating migrants and minority groups. I have shown that the notion of nation-
al models is polluted by normative (if not moral) connotations that hinder social
scientists’ ability to address empirical reality.
If models tend to be taken as a substitute for reality and distort research
strategies, we should not discard them entirely. The five working propositions I
have presented suggest a way forward to shift research on national models. A con-
siderable amount of energy has been expended in trying to extract a complex social
reality from national integration models, with the risk of caricaturing the world that
we study by using extremely attractive, but limited, narratives. It seems to me that it
is time for us to move backward, so to speak, inducing models from reality and
conceiving of them as fluctuating dependent variables that must be explained. If
we really want to understand the injustices of our societies, I believe that we need
to study the actors who develop a multiplicity of conceptions of equality, inclusion,
and identity, and understand from a sociological perspective how national models
of integration play a role in these developments.
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The European Union (EU) of today is a scene of clashing options: those advocating
liberalizing migration policy on the one hand and those calling for stricter immi-
gration regulations by individual member states on the other. This clash frequently
happens indirectly and obliquely, substantiated by the otherwise understandable
argumentation of the need to protect a given state’s domestic interests. This article
examines the case of three Nordic countries (Denmark, Sweden, and Finland) and
the shape of the current discourse on the need to reform today’s immigration policy.
The applied qualitative research method includes analysis of official statements made
by politicians and analysis of media content (TV, news papers) in the years 2005-2010.
The discourse reveals the direction of changes that might be expected in the form
of new immigration policy in the Nordic countries.
The French policy reform, Code on the Entry and Stay of Foreigners and the
Right to Exile (CESEDA), opens the door to educated immigrants, but requires the new -
comers to undertake every effort to assimilate into mainstream society. More over,
the code restricts the family reunification law considerably, tightens the law on mixed
marriages and naturalization, and —most controversially— excludes automatic lega l -
ization of the status of illegal immigrants’ children (Bolzman and Baucher 2006).1
This kind of change in immigration law, proposed in 2006 by Nicolas Sarkozy,
is no novelty, not only in France, but in most of the highly developed European coun -
tries. Migration policy reform has become one of the major subjects deliberated
in the first decade of the present century. Following the French example, other
European Union member states also embarked on modifying their migration poli-
cies. It appears that current migration policy spans two aspects: immigration pol-
icy (legal regulation of immigration streams) and immigrant policy (policy deter-
mining the management of ethnic and cultural diversity, directly linked to immi grant
groups, and their right to participate in the social, political, and economic life of
the receiving country). 
Legal regulation of immigration streams, from the point of view of the receiving
country’s interests, necessarily has to aspire to relatively conservative solutions. It
exercises control over the number of immigrants and their market usefulness. As
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the experience of modern Europe reveals, in some countries (e.g., France, Denmark,
Belgium, Germany, or Austria) restrictions to free access to the domestic market
have been introduced particularly for uneducated people or those with insufficient
vocational qualifications. Instruments servicing that selection are, among others,
the “reception and integration contracts.”2 Failure to comply with these contracts
may result in unpleasant consequences for the immigrant, including an “invitation to
leave the country of residence.” 
European countries unanimously agree on tightened border control along the
frontier between the EU and the rest of the world, but different approaches to inte-
grating foreigners have left every member state to develop its own strategy for im -
migrants’ integration.3 For some countries, effective integration policy consists of
granting foreigners applying for permanent residence civil rights in all areas; for
others, it boils down to selective access to social privileges, such as the right to
vote, to fully enter the economic sphere (e.g., the real estate market), or to obtain
citizenship.4 Thus, while some countries endorse immigrants’ fuller participation
in society, others limit their efforts to institutionalizing immigrants’ temporary res-
idence (Bolzman 2006).
The general perception of migration in a given country affects people’s atti-
tudes toward immigrants as well as toward those natives who choose to emigrate.
Immigrants may inspire in society both positive and negative emotions, which are
in turn modified by economic, political, and cultural circumstances. An addition-
al element that shapes pro or contra immigration attitudes is the concept of state
and nation as a mono- or multi-ethnic entity. The concept is understood in many
different ways within European culture and politics.  
French sociologist Dominique Schnapper presented a socio-linguistic look at
the phenomenon of immigration (1999, 18). To explore the true attitudes of Euro pean
societies toward immigrant populations, she examined the terms used to describe
them in the languages of different receiving countries. And so, according to Schnap -
per, the Germans speak of foreigners (Ausländer); the British speak of racial and eth-
nic minorities;5 the Dutch use the term cultural minorities (culturele minderhe-
den); the French talk of immigrants (immigrants), who, with the passage of time,
come to be called members of the nation and eventually citizens. This terminol-
ogy points to the various ways people from a different cultural area are perceived
by the indigenous population. The perception then affects the way social integration
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Union, based in Warsaw.  
4 Switzerland, which remains outside the EU structures, but is a member of EFTA and is located in the
very center of Europe, exemplifies restrictive treatment of immigrants and their children. People who are
born there, spend their entire lives there, study, and work there are still refused Swiss citizenship.  
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of origin of the incoming population, for example, “Eastern Europeans.”
models are constructed, which adopt different paradigms in each of the European
countries. 
Society’s attitude to foreigners sometimes changes with the passage of time,
as it is conditioned by economic, political, and social factors. In France, for instance,
the fellow countryman/foreigner relationship is based primarily on the utilitarian
assumption that could be translated into the following simple, though painful words:
the only desirable immigrants are those who can respond to the current needs of the
labor market.
In Great Britain, the presence of immigrants is a manifestation of the legacy
of an extensive imperial past, and the culturally diverse society is a consequence of
the country’s opening to people from the former British colonies. This way of com -
 pensating for the previous exploitation of subject economies has always had both
its advocates as well as violent opponents, auguring the “end of Britain.”6 When
comparing Great Britain to other colonial empires, we can easily notice that the flow
of immigrants from former dominions has been greatest here. This can be accounted
for by the adoption of the multiculturalism policy as a natural consequence of those
migration processes. 
A different integration model is characteristic of the Federal Republic of Ger -
many, which uses the notion of the “German people” (Deutsches Volk), understood
as ethnic, cultural, and linguistic unity (Schnapper 1999, 18). This concept of na tio n -
al community leads to the acknowledgement that immigrants, who form cultur-
ally and ethnically different communities, do not constitute an organic part of the
nation and, in some cases, may even debilitate it. According to Rita Süssmuth, a
German sociologist and chair of the Independent Council of Experts on Mi gration
and Integration, “Since the beginning of the 1990s, it is generally believed in Germany
that the presence of foreigners leads to the loss of German identity” (Center for
International Relations in Warsaw 2004, 7). This is a popular opinion that can be
heard on the street, especially in the eastern Länder of the country.
The government’s 2007 Integration Plan provides for the im plementation by
2013 of a series of essential actions to enhance social cohesion through educa-
tion, generally accessible German language courses, sports —a very effective plat-
form for integration— and the media, which raise awareness of cultural and eth-
nic diversity and through stimulation of “civic involvement” attitudes in German
society (Die Bundesregierung 2007).
The Netherlands presents an entirely different model. The dissimilarity stems
from historical and social differences. As a former colonial superpower, the Nether -
lands initially elaborated a type of an “asymmetrical consensus” of a multicultural
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country, in which immigrants were, above all, offered work. According to Andre
Krouwel, a political scientist from the Free University of Amsterdam, in the years
of massive importation of labor (1960-1980), not only the authorities, but foreign
workers themselves, believed they would go back to their home countries once
their employment was terminated. This belief was reflected by a policy of “many
cultures,” which meant that immigrants were not included in the social mainstream
and foreigners were not stimulated to learn Dutch, explore the history, culture,
traditions, or anything else conducive to acculturation (Radio Free Europe 2004a).
More recently, Meindert Fennema, one of the leading experts on migration pro ces ses
and a professor at the same university, has concluded that the multi cultural policy
was abandoned too late, only in the early 1980s, when it was observed that it led to
“ethnicization” of social life, understood as the establishment of closed cultural en -
claves (Radio Free Europe 2004b). In order to stop the creation of ghettos detached
from one another and from mainstream society, it was necessary to introduce actions
based on a different way of thinking.
Thus, integration took the form of joint efforts, actively involving both parties:
the minority and the so-called “mainstream” one. This paradigm shift in the per-
ception of the integration process was also reflected by the fact that the Ministry
of Integration became part of the Ministry of Education instead of, as it had been
until 2008, the Ministry of Justice (Słojewska 2008). Currently, the idea that inte-
gration should be based on education and understanding prevails in the Dutch
model of a cohesive society.
Switzerland, which is not part of the European Union, has worked out an immi -
gration policy of accepting the newcomers without guaranteeing them full partic-
ipation in social, economic, or political life. Immigrants are perceived as part of the
work force and, as such, do not have the right to citizenship, even after a stay of many
years. They are employees, tax-payers, consumers, producers, and little more (Bol z -
man et al. 2004, 411-429; Mahnig and Wimmer 2003). It is difficult for them to
obtain a Swiss passport, even if they were born in the country and studied and
worked there. Referenda on the simplification of the naturalization procedure for
foreigners were rejected. Therefore, descendants of immigrants, even if they were
born in Switzerland and have never lived in any other country, continue to be for-
eigners.7 The broad autonomy of the Switzerland’s cantons, with its long history,
produces divergent attitudes on integration, education, or religious denomination
in the respective administrative districts. However, in one area, all cantons share the
same stance. In the referendum held on November 29, 2009, 57 percent of those
who voted supported the ban on the construction of minarets, thus expressing their
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attitude toward the so-called “Islamization” of the country, a specter often raised
by the Swiss People’s Party (Rzeczpospolita 2009; BBC News  2009).
Until recently, Spain had a liberal immigration policy, but with no concrete
integration mechanisms. This resulted from the country’s haste to import the much-
needed work force (especially low-skilled and under-qualified workers) on the one
hand, and from traditionally being a country of emigration. Later, during the time of
economic boom and the resulting inflow of foreign workers, periodic regulation of im -
migrant streams proved insufficient as a temporary remedy for the new problems.
Therefore, following the example of the United States, the Spanish authorities de -
cided to legalize the stay of illegal immigrants who had lived in Spain for many years.
The 2005 amnesty revealed the real scale of “illegal” immi gration and also put a stop
to new waves by creating an efficient administrative and con trol apparatus (Arango
and Jachimowicz 2005). In consequence, a set of only partially cohesive regulations
was developed, which has three weaknes ses: ineffecti ve ness in counteracting growing
spatial segregation; uneven territorial distribution of immigrants, resulting in a dense
population of foreigners only in certain regions of the country; and the resultant addi -
tional burden on the pro vinces and communes.
The Italian case turned out to be slightly different from the Iberian one. In
the first decade of the twenty-first century, Italy oscillated between two poles: the
liberal one, manifested in the 2002 adoption of an amnesty for illegal immigrants,
and the extremely restrictive one, legalized in the Act of July 2009. While the
amnesty for illegal immigrants did not raise doubts or objections throughout Euro pe,
the introduction of the restrictive law has. European public opinion was shaken
by the fact that Italian legislators and politicians decided to pass an amendment
according to which illegal stay in Italy is recognized as a criminal act and not, as
it used to be, an administrative offence. Additionally, a foreigner in detention who
has no residence permit is fined €10 000, and a person who intentionally shelters an
illegal immigrant runs the risk of up to three years imprisonment (Morris 2009). Such
a drastic law has raised objections from institutions dealing with human rights pro-
tection, as well as other entities concerned with the nature of the newly intro-
duced regulations, which —like it or not— resemble those from the times of the
Mussolini dictatorship. Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Eu -
ro pe Thomas Hammarberg believes that the case of Italy directly points to an urgent
need for developing a joint migration policy —particularly one on immigration—
in Europe to eliminate the potential for creating legislation and regulations vio-
lating human dignity in the future (Hammarberg 2009; Lewis 2009).
In the era of increasingly intensive globalization and fast, cheap communica-
tion, leading to relatively easy movement and travel, the flow of immigrants entails
growth in cultural diversity. The phenomenon is sometimes interpreted as a threat,
all the more so because the terrorist attacks in New York, Madrid, or London con-
tribute to the catastrophic vision of the effects of such an encounter of different
cultures and the alleged “clash of civilizations.” Fear of terrorism, associated with cul -
tural and religious otherness, is intensified even more by the competition of groups
and individuals for the access to real and symbolic capital.
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To sum up, one is bound to recognize that the strong critique of the current
“working models of integration” is fully justified. Criticism itself does not solve the
problem, though, which is taking on more and more advanced forms, requiring
urgent and efficient solutions. 
Immigrants in the Nordic Countries: 
The Cases of Denmark, Sweden and Finland
Integration policy models cannot be constructed without reference to the struc-
ture of the immigrant community. Apart from the demographics, profession, and
competencies categories, their legal status needs to be taken into account (legality or
illegality of stay), as well as the equally important way a given country defines cit-
izenship. What should be mentioned here are two chief principles of including an
individual in a civic community, i.e., two principles used to determine the condi-
tions for an individual becoming a citizen of a given country. These are the so-
called right of blood (ius sanguinis) and right of soil (ius soli).
Taking all this into account, let us take a look at the modern integration mod-
els in the three Nordic countries: Denmark, Sweden, and Finland.  
DENMARK
Due to its geographic location between Scandinavia and continental Europe, Den -
mark has been a natural place of transit, first for the trade of goods, and later for mi -
 gration. In the second half of the nineteenth century, due to the dynamically de -
 v eloping agriculture and food-processing industry, the country became a very attrac tive
destination for the foreign work force in search of employment. The Danish market also
continued to be highly receptive at the beginning of the following century (Olszewski
2008, 17). Thus, the phenomena of emigration and immigration were by no means
alien to Denmark, which led to the development of a certain migratory tra di tion.
Initially, it involved the neighboring countries (Sweden, Germany, the Nether lands,
Great Britain), whose societies were culturally similar and whose eco nomies were
comparably developed. Emigrant and immigrant movement balanced out, and for
a long time the number of Danish inhabitants remained virtually unchanged. 
Different changes in the origin of immigration and the number of immigrants
occurred in the second half of the twentieth century. The size of the new immigrant
groups, consisting mainly of Turks, Pakistanis, and citizens of the former Yugos lavia,
upset the former balance of emigration and immigration, in favor of the latter. 
In 2007, immigrants constituted 8.7 percent of the Danish population, slightly
over 454 000, far more than two decades earlier, when in 1984 they made up only 2
percent of Danish society.8
410 MONIKA BANAS´
8 According to the Ministry for Integration website, there is no precise data on the size of the immi-
grant group following Islam in Danish population statistics. Statistics Denmark estimated that the
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By adopting the 1999 Integration Act, Denmark became the first state in Eu -
ro pe to approach the key issue of immigration and the resultant consequences in a
regulated and comprehensive manner. Danish legislators intended to create opti-
mum conditions for the newcomers so they could be swiftly and effectively included
in the social mainstream and at the same time guarantee their rights to education
and professional and personal development.  
Since then, the law has stipulated that the first step in the integration process is
to facilitate the immigrant’s contact with the Danish language, tradition, history, and
reality. Immigrants enjoy the right to a three-year, free-of-charge course in Danish.
Apart from that, they can take courses on Danish culture, politics, and economy. Re -
gional and local government authorities, on the other hand, are res pon sible for the
appropriate verification of the immigrants’ professional competencies, to be able
to offer them proper on-the-job or vocational courses. These activities are super-
vised by the Ministry for Integration. 
In 2005, the government submitted an integration plan called “A New Chance
for Everyone” to the parliament. The plan passed by majority vote and was approved
for implementation. Key elements of the program include increasing immigrant
employment, raising qualifications through education and training, and enhancing
the involvement of authorities and local units in the integration pro cess. These pre m -
ises are translated into concrete actions targeting different segments of the immigrant
community: women, children, youth, the elderly, etc. 
Elements of integration policy were included in the 2007 government plan,
determining the social development objectives for the years to come. The plan is
entitled “Society of Opportunities. New Goals” and provides for the construction
of an integrated society on the basis of far-reaching cooperation on all levels (local,
regional, and national) involving numerous entities, both state and private (Stats -
ministeriet 2007). The main emphasis was placed on the activation of immigrant
circles, especially in the field of the so-called ethnic businesses, and on the par-
ticipation of women in society. 
An important element in integrating all members of society is informal edu-
cation, which consists of different parallel processes such as passing on knowledge
and cultivating tolerance and understanding of different cultures. At the same time,
even the slightest manifestations of discrimination or hostility toward people of
different ethnic, racial, or national origin as well as different sexual orientation or re -
ligion must be eliminated. 
As mentioned above, integration actions involve not only state, but also pri-
vate entities. The idea is to distribute the integration effort among many partici-
pants, both on the side of the receiving country as well as the incoming individu-
als/groups. An example of such an approach is the “All Young People Needed”
size of the Muslim population was 120 000 in 1999. Curiously enough, no detailed calculations have
been performed so far to determine the number of immigrants in this category. Researchers estimate
that in 2006, the Danish Muslim community totalled around 210 000 (Ministry of Refugee, Immi -
gration, and Integration Affairs 2006).
campaign, proposing to the youth of non-Danish descent that they co-found local
cultural and educational centers in their neighborhoods. Five years after the adop-
tion of the Integration Act, the following facts speak to the effectiveness of inte-
gration actions:
• increased number of employed immigrants,
• higher employment rate of immigrants by private employers, 
• greater satisfaction of Danish entrepreneurs with the work done by immi-
grants (76 percent of private employers and 79 percent of state employers), and
• increased percentage of young people of non-Danish descent who contin-
ue their studies in secondary schools (Statistics Denmark n. d.).
A survey carried out by Catinét Research provided additional information
confirming positive changes on the path toward greater social integration: in 2001,
39 percent of immigrants had Danish friends and acquaintances, while four years
later this rose to more than 50 percent with native Danes in the circle of their
closest friends.
SWEDEN
Sweden, experiencing intensive migratory movements since the second half of the
twentieth century, and consequently a more and more conspicuous presence of
culturally, ethnically, religiously, or racially different minority groups in its territory,
tried to develop a model of social, political, and economic relations that would gua r -
antee every person full participation in the country’s communal life. This did not
happen right away, and as the analysis of the current situation reveals, the objective
of full inclusion of immigrants in the social mainstream has not yet been achieved,
even though Sweden is perceived as a role model for good integration practices.9
Modern Swedish society, as a result of past and current migratory flows, has become
a mul ticultural, multiethnic society, where one-fifth of its nearly 10 million inhab-
itants is made up of immigrants and their children.
In the Swedish discourse on migrations and their effects, threads drawing on the
native Swedish experience of immigration in the second half of the twentieth cen-
tury are intertwined with the ones going back to a much earlier experience in the
final three decades of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth
century. That period witnessed Swedish emigration to the United States, Canada,
Brazil, Argentina, Australia, or New Zealand. “Migratory experience,” made up of sev-
eral generations’ individual and collective experiences, is an important factor that
determines the modern outlook on the phenomenon.
An ideological change in the way the relationship between the majority soci-
ety and the minorities was shaped in Sweden occurred in the late 1960s. At that
time, a new concept emerged, consisting of the construction of social relations on
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the basis of three fundamental principles: respect for difference/otherness (racial,
ethnic, religious, or cultural), equal treatment of every individual on the labor market,
and immigrants’ right to a free-of-charge course in Swedish. The emerging foun-
dations of “immigrant policy” (invandrarpolitiken), inspired by the Canadian pol-
icy of multiculturalism, provided for:
1) equality: first and foremost, equal treatment of every individual in the
labor market;
2) freedom: the possibility of choosing between practicing native customs
and adapting to Swedish culture;
3) cooperation: state endorsement of immigrant initiatives, especially activities
by ethnic organizations acting as parties in the dialogue between the majori-
ty society and the minorities.
A further element within the framework of immigrant policy is refugee poli-
cy (flyktingspolitiken), in place since the 1970s. With time, it has taken on a separate,
more independent status. 
The early 1990s brought turbulence in Swedish social, political, and econo mic
life. The country was struck by the economic crisis involving most of the dev eloped
countries in the world, as well as mass emigration from the Balkans. Growing
unemployment, reaching 8.2 percent in 1993, affected immigrants first, and they
became the direct victims of the crisis.10 In the new situation, Sweden was forced
to tighten immigration regulations, all the more so because parties that built their
potential draw on social bitterness and resentment toward the social and economic
policy then in place gained popularity and came to the fore. The crowning argu-
ment of the extremely conservative parties, including the thriving right-wing New
Democracy, was the need to protect the Swedish market, the Swedish economy, and,
first and foremost, to protect Sweden against the inflow of individuals and groups
representing different, and consequently, incongruent cultural patterns. It was a
popular belief that immigrants were a group of people who ignored the Swedish
social and cultural reality, were unwilling to study the Swedish language, and took
advantage of the extensive social benefits offered by the welfare state.
What happened in Sweden, a prosperous country at the time, was neither
unusual nor strange. Any crisis, particularly one involving the economy, generates
resentment and a tendency to search for a simple justification of an unacceptable
situation. In such cases, one usually finds explanations in arguments that are not
rational, but appeal to human emotions. This is exactly what happened when the
attitude of Swedish authorities about the exodus from the Balkans and the con-
tinued admittance of refugees was highly criticized by the opposition, supported
by an ever-growing portion of Swedish society. That was when discriminatory or
racist speeches and acts were being witnessed more frequently than ever. Preju -
10 Interestingly enough, in 2009, unemployment reached a similar level: 8.3 percent. See Dagens
Nyheter (2010).
dice against foreign minority groups was no longer hidden, but more and more
boldly demonstrated in the form of aggressive speeches or incidents. The tense
domestic situation called for a swift reaction, which consisted of a change in pre-
vious premises for immigrant and refugee policies. It was understood that previ-
ous practice led to the development of “closed,” passive attitudes among immi-
grants, who were allowed to choose between their native culture and the Swedish
one. Paradoxically, the freedom of choice led to the creation of ethnic enclaves,
cultural islands of sorts, existing next to each other, but never together. The slow,
gradual separation of immigrants from the rest of the society did not help shape
mutual relations, but made social dialogue, already weakened by the unfavorable
economic situation, even more difficult.
Toward the end of the 1990s, a new concept of the organization and man-
agement of the Swedish multicultural society appeared. It received the “promising”
name of integration policy (integrationspolitiken). According to its principles, the
parties were granted the same rights, opportunities, and, first and foremost, obli-
gations; this had never been as firmly emphasized before. Thus, integration, and
not coexistence, became the determinant factor and the goal of Swedish domes-
tic policy. The principle is still followed today, even though it is continually mod-
ified based on the dictates of everyday practice and necessity.  
FINLAND
After World War II, Finland remained an emigrant country for a long time. Waves
of Finnish emigrants poured into neighboring Sweden, but also into Norway and
Denmark. A considerable percentage of emigrants chose the United States as their
destination. It was only in the final two decades of the twentieth century that the
emigrant flow subsided. The 1980s were characterized by an accelerated growth
of the Finnish economy, which switched to the production of high technologies and
filled the Finnish Diaspora with new hope for a return home. The country’s improved
financial conditions soon turned out to be good enough to start building prosperity.
This is indeed what happened. What was significant for the efforts undertaken at
the time was Finnish cooperation within the framework of the Nordic agreement,
involving the economic, political, and cultural spheres. 
Starting from the early 1990s, repatriation of the people of Finnish descent
from the territories of the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) began.
This group did not integrate easily, as its members spoke no Finnish and did not
feel a particularly strong bond with the country of their ancestors (Tanner 2004).
At the same time groups of people seeking refugee status started flowing into Fin -
land, as well as individuals in search of a new homeland, often for purely economic
reasons. In early 2009, Finland’s population included nearly 156 000 foreigners,
a little over 3 percent of the total (Statistikcentralen 2009).
In 1997, Eduskunda, the Finnish parliament, passed a law about the princi-
ples of immigration and integration policy. According to its guidelines, integration
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consists of active participation of immigrants in social, economic, and political life.
The principle of equal status is characteristic of this participation. What is also sig-
nificant is that the state ensures that immigrant groups can cultivate their traditions
and customs as long as they do not contradict the Finnish Constitution.  
According to the Finnish integration concept, foreigners are perceived as
partners actively involved in the process of the construction of Finnish reality.
Finland does not follow the ius soli principle when granting citizenship. Newcomers
are allowed to apply for Finnish citizenship after a five-year legal stay in the coun-
try. Applicants need to meet several requirements: they have to speak fluent Finnish
(an additional asset is good command of Swedish), have no criminal record, and
have a regular, steady income (Kyntäjä 2003, 187).
Since Finland is undoubtedly a prosperous country, foreigners with perma-
nent residency can enjoy extensive welfare benefits. Unemployed immigrants are
invited to participate in special, individual integration programs from which they
receive a government integration allowance whose use is monitored by an employ-
ment office worker. The solution is aimed at the best possible and most effective
use of financial resources, coupled simultaneously with the development of the
interested party’s professional potential. 
The Ombudsman for Foreigners, established in 1998, supports the imple-
mentation of integration policy. The Advisory Board for Ethnic Relations (ETNO)
is an advisory body to the government institutions dealing with migration and
integration that dates from the same year. The 14 board members were directly
appointed by both the native and the ethnic minority groups, a practical manifes-
tation of immigrants’ real involvement in the decision-making process about inte-
gration (Kyntäjä 2003, 205).11
Like Sweden, Finland has become a typical immigration country over the last
10 years. Facing the issue of the growing inflow of foreigners, the Finnish govern -
ment determined (with the approval of the parliament) annual quotas of between
500 and 1 000 for the number of immigrants allowed into the country as refugees
(Kyntäjä 2003, 193). These people are entitled to language courses and vocational
training. Additionally, in order to facilitate quick integration, they are sent to diffe -
rent parts of the country to prevent the creation of ethnic clusters (Kyntäjä 2003,
198). Thanks to agreements signed with different state institutions, local district
and municipal authorities can offer accommodation to immigrants and reimburse
the maintenance cost from public coffers.
As far as educational programs for immigrant children and teenagers are con-
cerned, day care and education centers, where children can learn Finnish as well
as their native language free of charge, are highly popular. According to integra-
tion policy principles, children can study their native language three to four hours
a week free of charge. Adults can also participate in similar courses, tailor-made for
their needs. Apart from the aforementioned forms of assistance, the Finnish state
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offers financial support to institutions founded by immigrants, sponsors television
and radio programs broadcast in native languages, and earmarks funds for ethnic
press publications. 
Problems with adaptation and integration occur in different spheres of com-
munal and private life. However, in Finland the greatest problem for immigrants
is their continued high unemployment rate, which is much higher than that of the
native population, coming to nearly 30 percent, compared to 7 percent for the rest of so -
ciety. Lack of work and frequent use of welfare benefits constitutes a direct cause of
foreigners’ marginalization and partial exclusion. For those very reasons, general opi n -
ion about immigrants is not particularly positive. This negative attitude is addi tio nally
strengthened by the events in neighboring Sweden and Denmark, as well as by the
general tendencies to radicalize attitudes about immigrants in continental Europe.  
Rhetoric Predicting Changes: Denmark
Widely discussed in Europe, the need to change migration policy is also subject to
debate in the Scandinavian countries. In Denmark, Sweden, and Finland, we can
see a dramatic change of rhetoric in the discourse on migration and its consequen -
ces. The last decade has seen the rise of great social resentment not only in terms
of the general economic condition caused by the global financial crisis since 2007,
but also disappointment in previous integration policies for immigrants, policies that
apparently have not achieved the intended results. 
In European countries with a large proportion of immigrants like France, the
United Kingdom, Italy, or Spain, integration policies seem to be relatively inef-
fective compared to their financial and social costs. This naturally undermines
citizens’ confidence in political parties, politicians, and intellectuals who opt for
immigration as a means to rescue aging societies.
German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s statement in the German parliament in
October 2010 about the failure of the German policy of multiculturalism received
wide media coverage in Europe. For some in the audience, the statement was
shocking, but for others it was not and merely reflected the true state of affairs.
Merkel’s conclusion, adopted by the media and extended later to European migra-
tion policy in general, has modified the public discourse, giving it a much more
critical tone. Since then it has become much easier to question the policy of mul-
ticulturalism, and to challenge the presence of immigrants, especially those from
outside the EU.
Anti-immigrant rhetoric typical of extreme right-wing circles also began to
appear gradually in the statements of politicians from liberal circles. The case of
Denmark constitutes such an example.
The recovery plan for the Danish economy after the 2007 financial upheaval,
presented on May 25, 2010, by Prime Minister Lars Løkke Rasmussen, contains
several major changes. One concerns toughening the procedures for legalizing the
stay on Danish soil for non-EU citizens. Another significant change boils down to
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modifying —by restricting more— access to the system of social services for
immigrants already residing in the country.
According to the authors of the recovery plan and the prime minister himself,
the proposed changes are dictated by the need to repair state finances, as well as
by the obligation (as an EU member-state) of reducing the budget deficit from five
percent to three percent of GDP. 
The planned savings are to be ensured by the following cuts in public expen-
ditures:
• shortening the period for receiving unemployment benefits from four to
two years;
• reducing child allowances to 30 000 crowns (This is supposed to save 1 bil-
lion crowns in 2013.);
• keeping financial support for developing countries at the same level as in
previous years (This will save nearly 1.4 billion crowns.); and
• reducing subsidies for translators in hospitals (This will create a savings of
15 million crowns). (Lehmann 2010)
Critics of the plan and the reform say the government is going after simple
solutions using populist arguments and applying methods that might affect the
most vulnerable, including immigrants.
Some experts, observers of the Danish domestic political scene, believe that
before being put into practice, the government initiatives must first gain the “silent”
support of the populist party Dansk Folkeparti (DF). The party has been growing
in power since the late 1990s and now constitutes a significant political force in the
Danish parliament. The proposed toughening up of migration policy and re duc tion of
social benefits are changes very welcomed by the DF.
Michael Bach Henriksen, a journalist at the Kristeligt Dagblad newspaper,
stated that the savings proposed in the reform program could be called into ques-
tion and are very small taking into account all the country’s finances. According to
Henriksen, this indicates three tendencies: first, ruling politicians do not have the
courage to look for savings in areas where they really should (e.g., by limiting the
possibility of early retirement); second, the DF’s impact on the government is dis-
turbingly hefty; third, the government is looking for temporary solutions, under-
taking rather symbolic and irrelevant actions (2010).
In addition to all of the above, the reduction of allowances for families with
more than three children strikes directly at immigrant families, which are traditio n -
ally large. This is an open warning signal to immigrants that family policy in Denmark
is being toughened.
Helle Ib expressed similar comments in the Berlingske Tidende newspaper. The
journalist stated that the government bowed to DF influence, deciding to repair
the state budget at the expense of immigrants and their descendants (2010).
A contrary point of view is presented by DF leaders Pia Kjærsgaard, Kristian
Dahl Thulesen, and Peter Skaarup. They believe that the reform does nothing more
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than divide the cost of the Danish welfare state among all its residents, including
immigrants and their descendents. The immigrants should not be treated more
favorably than native Danes (Lehmann 2010). 
A controversy arose after Peter Skaarup’s statement that if non-European immi -
grants worked as much as native Danes, the state would be able to save nearly 24 bi l -
lion crowns (Skaarup 2010). This is one of the examples and at the same time an
indicator of the direction the public discourse on immigration may develop.
Suggestions that immigrants are prone to misuse the Danish welfare system
and that they avoid work fall on fertile ground. Populist arguments about the re -
luctance of immigrants to integrate into Danish society, immigrants’ inclination to
lock themselves in ethnic ghettos, and their tendency to crime constitute very dan -
gerous and powerful rhetoric creating a metaphoric picture of immigrants as a group
of people unwilling to integrate and willing to separate and live on the ex pense of
the rest of society. 
The recovery program for the Danish economy has become a convenient mo -
ment for the DF to push through the modification of Danish (im)migration policy.
Thus, in the new concept of the policy the immigrants are obliged to be ready to
accept work quickly after arrival in the host country, undertake professional train-
ing courses, and learn the Danish language. Failure to fulfill these requirements
would constitute grounds for expelling an immigrant from the country. 
Denmark’s political landscape has significantly changed during the past two
decades. So has the public discourse on immigration. The contemporary discourse
around the policy applied to immigrants in Denmark contains much more severe
criticism than several years ago. It is powered by such events as the Islamist’s reac -
tion to the Muhammad cartoons published by Jyllands Posten in 2005 and the for-
tunately unsuccessful attempt to murder cartoonist Kurt Westergaard, their author.
The present alignment of forces in the government coalition and the parlia-
ment reflects the mood of the Danish voters, who do not deny the need to reduce
the influx of immigrants to their country and to tighten the rules governing their stay.
For some political commentators, what is happening in Denmark is rather an
unnecessary and embarrassing episode in the country’s modern history; others un -
derstand it as an indispensable element in the process of governing a country like
Denmark, with a tradition of democracy, freedom of speech, and a secular state.
The End of Political Correctness? Sweden
For several years, the Swedish discourse on the financial and social condition of
the country has included increasing calls for an open, constructive, public debate
about (im)migration policy. A need for such a discussion based on solid arguments
has been evident for several reasons. These include the lack of transparent pro-
cedures for the admission of immigrants (including refugees); incomplete data
about the financial costs involved in this process; and imprecisely stated amounts
of the tax revenues paid by immigrants into state coffers.
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An analysis of the discourse in the Swedish media over the past few years in -
dicates that public opinion demands the revision of current immigration policy.
There appears to be a great deal of concern about the safety of public finances.
Questions are raised, among others, about the allocation methods for budgetary
resources dedicated to social services. The generosity of the social system prac-
ticed for many decades had few opponents, who argued the grave consequences of
such a policy. The voices of these skeptics, however, were not loud, and they re -
mained outside the mainstream rhetoric, which accepted the current practice.
For almost four decades, generously supported disadvantaged groups had de -
veloped an attitude, a tendency to excessive use of allowances and benefits. This
appealed to immigrants, but also to native Swedes.
The information policy of the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, seen from today’s per -
s pective, contributed to creating the image of immigrants as individuals who needed
protection and special state aid, because they came mostly from developing coun-
tries. Opinion leaders set an example by showing commitment to the immigrants’
issues. This commendable attitude has become the norm, but, to some extent, it has
also “disabled” the immigrant population, by indicating that it was more profitable
to be dependent than to be independent and resourceful.
The question arises about the origin or source of such a generous social pol-
icy. One of the answers may be that, while becoming a welfare state in the 1950s
and 1960s, Sweden wanted to change its own image, which had accompanied the
country before and during World War II. Declaring itself neutral in the conflict,
Sweden could afford economic agreements with each of the warring parties, thus
sparking severe controversies worldwide.
Returning to the present, the criticism of current migration policy raised by some
media is due to the fact that, according to the United Nations definition, 8 out of
10 asylum seekers are in fact not refugees (Sandelin 2008).
The variety of terms and a multiplicity of denominations present in the Swedish
language contribute to clerical errors in the proper recognition of immigrants’ status.
The multiplicity and variety of terms similar in meaning seems to be a factor con-
tributing to deficiencies in the management of migration flows.
The costs of the current migration policy are not exactly known; they remain
estimates. This provides another reason to speculate about the actual amount. The
daily press publishes different numbers ranging from 40 billion to 300 billion crowns
a year. The large spread between the quoted sums is caused by the changing in -
tensity of immigration flows in a particular year and in the preceding years.
This is all aggravated by the fact that the results of research conducted for
the state institutions responsible for integration show that, after five years’ residence
in Sweden, half the men who came as refugees in 2003 continued without a job!
When it comes to women, it was even worse: 60 to 70 percent, depending on the
ethnic group (Sandelin 2008).
The lack of an open critical review of (im)migration policy resulted from sev-
eral factors: 1) a belief in this policy’s efficacy; 2) a deep-rooted conviction about
the  righteousness of helping disadvantaged individuals by granting asylum; and
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3) political correctness. The last of these factors meant that migration issues were
not a subject of public debate, but rather stayed behind ministry doors. No one
taking part in the public discourse on immigration wanted to be accused of “hid-
den hostility toward immigrants” or “hidden racism.”
Ideologically tinged rhetoric used hitherto in public debate distorted the dis-
course about immigration, making it artificial, unreal, distanced from reality, in the
name of solidarity and empathy for the less privileged. As it turns out, one of the major
challenges for today’s migration policy in Sweden is to modify the socio-political
discourse on immigration both in its form as well as its content.
A New Balance of Power in the Parliament: 
Finland 
A need for change in immigration policy is also evident in Finland. Until the 2007
crisis, debate over immigration and immigrants was not a central theme in Finnish
public discourse. It was carried out almost on the margins, using rather mild rhet-
oric. However, today the situation has changed. The economic downturn reduced
the sense of financial stability among ordinary citizens, who began to launch neg-
ative comments about the issue of open borders. Slogans demanding tighter immi -
gration laws are not exceptional or unusual today. They can be heard on the streets,
read on Internet portals, or even seen in some media. 
A dramatic increase of these negative emotions can be observed since 2008,
when the elections for municipal councils took place. The pre-election struggle was
fierce, full of sharp arguments, sometimes even aggressive. Astrid Thors, Finnish
Mi nister of Migration for European Affairs, experienced the resentments per-
sonally. One of the members of the populist party Sannfinländarna (“True Finns”)
published on Facebook a statement expressing his readiness to accept the penalty
and consequences for killing the minister. These threats were immediately spot-
ted by police and prosecutors, who began an investigation. The swift response of law
enfor ce ment agencies, however, did not discourage other party supporters from
uploading further aggressive statements onto the Internet (Kaarto 2010).
The Internet has turned out to be an effective communication platform for
disseminating contents impossible to publish elsewhere. Some groups, associations,
or other politically oriented formations, reluctant about or opposed to immigrants,
take advantage of this. The anti-immigration groups and associations that are active
on the Internet are also rather well organized. They have their own forums, stay in
regular contact with each other, and jointly take actions directed against their oppo -
nents. Examples can be found among harassment cases in which jour na lists and poli -
ticians who support liberal immigration policy have received anonymous letters,
often containing threats (Helsingin Sanomat 2010a).
The anti-immigrant movement still remains on the margins of social movements;
however, it is growing stronger and expanding its influence. One of the symptoms
of this trend is the result of a Gallup survey conducted for Finland’s largest daily
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Helsingin Sanomat in March 2010. According to the survey, 60 percent of those
interviewed were against continuing the current immigration policy, and support-
ed proposals for its tightening (Helsingin Sanomat 2010b).
Public opinion in Finland exerts a strong and clear influence on the shape of
the country’s domestic policy. The voice of Finnish society contributed to the mo d -
ification of the asylum law in 2010, making it more restrictive in cases of family
reunification when individuals granted Finnish asylum want to bring family mem-
bers from abroad.
Finland’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Alexander Stubb openly supports immi-
gration. In an interview given to the daily Helsingin Sanomat in March 2010, he
stated that the ongoing anti-immigrant debate was not acceptable and that it con-
tradicted the overall interests of the state. His opinion is shared by Minister of Mi -
gration for European Affairs Astrid Thors, who, at a parliamentary meeting in
May 2010, presented statistical evidence of de facto decreasing inflow of immi-
grants to Finland.
In light of this fact, the public’s increasingly critical attitude toward foreigners
may be problematic and confusing, especially when immigrants constitute only
about 2.5 percent of Finnish society, much less than in the case of neighboring
Sweden and Norway. 
Historically, anti-immigration attitudes seem to have a long tradition, dating
back to the mid-twentieth century. At that time, anti-immigration slogans were often
expressed by the Finnish Rural Party (Finlands Landsbygds Parti), which hit its
peak in the 1960s and 1970s. The party’s prominent leader, Veikko Vennamo, was
a charismatic, talented orator and strategist who created a significant audience of
listeners and supporters.
Although Vennamo’s party dissolved in 1995, his ideas survived and found
followers. One of them is Timo Soini, the leader of today’s populist party, the True
Finns (Sannfinländarna), which won seats in parliament in 2003.
The party’s increasing popularity is due to several factors. Among them are its
leader’s oratorical skills. Soini is an outspoken critic of the EU and its financial in -
 s titutions, which makes him popular among EU skeptics. The crisis of the Greek eco n -
omy, which seriously disturbed the euro zone, has provided Soini with additional
arguments against the EU, and also indirectly against the immigration policy pursued
by Finland as an EU member.
The growing strength of the populist party should be viewed particularly in
the wider context of the upcoming parliamentary elections in April 2011.12 Today’s
government coalition made up of four parties, including the strongest one, the Center
Party, with 51 seats in parliament, is challenged by a similar number of opposition
parties. The biggest of these, the Social Democrats, has 45 parliamentary man-
dates. It seems that subtle internal frictions within the Center Party may become
an important factor in the possible shift of power after the elections. These fric-
12 A majority of voters cast their ballots for the conservative/liberal National Coalition Party in those
elections.
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tions indicate absence of a commonly shared and united vision of the future of
Finland. Consequently, the balance of power in the Finnish parliament can and
probably will significantly change after the elections in April.
One may hope that the victorious party, in a position to build a government
coalition after the elections, will not do so by turning to the True Finns as a pos-
sible partner.
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Introducción
El mundo contemporáneo ha conocido cambios radicales, especialmente a partir del
otoño de 1989, que entre otras dimensiones se han expresado en la naturaleza de las
fronteras y, por ende, en el trato dispensado a los flujos migratorios. Estos cambios,
además de impactar en la vida de pueblos, sociedades y en las relaciones interna cio na -
les, sorprendieron al grueso de la comunidad científico-social. La caída del muro de
Berlín y del orbe comunista en Europa central y oriental en el otoño de 1989, las cri -
sis financieras y económicas de los noventa en México, Asia, Rusia, Sudamé rica, los
ataques terroristas en Nueva York y Washington en septiembre del 2001, o el inicio
de la crisis financiera en el 2007 y la consiguiente depresión económica mundial en
el 2008 son algunos de los hitos más destacados.
No hay que olvidar que tras estos sucesos hay diferentes procesos y reacomo -
dos que impactan la vida de los más vulnerables. De hecho, las reestructuraciones
tanto a gran escala como en contextos locales y “micro” intensificaron o inaugura -
ron algu nos movimientos migratorios hasta extremos inéditos. Así, los flujos migra -
torios in ter nacionales, según estimaciones de la ONU, se aproximaron a la cifra de
doscientos millones de migrantes en años recientes (United Nations, 2009). Y es que
aquellas turbulencias políticas y económicas produjeron la emergencia de nuevos
países como destino migratorio a partir de los noventa (el caso de España), o la intensi -
fica ción de flujos históricos como los que confluyen en Estados Unidos, o el cam -
bio gradual del patrón migratorio general, como ocurre actualmente en Polonia.
No por casualidad, tanto en España como en Estados Unidos, el año de 1993
supuso el inicio de la implantación de fronteras-muro: en las ciudades norafrica -
nas de Ceuta y Melilla y en las ciudades-condados del southwest estadunidense
como El Paso, San Diego o Nogales. También por aquellos mismos años, Polonia co -
noció una transformación social, política, económica y cultural que se reflejó en
la naturaleza de sus fronteras, y pasó de ser parte de la Cortina de Hierro hasta 1989
en cierta manera, a integrante de la Unión Europea en 2004 y del espacio Schengen
en 2007, uno que impone fuertes restricciones al movimiento de los migrantes no
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comunitarios y, por tanto, exige un estricto control de las fronteras externas de la
Unión Europea.
Resulta significativo comprobar cómo en los casos español, polaco y estadu -
nidense se enfrentó la decisión política del control de los límites territoriales y el
manejo de los flujos migratorios irregulares “cerrando” segmentos estratégicos de la
frontera. Como veremos más adelante, en los tres casos concurren distintas causas
y circunstancias. Sin embargo, existen indicios que apuntan a que, en cierta forma,
esas políticas están vinculadas a un sentimiento antiinmigrante albergado por im -
portantes sustratos de las distintas sociedades. Es decir, una hipótesis que emerge
verosímilmente ante este panorama apunta a que las parecidas políticas de control
fronterizo en tres “lugares” tan diferentes sólo se explican por un previo clima antiin -
migrante que se estuvo gestando durante décadas y que atravesó más de una gene -
ración de ciudadanos. Por tanto, entendemos que las fronteras-muro reflejan una
previa ideología de rechazo al extranjero migrante, bien por parte de amplias capas
de las sociedades, bien por decisiones políticas/jurídicas que de facto “contie nen”
o vehiculan ese sentimiento antiinmigrante.
La geografía de las migraciones y la territorialidad 
de las políticas antiinmigrantes
La animadversión al otro-extranjero, que se manifiesta bajo múltiples formas por
parte de sectores sociales con capacidad de incidencia política, propicia “políticas”
y medidas de combate y represión de la inmigración. “El método más conocido y
clásico de controlar la inmigración es a través del reforzamiento físico de las fron -
teras de una nación” (Doomernik, 2010: 22). No obstante, en los tres casos el senti -
miento antiinmigrante tiene un origen, unas expresiones y un peso desigual, puesto
que se trata de contextos geopolíticos, jurídico-legislativos y socioculturales distin -
tos, sin olvidar que la cuestión del vínculo entre control fronterizo y sentimiento
de animadversión al inmigrante no son fáciles de abordar o reducir a térmi nos de aná -
lisis manejables, máxime cuando hay todo un proceso de gestación que llevó décadas,
sustanciado en leyes supranacionales como las de la Unión Euro pea, que acaban
imponiéndose en España y Polonia. O las directrices de Washing ton, que no necesa -
riamente tienen en cuenta las dinámicas transfronterizas del suroeste y sus espe -
cificidades (Alonso, 2009).
La dimensión “física” y geopolítica de las fronteras es otro factor que influye.
Sólo España, en el extremo suroccidental de la Unión Europea, tiene como míni -
mo cinco tipos de fronteras, y desde 1989 se produjo la “obstaculización” de algunas
de éstas y el consiguiente desvío de flujos; es decir, se han dado en todo este tiempo
distintos escenarios, distintas medidas y políticas y distintas coyunturas de animad -
versión a los inmigrantes y, algo de lo que a veces nos olvidamos, de animadversión
a los vecinos. Hay sobrados ejemplos en que los inmigrantes pueden proceder del
país vecino, inseparable de una historia de relaciones que carga con sus juicios y pre -
juicios. En esos casos las(os) inmigrantes van acompañados de antecedentes de
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estigmas, discriminación y violencia. Para el caso español, por ejem plo, el vecino pue de
ser el francés en el norte o el marroquí (musulmán o no) en el sur; el inglés-gibral ta reño
en Gibraltar, el portugués hacia el oeste o el argelino por el sureste. Finalmente, en
años más recientes, el litoral de toda África noroccidental (magrebí, saharauí y sub -
 sahariana) se transformó en una frontera “caliente” respecto de las Islas Canarias,
que fue por donde se desviaron los flujos entre el 2005 y el 2008. 
Por otra parte, el caso de Polonia permite visualizar un fenómeno en cierta
dimensión análogo, pues de ser, en cierto sentido, parte de la Cortina de Hierro se
ha convertido en un segmento importante de la frontera oriental de la Unión Euro -
pea. Además, a lo largo del siglo XX, las relaciones con algunos vecinos, sobre todo
con Alemania y Ucrania, solían ser bastante turbulentas. Los cambios que empe -
zaron a llegar a partir de los noventa en un principio tampoco facilitaban el proce -
so de mejoramiento de las relaciones con vecinos en el contexto migratorio; primero,
a causa de la mayor protección de la frontera occidental por parte de Alemania (la
entonces frontera externa de la Unión Europea) y luego, en la siguiente década, por
la implementación de medidas semejantes a las padecidas hasta el 2004, sólo que
aplicadas por Polonia en su frontera oriental con Rusia, Bielorrusia y Ucrania, es
decir, en la nueva división entre los países comunitarios —la denominada forta le -
za Europa— y “los otros”.
Finalmente, el trato a los inmigrantes y el control de las fronteras en Estados
Unidos constituyen todo un paradigma. Desde su misma independencia han expe -
rimentado profundos cambios en la naturaleza política de su territorio/fronteras y
la percepción de los inmigrantes. Es decir, el manejo de sus fronteras y de los flujos
de inmigrantes tienen una “tormentosa” o nada civilizada historia detrás (Zolberg,
2006). Actualmente existen cuatro operativos de control (represión) de la migra -
ción indocumentada en la frontera con México. Allí surgió la Operation Blockade
(Operación Bloqueo) que se inició el 19 de septiembre de 1993 entre El Paso, Texas,
y Ciudad Juárez, Chihuahua.1 Puesta en práctica por la Border Patrol (Patrulla Fron -
teriza) meses después con la entrada en vigor del TLCAN,2 la Ope ra tion Blockade
fue “later diplomatically renamed Operation Hold-the-line” (Eschbach et al., 1999:
448). Seguidamente fue reproducida en Gatekeeper (en San Diego, California)
y Safeguard (en Nogales, Arizona), iniciadas en octubre de 1994. Años después
se implementó la Operation Rio Grande, en Texas (agosto de 1997), que se ex -
tiende por el bajo río Bravo entre Brownsville y Laredo hasta que, con el tiempo,
cada una ha desarrollado especificidades propias (Alonso, 2003). Las medidas post
sep tiem bre 11, la creación del Departamento de Seguridad Nacional (Homeland
Se curity) y la construcción de “muros” del 2006 al 2010 cierran lo más rele vante de
este proceso.
Por lo expuesto sintéticamente hasta aquí, los tres países muestran un pro -
ceso de reconstrucción de las fronteras exteriores conflictivas que son indisocia -
bles de la presión de un sentimiento antiinmigrante, insistimos, con distinto peso
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1 Más exactamente, entre Sunland Park, en Nuevo México, y Fabens, en Texas (Ortiz, 1994).
2 Obsérvese que en términos diplomáticos un “agreement” no es lo mismo que un “tratado”·
en cada estado. Los cambios radicales entre la caída del muro de Berlín a la ley de
Arizona SB1070 del verano del 2010, pasando por las crisis de las pateras y los ca -
yucos en España 1992-2008, muestran más de una similitud ideológica y coyun tural.
Paradójicamente, el periodo que analizamos está comprendido entre la caída de la
Cortina de Hierro y el levantamiento de una auténtica Iron Courtain en la fron -
tera Estados Unidos-México.
Una síntesis del proceso de animadversión 
antiinmigrante en perspectiva histórica
Los casos español, polaco y estadunidense, aunque son regiones distantes cultural,
social y geográficamente, tienen en común, también, que son los bordes de unas
placas tectónicas geopolíticas y económico-financieras estratégicamente rele van -
tes. Encierran economías y mercados de trabajo de un gran dinamismo, que atraen
por igual tanto flujos de capital e inversión como flujos migratorios internaciona -
les procedentes de distintas regiones, aunque siempre hay una nacionalidad pre -
dominante: marroquíes, ucranianos, mexicanos. Y estos colectivos de inmigrantes
son el target, así como “el marco de referencia” (Goffman, 2006b) con el que las y los
individuos de las comunidades receptoras legitiman el sentimiento de animad ver -
sión o de bienvenida: xenofobia o xenofilia.3 Siempre existe un chivo expiatorio y
un marco de prejuicios, mitos (ahora se habla de leyendas urba nas) y estigmas
(Goffman, 2006a), unidos en un sustrato sociocultural racista que, conjuntamente
con las políticas y los discursos, encuadran el fenómeno de la mi gración regu-
lar o irregular para juzgarla moralmente y “combatirla”. 
Los muros y los dispositivos electrónicos de detección vienen después, ya que
todo apunta a que, por lo general, suelen responder en gran medida a una presión
de distintos sectores sociales,mass media incluidos, en cuyas calderas mediáticas las
más de las veces se gestan y potencian los sentimientos y actitudes antiinmigrantes.
Es como si las “comunidades imaginadas” (Anderson, 1983) necesitasen “enemi -
gos imaginados” que provocan problemas ficticios con consecuencias reales. El
poema “Esperando a los bárbaros” de Kavafis podría ilustrar esto; también la si -
guiente cita de finales de los setenta de Wayne Cornelius:
La administración de Carter ha hecho más que cualquiera de las precedentes para
elevar el nivel de preocupación entre la población estadunidense en general, sobre la in -
migración indocumentada. Ha habido un esfuerzo deliberado por ciertos sectores del
gobierno —especialmente el Departamento de Trabajo— para echar la culpa de altas
ta sas de desempleo entre los negros, los jóvenes y otros sectores de la población en los
EE.UU., sobre la inmigración indocumentada. A México se le culpa por exportar su
desempleo, y otros problemas sociales y económicos […]. El público americano ya estaba
dispuesto a creer que la inmigración era perjudicial para ellos mismos y para el país
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3 Sobre el concepto de xenofilia y su aplicación véanse Aramburu y Zegrí (1994).
[…]. Ya para el año 1976, aproximadamente un 80 por ciento o más del pueblo esta -
dunidense creía que los migrantes indocumentados acaparan los trabajos de los habi -
tantes legales, que se meten en actividades criminales, que rebajan el nivel de los salarios
que se pagan a los habitantes legales, y que muchos recogen pagos por desempleo
o “welfare”. El 80 por ciento apoyaban el tipo de ley recientemente propuesta por el
presidente Carter, que multaría a los patronos que contratan migrantes indocumen -
tados (Cornelius, 1979: 28-30).
Wayne Cornelius señaló en este pasaje uno de los impulsos contemporáneos
dados en Estados Unidos por un presidente demócrata que, no por casualidad, meses
después tuvo que enfrentar la crisis de los rehenes americanos en la embajada de
Teherán. Los cambios que se estaban produciendo en aquellos años —y que a su
vez no pueden entenderse sin las turbulencias racistas, xenófobas y antiinmigrantes
de la primera mitad del siglo XX— fueron clave para entender la actual animadver -
sión a los inmigrantes en Estados Unidos, incluidos los muros, la propuesta SB1070
o las deportaciones récord del ICE en el periodo 2007-2010. A este respecto, Robert
A. Pastor (1983) ofrecía datos esclarecedores. Si de 1900 a 1965 la mayoría de los
inmigrantes de Estados Unidos procedían de Europa, ya en 1978 el 82 por ciento pro -
cedía de Asia y América Latina. Los hispanos en 1970 sumaban nueve millones, el
4.5 por ciento de la población. Diez años después, en 1980, eran 14.6 millones,
el 6.4 por ciento del total, de los que a su vez el 60 por ciento eran descendientes
de mexicanos. Y desde hace unos años son la primera minoría con una población
culturalmente heterogénea y de diversas procedencias con más de cuarenta mi llo nes
de per sonas (aproximadamente tres cuartas partes de origen mexicano).
Los hispanohablantes en general y los mexicanos en particular, de una u otra
forma, llevaban décadas sufriendo el racismo (McWilliams, 1968; Samora, 1971;
Zolberg, 2006). Pero durante la presidencia de Jimmy Carter (1977-1981) se pro -
dujeron cambios cualitativos y cuantitativos que los abocaba a ser una vez más el chivo
expiatorio —la cortina de humo— en momentos de crisis; las víctimas de una infor -
mación tergiversada o descontextualizada tanto por gobiernos y partidos políticos
como por empresas de comunicación y prensa sin escrúpulos. Jorge Bustamante, en
la misma obra colectiva en la que participó Cornelius (en Torres, comp., 1979), tam -
bién señaló que periódicos de prestigio solían publicar a mediados de los setenta
—antes de Carter— contenidos de un indisimulable amarillismo xenófobo:
La emigración indocumentada hacia Estados Unidos, particularmente la que se origina
en México, ha llamado considerablemente la atención de los medios de comunicación
masiva. En Estados Unidos la prensa se refiere a los inmigrantes indocumentados en
términos tales como “una invasión de ilegales” (Withmore, 1976); “invasión silen cio -
sa” (Fitzhugh, 1976; Jense, 1976); un caso de “crisis nacional (The NewYork Times, 1974):
una “carga de 13 000 millones de dólares para los contribuyentes” (U.S. News and
World Report, 1976); y en titulares a ocho columnas como: “El Estado amenazado por
hordas de extranjeros” del Herald Examiner de Los Ángeles del 8 de agosto, 1977. Sin
embar go, apenas si se ha escuchado a los científicos sociales hablar de lo poco que se
conoce aún sobre el tema” (Bustamante, 1979: 23).
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Evidentemente, para buscar antecedentes sobre animadversión al extranjero
o al “otro” podríamos retrotraernos a los clásicos grecolatinos. Sin embargo, el ensa -
yo de Geraldo Rivera (2008), Hispanic: Why Americans Fear Hispanics in the U.S.,4
ahonda en algunas raíces de aquellos “mismos” males mediáticos que denunciaban
Cornelius o Bustamante. Este análisis (es periodis mo bien documentado y argu -
mentado) critica los excesos e irresponsabilidad de los medios, especialmente pro -
gramas concretos como el caso deO’Reilly Factor, en ca nales específicos: FOX News.
Sorprendentemente, parecidos antecedentes a los referidos por Bustamante
o Cornelius los hallamos en Europa Occidental. La antropóloga Verena Stolcke,
siguiendo la estela de trabajos que analizaron la creciente hostilidad y vio lencia di -
rigida a lo que por entonces se denominaba “inmigrantes procedentes del tercer
mundo” por parte de amplios sectores de las sociedades de distintos países euro -
peos, ya habló de esta animadversión racista y de las “nuevas retóricas de ex clusión”
que las legitimaban (Stolcke, 1995). Esta autora llegó a la conclusión de que
aque lla hostilidad y violencia estuvo vinculada previamente al resurgimiento en los
años setenta del “racismo”, que tras la segunda guerra mundial y el holocausto judío
había retrocedido en Occidente.
Sin duda, la crisis del petróleo después de 1973 marcó aquella época. La
Europa de fines de los setenta y la década de los ochenta conoció profundos rea -
justes consustanciales a las crisis capitalistas, reconversiones profundas de regiones
y ciudades o en sectores productivos como la minería del carbón o los astilleros. Mar -
garet Thatcher en el Reino Unido en 1978 esgrimía el miedo a los inmigrantes de
otras culturas; eran los mismos años de Jimmy Carter previos a la era de Ronald
Reagan. Una vez más, los extranjeros inmigrantes fueron acusados del desempleo
o la recesión económica, y de nuevo aparecieron titulares amarillistas como “ava-
lancha de inmigrantes” o “la bomba de tiempo de la inmigración”, noticias con las
que se infundía temor a la población para acrecentar el descontento y capitalizarlo
políticamente en las elecciones. Irrumpían así en los programas polí ticos y en los
me dios de comunicación —Van Dijk (2003) menciona los tabloides anglosajones
como los periódicos que cobijan públicamente estas ideas— discursos abiertamente
antiinmigrantes. Van Dijk también señala que “la invasión de extranjeros” y “Fuera
extranjeros” fueron lemas familiares y que ahora son mundia les. De esa manera se
distraían y ocultaban las verdaderas causas u orígenes político-económicos de pro -
blemas como la pobreza, la violencia o el malestar que afectaban y afectan a las socie -
dades de salida y de destino de migrantes.
Asimismo, la relación inclusión/animadversión subyace a cualquier política inmi -
gratoria. De esa manera, el lenguaje oficial de la Comunidad Económica Europea
(la CEE, ahora denominada Unión Europea) de aquellos años, hablaba de “inmi -
grantes extracomunitarios”, lo que ocasionaba una exclusión dual y podría constituir
una frontera simbólica interna entre los mundos “diferentes”. Obviamente, la mayo -
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la traducción de Hispanics es hispanos en el sentido de hispanohablantes).
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ría de ellos, excluidos los estadunidenses, eran inmigrantes del sur pobre y de la
Europa del Este, comunistas o “socialistas” por aquello de la URSS y ex comunistas,
que eran objeto de discriminación por ser extranjeros indeseables, ya que portaban
la diferencia cultural cual virus amenazante. Por tanto, el discurso antiinmigrante
tuvo y tiene en los políticos de derecha y los gobiernos conservadores los pro pa -
gadores de temores entre la población, con una retórica de la exclusión que ensalza
la identidad nacional basada en la exclusividad cultural (Stolcke, 1995).
La plasmación de lo que ha ocurrido en la vida política en las últimas dos dé ca -
das se puede entender mejor repasando unos hechos de hace menos de una década.
El 6 de mayo del 2002 (un día después de la derrota electoral del fascista Le Pen
en Francia), fue asesinado Pim Fortuyn, el candidato de la ultraderecha de los Paí -
ses Bajos. Las elecciones en Holanda se iban a producir unos días después y Fortuyn
proponía frenar en seco la inmigración, criticaba duramente al mundo islá mico, al
que acusaba de atrasado, y esgrimía en sus campañas electorales un lema sintomá -
tico de las ideas que aún flotan en significativos sectores de la sociedad de la Unión
Europea e incluso de Estados Unidos: “Holanda está llena”. Ergo, no hay sitio para
más inmigrantes en las sociedades capitalistas occidentales.
La biografía de Pim Fortuyn no tenía nada que ver con la del “asesino de gue -
rra” enArgelia y candidato a la presidencia de la República Francesa, J.-M. Le Pen;
sin embargo, coincidían en bastantes puntos de sus programas políticos, casi todos
democráticamente insostenibles. Aunque ellos dos no eran los únicos repre sen -
tantes de un discurso ideológico-político conceptualizado de “nacional-integristas”
por José Vidal-Beneyto, por su rechazo y exclusión del extranjero. A la par de For -
tuyn y Le Pen estaban Haider en Austria; Edmund Stoiber y Schill, en Alemania; en
Gran Bretaña, Nick Griffin; en Italia, Umberto Bossi, Gianfranco Fini y Silvio Ber -
lusconi; en Portugal, Paulo Portas; en Dinamarca, Pia Kjaersgaard y el Danske Folke -
parti; en Bélgica, Dewinter y el Vlaams Blok; Carl Hagen en Noruega. In cluso en
Estados Unidos, en aquella época, destacaba Pat Buchanan. Todos ellos no sólo
encarnaban el ascenso de la ultraderecha y del “integrismo nacionalista” o la coar -
tada de la “exclusividad culturalista” por vía de las urnas (el partido de Pim Fortuyn
fue, días después, la segunda formación más votada en las elecciones ho landesas;
también representaban la parte visible de ese iceberg que tiene debajo un discurso
antimigrante y xenófobo que no tiene el más mínimo problema en vocear prejuicios
contra los inmigrantes).
Lo que ha ocurrido, en resumidas cuentas, fue que aquellos discursos ra cis -
tas de los setenta se transformaron en el “fundamentalismo cultural” que creció en
los ochenta, cuya retórica de la inclusión (el reverso de la retórica de la exclusión)
propugna la vinculación entre nacionalidad y ciudadanía por una herencia cul tu -
ral compartida, al menos en la Europa occidental. El clima antiinmigrante en países
como el Reino Unido o Francia fue tal que el Parlamento Europeo realizó la “Decla -
ración contra el racismo y la xenofobia” en 1986. Y durante los noventa se forjó un
clima antiinmigrante que llegó a los parlamentos vía elecciones democrá ticas hasta
bien entrado el siglo XXI. Una poderosa fuente, sin duda, generadora de senti mien -
tos y actitudes antiinmigrante en el seno de Occidente.
Hace unos años, Immanuel Wallerstein volvía a señalar los mismos males habi -
tando el siglo XXI. “Los inmigrantes no son muy populares en estos tiempos, especial -
mente en los países ricos”, y tras apuntar que en pocos asuntos hay tanta hipocresía
como en la inmigración, nos recordaba: “El resultado es que cuando la Unión So -
viética no permitía a sus habitantes emigrar libremente, se le acusaba con indig -
nación de violar los derechos humanos, pero cuando los regímenes poscomunistas
permiten a la gente emigrar sin restricciones, inmediatamente los países más ricos
imponen barreras a su entrada”.
El caso de Europa central y oriental. 
La transformación de la situación migratoria en Polonia
Durante las últimas dos décadas, la frontera oriental de lo que fue la CEE y ahora
Unión Europea se ha estado trasladando significativamente hacia el este: empe -
zando con la división de las dosAlemanias (RFA y RDA); luego colocándose, por bas -
tante tiempo, en la frontera entre la Alemania “reunificada” y Polonia, para terminar
en la actualidad en los territorios orientales de los nuevos países miembros de la
Unión Europea. El caso de Polonia muestra los debates sobre fronteras e inmigra ción
mundiales desde una perspectiva paradójica por los “contradictorios” roles geopolí -
ticos que ha desempeñado; en cierta forma diferente, pero complementario, del caso
español y punto de contraste con lo acaecido en el suroeste de Estados Unidos. 
Polonia, debido a todas las transformaciones de índole social, económica y, sobre
todo, política que ha experimentado en las últimas dos décadas, evidencia algunos
procesos interesantes en cuanto al fenómeno migratorio. Al analizar este caso, se
pueden observar algunas tendencias, tanto de carácter más general (es decir, euro -
peo o mundial), como las del aspecto particular, que surgen de un determinado con -
texto geopolítico e histórico, y que iluminan los fundamentos relativos, ideolo giza -
dos y coyunturales sobre los que se construyen fronteras férreas y excluyentes, así
como la percepción de la naturaleza de las corrientes migratorias. La historia po laca,
en lo tocante a la migración, es un ejemplo muy tangible de aquellas acciones que
siguen el patrón descrito anteriormente por Wallerstein u otros autores críticos de
la realidad, aunque bien es cierto que el caso polaco ha evolucionado a un ritmo
peculiar.
Efectivamente, para entender la situación migratoria contemporánea en Polo -
nia, con todos sus matices, hay que tener en cuenta también los procesos de carác -
ter histórico, porque éstos, aunque aparentemente están situados en “un pasado
olvidado”, siguen teniendo consecuencias a largo plazo. Sin pretender enredarnos
demasiado en las peculiaridades históricas, es preciso mencionar el cambio signi -
ficativo a lo largo del siglo XX en la sociedad polaca, pues aunque era un país relati -
vamente multicultural, con minorías diversas, tras la segunda guerra mundial se
convirtió en un territorio prácticamente homogéneo (en el plano nacional, étnico,
lingüístico e incluso religioso). Tal cambio se produjo no sólo por la guerra misma y
los exterminios planificados, sino también por sus secuelas: traslados de las fron -
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teras y grandes desplazamientos de las poblaciones (también por la fuerza) en esta
parte de Europa (Janicka y Bojanowski, 2008: 113). 
Posteriormente, ya bajo el régimen comunista, tanto la emigración como la
inmi gración fueron prácticas muy difíciles de ocurrir y salvo en periodos espe cia -
les estuvo prácticamente bloqueada, al menos formalmente. El inicio de la gran y
veloz transformación a partir de 1989 hizo que Polonia, junto con otros países de
la región, se enfrentase a los consabidos procesos de carácter social, político o eco -
nómico, los cuales influyeron a su vez, directa o indirectamente, en los procesos
migratorios que la definen actualmente. En ese sentido, Polonia sigue siendo un país
con un porcentaje de extranjeros relativamente pequeño, que no se puede compa -
rar con el de España o Estados Unidos, e incluso está por debajo del promedio de
la Unión Europea (Wenzel, 2009). Además, existe cierta confusión en cuanto al
número exacto de los inmigrantes en Polonia. Los datos oficiales parecen ser muy
imprecisos: sólo se informa de unos cien mil extranjeros en Polonia, debido a que
no se contabiliza a los inmigrantes que viven o trabajan en el país sin cumplir los
requisitos formales, ni tampoco los trabajadores temporales (sobre todo los ucra -
nianos) (Łotocki, 2010: 29).
Esta cifra refleja los patrones migratorios experimentados por Polonia en las
últimas dos décadas. Y para explicarla en términos muy generales podemos acudir a
tres planos de análisis, que son los que suelen dar cuenta del “universo migratorio”
polaco y, por ende, también de las actitudes hacia los inmigrantes. Por un lado,
destaca la emigración de los polacos mismos, quienes se aprovechaban de la co yun -
tura trabajando, por ejemplo, en Alemania (ya desde principios de los no venta) y
en otros países occidentales. El ingreso a la Unión Europea en el 2004, que implicó
la posibilidad de trabajar legalmente en los países miembros, acompañado de altas
tasas de desempleo en Polonia y del crecimiento de las economías de los países de
Europa occidental, causó un cambio en el patrón migratorio (Iglicka, 2010). 
La aparición de esta nueva ola de emigración laboral se dio desde el principio
de la integración nada más con algunos países, por ejemplo Irlanda o Gran Bre -
taña, mientras en otros, como Alemania y Austria, se mantuvo por unos años (hasta
2010), mientras duró el periodo de transición para los trabajadores procedentes de
los nuevos países miembros (Bulgaria, Rumania, etc.). Este último flujo, a partir
del 2004, no se relaciona solamente en apariencia con las migraciones a Po lonia, pues
la escasez de trabajadores originó la decisión de 2006 de permitir a los extranjeros
de países vecinos poder trabajar hasta tres meses (durante seis meses de estancia)
sin permiso, prolongando este periodo hasta los seis meses, durante un año en el
2008 (Iglicka, 2010).
Y esto lleva a un segundo y tercer plano, es decir, la recepción de los extranje ros,
que tiene carácter dual: los inmigrantes que nada más pasan por Polonia (migrantes
en tránsito) en su camino hacia “unmundomejor”, o sea Europa occidental, y tam bién
los inmigrantes que relacionan su futuro, a corto o largo plazo, con la vida en Po lo nia.
En este segundo caso hay que tener en cuenta que el hecho de tener un pa sa porte po -
laco permite circular libremente en todo el espacio Schengen. Los ma yores grupos
de extranjeros son los ucranianos, rusos (entre los cuales destaca un grupo de re -
fugiados de Chechenia, aunque formalmente sean ciudadanos rusos), bielorrusos
y vietnamitas (Łotocki, 2010: 29-30).
Tal ordenamiento indica tanto el volumen como, al menos hasta cierto grado, la
importancia de estos procesos en la sociedad, pues el tema de la inmigración, tan to
temporal como permanente, no constituía parte importante del discurso pú blico
ni tampoco del político. Tampoco lo fue la emigración, a pesar de su presen cia
rela tivamente importante en Estados Unidos durante el siglo XX. Sin embargo, la
conciencia de tales movimientos migratorios en la sociedad polaca tiene tenden -
 cia creciente, en especial después del ingreso a la Unión Europea, cuando se empezó
a debatir sobre los efectos sociales y económicos de las migraciones, sobre todo entre
los jóvenes. Esto a su vez permitió ampliar de cierto modo la agenda de los temas mi -
gratorios en toda su escala, pues al hablar de los polacos en el extranjero crecía la
posibilidad de que los inmigrantes en Polonia, aprovechando la oportunidad, ad qui -
 rirían cierta visibilidad y de hecho, actualmente se advierte un progreso paula tino en
esta materia. Es interesante observar estos cambios, sobre todo en los medios, puesto
que el discurso político sigue sin iniciar el debate público, ni plantearlo en la agenda
política. Y es justo eso, un programa político claro, obviamente precedido por un de -
bate abierto e investigaciones apropiadas, lo que los especialistas indican como un
elemento importante que falta en Polonia (Miciukiewicz, 2008: 54; Iglicka, 2010).
Pasando a un nivel más general, Polonia está encajándose en un proceso más
amplio que caracteriza a los países europeos y que concluiría con el paso de la etapa
de la emigración neta hacia la inmigración neta, que es el horizonte frente al que se
encuentra Polonia. Tal transformación está vinculada, entre otros factores, con el
proceso de la modernización y el estancamiento demográfico. Y aunque dicho pro -
ceso esté atrasado respecto de los “miembros viejos” de la Unión Europea, efecti -
vamente hay que notar esta tendencia análoga.
Lo que atrae las miradas al caso polaco en el contexto migratorio es, sobre todo,
su ubicación. La situación geográfica coloca a este país en la ruta de tránsito de los
flujos migratorios del este al oeste. En este contexto, lo interesante es que se pos -
tula a algunas soluciones implantadas en Polonia como un modelo a seguir en los
países vecinos, como Ucrania (Kazmierkiewicz et al., 2009). La tarea de proteger
la frontera externa de la Unión Europea frente a los otros —inmigrantes no comu -
ni tarios— tiene también ciertas consecuencias institucionales, como la implan ta -
ción de las leyes comunitarias en cuanto a las reglas que ordenan el proceso de la
entrada de extranjeros, antecedido por el otorgamiento del visado de pago (a partir
del 2009 se facilitaron los trámites para los ciudadanos de las franjas fronterizas,
al establecerse permisos más baratos que los visados normales, válidos por dos años,
que dan derecho a entrar hasta 30 kilómetros al interior) (Iglicka, 2010). 
Este ajuste empezó ya antes de la entrada a la Unión Europea, durante nego -
ciaciones en las cuales se indicaba la necesidad de adaptar las leyes de los nuevos
miembros al régimen migratorio comunitario, a pesar de la falta de una política mi -
gratoria europea bien definida en algunos niveles, y sin poner mucha atención a la
importancia de las relaciones históricas y locales con los países vecinos. Este moti -
vo de la homologación interna de la Unión Europea “castigó” las visas para ucra -
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nianos, bielorrusos y rusos —Estados vecinos de Polonia—, y enseguida dificultó los
negocios fronterizos (una fuente de ingreso ya casi “tradicional” para las pobla cio -
nes fronterizas de ambos lados de la frontera) y también, entre otros, el con tra bando
hormiga de cigarrillos, alcohol, gasolina, etc. Después de un descenso signifi cativo
de los cruces fronterizos, el movimiento en la frontera oriental se restableció, sólo que
ya bajo reglas más estrictas (Garner, 2007: 12). 
En tal contexto se observan también unas tendencias más generales, o sea, la
frontera oriental de Polonia pone de manifiesto la complejidad de ciertos proce -
sos fronterizos. Como lo señala Konrad Miciukiewicz (2008), en un entorno posna -
cional europeo, el nuevo orden migratorio se caracterizaría sobre todo por cuatro
trans formaciones que describen cambios en las políticas migratorias comunitarias.
Estos procesos serían los siguientes: 1) el desarrollo de las estructuras intrate rrito -
riales de la vigilancia inmigratoria, 2) la extrapolación del control a terceros países,
3) la privatización del control y, por fin, 4) la internacionalización de la responsa -
bilidad por la iniciativa legislativa en materia de migración de los países miembros
a las ins tituciones comunitarias (Miciukiewicz, 2008: 45-49).
Entre las varias polémicas y preguntas que suscitan estos procesos, se indica -
 rían ciertas analogías con la frontera southwest estadunidense, pues la discusión
sobre la ley SB1070 en Arizona, tan criticada en el hemisferio occidental, en Euro -
pa correría el riesgo, incluso, de no ser entendida, pues para estas sociedades pa -
rece bastante clara y prácticamente indudable la prerrogativa de las insti tuciones
policiacas, como del Estado en general, en cuanto a la competencia para compro -
bar el estatus migratorio de cualquier persona, una capacidad de interpelación
e interrogatorio que tienen todas las policías de la Unión Europea frente a una
persona que, por los indicios o atributos que sean —desde el acento al fenotipo—
pudiera “ser” inmigrante.
Al lado de todos los factores antes mencionados, la animadversión al otro-ex -
tranjero, tanto la potencial como la real, en cierto punto tiene que ver también con
la general falta de confianza social (entendida como un capital social, tal como lo
definía Robert Putnam) en la sociedad polaca. Entonces, se supondría que con la
creciente inmigración, y vinculada a ésta una mayor posibilidad de entrar a las in -
teracciones con el otro-extranjero, se formaría una actitud más consciente al
respecto, pues, hasta la fecha, los estudios indican la existencia de actitudes relati -
va mente positivas o, al menos, no alejadas de la actitud europea promedio hacia los
extranjeros. No obstante, esto se debe también, al menos parcialmente, a la índole
algo abstracta de la presencia de los extranjeros en Polonia (Wenzel, 2009), pues
incluso en las ciudades grandes resulta casi imposible observar tanta presencia de
extranjeros como en la mayoría de ciudades españolas, o como en ciudades califor -
nianas, texanas, etc. Tanto la intuición sociológica, como la observación del discurso
público, apuntan a que aún queda un buen camino hacia el entendimiento y la acep -
tación de la inmigración como un proceso natural para las sociedades contemporá -
neas, y en ese sentido también para Polonia.
Por otro lado, el papel que desempeña Polonia en el concierto de la Unión Euro -
 pea se podría haber vislumbrado con ese acto simbólico que resultó ser su desig -
SIMILITUDES Y PARTICULARIDADES 437
nación como sede de la agencia comunitaria Frontex en Varsovia.5 La capital del
país que en los noventa experimentó un control fronterizo férreo por parte de los
alemanes, para posteriormente hacerse cargo de tales procedimientos en el amplio
sentido de la palabra, respecto del control de los vecinos orientales a lo largo de más
de mil kilómetros de la frontera común con Rusia, Bielorrusia y Ucrania.
En resumen, Polonia está inmersa en un proceso de cambio: de un país de emi -
grantes hacia un país de inmigrantes, una tendencia que caracteriza a la inmensa
mayoría de países miembros de la Unión Europea. No obstante, esto no es un pro -
ceso rápido ni mucho menos unidimensional, y varios de los pronósticos se basan
más bien en la extrapolación de los procesos anteriores y en la observación de lo
que acaece en otros países europeos, una previsión que pudiera incurrir en el ries -
go de omitir tanto algunas peculiaridades de carácter local (como la estructura del
mercado laboral), como algunos factores influyentes de tipo más general o global
(la crisis financiera). Además, lo que espera a la sociedad polaca es el proceso de
aceptación de la situación migratoria actual (y también la que supuestamente está
aún por llegar, por razones económicas y demográficas), sobre todo en el nivel
sim bólico, vinculado tanto con los prejuicios como con la simple ignorancia, esto es,
la continuación de la familiarización con los inmigrantes, lo que a la larga pudiera
encarnarse en la aceptación, tolerancia u otra actitud. Sea como fuere, el tiempo
dirá si su papel de gendarme o guardián de la frontera centro-oriental de la Unión
Europea se traducirá en alguna forma de animadversión hacia los vecinos y hacia
los inmigrantes.
Sentimientos, actitudes, acciones 
y fronteras antiinmigrantes
Hay que hacer hincapié en que la reacción desde Estados Unidos y España —in -
cluida la mayor parte de Estados integrantes de la Unión Europea— hacia las co -
rrientes migratorias provenientes del sur a partir de los años noventa se encaminó
principalmente en dos sentidos: por un lado, al control riguroso de las fronteras; por
otro, los sectores estratégicos de la sociedad estadunidense y española reconvir -
tieron o crearon hasta prácticamente la crisis del 2008 —casi dos décadas— un
mayor número de puestos de trabajo para ser desempeñados por inmigrantes con
permiso e inmigrantes “irregulares”, donde lamujer desempeña cada vezmás un papel
de peso. La generación de este tipo de actores, que más veces de las que imagina mos
muestran características de resignación y docilidad que optimizan la explota ción,
es un proceso que se ve potenciado por el hecho de que existen fronteras muy vigi -
ladas y peligrosas que intimidan al flujo migratorio indocumentado. Una vez que
se cruza la frontera, mejor permanecer en la sociedad de llegada aceptando las
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5 Frontex es la agencia de la Unión Europea para el control fronterizo a través de operaciones conjun tas
coordinadas (Doomernik, 2010: 27). 
condiciones que hay: un ingrediente, el de la vulnerabilidad, del cual se apro ve -
chan los discursos antiinmigrantes.
La experiencia española en el periodo 1989-2010 está a medio camino entre
las experiencias estadunidense y la polaca, ante la celebración de las olimpiadas de
1992 en Barcelona y la Exposición Universal de Sevilla aquel mismo año —Espa ña
comenzó a atraer migración desde prácticamente cinco años antes, 1987—, aunque
los flujos más diversos y numerosos comenzaron hacia 1997, y se consolidó con el
nuevo siglo. Durante el periodo 2000-2008 España fue el país que más migrantes
atrajo en términos porcentuales detrás de Estados Unidos, y las fronteras españo -
las fueron, junto con la de Estados Unidos-México, en las que más migrantes clan -
destinos fallecieron.
El fenómeno de la inmigración en España se ramificó por canales y dimensio -
nes socioculturales problemáticas, como la consolidación del tráfico clandestino
de inmigrantes, la explotación laboral de mano de obra inmigrante por una parte de
empresarios españoles, brotes violentos de xenofobia y racismo contra inmigran -
tes en distintas provincias españolas como Almería o Barcelona en el 2001, o más
recientemente, en enero del 2011 en Salt, cerca de Barcelona.
En otro orden de cosas estarían la aparición pública del islam, aparición de ba -
rrios e incluso guetos (asumimos el carácter problemático de este concepto) de inmi -
 grantes en ciudades como Madrid o Barcelona, Valencia o Almería, la creciente
presencia de los hijos de inmigrantes en las escuelas y en ámbitos sociales que
supone la coexistencia multicultural pública, todo lo cual indica que la sociedad
española del siglo XXI, así como la Unión Europea en la cual se inserta, no podrán
en tenderse sin la participación activa e importante de estos colectivos de inmi -
grantes, procedentes de América del Sur y el Caribe, África y algunos países asiá -
ticos, aunque la animadversión hacia ellos ha demostrado ser estructural, además
de manifestarse periódicamente ante eventos coyunturales. La imagen de las pa te ras
y los cayucos, las embarcaciones en las que los inmigrantes africanos cruzan las fron -
 teras marítimas hacia España y la Unión Europea, son parte del discurso de la xeno -
 filia y la xenofobia. Lo que unos interpretan como un acto arries gado de deses peración,
otros lo ven como un indicador de la invasión que se “nos” viene encima.
La experiencia de Estados Unidos es más compleja y antigua. Los muros fron -
terizos del sur de California, en San Diego, es decir, frente a Tijuana, tienen sus ante -
cedentes en los debates en torno a la regularización de la IRCA en 1986 y la protesta
denominada Light Up en 1990; la protagonizaron los vecinos del sur de San Die -
go, que al anochecer llevaban sus automóviles frente a la frontera con Ti juana para
alumbrar con sus carros el terreno por donde cruzaban los indocumen tados. Hacia
el año 2001, los protagonistas fueron los rancheros cazaindocumenta dos, y hacia el
2005 los “Minuteman”, entre otros. Ellos evidencian los vínculos entre senti miento
antiinmigrante y endurecimiento del control fronterizo.
Ahora bien, ¿estas posturas políticas tuvieron o tienen un reflejo o respaldo
teórico en las ciencias sociales? La respuesta es sí. Estas circunstancias y actitu -
des tuvieron su repercusión en la academia estadunidense y europea. Sabido es
que Samuel Huntington, el autor de El choque de las civilizaciones (1997), ya de -
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fendía a mediados de los noventa que los conflictos del siglo XXI tendrían un ori -
gen cultural-étnico y no ideológico, como el enfrentamiento bipolarizado entre
comunistas y “occidentales” durante la guerra fría. Desarrollando esa tesis, este mismo
autor señaló a los inmigrantes mexicanos como el principal “enemigo” de Estados
Unidos en el siglo XXI: “Mexican immigration looms as a unique and disturbing
challenge to our cultural integrity, our national identity, and potentially to our fu -
ture as a country” (Huntington, 2000). Un breve artículo que fue el preludio o se mi -
lla de su obra ¿Quiénes somos? Los desafíos a la sociedad estadunidense, posiblemen -
te el mejor epítome de la visión estadunidense prejuiciosa sobre México, donde la
invasión silenciosa es el fantasma que se esgrime una vez más (Huntington, 2004).
Y en el seno de la Unión Europea destacaría Giovanni Sartori (2001), quien
planteó que los migrantes extranjeros, de seguir así las cosas, pueden dinamitar las
bases del pluralismo y el liberalismo de los Estados democráticos, capitalistas y occi -
dentales. La sociedad abierta de Popper, democrática y pluralista, debe ce rrar se al
elemento extranjero y perturbador, según Sartori, para seguir siéndolo. O, lo que es lo
mismo, la capacidad de acogida de migrantes es limitada porque, de lo contrario,
pueden colapsar al sistema democrático. Paradójicamente, la sociedad abierta y plu -
ral tiene un enemigo en casa: el multiculturalismo, corriente caracterizada por su
defensa de las culturas extrañas —y problemáticas— de los inmigrantes, entre otras
cosas (Taylor, 1993).
Ahora bien, sí resulta difícil comparar casos y procesos entre lo que ocurre en
Europa y Estados Unidos (Henke, 2005) o la experiencia de un mismo colectivo de
inmigrantes a ambos lados del Océano Atlántico, aunque compartan la vaga con -
dición de “latinos-americanos” (Relaño y Alonso, 2005), lo cierto es que en cuanto
a los factores que subyacen bajo el férreo control fronterizo parece —a nuestro
modo de ver— que algunas conexiones sí están presentes. Es decir, no se pueden
explicar sin ver la presencia de la ideología antiinmigrante a partir de los años se -
tenta, la cual se redimensionó en los años ochenta, y que ideológicamente ha esta -
do marcada por la caída del muro de Berlín y el auge del fundamentalismo islámico
asociado a Al-Qaeda y los atentados de Nueva York, Madrid y Londres.
Si la coartada culturalista sustituyó a la vieja coartada racista, pasando a funda -
mentar la retórica contemporánea de la exclusión de los extranjeros y los inmi gran tes,
especialmente los menos “calificados” o vulnerables, es evidente que nece saria -
mente podemos encontrar a la exclusión culturalista como un referente ideológico
que ha impactado en las políticas de inmigración, las cuales se han tra ducido, desde
1989 y después de la caída del “telón de acero”, en nuevas fronteras-muros inex pug -
nables. Las nuevas concepciones de fronteras en los tres escenarios que hemos privi -
legiado en este trabajo se deben, en buena parte, a una percepción ideológicamente
distorsionada de los flujos migratorios indocumentados y a un con comitante “senti -
miento” de rechazo gestado décadas atrás.
Para el caso estadunidense, esta genealogía ideológica es más clara; para el
caso español, pero sobre todo para el caso polaco, la originalidad viene dada por las
propias dinámicas políticas y legislativas de la Unión Europea, donde los modelos
de fronteras son adoptados por Estados y sociedades donde la inmigración es “re -
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ciente” y el sentimiento de animadversión a los inmigrantes está madurando; pero
que no quepa duda que su vigencia en la Unión Europea o Estados Unidos sigue
intacta. Las manifestaciones del primer ministro británico David Came ron y del
presidente francés Nicolás Sarkozy (enero y febrero del 2011) rechazan do la multi -
culturalidad en sus países, es el último ejemplo de un complejo proceso que sigue
creciendo. El otro es una iniciativa de ley en Arizona para quitar la ciudadanía
a los(as) menores nacidos de padres indocumentados.
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Introducción
España, en poco más de una década, abandonó su perfil emigratorio tradicional y se
convirtió en una sociedad netamente receptora. Antes del inicio de la crisis eco -
nómica internacional, según estadísticas de la OCDE, los extranjeros representa -
ban el 14.1 por ciento de la población española. Si bien los partidos políticos con
opción real de ejercicio de gobierno (Partido Popular y Partido Obrero Socialista
Español) han expresado, con matizaciones circunstanciales, su adhesión a la idea de
integración de los inmigrantes en la sociedad de acogida, existen partidos minorita -
rios que expresan abiertamente consignas antiinmigración. En ese sentido, España
no se aparta de la tendencia observada en el resto de los países europeos (Biderbost,
2010; Ivarsflaten, 2008; Koopmans et al., 2005). 
En el caso de la nación mediterránea, estas agrupaciones partidarias, de acuer -
do con informes del Ministerio del Interior de España, se encuentran vinculadas
a movimientos neonazis, skinheads y de ultraderecha. Esta familia de organizaciones
de corte xenófobo atribuye a la inmigración el actuar como factor corrosivo de la
cultura autóctona. Sus discursos y repertorios de acción se encuentran inspirados
en otros utilizados por asociaciones similares en países del entorno (Hainsworth,
1992; Kriesi y Duyvendak, 1995). 
El presente artículo tiene por objeto, en primer lugar, analizar el discurso de dos
de estos partidos políticos (Democracia Nacional y Plataforma per Catalunya); en
segundo lugar, se observará, a la luz de las grievance theories (“teorías del agravio”),
si existe relación entre la tasa de inmigración y el nivel de desempleo con el rendi -
miento electoral de estos partidos en los diferentes distritos políticos. Finalmente,
se describirá cuál ha sido la influencia de estas agrupaciones en la elaboración de
legislación y políticas públicas cuando han obtenido representación parlamentaria.
La elaboración de este artículo responde a un déficit sobre estudios en la materia
en España.
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Cuando el franquismo se vuelve antiinmigrante: 
el discurso de Democracia Nacional
En la transición a la democracia en España, las antiguas corrientes franquistas su -
frieron diferentes procesos de metamorfosis: por un lado, algunas mutaron a par-
tidos políticos catch all anclados en la derecha (Alianza Popular, precursora del
actual Partido Popular), o el centro ideológico (Unión de Centro Democrático)
(Gunther, 1986; Huneeus, 1985; López Nieto, 1998). En ambos casos, la vocación
de participación en el juego democrático resultó clara. Procedieron de tal manera
quienes, desde dentro de la extinta dictadura, apostaron por la apertura institucio -
nal. Por otro lado, se encontraron los nostálgicos del régimen que optaron por la
creación de agrupaciones cívicas, con pretensiones fundacionales de protagonismo
político, pero con eco irregular en el resto de la sociedad. A este último grupo, de -
seoso de mantener la impronta sociológica de la matriz nacional-católica vigente
durante la autocracia, pertenece Democracia Nacional (DN). 
Este partido político nace en 1994 bajo la denominación de Alternativa De -
mócrata Nacional, como fruto de la fusión de antiguas agrupaciones de filiación
de extrema derecha (Juntas Españolas, Frente Nacional Español, Círculo Español de
Amigos de Europa, entre otros). En 1995, el partido es registrado con la actual deno -
minación. DN nace en el marco de un ciclo contractivo de la economía y cuando,
desde hacía un lustro, España estaba convirtiéndose en opción real de destino mi -
gratorio para muchos norafricanos y latinoamericanos. Juan Enrique Peligro Ro ble -
do fue su primer presidente y, en la actualidad, lo dirige Manuel Canduela, antiguo
cantante y miembro fundador de un grupo musical de tendencia neonazi.
Desde su creación, se ha autodefinido como “social-patriota” y ha escogido al
Frente Nacional de Jean-Marie Le Pen como referente institucional externo. En
tal sentido, forma parte de la plataforma Euronat, red creada por el líder galo para
propiciar la sincronización del discurso y de las actividades de los partidos de esta
naturaleza en el viejo continente. Desde sus inicios, su ideario y propuestas políti cas
se han centrado en criticar todo lo que, por foráneo y diferente, atenta contra la esen -
cia de la identidad española. La inmigración representa, según esta cosmovisión, una
afrenta al bagaje cultural hispánico.
Según afirma Democracia Nacional (2008) en sus idearios (una especie de
diagnóstico institucional sobre la realidad social española), los procesos migra -
torios forman parte de la historia sociológica de la humanidad. Se describen como
inevitables. A pesar de ello, se condena expresamente la inmigración masiva por la
amenaza que implica para el mantenimiento de la identidad nacional, cultural y
social de España y de la Unión Europea. La inmigración se equipara con “un ge -
nocidio lento y bien planificado de la nación española”. La llegada indiscriminada de
inmigrantes es, para esta agrupación, una de las tantas caras de la globalización. Bie -
nes, capitales y personas, en el marco de un mercado globalizado, se trasladan de un
sitio a otro sin ningún tipo de filtro.
Los inmigrantes, al ser mano de obra barata, le hacen el juego a los empresa -
rios que lo que desean es incrementar su beneficio a partir de la reducción de lo
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que abonan a sus trabajadores. En consecuencia, los obreros/empleados autócto -
nos son des plazados por extranjeros que realizan la misma tarea por una paga subs -
tancialmente menor. Los inmigrantes provocan desempleo entre los locales.
Según el crite rio de DN, los partidos de izquierda y los sindicatos actúan como
cómplices de este esquema a partir de la defensa férrea que hacen de los colecti -
vos inmigrantes.
A su vez, la presencia de inmigrantes provoca, luego de balancear lo que apor -
tan y lo que reciben, un déficit para las arcas del Estado español. Al mismo tiempo,
desvía recursos que deberían ir prioritariamente al colectivo autóctono. En el caso de
quienes son indocumentados, se asume que no realizan ningún tipo de ingresos,
pero sí reciben atención sanitaria y educativa. En el caso de quienes son migrantes
documentados, se sostiene que, al pertenecer a las franjas menos favorecidas en la
escala salarial, cotizan montos limitados a la seguridad social y, consecuen te men -
te, mayor cantidad de subsidios reciben. Las ONG que, por las tareas que desarrollan,
apoyen a los inmigrantes para la obtención de protección oficial deben, en opinión
de DN, ser desarticuladas.
Al no existir una adecuada correspondencia entre puestos de trabajo creados
por la economía vernácula y el número de extranjeros que arriban a España, existe
un saldo de inmigrantes en el paro que, conforme a lo expuesto por este partido, pasan
a conformar una masa crítica de delincuentes. Los inmigrantes, según DN, generan
inseguridad por encontrarse vinculados a situaciones de delincuencia orga nizada,
mafias, narcotráfico y prostitución, entre otros males sociales.
A la inseguridad física descrita, se añade otro tipo de inseguridad creada por
los inmigrantes: la de tipo cultural. En otras palabras, la llegada de los inmigrantes
implica potenciales conflictos sociales por las diferencias culturales existentes entre
los oriundos y los recién llegados. Los grupos conflictivos merecen, según considera
esta plataforma política, especial seguimiento por parte del Estado.
En relación con los orígenes de los inmigrantes, el que resulta menos aprecia -
do, en los documentos constitutivos de DN, es el islámico. Se sostiene que el culto
islá mico no debe recibir ningún tipo de apoyo oficial mientras las religiones cris tia -
nas no reciban protección pública en los países árabes. Se recomienda la per se cu ción
de la poligamia y el uso de prendas religiosas por parte de individuos que no sean mi -
 nistros de culto. El avance del islam se entiende como la mayor amenaza que se cier-
ne sobre la identidad nacional y europea.
A partir del diagnóstico descrito sobre la inmigración en España, DN presenta un
conjunto variopinto de propuestas para la gestión de la inmigración, las cuales se
agrupan en ocho dimensiones diferentes. En primer lugar, en relación con la se gu ri -
dad y el orden público, se sostiene que debe acentuarse la vigilancia en las fron teras
y que las fuerzas de seguridad deben ser dotadas de los elementos necesarios para
el combate de la inmigración ilegal. Los inmigrantes no podrán vivir en barrios o ciu -
dades donde los inmigrantes hayan superado el umbral del 10 por ciento sobre el total
poblacional (máximo tolerado por DN para evitar la incubación de conflictos).
En segundo lugar, en relación con los derechos civiles y políticos de los inmi -
grantes, se recomienda la creación de una nueva ley de extranjería que permita la
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expulsión de todos los extranjeros en situación de irregularidad, la repatriación de
quienes hubiesen delinquido (excepto cuando cumplan condenas por delitos graves
y exista presunción de que no cumplirán la pena en sus países de origen), la anula -
ción de los permisos de estancia y residencia para inmigrantes posteriores al año
1998 y la derogación de la figura de la reagrupación familiar. La residencia (que no
debe permitir el libre tránsito dentro de la Unión Europea) sólo puede otorgarse
a quien tenga solvencia en el manejo del español y su renovación, luego de una eva -
luación, debe ser anual. A su vez, en el contexto de matrimonios mixtos (una perso-
na autóctona y una extranjera), la custodia de los hijos menores de edad siem pre
debe concederse al autóctono. Los derechos de voto y de protesta son exclusiva mente
patri monio de los ciudadanos españoles.
En un tercer momento, respecto de la naturalización (adquisición de la nacio -
nalidad española) de los inmigrantes, sólo podrán acceder a ésta quienes, habiendo
nacido en el extranjero, fueran hijos de españoles de origen. La conversión en espa -
ñoles a través del matrimonio con un local o mediante la residencia prolongada en
el tiempo sólo acontecerá en casos especiales que no se especifican. Los nacidos
en el marco de un matrimonio mixto podrán adquirir la nacionalidad española, pero
pueden perderla en caso de ser declarados culpables de delitos.
En cuarto término, sobre el mercado de trabajo, DN propone la prohibición de
la contratación de trabajadores inmigrantes para puestos de trabajo para los cuales
existe, al menos, un autóctono preparado para ello y dispuesto a aceptarlo. A su vez,
sostiene que deben incrementarse las inspecciones en los centros de trabajo para
multar a empresarios que contraten a inmigrantes irregulares. Se recomienda que,
en caso de no haber mano de obra vernácula disponible para diferentes empleos,
el ingreso de trabajadores inmigrantes debe darse vía importación de contingente
de trabajadores temporales.1 Estos individuos no tendrán posibilidad alguna de con -
vertir su estancia transitoria en permanente.
En quinto lugar, para evitar la dependencia de mano de obra inmigrante, DN
propone el fomento de la natalidad, el incremento de la base de población ocupada
y la elevación de la inversión en investigación destinada a mejorar la productividad
de la sociedad española y, de esa manera, garantizar la supervivencia del sistema de
Seguridad Social. Como sexta dimensión, se trabaja lo vinculado con el Estado bene -
factor. DN auspicia, por un lado, la eliminación de la discriminación positiva que
prioriza a los inmigrantes al momento de recibir ayudas sociales; y, por el otro, sos tie -
ne que los inmigrantes, en determinado distrito, nunca podrán recibir un porcen taje
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1 Democracia Nacional considera que el acceso al mercado de trabajo español vía contingentes debe ser
organizado, según los orígenes prioritarios. En primer lugar, tendrán acceso ciudadanos de países actual
o potencialmente miembros de la Unión Europea. Luego, se considerará a quienes provengan de Amé -
rica Latina, Sahara y Guinea Ecuatorial (antiguas colonias españolas) para, en un tercer plano, conside-
rar a postulantes procedentes de países del entorno mediterráneo. Finalmente, se encontrarán quienes
sean originarios del resto del mundo. En los últimos tres casos, se eliminará a los individuos que proce -
dan de países cuyos inmigrantes en España han sido evaluados (por las fuerzas del orden público) como
“conflictivos”. 
de subvenciones que supere el doble del porcentaje de población extranjera residente
en la circunscripción.2
En séptimo término, para evitar en los países de origen las causas de la inmi -
gra ción, se apoya la idea de elevar la ayuda internacional al desarrollo, pero de mane-
ra condicionada. Sólo podrán recibirla los Estados que no creen condiciones
de miseria entre sus ciudadanos y, consecuentemente, no estimulen su emigra-
ción. Finalmente, se sugiere crear una especie de sistema para diferenciar entre
inmi grantes económicos (no merecedores de la permanencia en España como
país de destino) y los refugiados políticos (a quienes debe protegerse en suelo ibérico,
al menos, temporalmente). DN considera que una vez que han desaparecido, en
los países de origen, las condiciones que originaron el desplazamiento, los refu-
giados o asi lados deben retornar y el Estado español no debe renovarles su auto-
rización de estancia.
El diagnóstico y las propuestas sobre inmigración de DN son dados a conocer
al resto de la sociedad española a través de tres vías: la organización de manifesta -
 cio nes (marchas) en las principales ciudades españolas, la colocación de carteles
con claras consignas antiinmigración3 en la geografía urbana y la realización de tor -
neos deportivos y conciertos en los que actúan agrupaciones musicales autode fi -
nidas como nacionalistas. Excepto cuando acontecen situaciones conflictivas (abierto
enfrentamiento entre miembros del partido y militantes antifascistas o denuncias,
realizadas por terceros, por su marcado carácter xenófobo), no acaece la difusión,
en los principales medios de comunicación hispanos, de las consignas de esta agru -
pa ción partidaria. Su presencia mediática ha sido, en términos generales, marginal.
No somos españoles, pero tampoco queremos inmigrantes: 
el discurso de Plataforma per Catalunya
España se encuentra conformada por comunidades autónomas, algunas de las cua -
les tienen una identidad cultural propia que se traduce, entre otras cuestiones, en la
posesión de una lengua regional diferente al español y en la autoconsideración como
naciones históricas. En estos espacios geográfico-políticos, una vez que aconteció
la transición a la democracia, se enraizaron propuestas partidarias que recogían el
ideario nacionalista. Éste es el caso de Catalunya.Abrevando de esta cosmovisión cata -
lanista, emerge, en la primera década del siglo XXI, Plataforma per Catalunya (PxC). 
Esta agrupación nace en el año 2001 en la ciudad de Vic (provincia de Barce -
lona). PxC nace, en pleno ciclo económico expansivo, luego del salto demográfico que
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2 En otras palabras, si los inmigrantes representan el 5 por ciento de la población de un vecindario/ciu -
dad, no podrán recibir más del 10 por ciento de las ayudas sociales previstas para esa jurisdicción.
3 En varias ciudades, en el último quinquenio, se han encontrado carteles en los que se dibujan ovejas
sobre la bandera de España. Todas las ovejas, excepto una, son de color blanco. Las ovejas, en el dibujo,
expulsan de una patada a la oveja diferente (de color negro) del territorio que ocupan y le dicen como
admonición: “Compórtate o lárgate”. Esta campaña parece haber sido tomada de una semejante que,
en su momento, fue desarrollada por el Partido Popular Suizo (SPV) (público). 
implicó la llegada de inmigrantes durante el decenio de 1990 a Cataluña.4 Fue fun -
dada y es dirigida desde entonces por Josep Anglada i Rius, antiguo militante del
ultraderechista Partido Fuerza Nueva (Pinyol, 2010: 1). Este partido político se
auto define como “catalán, democrático, con vocación europea y decididamente
innova dor” (PxC, 2011).5 Se propone la preservación de la identidad y cohesión so -
cial catalana que se encuentra, según su criterio, amenazada por el multicultura lis mo
crea do y alentado por las elites a partir de la llegada de inmigrantes (Casals, 2009).
Como en el caso de DN, se admite no rechazar a “la persona del inmigrante”, sino el
enraizamiento de determinadas culturas foráneas.
PxC forma parte de la familia de partidos vinculados a la derecha radical po -
pulista (Arzheimer y Carter, 2006; Ivarsflaten, 2008). En el plano internacional, ha
estrechado vínculos con la Lega Nord (Italia) y el Vlaams Belang (Bélgica). Aunque,
inicialmente, el partido pretendía una presencia en el ámbito geográfico estatal
(denominación aplicada en España para hacer referencia a todo el país), desde el
año 2008, en ocasión de su IV Congreso, se decide que su ámbito de acción se en -
cuentra centrado enCataluña (Casals, 2009; Mudde, 2007). De acuerdo con sus docu -
mentos fundacionales y con la estrategia política aplicada desde su creación, las
acciones encaminadas a la conquista del poder deben darse en el espacio municipal.
Según se afirma en el documento mencionado, la inmigración es una de las
tantas manifestaciones de la globalización. En este cuadro situacional, quienes de -
tentan el poder son las grandes corporaciones financieras, las cuales han actualizado
el extinto sistema feudal y han catapultado a la corrupción como su elemento cen-
tral. En este texto fundacional, se crea una especie de triangulación de procesos:
elevada especulación, baja natalidad vernácula y llegada de extranjeros. Según la
lógica construida, los empresarios son los responsables de la llegada masiva de inmi -
grantes (como consecuencia de la ausencia de mano de obra local) y los últimos son
quienes provocan el descenso en los salarios de los autóctonos. Los inmigrantes, según
refleja este documento vertebral, son junto a otros grupos sociales (gitanos y dro-
gadictos) los que concentran, producto de la aplicación de una mal concebida po -
lítica de discriminación positiva, la recepción de subsidios y beneficios sociales. 
En Cataluña, los inmigrantes se asocian con la implantación de una cultura de
la criminalidad. El aumento de robos, terrorismo y abusos sexuales se adjudican, sin
excepción, a la presencia de los inmigrantes. Los extranjeros, al no encontrar tra ba jo,
se verían obligados a delinquir. Las autoridades procuran desorientar a la opinión
pública en relación con la gravedad de esta problemática social.
La radicación de extranjeros en el territorio catalán apareja, a su vez, un pe -
ligro para el mantenimiento de la cultura vernácula. Se sostiene que determinadas
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4 Entre 1980 y 2003, se septuplicó el número de inmigrantes que habitaba en Catalunya (Instituto
Nacional de Estadística). 
5 La propuesta partidaria de PxC se encuentra dirigida, según se induce de la lectura de sus documentos
genésicos, a votantes que no se sienten representados por los partidos tradicionales. Al mismo tiempo,
evitan posicionarse claramente en dos ejes clásicos de la política vernácula: derecha frente a izquier-
da y catalanismo frente a españolismo (Casals, 2009: 3). 
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creencias religiosas no occidentales contradicen, en material de distribución de
libertades entre varones y mujeres, a los derechos humanos como parámetro ético
imperante. Para justificar tal afirmación, se procede, en esta carta identitaria de
PxC, a la presentación contrastada de principios expuestos tanto en la Declaración
Universal de los Derechos Humanos y la Convención sobre la Eliminación de
Todas las Formas de Discriminación contra la Mujer, como en el Corán.
Dentro de los colectivos inmigrantes, como se infiere de la lectura de los pá rra -
fos previos, el que representa un peligro mayor es el islámico, porque se le supone,
debido a su intolerancia constitutiva, incompatible con una cosmovisión pluralista
como la que existe en Occidente (Casals, 2009: 5). Al mismo tiempo, PxC presu -
pone que el islam no tiene otro objetivo sino la conquista del continente europeo.
La islamofobia declarada por PxC parece derivar del hecho de que, en Cataluña
según datos recientes, el 35.4 por ciento de los inmigrantes tiene origen musulmán
y el colectivo islámico representa entre el 3.8 y el 4.9 por ciento de la población
autonómica (Moreras, 2007). 
PxC propone una batería de políticas para hacer frente a la inmigración como
proceso social nocivo. En relación con el control, regularización y derechos civiles
de la inmigración, recomienda la creación de cuotas de procedencia y la prohi -
bición del ingreso de individuos adherentes a la ley islámica (sharia). A su vez, estima
conveniente expulsar y quitar la nacionalidad (obtenida por residencia continuada
en el tiempo) a quienes, siendo legales y encontrándose radicados en Cataluña,
apoyen esta cosmovisión. Los ilegales también deben ser expulsados y se les eli -
mi nará la regularización vía arraigo. Estas medidas se complementarán con la pena -
lización legal de creencias y conductas de naturaleza islámica. Se sostiene que el
objetivo es que “sólo los islámicos españoles de origen puedan continuar residien -
do en el país […]”.
En materia laboral, se propone la creación de oficinas gubernamentales a nivel
local, en las que deben autorizarse todas las contrataciones de trabajadores para
evitar que un no catalán tenga prioridad como acontecería (y acontece) en el caso
de que el reclutamiento se acordase entre personas físicas. En lo vinculado a la
política social y habitacional, se propone la eliminación de criterios de discri mi na -
ción positiva y su reemplazo por una pauta en la que se consideran tres factores:
necesidad objetiva del solicitante, su nacionalidad (preferencia para los oriundos)
y la comprobación de su conducta fiscal.
En relación con lo cultural, PxC propone la puesta en marcha de acciones que
promuevan, desde los municipios, los valores de la cultura occidental. Entre otras
cuestiones, se sostiene que los fondos que actualmente se dediquen a subsidiar las
actividades llevadas a cabo por ONG proinmigrantes deben redireccionarse a ins -
tituciones cuyo objeto sea velar por el mantenimiento de la cosmovisión asociada
a los derechos humanos.
En materia de seguridad, se promueve la cooperación desde el ámbito local,
en coordinación con las fuerzas policiales de los gobiernos central y autonómico,
a partir de la puesta en marcha de acciones destinadas a prevenir el delito y custo -
diar la urbanidad. Los crímenes serán evitados desde el trabajo conjunto entre la
política municipal y la comunidad vecinal. La persecución del delito tendrá un
elevado componente cultural: se supone que la difusión de los valores asociados
a los derechos humanos facilitará la disminución de las faltas por parte de quienes
no comparten tales criterios (los recién llegados). Los vecinos serán invitados a de -
nun ciar la presencia de inmigrantes ilegales. Los inmigrantes que se encuentran
en prisión serán expulsados una vez que cumplan con su condena.
Finalmente, en el área de la cooperación internacional, se considera pertinente
incrementar los niveles de apoyo a las sociedades expulsoras de población. A dife -
rencia del caso de DN, no se habla de condicionamientos para la entrega de esta ayuda.
PxC entiende que, de proceder así, se logrará el control y posterior disminu ción del
flujo de inmigrantes que arriba a Cataluña.
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DIFERENCIAS IDENTITARIAS Y DE DIAGNÓSTICO SOBRE LA INMIGRACIÓN
ENTRE DN Y PxC
FUENTE: Elaboración propia. 
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La difusión de su diagnóstico y propuestas de gestión de la inmigración la rea -
liza PxC a través de la organización de marchas, la participación en debates televi sivos
en señales locales y el reparto de material informativo entre los vecinos de los pue -
blos y ciudades donde su estructura tiene presencia. A diferencia de DN, la alu sión
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Creación de cuotas de origen
Expulsión y prohibición 
de ingreso de individuos 
que apoyen la sharia
Penalización de creencias 
vinculadas a la sharia
Comunidad organizada de vecinos
Denuncia, por parte de los vecinos,
de los inmigrantes ilegales
Promoción de la cultura occidental
Expulsión de inmigrantes 
irregulares
Derogación de la figura del arraigo
No precisa
Privación de nacionalidad 
a individuos que apoyen la sharia




Priorización de necesidades 
de población autóctona
Creación de guarderías
Apoyo no condicionado a países
expulsores de población
No precisa
Fomento de la cultura occidental
Eliminación del apoyo 
gubernamental a las ONG
pro inmigración
CUADRO 2
DIFERENCIAS SOBRE PROPUESTAS DE POLÍTICAS PÚBLICAS
EN MATERIA DE INMIGRACIÓN ENTRE DN Y PxC
a esta agrupación partidaria en los medios de comunicación es mucho más fre -
cuente, en gran medida debido al ascenso electoral paulatino que ha vivido desde su
creación. Obsérvese, por favor, en los siguientes cuadros comparativos las princi -
pales características en materia de autoidentidad, diagnóstico sobre la inmigración
y pro puestas de políticas públicas tanto de Democracia Nacional como de PxC. 
Visibilidad inmigrante, desempleo 
y crecimiento electoral de las consignas antiinmigración
La literatura dedicada al estudio de la aparición de movimientos y partidos políticos
antiinmigración se divide en dos corrientes, en función de los factores que la pro -
pician. Según nos recuerdan Koopmans et al. (2005: 181), este conjunto de elemen -
tos pueden distribuirse según la lógica de explicaciones vinculadas a la demanda
y explicaciones vinculadas a la oferta. En relación con lo primero, se encuentran las
expli caciones vinculadas a las llamadas teorías del agravio. En vin cu lación con lo
segundo, se hallan las explicaciones basadas en la denomi na das opportunities theo-
ries (o “teorías de la estructura de la oportunidad”). 
Las teorías del agravio hacen referencia, genéricamente, a que determinadas
condiciones objetivas en la sociedad conducen a situaciones de descontento entre
los individuos que se sienten afectados o disminuidos por aquéllas. A partir de este
diagnóstico, quienes se sienten agraviados proceden a reivindicar su punto de vista y
a movilizarse (Gurr, 1970; Smelser, 1962; Collier y Hoeffler, 2002). 
Por el contrario, las teorías de la estructura de la oportunidad sostienen que la
movilización de los individuos acontece debido a que existen circunstancias polí -
ticas que las facilitan (capacidad o incapacidad de los partidos políticos para incor -
porar nuevas demandas, fractura entre las elites, apertura o cierre del sistema po -
lítico y capacidad represiva estatal, entre otras) (McAdam, Tarrow y Tilly, 2001;
Koopmans et al., 2005: 180-185).
En este apartado, se procederá a evaluar la validez de las teorías del agravio
para explicar la fuerza electoral de Democracia Nacional y de Plataforma per Cata -
lunya. Según esta mirada, a medida que acontezcan determinados procesos que
provoquen, entre los autóctonos, un sentimiento subjetivo de pérdida de estatus, será
posible observar un paralelo ascenso del apoyo electoral a este tipo de partidos polí -
ticos. Aquí se ha procedido a utilizar dos indicadores clásicos de este tipo de hipóte-
sis: tasa de inmigración y tasa de paro (desempleo).
En relación con DN, se ha tomado como referencia de su fuerza electoral el
apoyo recibido en oportunidad de la celebración de las últimas elecciones euro -
peas (junio de 2009). En este tipo de comicios, las agrupaciones de extrema derecha
suelen registrar un incremento en el porcentaje que sus votos representan sobre el
total de sufragios, debido a que el nivel de abstención suele ser elevado (aún más
entre votantes de izquierda) (Valles, 2009). En una primera observación en un dia -
grama de dispersión de la distribución del apoyo electoral a DN asociado a la tasa de
inmigración registrada en cada comunidad autónoma, no se concluye que existe
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relación entre ambas variables. Corroborando esta apreciación con la aplicación del
coeficiente de Pearson, se obtiene idéntica conclusión: no se aprecia correlación esta -
dística mente significativa entre estos elementos.















RELACIÓN ENTRE APOYO ELECTORAL A DN Y TASA DE INMIGRACIÓN
POR COMUNIDAD AUTÓNOMA
FUENTE: Elaboración propia, con datos del Instituto Nacional de Estadística y del Ministerio del
Interior. 
6 En este caso, no se ha incorporado información sobre la tasa de inmigración en las dos ciudades autó -
nomas españolas (Ceuta y Melilla) ubicadas en el norte de África. La omisión ha sido consecuencia
de no existir datos fiables para el año que se ha tomado como referencia para esta variable (2005).
En las siguientes dos correlaciones, por existir disponibilidad, se han agregado a los cálculos los datos
correspondientes a ambas jurisdicciones.
CUADRO 3
ASOCIACIÓN ESTADÍSTICA ENTRE APOYO ELECTORAL A DN
Y TASA DE INMIGRACIÓN POR COMUNIDAD AUTÓNOMA6
Correlaciones
Apoyo DN Tasa inmig.  
Apoyo DN Correlación de Pearson 1 .133
Sig. (bilateral) .611
N 19 17
Tasa inmigración Correlación de Pearson .133 1
Sig. (bilateral) .611
N 17 17
FUENTE: Elaboración propia, con datos del InstitutoNacional de Estadística y del Ministerio del Interior.
Cuando se realizan idénticos ejercicios para observar si existe relación entre
apoyo electoral a DN y tasa de desempleo en las diferentes comunidades autó -
nomas españolas en el trimestre en el que acontecieron los comicios europeos, los
resultados distan incluso de la dirección sugerida por los presupuestos teóricos. La
relación que existiría entre ambas variables es negativa. Habría, entonces, una con -
centración del apoyo electoral a DN entre las comunidades autónomas con menor
nivel de paro. Sin embargo, esta relación no reviste mayor significación estadística.














FUENTE: Elaboración propia, con datos del Instituto Nacional de Estadística y del Ministerio del Interior.
CUADRO 4
ASOCIACIÓN ESTADÍSTICA ENTRE APOYO ELECTORAL A DN
Y TASA DE PARO (DESEMPLEO) POR COMUNIDAD AUTÓNOMA
Correlaciones
Apoyo DN Tasa paro  
Apoyo DN Correlación de Pearson 1 -.264
Sig. (bilateral) .274
N 19 19
Tasa paro Correlación de Pearson .264 1
Sig. (bilateral) .274
N 19 19
FUENTE: Elaboración propia, con datos del Instituto Nacional de Estadística y del Ministerio del Interior.
GRÁFICA 2
RELACIÓN ENTRE APOYO ELECTORAL A DN Y TASA DE PARO (DESEMPLEO) 
POR COMUNIDAD AUTÓNOMA
Según lo observado, las teorías del agravio no serían útiles para explicar, al menos
en a lo que acontece en las elecciones europeas, el apoyo que detenta DN. Pro ba ble -
mente, alguna variable asociada a las teorías de la estructura de la oportunidad con -
 tribuya a arrojar cierta luz sobre el desempeño electoral de esta agrupación. Para
esos fines, se ha usado el apoyo electoral al Partido Popular (PP), principal partido de
centro-derecha en España, como indicador de la existencia de una matriz socio cul -
 tural que, en deter minadas co munidades autónomas, facilite bajo ciertas condiciones
una mayor sintonía del elec torado con las propuestas de DN. La visión de dia gra -
ma de dispersión dificulta la identificación de relación entre apoyo electoral al PP
y apoyo electoral a DN. La rea lización de la corre lación confirma la inexistencia de
asociación estadística entre ambas variables.















RELACIÓN ENTRE APOYO ELECTORAL A DN
Y APOYO ELECTORAL AL PP POR COMUNIDAD AUTÓNOMA
FUENTE: Elaboración propia, con datos del Ministerio del Interior.
CUADRO 5
ASOCIACIÓN ESTADÍSTICA ENTRE APOYO ELECTORAL A DN
Y APOYO ELECTORAL AL PP POR COMUNIDAD AUTÓNOMA
Correlaciones
Apoyo DN Apoyo PP
Apoyo DN Correlación de Pearson 1 .057
Sig. (bilateral) .816
N 19 19
Apoyo PP Correlación de Pearson .057 1
Sig. (bilateral) .816
N 19 19
FUENTE: Elaboración propia, con datos del Ministerio del Interior.
¿Cuál será el comportamiento de las variables estudiadas en el caso de PxC? En
primer lugar, la asociación entre tasa de inmigración y apoyo electoral al partido en
las últimas elecciones autonómicas (noviembre de 2010) es inexistente. El diagrama
de dispersión refleja la existencia de una nube de puntos cuando se considera la rela -
ción entre ambas variables en las provincias catalanas. La realización del ejer cicio
de correlación brinda idénticos resultados. La tasa de inmigración parecería no ser
el motivo del apoyo electoral a esta agrupación para este tipo de comicios.
















RELACIÓN ENTRE APOYO ELECTORAL A PxC Y TASA DE INMIGRACIÓN
POR PROVINCIA EN CATALUÑA
FUENTE: Elaboración propia, con datos de Idescat (2011a) y del Ministerio del Interior.
CUADRO 6
ASOCIACIÓN ESTADÍSTICA ENTRE APOYO ELECTORAL A PxC
Y TASA DE INMIGRACIÓN POR PROVINCIA EN CATALUÑA
Correlaciones
Apoyo DN Tasa inmig.  
Apoyo DN Correlación de Pearson 1 -.336
Sig. (bilateral) .581
N 5 5
Tasa inmigración Correlación de Pearson .336 1
Sig. (bilateral) .581
N 5 5
FUENTE: Elaboración propia, con datos de Idescat (2011a) y del Ministerio del Interior.
La situación cambia radicalmente cuando se analiza la asociación entre apoyo
electoral a PxC y la tasa de paro por provincia catalana. En este caso, el diagrama de
dispersión permite la visualización de algún tipo de relación positiva que, a poste -
riori, se confirma con la ejecución de la correspondiente correlación. Entre ambas
variables existe asociación estadística. En otras palabras, en las provincias en las que
se registra un elevado nivel de paro, existe, a la vez, un mayor apoyo electoral a PxC.
Las teorías del agravio ayudan a explicar el éxito electoral de la agrupación en un
contexto marcado por una profunda contracción económica.
















RELACIÓN ENTRE APOYO ELECTORAL A PxC Y TASA DE PARO (DESEMPLEO) 
POR PROVINCIA EN CATALUÑA
FUENTE: Elaboración propia, con datos de Idescat (2011b) y del Ministerio del Interior.
CUADRO 7
ASOCIACIÓN ESTADÍSTICA ENTRE APOYO ELECTORAL A PxC
Y TASA DE PARO (DESEMPLEO) POR PROVINCIA EN CATALUÑA
Correlaciones
Tasa paro Apoyo PXC
Tasa paro Correlación de Pearson 1 .904*
Sig. (bilateral) .035
N 5 5
Apoyo PxC Correlación de Pearson .904* 1
Sig. (bilateral) .035
N 5 5
* La correlación es significativa a nivel 0.05 (bilateral)
FUENTE: Elaboración propia con datos de Idescat (2011b) y del Ministerio del Interior.
Como se ha observado, los indicadores utilizados para encontrar evidencia empí -
 rica en relación con las teorías del agravio han resultado muy limitados para expli-
car el éxito electoral de DN y PxC. La tasa de inmigración, al menos para los comicios
ele gidos, parece no ser un buen estimador del nivel de apoyo electoral recibido por
nin guna de las dos agrupaciones. La tasa de desempleo funciona adecuadamente
sólo con PxC. En el caso del apoyo electoral a DN, se estima adecuado para futuras
inves ti ga ciones profundizar en variables vinculadas al universo de las teorías de la
estruc tu ra de la oportunidad. Éstas deben hacer referencia a algún elemento cul -
tural que facilite la consolidación en ciertos electorados de este tipo de propues-
tas parti da rias. La tasa de religiosidad (cristiano católica) o la concepción de ciuda -
danía vigen te pueden ser indicadores plausibles para tales efectos (Koopmans et al.,
2005: 31-73). 
El turno de la acción: el papel parlamentario 
de los partidos políticos antiinmigración en España
El desempeño electoral nacional de Democracia Nacional ha registrado un nivel
semejante desde su creación. En los comicios generales (2000, 2004 y 2008), el
electorado que ha sufragado por esta agrupación se ha ubicado, en promedio, en
torno al 0.5 por ciento. La situación es diferente en elecciones locales. Si bien su
desempeño electoral municipal es marginal en comparación al recibido por los par -
tidos mayoritarios, DN cuenta en la actualidad con tres concejalías obtenidas en los
comicios de 2007: una en Tardajos (Burgos) y otras dos en Herradón de Pinares
(Ávila).7 En la primera localidad, ha formado gobierno gracias a un pacto rubricado
con el PP (Ministerio del Interior).
En Tardajos, DN pretendió imponer en enero de 2010 una moción sobre inmi -
gración, cuyo objeto era evitar el empadronamiento de los inmigrantes irregulares.
La adopción de una medida de esta naturaleza implica, según el diagrama del Estado
benefactor español, que los inmigrantes irregulares carezcan de la prestación de
servicios educativos y sanitarios por adolecer de certificado de empadronamiento.
La situación originó un importante conflicto con el Partido de Castilla y León
(PCAL), la única agrupación opositora en el recinto parlamentario. La propuesta,
finalmente no aprobada, introdujo la cuestión del “empadronamiento de irregulares”
en la agenda política de Castilla y León, una comunidad autónoma ubicada por
debajo del promedio nacional en cantidad de inmigrantes (3.60 por ciento sobre el
total de su población) y que, hasta ahora, se había mantenido al margen de discu siones
de este calibre. De esta manera y por primera vez, DN logró proyección a nivel na cio nal
(debido a la repercusión en los medios de sus intenciones) no gracias a sus tradi cio -
nales campañas urbanas gráficas antiinmigración, sino a partir de una propuesta en
concreto desde la gestión gubernamental (Público, 2010; Noticias de Navarra, 2010).
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7 En la primera localidad, obtuvo el 22.13 por ciento de los votos. En la segunda, consiguió el 21.93
por ciento de los sufragios (Ministerio del Interior). 
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En el caso de Plataforma per Catalunya, el desempeño electoral ha registrado
una senda de crecimiento constante desde su fundación. En su primera incursión
en comicios locales, en 2003, ya había logrado representación a nivel de con ce ja lías
en cinco localidades catalanas (Manlleu, Vic, Cervera, El Vendrell y Premià de Mar).
Las concejalías obtenidas por PxC aumentaron a 17 en las elecciones celebradas
en 2007. En esta oportunidad logró constituirse en segunda fuerza política en Vic
(Barcelona) y en Cervera (Lérida).
En las elecciones autonómicas, si bien no ha logrado hasta el presente obte -
ner representación parlamentaria, PxC ha logrado sextuplicar su caudal electoral.
De ser representativa de sólo el 0.15 por ciento de los votos autonómicos en 2003, ha
logrado recibir el apoyo del 2.42 por ciento de los sufragantes en 2010 (Ministerio
del Interior).
La mayor capacidad de influencia directa sobre las acciones del gobierno ha
sido ejercida por PxC en el ayuntamiento de Vic, donde la alianza gobernante de
centro izquierda,8 en una jugada política destinada a no perder votos frente a PxC,
impulsa y aprueba la prohibición del empadronamiento a todos los inmigrantes
irregulares que residiesen en la jurisdicción. La decisión provocó, por pedido de
las autoridades municipales, el estudio, por parte de laAbogacía del Estado, de su le -
galidad. Al mismo tiempo, el proceder del gobierno de Vic originó una discusión
mediática sin precedentes sobre los derechos de los inmigrantes en la sociedad
española en un momento de marcada recesión económica (Abogacía del Estado).
A pesar de que los informes jurídicos del Estado español desestimaron la via -
bilidad de la aplicación de una decisión semejante,9 el gobierno de Vic, presio na -
do por el creciente vigor electoral de PxC y deseando desarticular su influencia
sobre la población, promovió posteriormente el que el ayuntamiento denunciase
a los inmigrantes irregulares que residiesen en su territorio frente a la Delegación del
Gobierno en Catalunya (que cuenta con las competencias de gestión de la inmi -
gración en España). La propuesta, finalmente no aprobada, originó una crisis en el
seno de la alianza a cargo de la gestión de la ciudad. 
Recientemente, las autoridades de Vic exigieron a las administraciones cata -
lana y española, a través de una moción, que los informes de arraigo10 y de reagru -
pación familiar que elaboran sobre sus inmigrantes tengan carácter vinculante en
caso de ser desfavorables (Clota, 2011).
8 El gobierno de esta localidad se encontraba, al momento de acontecer los hechos relatados, a cargo
de una coalición entre Convergència i Unió (centro), Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya (centro
izquierda) y Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya. 
9 Según el informe elaborado por Joaquín de Fuentes Bardají, abogado general del Estado, el empa-
dronamiento de los inmigrantes “procede con independencia de que los mismos tengan o no residen -
cia legal en territorio español”.
10 El arraigo social es la figura jurídica que permite, en España, la obtención de documentación como
residentes legales a todos los inmigrantes que se encuentren en situación de irregularidad durante un
tiempo mínimo de tres años. Para la concesión de esta figura, los aplicantes deben, entre otros requi -
sitos, tener un familiar en primer grado también viviendo en España, o presentar un informe de inserción
social municipal expedido por las autoridades del pueblo o ciudad en el que se encuentran radicados.
462 PABLO NICOLÁS BIDERBOST MOYANO
En lo acontecido en Vic es posible detectar un claro ejemplo en el que los par -
tidos antiinmigración tienen suficiente capacidad para reordenar, desde la oposición,
las prioridades políticas de gobiernos conformados incluso por partidos de izquierda.
Desde el punto de vista de los objetivos electorales, PxC ha conseguido en esta loca -
lidad que éstos se plasmen sin encontrarse a cargo de la gestión gubernamental.
No se preveía cómo reaccionaría el electorado antiinmigración en los co mi -
cios municipales (en mayo de 2011) ante las jugadas estratégicas desplegadas por
la coalición gobernante para bloquear la llegada al gobierno de PxC. Las opciones
parecen ser una de dos: o termina reforzando su voto pro PxC (finalmente, el gobier -
no ejecuta lo propuesto por la agrupación) o traslada su preferencia electoral a
alternativas con mayor arraigo histórico en el sistema de partidos catalán (es decir,
las que supieron operativizar su rechazo a la inmigración).
Conclusiones
Existen registros de procesos migratorios desde tiempos inmemoriales. Tan antiguos
como éstos son los movimientos y actitudes de rechazo a los extranjeros. La ace -
leración y la profundización del fenómeno migratorio que se ha observado en los
últimos decenios han encontrado su eco en la multiplicación, en las sociedades
receptoras, de las propuestas políticas contrarias a la recepción de inmigrantes.
España no ha sido la excepción a esta regla histórica. En un periodo relati va -
mente corto de tiempo (los quince años transcurridos entre 1995 y 2010), el núme-
ro de inmigrantes radicados en su territorio ascendió desde un millón a 5.7 millones
de personas. Ello condujo a que los movimientos y partidos políticos antiinmi -
gración adquiriesen una renovada visibilidad. En los últimos años, la irrupción de
la crisis económica y el hecho de que la tasa de desempleo se ubique en valores en
torno al 20.33 por ciento aceleraron el nivel de apoyo social recibido por este tipo
de agru paciones (Instituto Nacional de Estadística).
Sin embargo, en la investigación a la que refiere este artículo, no se ha en con -
trado suficiente evidencia empírica para afirmar que el incremento en las tasas de in -
migración y de desempleo se correlaciona con el ascenso de la fuerza elec toral de
partidos como Democracia Nacional y Plataforma per Catalunya. Estos indicadores
de las llamadas teorías del agravio deberían ser probados con otros procedentes del
universo de las llamadas teorías de la estructura de la oportunidad para observar pro -
bables efectos conjuntos sobre el apoyo electoral de partidos antiinmigración.
La correcta identificación de los factores que propician el surgimiento de sen -
timientos antiinmigración constituye no sólo una inquietud de tipo intelectual sino,
a su vez, representa una herramienta con la cual se mejora el diseño de políticas pú -
blicas dirigidas a gestionar adecuadamente los procesos migratorios y a amortiguar
sus impactos negativos en las sociedades de acogida. Este terreno del conocimien-
to conforma un fértil campo de diálogo entre académicos y hacedores de políti-
cas, con miras a un único objetivo: la promoción de la paz social y la desactivación
de conflictos actuales y potenciales en escenarios migratorios.
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